

the Armenians

in the
Late
Ottoman
Period



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THE ARMENIANS
in the Late Ottoman Period

Edited by
TÜRKKAYA ATAÖV

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TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ
KÜLTÜR, SANAT VE YAYIN KURULU BAŞKANLIĞI
ANKARA-TURKEY

Fax: (090) 0312 420 66 16

E-mail: kultur.sanat@tbmm.gov.tr

*To the memory of all who lost their lives during
the clashes in the late Ottoman period, which
is the subject of this book, and also to the
Turkish diplomats assassinated by terrorists*

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Robert Frost, the American poet, wrote in one of his poems, that two roads diverged in a wood, and that he "took the one less travelled by, and that has made all the difference". The chapters in this collective volume provide the reader with information, documents and arguments, less utilised but nevertheless that make all the difference in the treatment of Armenian-Turkish relations, especially in the year 1915. A group of academics and other interested researchers who contributed individual articles selected a three-member board of advisors one member of which assumed the functions of editor, collected the written material, assigned translators to render the Turkish ones into English, read and summarized submitted papers, wrote this editor's note, drew up the conclusions stressing only the opinions shared by all the contributors, prepared a balanced bibliography, not exhaustive but informing the reader of further possible references, and added an Index as well as the short write-ups of the contributors.

The editor who prepared this volume for publication (and the two other members of the advisory board) diligently refrained from making changes in the texts that would alter the meaning but restrained themselves to suggest some modifications to avoid excessive repetitions and to secure a degree of uniformity in footnotes. Even then, individual authors were left free in their choice of drawing their own frames of reference and style of writing. Hence, a degree of repetition or variance in quotations and footnotes.

The articles are listed to conform to a chronological order of relations between the Turks and the Armenians ending with the contribution of the editor who prepared this volume for publication. A great majority of the contributors are academics, some being emeritus professors, and a few others who dealt with this particular issue in their careers.

Ömer İzgi, the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the author of published selected legal texts in the capacity of a former practicing barrister, contributed the first

article by way of "Introduction" to this book, summarizing the overall relations of the Turks with the Armenians within the framework of the Ottoman experience. Reminding the reader of the Ottoman tradition of religious tolerance, the writer observes that it was the ethnic churches, initially, of the Balkan peoples, and later, of the Armenians which were used as vehicles for nationalist movements. He correctly supports the view that the founders of the Turkish Republic were neither uninformed about nor insensitive to the events of the last quarter of the 19th century and the second year of World War I. The revolutionary leadership, with its motto of "Peace at home, peace in the world", simply stressed the future, not the past, of the Turkish people. Neither did it educate the new generations in vindictiveness or irredentism, nor did it join the revisionist powers in the international arena. It is no coincidence that an experienced legal expert no other than İzgi underlines that Republican Turkey was one of the very few host countries indeed, which offered a safe haven to the European liberals and democrats fleeing persecution, brutality and death. While the Turks put the past to rest, various Armenian groups, certainly outside Turkey, let the one-sided interpretation of memories live and be transferred from generation to generation. The number of victims on one side only was thus increased to hundreds of thousands and eventually to millions, without proper reference to the violence and bloodshed that the Armenians had earlier caused. The Turkish arguments, in terms of evidence and publications, were however unavoidable in response to the renewal of Armenian terrorism. İzgi introduces the genesis of the topic, which is the bloody Armenian rebellion in the Van province during the war, which left no alternative to the Ottoman Government but to relocate those citizens deemed disloyal, rebellious and murderous. The author, who happens to be a prominent lawyer and the Speaker of the Turkish Parliament, introduces this book as an evaluation of the Turco-Armenian events in the late Ottoman period.

Nejat Göyünç, Professor of History, takes up an often-neglected aspect of Armenian-Turkish relations, namely their cultural interactions throughout centuries, stretching back even to the pre-Ottoman period. He canvases various fields of shared achievement in poetry, folklore, architecture, music, theatre arts, and journalism. Concrete evidence of such close cultural interaction helps to draw an image quite distinct from, and even

contrary to the superficial but more widespread image of the so-called "terrible Turk" or the "meek Armenian", but offers a wealth of clues to the two peoples who may be described as soul brothers for centuries, in spite of the difference in confession of faith. It was the tolerance, expressed through daily life no less than numerous official *fermans* (edicts), throughout the overwhelming part of the history of our relations, in the multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-racial Ottoman atmosphere in which the talents of all, be Abhaz, Armenian, Bosnian, Circassian, Gagauz, Greek, Jewish, Levantine, and a host of others, were cradled that explain the existence of different cultural groups. It was this environment and training that encouraged and enabled Armenian architects, Jewish doctors or Greek ambassadors to attain self-expression freely. It was this climate of recognition and applause that maintained and enriched the positions of these peoples within the all-embracing Ottoman world.

Yılmaz Öztuna, the author of voluminous works on general history, highlighted the political milieu when the "Armenian question" became more or less internationalized. Its starting point is naturally the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War and its dismal consequences for the defeated Turks. The Armenians as well as the Turks felt that the "psychological tent" of the hitherto largely secure Ottoman state was shaken very badly. Part of the Armenian leadership started to search for new alternatives of security, and even of survival. Their search, increasingly through foreign support and resort to arms, for an independent or autonomous administration on land where the Armenians formed only a minority, eventually led to clashes with the government and the Muslims forming the majority in the same area. The author reminds the readers that the same Armenian circles carried out assassinations of leading Muslim figures, led several uprisings, and even shed the blood of their own folk with whom they happened to disagree.

Justin McCarthy, Professor of History, compares Armenian, Ottoman and Russian statistics on population and arrives at endurable conclusions as to the actual number of Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of the six *vilâyet*s (provinces) of eastern Anatolia, İstanbul and Edirne. The author, who considers the Ottoman population statistics as reliable data on the Armenian minority as well, convincingly underlines that the Armenians nowhere constituted the majority. Describing the Armenian

Patriarchate statistics as "pure invention", he reminds that such spurious figures, often quoted as accurate even today, were not drawn from any actual count. The unreliable Armenian estimates, not only broke down the "Muslim" category into various groups, even including "sedentary" and "nomadic" Kurds, no one else but the Ottoman Government counted the Muslims. Refreshing our memories on the basis of dependable documents and meticulous calculation, the author persuasively argues that more Armenians were migrants than were resettled, and that many more Muslims also became forced migrants. Putting the Armenian loss into perspective, he notes that the Muslims suffered especially in the war zones, which saw the greatest conflict between Muslim and Armenian civilians. He correctly notes that the mortality in Anatolia was the product of total war, during which no crops were harvested, and disease ravaged populations. All shared starvation and sickness. Those who emphasise and elevate the mortality of one group, the author notes, should not ignore the mortality of the other.

Hüseyin Çelik, presently a Member of Parliament from the Turkish Van province and a former Associate Professor of Literature, relates the fateful events of Van, his hometown, in the crucial year of 1915, on the basis of the witness accounts by the surviving Turks. A "son of the soil", the author offers extensive quotations from recorded statements of the original inhabitants of that province which went through an ordeal of treachery and bloodbath in the hands of Armenians, whose weapons were procured by Russian agents. This attack on the defenceless quarters of the city triggered the government's decision to remove the combatant Armenian population operating so close to the front. It is essential to appreciate the military fact that the resort to arms to force by civilian Armenians, the ensuing cold-blooded slaughter of many of the Muslim inhabitants and the flight of the remaining ones activated the central government in İstanbul to take immediate measures to protect its armed forces and civilians under siege. It should not be overlooked that the Armenian use of arms was not a response to an order to resettle them elsewhere; quite the contrary, it was their insurgence and onslaught on other groups of Ottoman citizens that set in motion the process of relocation. Çelik's quotations from eyewitnesses, interviewed some years ago, describe the provocation of the Russian Armenians,

Armenian use of various kinds of weapons including artillery, and the exodus of the Muslims.

Yusuf Halaçoğlu, the Director of the Turkish Historical Society, dwells on the reasons that compelled the Ottoman authorities to resettle the bulk of the Armenian population, especially those close to the eastern war front. Utilizing first-hand authentic Ottoman documents, he elaborates on crucial facts, still not widely known in non-Turkish circles but which nevertheless make an altogether different story of the whole episode. It is essential to grasp, realistically, and in justice to both sides, not only the justifications behind the transfer decision, but also the precautions against abuse, which could not be totally prevented. The author's meticulous treatment of the subject, as perfect as it can be within the confines of an article, once more, justifies the decision and determines the absence of will on the part of the Ottoman state and government to annihilate any Armenian group. He convincingly analyses the purpose of resettlement, the conditions of transfer, official measures against possible attacks, the reality of resident Armenians, the official and public effort to solve the difficulties encountered, and the order to terminate the relocation. The author argues that there is absolutely no authorization, directive, law, edict, mandate or permission, or even a hint emanating from the official circles that the lives of Armenians are to be brought to an end. There are orders, on the other hand, prohibiting the members of the gendarmerie even to talk to Armenian women, for fear that the former may abuse their positions. According to the writer, the great bulk of the 450,000, or more, of the people moved southwards, actually reached their destinations. It was no other than the Ottoman courts that tried and convicted those guilty of criminal acts.

Enver Konukçu, Professor of History, concentrates on the mass graves of Turks killed by the Armenians between 1915-1920. The author was the responsible scholar who supervised and conducted the excavations on such mass graves, witnessed by a group of historians, Turkish and foreign media representatives, local officials, the sons and daughters of survivors and other interested people. Guided by the statements, photographs and other documentation left by General Kâzım Karabekir, on active duty in the eastern front at that time, as well as several eyewitness accounts, the author, an experienced historian, led excavations in seven areas in the present-day provinces of Erzurum, Kars and

Van. He underlines that there exist many more such mass graves in other regions of eastern Anatolia, where new excavations need to be carried out. The Turks, whose remains such as bones and worn-out pocket Qur'ans were unearthed, had been bayoneted, shot or burnt wholesale in village barns. These findings constitute part of the abundant proof of Armenian readiness in shedding Muslim blood.

Stanford J. Shaw, Professor Emeritus of Turkish History, uses material from the archives of the French Ministry of War in the Chateau de Vincennes in Paris and from the archives of the Turkish General Staff and the Prime Minister's archives in Turkey to show how France abused its occupation in south-eastern Turkey following the First World War, dressing Armenian soldiers in French uniforms and using them to ravage Turkish villages in "Cilicia" (Çukurova and its vicinities) and slaughter Turks between the years 1919 and 1921. He cites the reports of the Legion's French officers to show that after they first tried to send the Legionnaires to guard railroad tracks, and that after the Armenian soldiers refused to go on the grounds that they had come to Turkey only to kill Turks, the Armenian Legion was officially dissolved by the French Government. The author shows that the outrages committed by the Armenian Legion in the name of France, came at a time when the invading Greek army, sent to occupy İzmir, was also advancing far beyond the limits of its "authorization" in south-western Anatolia, burning Turkish towns and villages and killing Turks and Jews with the intention of forcing them to flee, substituting Greek refugees in order to create a homogeneous Greek population majority to justify permanent occupation of the area. These outrages led to the Turkish national resistance (1919-22) and the Lausanne Peace Treaty.

Ömer Turan, Associate Professor of History, dwells only on the Armenian issue during the Lausanne Convention (1922-23), which replaced the defunct Sèvres Treaty (1920). The author notes that a United Armenian Delegation, composed of the representatives of the newly-formed Republic of Armenia and of the Armenian National Deputation, was present almost throughout the conference lobbying for some kind of an "autonomous" Armenia in eastern Anatolia or at least a mere mention of a "national home" in the final official text at the end of the deliberations. General İsmet (İnönü), the head of the Ankara Delegation, stated that the living conditions of Turkey's minorities would be ameliorated but that

foreign interference in the form of provocations from abroad ought to come to a standstill for the benefit of all concerned. While the Armenian spokesmen did their best to remind the victorious Allies that the Armenian minority was an active combatant in the Caucasian front (in collaboration with Russia), in the so-called "Cilicia" in and around Adana (in partnership with the French) and in the Sinai and Palestine armed conflicts (in conjunction with the British), the Turkish side suggested that the representatives of the extensive Muslim world (for instance, those in India and North Africa), constituting clear majorities in certain regions, may also be heard in the Lausanne Conference. As the U.S. representative in the same meeting clearly expressed, some Allied states crudely used the Armenians for their military and political objectives on the one hand, and indulged in burlesque shows to satisfy their own aroused public opinion and Armenian lobbies on the other. Having pushed the Armenians into battle and caused bloodshed, they now felt the need, at least, to pay lip service to the idea of a national home for their pawns. Convinced that they cannot hope to be granted nothing more than an independent state in the Caucasus, the author records that the Armenian representatives abandoned the conference.

Süleyman Seyfi Ögün, Professor of Political Science, reminds the reader that the Ottoman Empire, which arose in the wake of the dissolution of the Roman legacy in Europe, converted the deeply rooted traditions and institutions into Islamic terms and sought to create a *Pax Ottomana*. Dwelling on the *millet* (religious group) system, the author explains the subtle Ottoman techniques to secure peace and harmony. It was under this system that each community, including the Ottoman Armenians, enjoyed the right to maintain their religious, cultural, judicial and professional traditions. He describes the behaviour of Armenian leadership in 1915 as a "fifth column" posture and distinguishes their relocation from the Jewish Holocaust.

Gündüz Aktan, former Ambassador, persuasively argues that there is sufficient material on the events of 1915 to prove that the circumstances of resettlement cannot be accepted as genocide. Analyzing the Genocide Convention (1948) in terms of what it entails and what it excludes, the author examines the four protected groups, the components of the criminal act and the concepts of objective and motive. Discussing whether or not these criteria apply to the case of the Ottoman Armenians, he reaches

the following conclusions: The Armenians should be described as a "political group" deeply involved in armed revolt. The Ottoman Government entertained no notion of exterminating its minority. General war conditions, hostile climate, and rampant contagious diseases took many Armenian and Turkish lives. The obvious impotence of a disintegrating state cannot be described as an intention or even neglect of duties. It was no other than the Ottoman courts that convicted 1397 persons, a great majority of whom received capital punishment. He proves that the whole episode beginning with the search for a solution of the revolting Armenians in the province of Van to the end of the resettlement cannot be made to fit the conditions of the Genocide Convention.

Türkkaya Ataöv, Professor of International Relations, challenges the effort of some Armenian authors and their supporters to link the events of 1915 with the Jewish *Holocaust*. He contends that the two events cannot be compared in terms of origins, extensive body of opinion, circumstances and results. Describing the antisemitic trend in Nazi Germany as thoroughly ideological, racial, coherent, official, juridical, total and expansionistic, the author reminds that Hitler's Third Reich created an antisemitism unparalleled in history. The national state being based on the idea of race as the final criterion, not only refused to absorb even the best Jewish elements, but planned wholesale murders, organised and carried out officially by the government or party leadership. It embraced all realms of life and did not limit the act to the subjects of the Third Reich. Nazi antisemitism is properly described as genocide. Jewish experience with the world, and especially the events encountered during the Nazi period being far different from Turkish relations with the Armenians throughout history, the author argues that it was the Turks who first recognized (1461) the Armenians as a separate religious community and who appointed an Ottoman Armenian as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the crucial year 1913. He also relates that groups of Armenians were resettled mainly on account of their association with violence during war, an attribute totally absent in the Jewish case in Germany.

The paragraphs above are short summaries of the chapters that will follow. Although the editorial policy was to maintain some uniformity in appearance, especially in footnoting, the contributors, accustomed to their own style of writing, were left free to express themselves. Hence, a degree of dissimilarity was

unavoidable. Some contributions had plenty of sub-titles and some none. Further, different authors employed the words deportation, resettlement, relocation or transfer, all meaning the removal of the Armenians, especially those residing close to the war fronts, to the southern parts of Ottoman lands to guarantee more security for the fighting Turkish armies.

Similarly, various contributors spelled the name of an Armenian political party, the Dashnagtzoutiun, in different ways. The editor adopted the "Dashnag" version, the closest to Western Armenian; it could be "Tashnak" in Eastern Armenian. "Hinchag" is probably closest to the original Armenian pronunciation, with the important difference that the sound of the "i" is like the Turkish equivalent without a dot. Perhaps, "Sasoun" or "Sassoun" is more suitable than Sason or Sasun. The same applies to the Treaty of San Stefano (Ayastefanos, Ayos Stefanos, Yeşilköy) or to Nubar (Noubar). The Turkish names of places, cities and persons are reproduced here as they are spelled in modern Turkish. However, some proper names, such as the Ottoman Empire (not *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*) are written as they are in English. 'İstanbul' with a dotted capital 'İ', and 'İlca' without dots, however, appear in Turkish form, in order to conform to other names that could otherwise sound unintelligible.

A bibliography is added under the title of "Additional References". It was bound to be selective for reasons of space. Some new material is included as well as sources whose contents are not shared by the contributors to this volume. Apart from three bibliographies by leading Armenian researchers, some exceedingly pro-Armenian and highly influential publications by people such as the U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau have also been added. Although unfairly one-sided, the impact of the Morgenthau book has few equals. Initially serialized in the largest newspapers and magazines, it was reprinted over and over again, becoming a key source for a number of others including Pastor Johannes Lepsius. But our bibliography includes other sources which prove, on the basis of the Morgenthau collection of papers, that two Armenian secretaries and the skilled hand of a popular American writer were more responsible for the book signed by the American Ambassador who relied on rumours passed on to him by the same Armenian interpreters.

Our bibliography also includes Aram Andonian's book, published in 1920 in three languages, referring to the so-called "official Ottoman documents" supposedly demonstrating the existence of genocide. Turkish scholars have already proved that the "Andonian documents" are counterfeit. Full of various factual mistakes, omissions and contradictions giving its Armenian author(s) away, there was no attempt even by the British and their Allies to make use of them when they were searching Ottoman and other archives for evidence to convict 144 Turkish leaders detained in Malta for this reason. Further, Turkey being a pluralistic society where all opinions are expressed, our bibliography includes also Turkish sources, diverging from the mainstream, but mentioned along with scholarly criticisms of the same publications, on grounds of contradictions and lack of documentation.

Our bibliography lists numerous publications on Muslims massacred by the Armenians, the bloodbath taking place before as well as after the relocation. Such printed works on the massacre of Muslims in Adana, Bitlis, Erzurum, İçel, Kars, Muş, Sarıkamış, Urfa, Van, Yeşilyayla, and in several other localities cannot be overlooked or minimized. Our bibliography also includes publications by prominent Armenians, who proudly announce, as a glorious saga, that they fought against the Turks on several fronts, but who provide us with irrefutable confessions justifying resettlement.

Our thanks go to a group of men and women who translated the Turkish texts of Göyünç, Öztuna, Halaçoğlu, Çelik, Konukçu, Turan, and Aktan, into English, and especially to Prof. Talât S. Halman, one of Turkey's leading poets who rendered the pieces of poetry (in Göyünç's article) into English in iambic meters.

The editor's special thanks should also go to Vahit Erdem, the experienced Secretary-General of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and his able aid, İbrahim Birler, and to some of the secretarial staff of the Council of Culture, Arts and Publications as well as the craftsmen of the Turkish Historical Society's printing house, which possesses modern facilities.

TURKS AND ARMENIANS: THE OTTOMAN EXPERIENCE

If one seeks to characterize the six hundred year history of the Ottoman Empire (1299-1923), i.e., to define the Ottomans' *Weltanschauung* relative to their treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, the first word that comes to mind is toleration. In an early-modern world sharply divided by religion, the Ottoman attitude of tolerance towards peoples of all faiths seems remarkably modern. When Catholic Spain expelled her citizens of the Jewish faith and gave her Muslim inhabitants the choice of conversion or death, it was the Ottoman Empire, which opened its doors to tens of thousands of persecuted refugees. In fact, this was not an isolated phenomenon. In the following centuries, the Ottoman doors were thrown open to a wide variety of groups including Russian Old Believers, who refused to conform to the orthodoxy imposed by Peter the Great, and Polish refugees fleeing their homeland following the 1848 Revolution. In short, throughout its history, the Ottoman Empire remained a haven for religious and political refugees.

This policy of toleration was not without its costs for the Ottoman polity. Many scholars have noted that had the Ottomans followed a policy of forced assimilation and forced religious conversion (as they are mistakenly portrayed in much of Western literature as having done), they would have eliminated those very seeds of destruction that were to be fanned in the 19th century by currents of nationalism which emerged from the French Revolution. Stated differently, had they not guaranteed religious freedom to all the subject peoples and, instead followed a policy of forced conversion to Islam, by the beginning of the 19th century there would have been a band of Turkish-speaking Muslims stretching from the shores of the Adriatic Sea to the Indian Ocean. Nor would this have been an atypical pattern of behaviour in an era when European and North American Christians were busily spreading throughout the world their missions of conversion.

This, however, was not the Ottoman approach to the rule of subject peoples. To the contrary, the Christians and Jews of the Ottoman Empire were encouraged to preserve their own religious and social institutions. Consequently, it was the ethnic churches of the Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians, and, later Armenians, which were to serve as the vehicles for the nationalist movements of all these Ottoman subjects.

This Ottoman tradition of religious tolerance did not die out with the empire. When the persecution of the German Jews began in the 1930s, hundreds of Jewish scholars were invited to Turkey where they were provided employment and a safe haven throughout the period of the *Holocaust*. Likewise, Turkish officials in Europe and Turkey were responsible for the rescue of thousands of Jewish refugees fleeing from Nazi persecution. Though relatively unknown in the West, this Turkish sense of hospitality, extended to visitor and refugee alike, is an aspect of the Turkish character well known to anyone who visits Turkey today.

It is against this historical background that one must measure the Turkish reaction to the claims that their forebears perpetrated 'genocide' against their Armenian citizens in the course of the First World War. For a people justly proud of their long history of religious and ethnic toleration, these claims strike into the very essence of the Turkish character as, on the one hand, patently ridiculous, and, on the other, as totally unjust.

In short, today we face a situation where large segments of Western public opinion have come to accept as genuine a version of history disseminated by former citizens of the Ottoman Empire, which bears little relation to the actual realities of the past. How did this situation develop, and what are the actual facts of the matter in question? These are the questions we must answer.

There can be little doubt but that the failure of successive post-World War I Turkish governments to respond to Armenian allegations has led to the current situation, i.e., for close to eighty-five years the Armenian version of Turco-Armenian history enjoyed an unchallenged audience in Western Europe and the United States of America. This occurred, not because Turks had no answer for these allegations, but rather as a conscious policy of the founders of the fledgling Turkish Republic, one of the many nation-states to emerge from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the

First World War. This attitude, perhaps best expressed in the well-known dictum of Mustafa Kemâl Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic: "*Peace at home, peace in the world*", stressed the future of the Turkish people, rather than their past. It did so for very specific reasons. A glance at the population of the newly founded republic in 1923 serves to illustrate this point. In 1923, close to a quarter of the inhabitants of Anatolia were refugees, Muslims, who as a result of the ever-increasing series of Ottoman military reverses culminating with the First World War had left their homes and all they owned in areas which today comprise parts of southern Russia, the Caucasus, the Crimea, Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, etc., and fled to the heartland of the Ottoman state, Anatolia. Nor had their losses been confined to material goods. Millions of Muslims, most of them Turks, had been killed as a direct result of the nationalistic fever that attacked Ottoman territories in the decades between 1880 and 1923. All this suffering had culminated, with the Greek invasion of Anatolia in 1919 and the large-scale massacres of civilian populations, which accompanied it. This threat, overcome only by the complete mobilization of the Anatolian Muslim population, had created wounds and scars of enormous proportions among the survivors of this carnage. To heal the traumas thus created, Mustafa Kemâl and his associates consciously downplayed the sufferings of Turks at the hands of their former countrymen. The scope of this effort can be gauged by an examination of the contents of the history textbooks used in Turkish schools during the 1920s and 1930s. One may search long and hard to find any references to the well-documented Turkish suffering throughout this period. It is as if there was a conscious attempt to downplay any and all Turkish claims to former territories of the Ottoman state, even regions that had been part of the Ottoman polity for hundreds of years. Instead, the focus was always on the boundaries of the republic as established in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and upon the future of the Turkish people.

As a corollary to this policy, an attitude of ignoring the claims of former Ottoman peoples outside the confines of the newly created state was also adopted. This was particularly true relative to the claims of the Armenians. These claims, however, did not fall on deaf ears in the West. Frequently packaged in a manner to appeal to Western prejudices, i.e., in Muslim versus Christian wrappings, they continued to circulate. Ironically, while having

little effect on the Westerners they were designed to influence, they had a major impact on subsequent generations of young Armenians. Indeed, with the passage of time, young Armenians in the Middle East, Western Europe and the United States began to accept as 'historical fact', what their forebears had promulgated as 'political propaganda'. Gradually, the nature and scope of such Armenian allegations grew in volume as well. Thus, the post-World War I Armenian claim that 600,000 Armenians had died in Anatolia during the war (this was the figure presented by leading Armenian spokesmen, such as Boghos Nubar Paşa, at the Paris Peace Conference), grew to a million, then a million and a half and, on occasion, even as high as two and a half million. One can not help but speculate that this growth stemmed from the fact that the *Holocaust* of about six million Jews in Western Europe during the Second World War was viewed by Armenians as having been a pivotal event in the establishment of the state of Israel, i.e., that Armenian propagandists may have deemed their own failure to realize their territorial ambitions as resulting from the fact that the 'scope' of their suffering was not sufficiently large to appeal to a Western audience accustomed to thinking of losses in the millions. Whatever the reasons, Armenian claims, unchallenged throughout the post-war period by Turkey, continued to expand.

Ultimately, these claims began to bear a deadly fruit. While failing to generate the desired effect among non-Armenians, they served to radicalize several groups of young Armenians in the 1970s. Misled by their elders into accepting propaganda claims as 'historical truth', these youth turned to terrorism as an outlet for the frustration they felt over the world's failure to respond to their 'cause' in what they deemed to be an appropriate manner. Throughout the second half of the decade of the 1970s and the early 1980s, several Armenian terrorist organisations struck out wildly at a wide variety of Turkish targets. Close to forty Turkish diplomats, most of who were not even born at the time of the alleged events, were assassinated in the name of 'justice for the Armenian cause'. While some felt a twinge of sympathy for the misguided perpetrators of these atrocities, the same cannot be said for their elders who knowingly sowed the seeds of lies and deceit, which bore the fruit of terrorism. While the perpetrators of the actual violence may be viewed as victims themselves, those who created the milieu that fostered them are as guilty of the crimes

they committed as if they had wielded the weapons of assassination.

What were the results of this terrorism? In addition to the human suffering it was responsible for, it created a certain interest in the Western media (an interest which the elder generation of Armenian spokesmen were quick to take advantage of), i.e., it created media opportunities for Armenian leaders to repeat their allegations against the Ottoman Empire on the television screens of North America and Western Europe. To the extent that these media opportunities may have exposed a larger number of non-Armenians to the Armenian 'claims', the senseless assassinations are indeed viewed by certain Armenian circles as having contributed to the overall aims of the 'Armenian cause'.

It was in another area (one totally unanticipated by the terrorists or their spokesmen), that the most important results of Armenian terrorism were to bear fruit. Namely, the unprovoked violence led to a Turkish revaluation of the 'policy of silence' in the face of Armenian allegations, a silence that had existed for over seventy years. For the first time, awareness began to develop in Turkish academic circles, as well as governmental circles, that the Turkish policy of ignoring Armenian charges as unworthy of responses must be reconsidered. What had begun as an attempt to 'bury the past' and thereby close the wounds of the Turkish people in the aftermath of World War I, was being widely misinterpreted (and sold to the Western public opinion) by Armenian propagandists as a tacit Turkish acknowledgement of guilt, i.e., Armenians went so far as to claim that Turkish silence equalled Turkish guilt. This was the *bardağı taşıran son damla*, as is said in Turkish or 'the drop that made the cup run over'. Stated differently, the seventy-year old policy of "turning the other cheek", rather than leading to a healing of past wounds was now being cited in support of the contentions advanced by those who sought *via* violence to keep the past alive. To counter this situation was no easy task. Literally, hundreds of books and articles espousing the Armenian claims (the overwhelming majority of them by Armenian authors) had been published in the decades following the First World War. Anyone interested in the topic of Turco-Armenian history had to search a long-time to find a single study questioning the basic Armenian allegation that their forebears had been the victims of a premeditated 'genocide', planned and carried out by their Ottoman rulers under cover of World War I. Even the neces-

sary infrastructure for scholars wishing to pursue the study of the period was not in place. The vast archives of the Ottoman state, comprising well over one hundred million documents, were largely not catalogued. In particular, those documents from the closing decades of the 600-year Ottoman history were still not-catalogued and, consequently closed to scholars. The process of making these materials available to disinterested scholars was also hampered by the absence of sufficient numbers of archivists trained in Ottoman Turkish (note: Ottoman Turkish written in the Arabic script was replaced in 1928 by the Latin script in which modern Turkish is written), plus a lack of a sufficient budget to allow the archives to employ additional staff. In the past twenty years an infusion of funds has radically altered this situation for the better.

Today, the Ottoman archives (known as the *Başbakanlık*, or the Prime Minister's Archives) are housed in a newly-built modern facility, several hundred additional staff have been trained as cataloguers, and close to 20,000 documents specifically relating to Turco-Armenian history during the First World War have been catalogued and are currently available to all scholars. Numerous volumes of these documents, with facsimiles of the original texts and translations into western languages, have been published under the editorship of archivists and Turkish experts on Ottoman history. In short, the foundations for the study of the real history of Turco-Armenian relations have been laid, and it is now up to scholars from all nations to reconstruct the actual history of the events in question. Turkey's political leaders have filled their responsibility to the past. The next step, that of utilizing these materials for the writing of an accurate version of the history of the period, must rest in the hands of scholars who are specialists in the study of Ottoman history. While politicians may well figure in history, and while they clearly have a debt to ensure that the raw materials out of which it can be written are made available to qualified experts, they have no function in its writing. The judgment of history is for others to make. In this case, for those scholars whose professional expertise encompasses the history in question.

Already, in the past two decades, a number of distinguished Turkish and foreign scholars have ventured into the hitherto uncharted waters of Turco-Armenian history. In this respect, names such as Türkkaya Ataöv, Nejat Göyünç, Kâmuran Gürün, Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Heath W. Lowry, Justin McCarthy, M. Kemâl Öke,

Şinasi Orel, Stanford J. Shaw, Salâhi Sonyel and Süreyya Yuca, come to mind. In the writing of this introductory essay I have benefited enormously from the pioneering studies penned by these experts, as well as from the opportunity to discuss the issues involved with several of them personally.¹ I feel the resulting profile to be a general outline of the parameters within which what will ultimately be accepted as the history of Turkish-Armenian relations is beginning to develop. What is emerging may be summarized under the following topic headings.

Background to Turco-Armenian History

As any student of the history of pre-Turkish Anatolia is well aware, the Armenian inhabitants of eastern Anatolia have had a long and troubled history. Situated primarily in the rugged mountainous areas of eastern Anatolia directly astride the invasion routes in and out of the region, the Roman, Persian, Byzantine, and Seljuk Empires successively ruled what Armenians traditionally call their 'homeland' prior to the establishment of Ottoman administration in the area in the 16th century. Under each of these ruling states the Armenian fate was similar. They served as mercenaries guarding the highlands, and as a reservoir for manpower. To illustrate this role, a case study of the part played by Armenians under Byzantium is germane. Divided by conflicting interpretations of Christianity (Armenians were Monophysites, i.e., they emphasised the 'divine' nature of Christ at the expense of the 'human', whereas the Orthodox Byzantine view was that in Christ there had occurred the union of the 'human' and 'divine' natures), repeated conflicts occurred throughout Byzantine history as the state attempted to enforce ecclesiastical union on the unruly Armenians. This state of affairs was to culminate in the mid-11th century when Kakig Bagratouni refused in 1065 to submit to union. He declared war on the Greek clergy and population of Anatolia and slew the Archbishop of Kayseri. He himself was killed before he could fulfil his announced intention of joining together with the invading Turkish forces.

A few years later, the Greeks of Sivas (Sebasteia) complained to the Emperor Romanus IV that they had suffered more from the Armenians than from the Turks, and the Byzantine leader was forced to take great care to ensure that the Armenians did not

¹ I am especially indebted to Professors Türkkaya Ataöv (International Relations) and Heath W. Lowry (Turkish Studies). My thanks to both.

attack his armies. Indeed, when the Seljuk Turks established their initial foothold in eastern Anatolia via a decisive victory over Romanus IV at the Battle of Manzikert (Malazgirt) in 1071, they did so aided by the fact that all of the emperor's Armenian troops, as a result of religious animosity, deserted to a man on the field of battle.

Ironically, in light of later history, whenever the Byzantine rulers felt particularly threatened by the Armenians of eastern Anatolia they frequently resorted to a policy of forced resettlement, i.e., deportations, in an attempt to control their Armenian subjects. This phenomenon, particularly in the 10th and 11th centuries, resulted in the transfer of large numbers of Armenians into central Anatolia and along the littoral of the Black Sea coast in the Trabzon (Trebizond) region.

It is no exaggeration to state that Armenians played a not unimportant role as mercenaries in helping to establish Turkish rule in Anatolia. Armenian contingents served first in the Seljuk armies and later joined with Timur in defeating the Ottomans at the Battle of Ankara in 1402.

With the entry of the Seljuk Turks into Anatolia any Armenian claim of ruling in the eastern highlands came to an end. By the late 11th century, a number of Armenian princely families and their retainers had migrated south into the Cilician plains (Çukurova) where they established a series of border states which remained in conflict with the Syrian Mamelukes until the Ottomans incorporated the area in the second decade of the 16th century under Selim I.

Ottoman-Armenian Relations: 14th-15th Centuries

In all likelihood, the first real contacts between the Ottoman Turks and Armenians occurred following the conquest of Bursa in 1326, i.e., with the Ottoman acquisition of this key (Bithynian) Byzantine city that is known to have had a sizable Armenian community. The Armenian element in the Ottoman population was to further expand in the 15th century with the incorporation of the Byzantine capital of Constantinople (İstanbul) and the Black Sea coastal region of Trabzon into the Ottoman polity. In the following years as the Ottomans increased their hold over central Anatolia, the Armenians of cities such as Konya, Kayseri, and Sivas likewise joined the Ottoman state.

This sequence of events is highlighted in order to stress a key factor which is generally overlooked in the history of Turco-Armenian relations, namely, given the fact that during the first two hundred years of their history, the Ottomans encountered Armenians only as a numerically insignificant element spread thinly throughout the urban centers of their ever-expanding state. From the outset Turco-Armenian relations took a different form than Ottoman relations with conquered subject peoples in the Balkans. In the case of the Balkans, Ottoman rule necessarily consisted of a thin veneer of a ruling class superimposed over a predominantly non-Turkish Christian subject people. Be these subjects Greeks, Bulgarians, Rumanians, or Serbs, they were to remain a majority, or enjoy a plurality, of the local populaces to the end of empire, while the Turkish-Muslim ruling class was always a minority, though substantial, in the Balkans.

In contrast, a far different situation existed in Anatolia, much of which had already been under Turkish/Muslim rule for two centuries prior to the advent of the Ottomans on the scene of history. Here, the Ottomans inherited a well-established version of the classical system of Muslim rule in connection with the non-Muslim 'peoples of the book', i.e., Christians and Jews. According to the tenets of this system, non-Muslims who submitted to Muslim rule were to be treated with kindness, and their religious beliefs were to be protected by the Muslim ruler.

It is against this background that we must examine the relations between Turks and Armenians that developed in the 14th through the 16th centuries. Tradition affirms that by the mid-15th century the Ottoman ruler Mehmed the Conqueror established an Armenian Patriarch (religious head of the Armenian community) in his newly conquered capital İstanbul. Further, among the peoples he ordered brought to repopulate the shell of Byzantine Constantinople were Armenians from throughout central and western Anatolian towns and cities. These Armenians, together with Turks, Greek-Christians, and Jews, formed the ethnic blend of Ottoman İstanbul, remnants of which may still be seen in the city today.

Indeed, in the resulting amalgam of 'ethno-religious' groups that came to comprise the Ottoman body politic, the Armenians were to occupy a special place. The signs of this relationships, while too plentiful to be enumerated in their totality here, were

many: perhaps the most significant was that, alone of all the Ottoman subject peoples, a majority of Armenians (while retaining their religion) became predominantly 'Turcophonic', i.e., spoke Turkish as their first language. According to 19th century missionary reports, perhaps half of the Armenian population of Anatolia spoke only Turkish.

Another factor setting aside the Armenians from their fellow Christians in the Ottoman Empire was that they alone were exempted from the *devşirme*, or periodic conscription of rural subject Christian boys into the *Kapı Kulları* (Janissary Corps). These exemptions may well have stemmed from the point made earlier relative to the nature of early Ottoman-Armeno contacts, i.e., in the 14th century when this Ottoman institution was developed, the Armenians under Ottoman rule were primarily an urban population.

Key to our understanding of Turco-Armenian relations in the period of the 14th-15th centuries is recognition of the fact that during their climb from frontier emirate to world empire, the Ottomans never conquered any territories 'claimed' by Armenians. In point of facts, throughout this period those Armenians who did become Ottoman subjects did so as a minority population in regions added to the Ottoman domains at the expense of initially Byzantium, and later, of other Turkish emirates that replaced the Seljuk authority in Anatolia.

Turco-Armenian Relations in the 16th Century

It was with the Ottoman conquest of the Arab heartlands of the Islamic world, under Selim I in 1516, that Ottoman Turks and Armenians first came into contact with one another on the battlefield. However, they did so not as enemies but as allies, for the petty Armenian rulers in south-eastern Anatolia supported the Ottoman armies in their war against the Mamelukes of Syria, with whom these same Armenian dynasties had long been fighting.

Throughout the preceding half a millennium, the so-called Armenian homelands, the highlands of eastern Anatolia, had been more or less continuously devastated by a never-ending series of wars, invasions and raids. The initial entry of the Seljuks had been followed by the Mongol invasions, which in turn were supplanted by the conquest of Timurlenk in the late 14th and early 15th centuries. Then, the *Türkmen* dynasties of the Black and White

Sheep carried out their quarrels with negative demographic consequences in the region. Throughout these centuries, large numbers of the Armenian inhabitants had been depleted through death, emigration, and enslavement. More importantly, their place had been filled by enterprising Kurdish tribes from the south and south-east who entered the region turning it into an area as much Kurdish as Armenian in population. This was the status quo when Selim I added eastern Anatolia to his realm in the second decade of the 16th century. Here too, he did so, not by defeating Armenian armies, but by his victory over the Persian Safavids at Çaldıran in 1514.

In short, a thorough search of the pages of history fails to establish any Ottoman expansion at the expense of anything resembling Armenian states, kingdoms or principates. To the contrary, the establishment of Ottoman suzerainty in areas where Armenians represented an element in the local population, far from representing a disruption in Armenian life, restored a stable central authority within which Armenians together with the other inhabitants were able to flourish and prosper.

Turks and Armenians as Citizens of the Ottoman Empire

Any attempt to come to terms with Turco-Armenian relations within the context of the Ottoman state must do so within the framework outlined above. That is a framework shaped by the historical realities of the period in question, rather than one viewed through the prism of 19th and 20th century Armenian nationalist rhetoric. It is also within this framework that we must weigh the validity, or lack thereof, of the Armenian claim that the Ottoman Turks who lived side by side with their Armenian neighbours for close to six hundred years suddenly decided to carry out a policy of racial extermination against their fellow citizens.

To make this evaluation we must weigh the claims of Armenian nationalists against the facts of the situation. First and foremost in this respect is the charge that the Armenians were a persecuted and mistreated non-Muslim minority in a Muslim polity that simply had no ability to tolerate such 'unbelievers'. Contrary to this assertion is the fact that the urban Armenian communities expanded and prospered as a result of the toleration and freedoms granted them by the Ottoman rulers. Indeed, over the centuries, they gained a status unequalled by any ethnic group (including, it might be argued: Turks) in the eyes of the sultans. It was as a

reflection of the special status enjoyed by this community that the oft-repeated title of 'the loyal community' (*millet-i sâdıka*) was frequently used in Ottoman sources to describe the empire's Armenian population. Nor was this situation one that flourished in the 16th century at the apex of Ottoman power and then completely disappeared by the 19th century. To the contrary, it was in the 19th century that a whole series of Ottoman Armenian families were to rise to prominence in the service of the state. Names such as the Duzians who held the key position of superintendents of the Ottoman mints, the Dadians who managed the imperial gunpowder factories, and the Balian, the family of architects who built numerous palaces, mosques, public buildings, and garrisons (many of which still grace the skyline of İstanbul today) come to mind when one considers the role played by Armenians in the final century of Ottoman rule.

Other Ottoman Armenians rose to prominence as wealthy bankers, merchants, and industrialists but it was in governmental service that this community was to make its real mark. The scope of Armenian contributions in this regard may be judged by the following breakdown of 19th century Armenian office holders:

- * Twenty-nine Armenians achieved the highest governmental rank of *paşa* (civilian generals);
- * There were twenty-two Armenian governmental *nazırs* (ministers). Among the posts they held were the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Trade and Posts;
- * Numerous Armenians headed governmental departments concerned with a variety of functions including agriculture, census, and economic development;
- * In the post-1876 *Meclis-i Mebûsân* (Parliament) there were thirty-three elected Armenian representatives;
- * In the provincial administrative apparatus there were literally hundreds of Armenian officials at all levels;
- * In the Ottoman diplomatic service there were a total of seven Armenian ambassadors and eleven Consul-Generals and Consuls;
- * In the academic community there were eleven Armenian university professors.

Far from being subjected to discrimination, relative to their numbers in the total population, Armenians may be said to have

enjoyed a favoured status in the 19th century governmental service.

It was in the cultural arena, however, that the full extent of Turco-Armenian symbiosis was to manifest itself. In the spheres of music, the performing arts, and the plastic arts Turks and Armenians developed a common cultural tradition. So deep was this co-operation that it is almost impossible to discuss Ottoman music, opera, or the performing arts without emphasizing the key role played by countless Armenians in their developments.

Again, this was not a tradition that disappeared with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Even today, Turkish music, arts, theatre, and photography all benefit from the contributions of members of Turkey's about 80,000 Armenian citizens.

Likewise, in the urban crafts and trades Turks and Armenians worked side by side. One only has to look at the surnames of prominent Armenian-Americans today (almost all surnames of western Armenians are Turkish in origins) to recognize this fact. As a case in point we may cite the name of California's former Governor George Deukmejian, i.e., in Turkish: George, son of the foundry man.

In short, within the framework of the Ottoman city Turks and Armenians lived and worked as one people. It can even be argued that in some areas of life Armenians benefiting from the traditional Ottoman attitudes of toleration enjoyed a favoured position.

As for the rural countryside, here too, Armenians were on parity with their Turkish neighbours. Both lived in poverty, both suffered from the exactions of the ever-hungry tax collectors, both were looked down upon by their city cousins. Here, however, the Armenian peasants enjoyed two very important advantages over their Muslim neighbours. First, their exemption from military service in return for a nominal tax. In the last century of Ottoman rule when being drafted into the military meant an enlistment of some ten years, and when the mortality rate in the Ottoman army was extremely high, this was a not insignificant advantage. Second, and perhaps even more important throughout the course of the 19th century, an ever-increasing number of foreign missionaries, consular officials and travellers began to interest themselves in the 'plight' of the Armenian peasant. Unfortunately for their equally destitute Muslim neighbours, no such foreign intervention operated on their behalf.

Stated differently, at a time when no one, Turk or foreigner, interested themselves in the plight of the Muslim peasants, a whole variety of sympathetic Christian voices were increasingly making themselves heard on behalf of the poor, persecuted rural Armenians.

No one can deny that the lot of peasants in the 19th century Ottoman Empire was far from pleasant. While not as harsh as that of the Russian serf to the North, when measured by the standards of the late 20th century, Ottoman peasant life was harsh enough. One can and must, however, deny the allegation that Armenian peasants enjoyed a worse fate than that of their Muslim neighbours. Both suffered equally, the only significant difference being that voices of indignation were raised on behalf of the Armenians while the plight of the Turks remained unsung.

It is against this background that we must examine the fate of the Ottoman Armenians in the period between 1860 and 1923, which may be described as an era of collapse.

Armenian Nationalism and the Ottoman Collapse

While a detailed analysis of Turco-Armenian relations in the half-century preceding World War I is outside the scope of this paper and indeed must await the writing of a number of scholarly monographs by experts in the 'fields', it is possible at this time to set forth in skeletal form the parameters within which these questions must ultimately be approached.

Key to our understanding of the problem at hand is recognition of the effect upon the Ottoman psyche, of the steady loss of territories and consequently revenues, resulting from the pattern of successful Balkan nationalist uprisings throughout the course of the 19th century. One by one, long-held Ottoman provinces such as Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria underwent separatist nationalist movements, each of which contributed to the further weakening of an already crumbling empire. The pattern of these uprisings were almost monotonous in their similarity to one another: a resurgence of national feelings, the origins of which are traceable to the various national churches; claims of Ottoman oppression, which were designed to secure the sympathies of a Christian Europe, were invariably couched in terms of Muslim persecution of innocent Christian peoples; organisation of revolutionary nationalist committees, each of which ultimately

utilised selective terrorism against Muslim targets knowing full well that the cycle of massacres and counter-massacres thus inspired would serve to buttress their claims of persecution; European support in the form of political pressure *vis-à-vis* the weakened Ottoman Government on behalf of the national group in question; armed uprisings, generally also with the support of one or another European state against Ottoman authority; Ottoman defeat with the consequent suffering of the Muslim inhabitants of the region in question; the ultimate establishment of a new nation-state in what had long been Ottoman territory; and finally, the retreat into Anatolia of thousands and thousands of embittered Turkish Muslim survivors, again eventually adding up to millions, each of whom had experienced first hand what was meant by the granting of national rights to Ottoman Christian subject peoples, namely: widespread death, suffering, and financial loss for the Muslims of the region.

This recurrent cycle of successful Christian nationalism and subsequent Turkish suffering could not help but scar the psyches of, not only those who experienced its effect first hand, but also of those who witnessed the steady stream of homeless refugees who descended initially on Istanbul and then ultimately found their way to other regions of Anatolia. In short, by 1880 there can hardly have been a Muslim in Anatolia who was unaware of what was to be expected when a subject Christian ethnic group gained their 'independence'. The pattern had been established, and all the players knew the rules.

Significantly, throughout this period of upheavals one, and one alone, of the Christian ethnic groups in the empire remained largely unaffected by the rising tide of nationalism: this was the *millet-i sâdika*, the faithful Armenians. Three factors seem to have contributed to this situation: (a) the commingling of Turks and Armenians which existed in almost every city and town of the empire, i.e., the *de facto* geographically dispersed nature of the Armenian people, which meant the lack of a homogeneous population base in a specific region of the state; (b) the relatively economic well-being of the 'urban' Armenian population, which shared a common culture and language with the Muslim Turks; and, (c) the integration into the Ottoman ruling class (the bureaucracy) of large numbers of Armenians between 1850 and 1880. In short, the fact that large numbers of the educated urban Armenians had reason to be satisfied with the *status quo*.

This was a fair approximation of the prevailing situation up to the decade of the 1890s. While throughout the period of the *Tanzimat* (Reform era) there were numerous Armenian voices raised with demands for improved conditions and a lessening of measures viewed as restrictive, these were the same kind of demands being made on behalf of the empire's Muslim population as well. That is, the Armenian desires were formulated as part and parcel of the same sentiments found in all segments of the population and, rather than assuming a nationalist guise, they fell under the category of a demand for increased human rights.

It was with the creation of two revolutionary Armenian committees, the Hinchag Committee formed in Geneva, Switzerland in 1887, and the Dashnag Committee, organised in Tiflis (Tbilisi), Georgia in 1890, that Armenian national aspirations began to assume the more classical form which the Ottomans had come to know and fear in the previous half-century. From the outset both the Hinchags and the Dashnags adopted 'terror' as a primary tactic in their struggle, the ultimate aim of which was the 'liberation' of the Armenian 'homeland' of eastern Anatolia from Ottoman rule. In retrospect, one factor emerges which seemed to have preordained the efforts of these youthful revolutionaries to ultimate failure: namely, their inability to comprehend the demographic reality that what they viewed from a historical perspective as the 'Armenian homeland', was, by the end of the 19th century, the 'homeland' for a great many peoples the absolute majority of whom did not happen to be Armenians. This lacuna, an awareness of which is markedly absent in all the published 'revolutionary' writings of the period, meant that tactics developed in the Balkans (where the Christian ethnic groups had been a majority in the territories they sought to 'liberate' from Ottoman rule) were doomed to fail when applied in a region where the ethnic group in question was but a Christian minority in a Muslim sea.

A second factor, which seems to have escaped the youthful revolutionaries, was the build up of fear that the earlier Balkan nationalist movements had engendered in the Ottoman body politic. This fact, in conjunction with the stark reality that the Armenian revolutionaries sought the liberation of not a far-flung appendage of the dwindling Ottoman territories, but, rather a significant piece of the Ottoman homeland of Anatolia, likewise, does not seem to have entered into the calculations of either the Dashnags or the Hinchags.

Yet another element missing from their calculations was a comprehension of the fact that a growing spirit of Turkish nationalism was beginning to take root among certain segments of the Ottoman population, in particular among the ever-swelling refugee groups. Increasingly, these efforts were focusing on a vision of Anatolia as a Turkish homeland.

Blindly, the Armenian revolutionaries embarked on the precedent established by their earlier Balkan counterparts. Propaganda and terror were the two key elements in this already proven successful formula. Attacks on Ottoman officials (including Armenian ones), isolated strikes against Muslim villages, forming of armed revolutionary cadres throughout Anatolia, were all implemented with the desired result. In the face of these activities, Muslims struck out blindly in response, and the revolutionaries gained fuel for their anti-Turkish propaganda efforts in Europe and North America. Gradually, the stage was set for the next act of the drama: European intervention on behalf of yet another poor, persecuted Christian minority—'the victim of untold atrocities as a result of their religious beliefs at the hands of fanatical Muslim Turks'.

There was, however, one miscalculation of the Armenian revolutionaries yet remaining: specifically their failure to factor into their equations the outbreak of what was to become the First World War. This event, more than any other single miscalculation, was to signal the collapse of Armenian nationalist aspirations *vis-à-vis* the Ottoman state.

In the decade preceding the beginning of the war, the Dashnags, who had emerged as the most significant of the Armenian revolutionary committees, had been working hand in hand with the Young Turks, i.e., the *İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress), the very group now ruling the state, and likewise the proponents of the growing spirit of Turkish national consciousness. In short, these two groups of revolutionaries knew one another very well. Prior to the outbreak of the war in August of 1914, the Young Turk leaders met with the Dashnags in the eastern Anatolian city of Erzurum in an effort to gain their pledge of support when war did come. Contrary to their pledge of not to act against Ottoman interests, a secret Dashnag party congress held two months earlier had already determined to use the anticipated conflict as an opportunity to mount an all-out

attack on the Ottoman state. In the words of the Armenian historian, Louise Nalbandian, the Armenian revolutionary committees considered that "[t]he most opportune time to institute the general rebellion for carrying out the immediate objective was when Turkey was engaged in a war".²

Indeed, in keeping with this plan, no sooner had Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire, than the official organ of the Dashnag's *Horizon* declared that the Armenians had taken their place on the side of the Entente states without showing any hesitation whatsoever. It added that they had placed all their forces at the disposition of Russia, and they had also formed volunteer battalions.

Nor were the Dashnags merely talking. When in March of 1915 the Russian armies began their invasion of eastern Anatolia, the Armenians of Van rose against their state on 11 April 1915. It was this armed rebellion, which led to the Ottoman decision to relocate Armenians away from the war zones. Within weeks of the Van uprisings, the genesis of the relocation plan is seen in a secret communiqué on 2 May 1915, from Enver Paşa, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, to Talât Bey, the Minister of the Interior:

"The Armenians around the periphery of Lake Van, and in other regions which are known to the governor of Van, are engaged in continuous preparations for revolution and rebellion. I am of the opinion that this population should be removed from these areas and that this nest of rebellion be broken up.

"According to information provided by the commander of the Third Army, the Russians, on April the 20th, began expelling their Muslim populations by pushing them without their belongings across our borders. It is necessary, in response to this action, and in order to reach the goals that have been outlined above, either to expel the Armenians in question to Russia or to relocate them and their families in other regions of Anatolia. I request that the most suitable of these alternatives be chosen and implemented. If there is no objection, I would prefer to expel the creators of these centers

² Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: the Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1975, p. 111.

of rebellion and their families outside our borders, and to replace them with the Muslim refugees pushed across our borders".³

The importance of this document should not be overlooked, for it clearly establishes that the purpose behind what became the Ottoman decision to collectively relocate the Armenians was one based on military and security needs and not an attempt to annihilate the Armenian population of Anatolia.

Was there reason for the Ottoman authorities to fear the spread of the Van uprising? Indeed, there was. The Russian army units, which were advancing at that very moment towards Van, were accompanied by Armenian units led by the former Ottoman Parliamentarian representing Erzurum, Karekin Pastirmacıyan (Gareguine Pasdermadjian), who now assumed the revolutionary name of "Armen Garo". Other Armenian parliamentarians, including Hamparsum Boyacıyan (Hambartsum Boyajian) and Yetivart Papazyan, were likewise leading Armenian guerilla forces in eastern Anatolia.

It is important to recollect at this point that the Ottoman decision to close the offices of the revolutionary committees throughout the towns and cities of Anatolia was likewise taken in the aftermath of the Van uprising. Just two weeks after the beginning of the Armenian rebellion in Van, orders were issued on 24 April 1915, to close the committee headquarters and to arrest the leaders of these groups.

Yet another month was to pass before the suggestion advanced by Enver Paşa, relative to relocating Armenians away from the war zones was implemented, that is, before the transfer of people began.

One thing should be clear at this point: the relocations and the resultant human suffering which ensued stemmed not from a "premeditated plan for the extermination of the Armenian inhabitants of Anatolia", as is repeatedly alleged by Armenian propagandists, but as a direct result of the activities of several groups of misguided Armenian revolutionaries, chief among whom were the Dashnags. Ironically, it is the political descendants of these same Dashnags, who, still today propagate the Armenian claims of

³ *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi* (Journal of Military History Documents), 81 (December 1982), Document No. 1830.

"genocide". There can be little doubt that their intent in so doing is partially designed to cover the enormity of their own crimes against their fellow Armenians.

Was there no Ottoman guilt in the resulting fate of the Anatolian Armenians? Perhaps, there was. But not the guilt of having designed and carried out a planned "genocide" of their Armenian citizens; it was the guilt of not having been able to protect *all* Ottoman citizens, including all Muslim groups, during the carnage of the First World War. Certainly, in retrospect it is easy to fault the Ottomans for having ordered the relocation of several hundred thousand Armenian civilians at a time when they had neither the manpower nor resources to ensure that they safely reached their intended destinations. Likewise, they may be faulted for having embroiled the Ottoman state in a world war, without having the necessary means at their disposal to ensure that hundreds of thousands of Muslim and Christian inhabitants alike were fed, were not subject to cholera and typhus epidemics, etc. However, in retrospect, one thing is clear: enormous numbers of Anatolian Muslim and Armenian non-combatants lost their lives in the years between 1915 and 1923. One cannot focus only on the sufferings of the Armenians while totally ignoring the fate of the Muslims.

In the final analysis, we must insist on viewing the question of Turco-Armenian relations within the context of the political developments of the period. One cannot in all fairness ignore the effects successful Balkan nationalist movements had on the attitude with which the Ottomans responded to what they justly understood to be yet another attempt at ethnic independence. They were likewise aware with the outbreak of World War I that the Ottoman state was engaged in a life and death struggle. Consequently, it is within this framework that we must place the Turkish reaction to the treasonous activities of the Armenian revolutionaries. At times, the Ottomans failed to distinguish between actual revolutionaries and innocent peasants. But this must be weighed against the fact that they were engaged in a world war on about half a dozen simultaneous fronts. Here one can not help but cite the Japanese-American resettlement of the Second World War to illustrate the manner in which even an enlightened 20th century democracy can overreact to perceived threats in wartime. Unlike the West coast of the United States in the 1940s, where not a single Japanese-American was involved in treasonous

activities, eastern Anatolia in 1915 was torn by rebellion on the part of large numbers of native Armenians who actively collaborated with the invading Russian enemy. With neither modern means of transport, communication or supply at hand it was easy for officials living in İstanbul to fall back on the traditional Ottoman policy of *sürgün*, forced relocation, as a solution to a political military problem. In the same way these officials ordered hundreds of thousands of Muslim civilians to evacuate the region in the face of the impending occupation (without giving adequate and detailed consideration to such basic questions as how these refugees were to sustain life), they too ordered the deportation of the Armenians. In both instances, the effect upon the deportees was tragic. Death came in many ways: at the hands of pillaging tribesmen, as a result of lack of proper nutrition or simple starvation, and, perhaps most significantly, as a result of repeated epidemics of cholera and typhus which swept the deportee and refugee columns alike. None of these causes of death cared whether their victims were Muslim or Christians, none distinguished between Turk and Armenian.

In closing, we must not lose sight of the fact that two conflicting nationalisms, vying for a single piece of real estate came into conflict in Anatolia during the period of the First World War. In the words of Bernard Lewis, the great contemporary Middle Eastern historian, "it was a struggle, however unequal, about real issues". As might have been anticipated by any objective observer, the winner in this struggle was bound to be the fourteen million Anatolian Muslims not the (less-than) one-and-a-half million Anatolian Armenians. Unfortunately for all concerned, the Armenian revolutionaries who precipitated the foment of rebellion, and henceforth must bear the brunt of the responsibility for its outcome, were neither objective nor observers. They were, as are their ideological descendents today, protagonists who actively sought to implant their skewed dreams on what had been for hundreds of years the *Anatolian homeland of the Turks*.

Ömer İzgi

Speaker
Grand National Assembly
of Turkey

TURKISH-ARMENIAN CULTURAL RELATIONS

Nejat Göyünç

Nations that live under a single administration in the same country for many years or as neighbours are influenced by each other's cultures. Cultural exchanges between societies sometimes even occur among those who reside in faraway lands. There are words that have been unconsciously inherited by our culture from people who have lived in ancient historical periods—elements of clothing, customs and similar things. For example, the Euphrates River originates as the Karasu in the Dumlu Mountains to the north of the Erzurum plain and, after uniting with the waters of the Murat, flows through the lands of Syria and Iraq to the Gulf of Basra (the Persian Gulf), a trip of 2,330 km. The Sumerians called this the "Bu-ra-nu-nu" which carries the meaning of "swift flowing water". This name becomes "Ufratu" in Old Persian, "Frat" in Middle Persian, "el-Furat" in Arabic, and finally "Fırat" in Turkish. The change in this name over the centuries is a typical example of the ancient cultural heritage we have inherited from historical times.¹

İstanbul Patriarch Nestorius (428-431) at the Council of Ephesus (431) propounded the doctrine "Jesus had two identities: human and divine. Because of this Mary is the mother of Jesus, but not of God". Missionaries and traders (Nestorians) who subscribed to these thoughts tried to spread his ideas to Iran, Central Asia and even as far as China; along with their tenets they brought the Syriani alphabet and saw it accepted.

In the 8th and 7th centuries B.C., it has been emphasised that the Greeks benefited from the Egyptian, Phoenician, Assyrian and Hittite cultures and Urartian influence has to be added where the

¹ There are articles on the "Euphrates" in the *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (hereafter *İA*) and the *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (hereafter *DVİA*). For words in Turkish borrowed from Greek, Slav, Arabic and Persian roots, see Andreas Tietze, *Worterbuch der griechischen, slavischen, arabischen und persischen Lehnwörter im Anatolischen Türkisch*, İstanbul, Simurg Yayınevi, 1999.

arts are concerned; the Greek poet Hesiod who lived in these same times wrote a book, **Theogonia**, on the appearance of the gods which was inspired by Hittite sources.²

Turks and Armenians for approximately more than a thousand years have lived sometimes as neighbours and sometimes under the roof of the same government. The first encounter between them was undoubtedly when the Abbasid Caliph Mutevekkil appointed the Turkish commander, Boğa el-Kebir, to suppress a rebellion that had broken out in the province of Ermeniyye³ (851-852).⁴ During the time of the Abbasid Caliph Mu'tasim (833-842), the commanders in the Islamic army who were appointed to the Anatolian front were chosen from Turkish *beys* and chieftains. Aside from Boğa el-Kebir who was the most famous of these, there was also Afşin, Ömer from Ferghana, and so on.⁵ The Seljuks arrived in the neighbourhood of Lake Van first in the 11th century (1015-1021) and, in the aftermath of the Battle at Malazgirt and their victory there (1071) contacts increased in a short time between the two communities and those who controlled Anatolia. There were political relations between the Armenian Kingdom of Çukurova whose center was Sis (today Kozan) and the Anatolian Seljuk state. During the times when the Seljuks were powerful, the Armenian Kingdom was required to give tribute. And in the former's weak periods the Armenians either behaved hostilely or cooperated with their rivals, the Mongols. During the time of the Ottomans, the Armenians were recognized as the loyal community (*millet-i sâdika*), and especially from the 18th century onwards they were assigned important duties.

In this regard, the memoirs of the then German Captain, but later Field Marshal, Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891) who came to Turkey in 1835 are interesting. In a letter dated 9 February 1836, he was a guest in the İstanbul home of War Minister Mehmet Hüsrev Paşa's chief translator Mardiraki. This individual, that is,

² Ekrem Akurgal, **Hatti ve Hitit Uygarlıkları**, İstanbul, İzmir, Tükelmat Yayınları, 1995, pp. 105-106; —, **Türkiye'nin Kültür Sorunları**, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınevi, 1998, p. 68n.

³ This province takes its name from Arminiye, one of three regions that Arab historians called *sugur*. Its main cities were Erzurum (Kalikala), Bitlis, Malazgirt, Ahlat, Ercis and Kemah. Mükrimin Halil Yınanç, **Türkiye Tarihi, Selçuklular Devri: I. Anadolu'nun Fethi**, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1944, p. 26.

⁴ Hakkı Dursun Yıldız, "Abbasiler devrinde Türk kumandanları: I. Boğa el-kebir et-Türkî", **Türk Kültür Araştırmaları**, Ankara, II (1965), pp. 195-203.

⁵ Yınanç, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

"Little Martin", was a wealthy Armenian living in Arnavutköy. Moltke writes: "Basically, it is possible to call these Armenians 'Christian Turks'. They have taken so many things from the customs of the ruling nation and even from its language. Their religion, that is Christianity, permits their taking one woman. But this woman is immediately kept away from view like Turkish women. When Armenian women go out, only their eyes and the upper part of their nose can be seen".⁶ He stayed with this Armenian family for two weeks as a guest and provided information about their life such as: "All of the food is based on lamb and rice in the Turkish style. One of the two of the many dishes offered is certain to be a dessert".⁷

One can see that there are cultural ties between the Turks and the Armenians in regard to language, various artistic fields, a number of customs and daily life. From this standpoint, it is essential to offer the reader some examples and draw attention to them.

Turkish-Armenian Exchanges in Language

The well-known Turkologist Andreas Tietze said: "The Turkish they spoke seemed to them to be more convenient for this purpose and easier," when discussing the use of Turkish in the daily life of Armenians living in İstanbul in his foreword to Vartan Paşa's work entitled **Akabi Hikâyesi** that he acknowledges as the "first Turkish novel".⁸ He also pointed out the difficulties of using Arabic letters, of texts written in an ancient language being read to them in their schools and the problem of expressing the life of their own times in that language. Tietze added, in his foreword, the following:

"If [Vartan Paşa] had written in the archaic Armenian used in church books of that period, no one would have been able to read it comfortably and he himself would not have been satisfied. Given such a situation, he decided to write his book in Turkish. Because his community members who read little found Arabic letters difficult and because the Armenians in Anatolia wrote in Turkish, he used the Armenian alphabet that had been in continual use for a long time; he committed his

⁶ Helmuth von Moltke, **Moltke'nin Türkiye Mektupları**, tr. Hayrullah Örs, İstanbul, Varlık Yayınları, 1969, p. 35.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁸ Vartan Paşa, **Akabi Hikâyesi: İlk Türkçe Roman (1851)**, ed. A. Tietze, İstanbul, Eren Yayınevi, 1991, p. ix.

work to paper and completed it in a form that suited Turkish. In this way, he produced a book that could be read easily and comfortably by Ottoman Armenians".⁹

At the same time, it ought not be forgotten that a book of religious instruction was written in Kipçak Turkish but with Armenian letters. The person who penned this work notes that he had translated it from Latin into "his own different language".¹⁰ Edmond Schütz also published a prayer book. The work was written in 1618 in Lvov and was in Kipçak Turkish but with Armenian letters.¹¹ One sees quite a number of religious, literary and historical works of the same type.

According to Omeljan Pritsak,¹² the total accumulation of works that have been described as Kipçak-Armenian occur in the middle of the 11th century at the end of the Seljuk assaults. When the Armenian Bagratid state in north-east Anatolia was destroyed, the Armenians migrated in big groups and settled in the Crimea. They gave the area such names as Greater Armenia (*Armenia Magna*) and Maritime Armenia (*Armenia Maritima*) in the 13th and 14th centuries. The main cities were Kefe (modern Feodosia), Solhat and Sudak, the last-mentioned a very important commercial center. They were frequently and continually involved in relations with the Kipçak Turks and as a result they appropriated Kipçak Turkish as their administrative and church language; however, they were able to maintain their religion, alphabet and Armenian expressions to a great extent. Some of these migrated again in 1280 on the invitation of Leo I, the king of Galatia and Lodomeria in western Ukraine, and later Poland took them in. Ever since 1496 the main center has been the city of Kamenez-Podolsk.

Edmond Schütz stands on the hypothesis concerning the Armenians settling in the Crimea. Küçük Ioannesow, an educator from Moscow's Lazarev Institute, discovered 150 Armenian gravestones in the Crimea between 1895 and 1896, and he dated the earliest two of these as 1027 and 1047. Schütz notes that it is necessary to make these dates 1357 and 1557 because of mistakes

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. x.

¹⁰ Marian Lewicki and Renata Kohnowa, "La version turque-kiptchak du code des lois des Arméniens polonais", *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, XXI (1957), pp. 153-300.

¹¹ Edmond Schütz, "Armeno-Kipchak Texts from Lvov (A. D. 1618)", *Armeno-Turcica: Selected Studies*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1998, Article 4.

¹² O. Pritsak, "Armenisch-Kiptschakisch", *Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta*, eds., Jean Deny, Kaare Gronbech, Helmuth Scheel, Zeki Velidi Togan, Wiesbaden, I (1959), p. 81.

in the way they were read. According to documents, the Armenians settled in the Crimea between 1280 and 1290. In this too, the commercial interests of the Genoese and the Armenian traders were factors. Armenian businessmen established close commercial ties with Iran and the east *via* Trabzon and in the south through Egypt.¹³

When Fatih Sultan Mehmed conquered the Crimea (1475), it is noted that he sent 40,000 people to İstanbul and of these most were Armenians. One part of the Armenians also moved to Poland and Moldavia. Despite this movement, Chardin, a well-known French traveller of the 17th century, mentions that in 1673 there were 800 Christian families in the Crimea of which a portion were of Greek origin and the rest Armenian. The Armenians were traders, artisans and gardeners. In the years following the Küçük Kaynarca Agreement of 1774 and after the Russians established their control over the Crimea, the Greek people there were forced to migrate to Ekaterinoslav by the Tsarist regime, and the Armenians went to eight villages in Nor Nahchevan and its vicinity near Rostov on the shore of the Don River.¹⁴

This group which was known as the Kipçak Armenians -if they were not members of the Turkish-based Gregorian church-remained under the very deep influence of Turkish culture, and, as Omeljan Pritsak points out,¹⁵ they became a community which kept its religion, alphabet and some Armenian expressions but forgot its mother tongue. Those who migrated to Poland and settled there were catholicized.

Edmond Schütz in a different article notes that nearly 40 of the 100 Armenian magazines being published in İstanbul ever since 1840 used Armenian letters with a Turkish text, on the basis of a book which G. Stepanian published in 1963 in Yerevan (Erivan). Among these were the novels of Xavier de Montepin and Alexander Dumas. In the work by Simeon the same writer registers more than 800 words taken from Turkish.¹⁶ There is likewise evidence for 806 basic words in Turkish that have been taken from

¹³ Edmond Schütz, "The Stages of Armenian Settlements in the Crimea", *ibid.*, p. 199.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 132-136.

¹⁵ Pritsak, "Armenisch-Kiptschakisch", *op. cit.*, I, p. 81.

¹⁶ E. Schütz, "The Turkish Loanwords in Simeon Lehaci's Travel Accounts", *Armeno-Turcica*, IX, p. 307, fn. 2, p. 310. The Turkish translation of the travel account under discussion was made by Hrand D. Andreasyan, *Ermeni Seyyahı Polonyalı Simeon'un Seyahatnamesi: 1608-1619*, İstanbul, Osman Yalçın Matbaası, 1953.

Armenian. One of the main sources for Robert Dankoff who carried out this research is the *Türkiye'de Halk Ağzından Söz Derleme Dergisi*.¹⁷

The Influence of Turkish Literature on Armenian Literature

In an article¹⁸ H[ayk] Berberian (Bérbérian) suggests that the Armenians who lived for many centuries in Anatolia with the Turks and spoke Turkish should be recognized as "turcophone" while those who resided with other peoples in the same way abandoned their own language and spoke that of the others, were a sociological phenomenon. The Armenians who speak Turkish have a literature. This can be separated into the following five categories.

1. The works of the minstrels. There are works composed by more than 400 Armenian saz-poets from the 17th century up to the 1840s. The majority of these works that were played and sung to the accompaniment of the saz were in Armenian and Turkish while a portion of them were in Turkish only. Berberian divides the Armenian saz-poets into three groups - the Iranian, Turkish and Georgian Schools and cites as examples Koroğlu, Aşık Garip, Kerem and Aslı, Şah İsmail and Gülizar, Melikşah and Güllü Hanım, and Hurşid and Mihri. In order to be able to better know some of the minstrels of Armenian origin whose names can only be given by relying on researchers such as Fuad Köprülü, Ahmet Rasim and İhsan Hincer and some Armenian writers, it is necessary to be able to specify what kind of influence Turkish minstrel literature had on the Armenians.

Mesihi was an Armenian who lived in Diyarbakır in the 16th century. According to Aşık Çelebi,¹⁹ this individual who wrote the *talik* script well and poeticized in Persian travelled as a merchant to İstanbul, Edirne and finally, to Venice.

Mirzacan, Raci Damaci²⁰ notes, was born in the Karabağ village of Çanakçı, lived at the beginning of the 19th century and knew Russian, Turkish and Persian well in addition to his native language of Armenian. Fuat Köprülü writes that this individual

¹⁷ Robert Dankoff, *Armenian Loanwords in Turkish*, Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz Verlag, 1995, pp. 8-10.

¹⁸ H. Bérbérian, "La littérature arméno-turque", *Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta*, II, pp. 809-819.

¹⁹ Fuad Köprülü, "Türk Edebiyatı'nın Ermeni Edebiyatı Üzerindeki Te'sirâtı", *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, I (1922), pp. 23-24.

²⁰ "Mirzacan Bey, General Valeryan Grigorovich Medetof", *Türk Folklor Araştırmaları*, I/13 (1950), p. 202.

knew the legends that belonged to the history of mysticism.²¹ Mirzacan praised Turkishness and the Turks in every meeting and as a result ended up in prison because of the slanders of his co-religioners and people. Damaci passes on a poem that he wrote in prison:

There's no one to share grief, no friend for those in woe;
All acquaintances have turned into strangers now.
Fate - you shut me up in a dungeon in the end
And never freed my soul from distress and sorrow.

Sarkis Zeki was born in 1842 in Sungurlu, completed his elementary education in the Armenian school and later continued on to a *medrese*. He held a number of different official positions and died in 1891. Fuat Köprülü writes that he believed this person was also a sincere Bektaşî-Hurufî dervish.²²

When Ahmet Rasim discusses the minstrels he says that Armenians were to be found among them and gives quite a few names: Derviş Hampar, Meydani, Lenkiya, Bidadi, Harabat Haçık, Aşık Şirini, Mihri and Puryani whom he characterizes as the last minstrels of the 19th century. Sevda'i, Saliki, Sabriya, Enveri, Nutkiya, Resmi, Ahteri and Namiya are also among those who were famous for playing and singing.²³

Fikret Türkmen provides information based on the works of Azeri researchers on Turkish folk tales published among the Armenians.²⁴ In one article also he refers to Armenian Minstrel Literature. The Armenian Aşug Emir who died in 1882 has the very meaningful quatrain below:

Our faiths are apart, we are strong brothers:
For our destiny, we share each other's.
United we're a mountain, one arm, one hand;
We're feeble slaves if divided we stand.²⁵

Aşug Emir talks about Turkish and Armenian brotherhood in these lines as if they were deeply involved in friendly relations, in

²¹ Köprülü, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

²² *Id.*, *op. cit.*, p. 27. In addition see: İzzet Ulvi, "Halk Şairi Zeki", *Türk Yurdu*, II, 31, pp. 121-123, Ankara, Tutubay Yayınları, 1999.

²³ Ahmet Rasim, *Muharrir Bu Ya*, İstanbul, Rey Yayınevi, 1927, p. 255.

²⁴ Fikret Türkmen, "Ermeniler Arasında Türk Halk Hikâyeleri", *Atatürk Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Araştırma Dergisi*, 7, pp. 17-23.

²⁵ Fikret Türkmen, "Türk-Ermeni Aşık Edebiyatı İlişkileri", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, III (1982), p. 20.

helping each other and, if separated, easily damaged. How beautifully these lines express that both became great and well off as peoples belonging to two different religions but supporting each other.

Fuat Köprülü praises a work of Arşak Çobanian's entitled **Les Trouvères arméniens** (1906) on "Armenian Aşug (Aşık) Literature". The writer in this book points out the deep and powerful influences that Turkish literature had on Armenian literature. In the Middle Ages in France those who addressed the aristocratic class were known as troubadours. They sang lyric poetry to the accompaniment of a lute. In the East too, the saz-poets recited poetry to the sound of the lute or saz at fairs, weddings, convents, coffeehouses and military parades.²⁶ Fuat Köprülü relates that those who provided information about Çobanian and from him on the Armenian Aşuglar say that those who were blind from birth performed their art at weddings, banquets, holidays or death ceremonies.²⁷

2. Literary Works. Of these Berberian discusses Hohannes who was born in the Diyarbakır village of Tel-Göran (today attached to the Derik district of Mardin) and lived between the 14th and 15th centuries, and in later periods the Armenian poets who wrote Turkish poems in the Crimea and İstanbul. For example, the poem of Pagdasar Dpir (1683-1768) below is attractive in its own way:

My best wishes for long life to those who love me,
For now my friends might as well forget about me.
May their faces always beam with light, happily;
For a while, my friends might just as well forget me.²⁸

There are literary and historical texts such as Vartan Paşa's²⁹ **Akabi Hikâyesi** discussed above among the works with Turkish texts in Armenian letters and published by A. Tietze (Eren Kitabevi)

²⁶ Fuat Köprülü, **Türk Saz Şairleri**, 2nd pr., Ankara, Milli Kültür Yayınları, 1962, I, pp. 55ff.

²⁷ Köprülü, "Türk Edebiyatı'nın Ermeni Edebiyatı Üzerindeki Te'sirâtı", **op. cit.**, p. 3.

²⁸ Bérberian, **op. cit.**, p. 814.

²⁹ Vartan Paşa (real name: Hovsep Vartanian) lived between 1815 and 1879. He was educated in Vienna and worked as the translator and later chief translator at the Saray (Palace) dockyards and in Bahriye (Naval Office). He is an Ottoman intellectual who wrote books entitled **Napoleon'un Hayatı** and **Risale-i Telgraf** and was the editor-in-chief for a time of periodicals like **Manzume-i Efkâr** (1866-1896) and **Tercüman-ı Efkâr** (1878-1884). R. Y. G. Çark, **Osmanlı Devleti Hizmetinde Ermeniler, 1453-1953**, İstanbul, Yeni Matbaa, 1953, p. 173; Bérberian, **op. cit.**, p. 817.

and Tanburi Arutin's **Tahmaskulu Hanın Tevârihi**.³⁰ Kevork Pamukciyan has published articles on books with Turkish texts in the Armenian alphabet in journals such **Tarih ve Edebiyat**, **Hayat Tarih Mecmuası**, **Türk Folkloru**, **Belleten**, **Müteferrika**, **Folklor ve Etnografya Araştırmaları** and **Tarih ve Toplum**.³¹

3. Translations made by Armenians. These are Turkish texts written or printed in the Armenian alphabet. Among these works are Aesop's **Fables**, Cervantes' **Don Quixote** and Daniel Defoe's **Robinson Crusoe**. Friedrich Kraelitz-Greifenhorst, Enno Littmann, Otto Spies and Eugeniusz Sluszkiewicz concentrated on literary works and publications of this same type.³² In Jean Deny and Edward Tryjarski's small article entitled "La literature armeno-kiptchak"³³ the topic of discussion is the written products of the community that lived in Poland and Ukraine. They were called Kipçak-Armenians and produced works in Turkish with Armenian letters. Fikret Türkmen, also, in some of his works aside from those discussed above, talks about Turkish-Armenian cultural relations and especially the influences in the people's and minstrels' literature of these two peoples who lived together or as neighbours for many centuries, and he noted that the first ones shaped what happened to the later ones.³⁴ Since most of the Armenian minstrels, with a few exceptions, are known to have lived in the 19th century, the information that Fuad Köprülü provides indicates that the poet-musicians who travelled in the 13th century among the different classes of people and the migratory tribes with musical instruments called *çöğür* (lute or guitar) in hand and for that reason were called *çöğürçü*. This information never puts in doubt the fact that the Turkish minstrels had existed earlier and had served as the example that shaped and formed the Armenians and their type of literature. Köprülü pointed out that ever since the reign of Murat IV (1623-1640) the minstrels had increased in number and the poems of the famous ones spread and were recited as far as the boundaries of Baghdad and throughout the length of the Danube and Ozi. The 17th century was a golden age for Ottoman minstrels. Bahşi who participated in

³⁰ The text in the Latin alphabet of this work, previously (1800) published in Venice, was printed by the Turkish Historical Society (Ankara, 1942).

³¹ "Kevork Pamukciyan Bibliyografyası, 1956-1996: **Tarih ve Toplum** Dışındaki Makaleler", **Tarih ve Toplum**, 153 (Sept. 1996), pp. 46-47.

³² Berberian, **op. cit.**, p. 818.

³³ **Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta**, II, pp. 801-808.

³⁴ **Türk Halk Edebiyatının Ermeni Kültürüne Tesiri**, İzmir, Akademi Kitabevi, 1992.

the Iranian and Egyptian expeditions of Yavuz Selim, Kul Mehmed (death: 1606), Öksüz Dede and so on are Ottoman minstrels known to belong to the 16th century.³⁵

4. Newspapers and periodicals. Berberian gives a list of this type of publications and registers the publishers and the dates. Among these but aside from the ones in İstanbul, some appeared in Amasya (**Amasia**, 1911-1914), Bursa (**Hüdavendigâr**, 1869), Erzurum (**Envar-ı Şarkıyye** 1867-1877), Kayseri (**Rehber**, 1912-1913), Ayıntap (**Mendor**, 1884) and in some other cities.³⁶

There is another type of Armenian literature that Berberian does not discuss: Armenian satirical literature. The publications in this field are divided into three sections: the *Tanzimat* period (1839-1876), the Young Turk period (1908-1914) and later. In the press of the *Tanzimat* era, the letters are in the Armenian alphabet and the texts in Turkish. This is further proof that the great majority of the İstanbul Armenians used Turkish as their mother language.

According to Anahide Ter-Minassian³⁷ whom I have benefited from on this subject, there were 18 satirical Armenian newspapers in İstanbul between 1908 and 1914. One of these was **Gavroş**. It was published between 1908 and 1914 under this name and later under another name for a short time. Its owner Yervant Toloyan was an Armenian, his father a journalist too. Yervant studied in Armenian schools and at Saint-Benoit. He published his newspaper in Paris between 1925 and 1935. In **Gavroş** he did not hesitate about criticizing, not just Ottoman society and its administrators, but also the Armenian Church, those who served in all of its offices, the hangers-on and the revolutionary Armenian organisations, Dashnag and Hinchag. In 1936, he immigrated to Soviet Armenia and was arrested a few months later. From 1937 onwards nothing further was heard of him.

5. Grave stones. Berberian refers to them very briefly. He notes publications connected with the gravestones with Armenian letters

³⁵ Fuad Köprülü, "Türk Edebiyatında Aşık Tarzı'nın Menşei ve Tekamülü", **Milli Tettebular Mecmuası**, İstanbul, I (1331/1915), pp. 16-22. Also see Fuad Köprülü, **Türk Saz Şairleri**, I-II; ____, "Türkler (Türk Edebiyatı)", **İA**, XII/2, pp. 533, 562-565.

³⁶ Berberian, *op. cit.*, pp. 816-817.

³⁷ Anahide Ter-Minassian, "Ermeni Dergisi **Gavroş**'ta Karikatür ve Hiciv (1908-1920)", **Doğu'da Mizah**, ed., Irène Feoglio and François Georgeon, tr. Ali Berktaş, İstanbul, Yapı ve Kredi Bankası Yayınları, 2000, pp. 115-135.

and Turkish texts (armeno-turc) in Kayseri, Bursa, Ankara, İstanbul, Beşiktaş and Yeni Mahalle.³⁸

Music

Sadun Aksüt³⁹ separates Turkish music into two parts on the basis of the system: (1) "Turkish Music composed of Turkish rules and tunes based on the Turkish system, that is, on Turkish progressions and requiring Turkish sazs or hand-played instruments and Turkish voices. (2) Turkish Music composed using the fundamentals of the Western system, that is, on Western tempo progressions and requiring Western instruments". The writer has called the former "Traditional Turkish Music" in order to differentiate one from the other. There are those who claim that this music has Iranian, Arabic, Greek or Byzantine roots. Hüseyin Sadettin Arel (1880-1955) proves, in his work entitled **Türk Musikisi Kimindir**, that this music is not of foreign origin,⁴⁰ but to the contrary, the aforementioned countries were influenced by this music and abandoned their earlier music systems. Ercümen Berker (born 1920) also says:

"The Turkish music system is one that the Turks brought from Central Asia and developed in the Near East. It was not taken from the Arabs, Iranians or Greeks...This music is presented to us in the city, the palace and the mansion as introductory pieces, composition, vocal music and songs; in the mosque as the call to prayer, prayers, Mevlevi services vocal sections and religious compositions; in the convent as eulogy poems, religious prayer, religious musical service, a form of religious music, hymns and Bektaşî hymns; in the village as folk songs, folk music without a rhythmic pattern, dance music and musical work composed for dancing; on the borders as the frontier folk song; and in the military barracks as military band music".⁴¹

Among the composers too are sultans, statesmen, convent shaihs, palace attendants, members of the Janissary corps, rich

³⁸ Berberian, *op. cit.*, p. 818.

³⁹ **Türk Musikisi**, I, İstanbul, Kervan Yayınları, 1983, p. 7.

⁴⁰ İstanbul, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Devlet Kitapları, 1969. Preface, Dr. Nevzat Atlığ. This work is a collection of 14 articles that H. S. Arel previously published in **Türklük Mecmuası** (April 1939-November 1940), first printing in 1969 in İstanbul (preface: Dr. Nevzat Atlığ), second printing in 1988 in Ankara (preface: Yılmaz Öztuna) in book form.

⁴¹ Aksüt, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

people and landowners and people of Armenian, Greek or Jewish origin.

O angel-face, heart and soul I am in love with you;
Darling, could anyone love you the way I do?
I want you in private for a moment or two:
It's been many days since the last time I saw you.

The song in the Persian-Kurdish style that begins with these lines was taken from a poem by the famous statesman and poet of Mahmut II's reign, Mehmed Sait Pertev Paşa (1785-1837).⁴² The composer Nikogos Ağa (1836-1885) was an Ottoman Armenian born in İstanbul in Hasköy. He took lessons from Hammami-zade İsmail Dede Efendi (1778-1846) and his student Dellal-zade İsmail Efendi (1797-1869). Yılmaz Öztuna,⁴³ speaking of Armenian-language sources such as Kevork Pamukciyan and some Armenian writers and relying on what they told him, notes that Nikogos Ağa also learned Turkish music "because Armenian church music uses Turkish musical lines and rules". Sixty-three songs by this composer who went on to visit the *Mevlevihanes* and sang songs there reached our day and Öztuna in his article gives the tunes and the first verses.

The words of one of Tanburi Nikogos Ağa's *Hicazkâr* tune is by the celebrated Ottoman poet Ziya Paşa:

Soon nightfall will be here and light of day will be all through;
On the riverbank, the shepherd will play his flute, all blue;
You are young and tender, may your creator protect you.
Run and join your herd lest the wolf snatch you,
my lovely lamb;
Come, don't lose your lover, come, my little one, here I am.⁴⁴

It is also understood that he himself wrote the words to some of his songs.

You are the sovereign among all beauties – and
At your door, as a slave of yours I stand:
I beg you, do not let go of my hand.
My master, my sovereign, my sultan,
May my life be sacrificed to you.⁴⁵

⁴² Şerafettin Turan, "Pertev Paşa", *İA*, IX, pp. 554-556.

⁴³ *Türk Musikisi Ansiklopedisi*, İstanbul, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1974, II, pp. 82-84.

⁴⁴ Etem Ruhi Üngör, *Türk Musikisi Güfteler Antolojisi*, I, İstanbul, Eren Yayınevi, 1981, p. 337; Aksüt, *op. cit.*, I, p. 335.

⁴⁵ Üngör, *op. cit.*, p. 494.

One of the very famous Turkish music composers of Armenian origin to whom we have frequently listened with great pleasure on the radio or some television programs is Bimen Şen (1872-1943). The real name of this individual, who was born in Bursa, was Dergazaryan. The fourth son of a priest, his father, mother and brothers, according to Bimen himself who could play the *saz*, did not buy him a single musical instrument, and he did not even know a single note. He had his songs written down as compositions in a single-beat style and later had them scored. When he was eight years old, he began to sing the prayers in the church. Muslim prayer leaders, Qur'an reciters and dervishes began to attend church services to hear his beautiful voice. In 1884 Hacı Arif Bey came to Bursa to hear him, and on his recommendation Bimen, who was fourteen at the time, set out for İstanbul over the opposition of his family. Having had financial difficulties, he found work singing prayers in a church. He himself states that he had more than 600 works.⁴⁶ Some of his famous songs are the following:

I know you are a tiny little thing yet:
My heart fell in love with you, what could you say?
How long will you play coy and hard to get?
My heart is in love with you, what can you say?⁴⁷

* *

Like a river, my life serenely flows away:
My heart is enslaved to an enchanting old flame.
I stand aloof to the changes of night and day:
My heart is enslaved to an enchanting old flame.⁴⁸

* *

Months and years roll by and yet your voice stays afar,
My heart writhes craving you, but who knows where you are.
Should my heart keep telling you over and over?
My heart writhes craving you, but who knows where you are.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ İbnülemin Mahmut Kemâl İnal, *Hoş Seda: Son Asır Türk Musikîşinasları*, İstanbul, Türkiye İş Bankası, 1958, pp. 106-108. I am very grateful to Mrs. Güzin Güreş who introduced me to this work that proved to be very valuable.

⁴⁷ Üngör, *op. cit.*, I, p. 463; Aksüt, *op. cit.*, I, p. 435.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 449; *ibid.*, p. 424.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 387; *ibid.*, p. 370. The words of this song belong to Fazıl Ahmet Aykaç. İbnülemin Mahmut Kemâl İnal liked this song very much, and one evening while Bimen Şen was giving a concert in the theater, he went where the artist was seated and wrote in his memoirs: "Whatever song he wanted, he should openly say so that he could sing

Bimen Şen was also delighted to sing in the presence of Atatürk. His last name (meaning: joy) too has its source in one of his most famous songs.

My face is full of joy, my memory, my circle of friends; a rose-garden is my place

My heart is full of cheer, so are boon companions and compatriots, so are all friends

This soul of mine rejoices at our revelries where we drink to our hearts' content-what else

Drinkers are full of joy, singers and listeners are full of joy, so are friends and strangers.⁵⁰

That Bimen Şen composed three marches has also been noted. The first of these marches, although we could not find their complete texts, is the Çanakkale March (1915) whose first line is "Allies, all of you are even such", the second which begins "Again the enemy is ambushing the homeland I have established", and the third is the *Harb-i Umumi* (First World War) march: "The main war has been declared, the day has broken for the combatants".⁵¹ These lines are evidence of how Bimen Şen had assimilated so much of Turkish culture even while being of Armenian origin.

Bimen Şen relates another memory about Naci Sadullah, the editor-in-chief of *Yeni Gün Mecmuası*. "During a *raka* party Süleyman Nazif wrote this line on a card and gave it to me":

He is the eternal creator of our vocal art;

Praise and kisses to Master Bimen's mouth deep from our heart.⁵²

Patriot poet Süleyman Nazif (1870-1927)⁵³ recognized Bimen Şen as "the immortal arranger of our art of song and master"⁵⁴ and truly praised him since it is clear that Şen must have shared in the

it for him right away". At his request, he executed a very lovely performance of this song that he had not sung for a long time. İnal, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

⁵⁰ Üngör, *op. cit.*, I, p. 576; Aksüt, *op. cit.*, I, p. 588.

⁵¹ Öztuna, *op. cit.*, p. 278. E. R. Üngör, *Türk Marşları*, Ankara, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1966, p. 62.

⁵² İnal, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

⁵³ İbrahim Alâettin, *Süleyman Nazif: Hayatı, Kitapları, Mektupları, Fıkraları ve Nükteleleri*, İstanbul, İstanbul Yayınevi, 1933.

⁵⁴ Basically "the art of lamenting" is an art form declaimed in a loud voice. After songs were read in a loud voice Süleyman Nazif felt it necessary to discuss this expression in the form of "the art of song".

feelings that he expressed from his heart in his marches and his patriotic feelings because his songs and compositions are so beautiful.

Of the Armenian composers it is also necessary to remember Kemani Tatyos (1858-1927),⁵⁵ Levon Hancıyan (1857-1947)⁵⁶ and Artaki Candan (1885-1948).⁵⁷ There is significant evidence for how these composers were involved and immersed in Turkish music and Turkish literature. Those like Nikogos Ağa chose the text of his works from Pertev Paşa and Ziya Paşa and those like Bimen Şen from Faik Ali Ozansoy⁵⁸ (1875-1950), Süleyman Nazif⁵⁹ and Orhan Seyfi Orhon⁶⁰ (1890-1972).

Hamparsum Limonciyan (1768-1839) who was from Harput on his father's side but was born in İstanbul, was supported at an early age by an Armenian jeweler family, the Düzyans.⁶¹ He participated in the music world at the Düzyans' *yalıs* at Kuruçeşme and as well at the Beşiktaş *Mevlevihanesi*. He attracted the attention of one of the greatest Turkish composers Hammami-zade İsmail Dede (1778-1846). He wrote down his musical tunes with the use of certain special signs that were more suitable than what had been used previously. He was admitted to the presence of Sultan Selim III, and with his encouragement he recorded the notes that bear his name.⁶²

Theater

Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, while discussing 19th century Turkish literature, says: "Abdülmecid's curiosity and love for everything coming from the West led after 1840 to the construction of a small Palace Theater, where some plays, operas and operettas were

⁵⁵ İnal, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-282; Öztuna, *op. cit.*, II/2, pp. 308-310.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 215 (Levon Hancıyan); *ibid.*, p. 249.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 75; *ibid.*, p. 121.

⁵⁸ Üngör, *op. cit.*, I, p. 221. "Come, my heart's ruin. Don't you know what sorrow is? Don't the ignorant know quite what the heart's sweetheart is?" *Hicaz* song.

⁵⁹ Süleyman Nazif's poem that begins "I spilled my pain on the ocean, I moaned to the skies" was used in Bimen Şen's composition for the *Bestenigâr* tune. Şerif İçli's *Hicaz* composition is more famous. Üngör, *Güfteler Antolojisi*, I, p. 178.

⁶⁰ Bimen Şen again set to music in his *Hicaz* tune a poem that began with the lines "I wonder are you cheerful, do you have a fate - how distressed I am, do you feel it?" Üngör, *op. cit.*, I, p. 207.

⁶¹ For the Düzyan family, Çark, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-64.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 188-189; Öztuna, *op. cit.*, I, p. 248.

performed".⁶³ Basically, the first opera in Ottoman lands was in the 18th century performed by Armenians in the Eflâk Palace nearly thirty years after its first performances in Italy.⁶⁴ Mahmud II was interested in the theater and had the texts of up to 500 theatrical works brought to the Palace Library in 1836. The two amphitheatres built in 1838 in İstanbul were filled with viewers despite high prices, and the palace supported these activities. In 1843 a part of the Valide Sultan Palace was turned into a theater where Donizetti's opera "Belisario" was performed.⁶⁵

The İstanbul Armenians began to be involved in theatrical activities starting from 1810, and presentations were made in the homes of some rich Armenians and in certain schools. The first theater in İstanbul (Şark Theater, Beyoğlu) opened in 1861. A theater building was constructed in İzmir at the same time. While the first plays were in Armenian or a foreign language, with time, works in Turkish that attracted more customers became important.⁶⁶

When the Şark Theater was closed in 1876, the famous artist Agop Vartoviyan (Güllü Agop,⁶⁷ 1840-1902) worked in a variety of other companies. He got permission to open theaters in Gedikpaşa, Bağlarbaşı, Beyoğlu and Tophane and to stage works in Turkish there.⁶⁸ This individual later on was appointed to the palace, and he became Yakup Efendi, voluntarily becoming a Muslim. He established an important first in Turkish theater history. These artists, who were Armenian writers and players in the beginning, became the leaders in establishing and developing the Turkish theater in later years.

Architecture

In the Ottoman state in the 15th and 16th centuries, among the imperial architects the chief architects like Ayas Ağa (death,

⁶³ Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, *XIX. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 2nd pr., İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1956, p. 118.

⁶⁴ Andreas Tietze, "Nuovi dati sui primordi dell'opera in Turchia", *Il Veltro*, XXIII-XXIV, pp. 363-369.

⁶⁵ Metin And, *Tanzimat ve İstibdat Döneminde Türk Tiyatrosu, 1839-1908*, Ankara, Türkiye İş Bankası, 1972, p. 24.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-52, 113-152.

⁶⁷ Mustafa Nihat Özün, Baha Dürder, *Türk Tiyatrosu Ansiklopedisi*, İstanbul, Remzi Kitabevi, 1967, p. 200.

⁶⁸ And, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-239.

1487),⁶⁹ Davud Ağa (d. 1598),⁷⁰ Mimar Sinan (d. 1588)⁷¹ and Kasım Ağa (d. 1660)⁷² were all *devşirme*; there were Christians but the majority were Muslim.⁷³ It is also known that Mimar Sinan was from the people of Ağırnas village in the neighbourhood of Kayseri. One meets people carrying completely Turkish names among the people of this village because there were those among his own relatives who were named in the same fashion. It has been suggested that he could have been a Karamanlı or to express it in another way, a "Christian Turk".⁷⁴

In the 19th century, a series of Armenian chief architects from the Balyan family stamped their signature on many structures. The eldest of the family, Bali Balyan from the Balen village of Karaman, was appointed to replace an Armenian palace architect whose son-in-law he was. When he died, his son Magar took his place, and this individual was sent into exile in Bayburt at the time of Mahmut I (1730-1754). Magar's son was Krikor (1764-1831) and his son, Garabet Balyan (1800-1866). His children were Serkis (1835-1899), Agop (1838-1875) and Nikogos (1826-1858). The most famous and magnificent of the works of father-son Garabet and Nikogos is the Dolmabahçe Palace (1842-1856) and that of Serkis Balyan is the Beylerbeyi Palace (1861-1865). The architectural works of this family includes quite a few palaces, mansions, mosques, and the like.⁷⁵

Armenians Who Carried Turkish Culture to Europe

It is known that Armenian traders in İzmir in the 19th century established a monopoly in Iranian goods and particularly in the silk trade and they supervised the caravans that came over the Erzurum-Tokat-Sivas-Ankara route; their chief rivals were Turkish traders.⁷⁶ The cultures meshed either through the commercial route or as the result of journeys.

⁶⁹ Zeki Sönmez, "Ayas Ağa", *DVİA*, IV, p. 201.

⁷⁰ Semavi Eyice, "Davud Ağa", *DVİA*, IX, pp. 24-26.

⁷¹ Oktay Aslanapa, "Sinan", *İA*, X, pp. 655-661.

⁷² İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, "Kasım Ağa", *İA*, VI, pp. 379-380.

⁷³ Şerafettin Turan, "Osmanlı Teşkilâtında Hassa Mimarları", *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Ankara, Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi, I(1963), pp. 157-202.

⁷⁴ Nejat Göyünç, "Mimar Sinan'ın Aslı Hakkında", *Tarih ve Toplum*, IV/19 (1985), pp. 38-40.

⁷⁵ Çark, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-75. Pars Tuğlacı, *Osmanlı Mimarlığında Batılılaşma Dönemi ve Balyan Ailesi*, İstanbul, İnkılâp ve Ata Kitabevleri, 1981.

⁷⁶ François Georgeon-Paul Dumont, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Yaşamak*, tr. Maide Selen, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 1997, pp. 228-229.

The introduction of Turkish coffee to Vienna by Armenians is a typical example of cultural trade *via* a commercial route. In 1665 Kara Mehmed Paşa was sent to Vienna as the Ottoman ambassador. The embassy was estimated by Evliya Çelebi to be very crowded (268 people). The members of the embassy settled in some guesthouses in the district known as Leopoldstadt, and they regaled their visitors with coffee, *sherbet* and the like. In 1683 following Kara Mustafa Paşa's retreat before Vienna, the bags of raw coffee beans that fell into their hands as booty were thought to be animal fodder because in those days the Viennese still were not acquainted with coffee. In 1697 Sahak Lucasian who was an Ottoman Armenian (and who became famous as Isaak de Luca) opened a shop in Vienna for drinking coffee. It was thus that Turkish coffee was introduced in Vienna.⁷⁷

Conclusion

In language, literature, music and almost every branch of the arts, Turks and Armenians were closely involved with each other, and sometimes in government service, in printing and in press Armenian contribution benefited the Turkish community. The following dedication that R. Y. G. Çark, the son of an Armenian citizen and the author of **Türk Devleti Hizmetinde Ermeniler** (Armenians in the Service of the Turkish State), put in his book is meaningful:

"For the Motherland/Overlooking the Apple of the Eye/a Farewell for the Young/a Thousand Sacrifices for the Country/a Legend on the Mouth/a Saga for All/to the Heroes of the Turkish Land/to the Martyrs of Çanakkale/amongst whom is My Beloved Father".

Is there any other way of expressing more openly than the dedication that Çark, who lost his father in the fighting at Çanakkale (1915-16), wrote on Turkish-Armenian closeness and affection, in other words, the mutual cultural influence? Can one accuse a country of genocide when it did not even hesitate to write down the name of a Greek doctor on the Martyr's List at the battle of Çanakkale?⁷⁸ On the other hand, there were also those who were

⁷⁷ Karl Teply, *Die Einführung des Kaffees in Wien (Forschungen und Beiträge zur Wiener Stadtgeschichte No. 6)*, Vienna, 1980.

⁷⁸ Ekrem Boz, *Adım Adım Çanakkale Savaş Alanları*, 5th pr., Çanakkale, 1998, p. 70 in the list of martyred officers of the 57th Regiment is "Regiment Doctor Capt. Dimitriyoti - İstanbul".

acting against the state among the Armenian officers and doctors serving in the Ottoman army during World War I.⁷⁹

In 1915, the Armenians, some of whom were engaged in activities against the state and living in areas near the battlefields and in neighbouring areas in İstanbul and in Anatolia, were exiled to more secure areas within the Ottoman boundaries of that time. It was not denied that some distasteful events took place then, but one must never overlook that the Turks themselves punished 1,397 people for their unapprovable activities.⁸⁰ While these events are used as pretexts today, it is a duty and responsibility to remind people of what some Armenians did against the Turks during the same period and the baseless accusations and mounting efforts against the Turks later. Following the ceasefire of Mondros (Mudros) on 30 October 1918, what the Armenian Legion that entered Adana and Saimbeyli (Hacin) did while wearing French uniforms caused the revolt even of the celebrated French man of letters Pierre Loti who wrote that the claims of Armenian genocide "were in fact invented by the British (*inventés par les anglais*)".⁸¹ The archival documents have been published in English and Turkish as to how Armenians killed hundreds of thousands of Turks and Muslims between 1906 and 1922 in the Caucasus and in Anatolia and who were the killers, how and where.⁸² The barbaric and inhuman murders and activities that the Armenians carried out in Anatolia have even entered Turkish folk legends and laments. One of these is called the "Lament of Hacin:"

They are the ones that mowed us down that day,
They impaled us on slaughterhouse hooks too.
Let all this be known to Doğan Bey:
They are the ones that raided Urumlu.

Go to sleep, sleep, my son Osman,
A well of blood is what was Hacin village;
We failed to take it though we attacked on:
Sultan's Stream is a token of the pillage.

They flayed Brave Genco:

⁷⁹ Ufuk Gülsoy, *Osmanlı Gayri-müslimlerinin Askerlik Serüveni*, İstanbul, Simurg Yayınevi, 2000, p. 169.

⁸⁰ Nejat Göyünç, *Osmanlı İdaresinde Ermeniler*, İstanbul, Gültepe Yayınevi, 1983, p. 20.

⁸¹ Pierre Loti, *Lettres pour la Turquie ; Türkiye için Mektuplar*, Ankara, Kültür Bakanlığı, 2000, p. 170. Letter dated 5 March 1920.

⁸² *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Kafkaslar'da ve Anadolu'da Ermeni Mezalimi*, 4 vols., Ankara, Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1995-1998.

His flesh is all bruised and burnt;
They murdered the Chief Clerk,
Bludgeoned him to death with their cudgels.

They set up infernal cauldrons
In which they boiled babies;
They rounded up innocent young ladies,
At bayonet point they made them dance.⁸³

In 1920 the Armenians who were members of the French Legion and who came to the village of Doğanbeyli near Kozan and to Hacin burned both of the two settlements and tortured the Turkish people to death in a hideous fashion. The "Lament" above is for Hacin. The following year it was the turn of the Nationalist Forces to surround Hacin for nine months and 'took revenge' on the Armenians for what had happened the previous year. The "Doğan Bey" who is mentioned in the "Lament" is the same person as Capt. Kemâl Bey who was appointed to the command of the Nationalist Forces of this region by Mustafa Kemâl Paşa while he was in Sivas in October 1919.⁸⁴ Armenian massacres did not remain unreciprocated. Every calamity produces a responsive disaster, and the Armenians at times paid the price for the cruelties they perpetrated. Do these kinds of reciprocal events, presented as if only one side carried out a strike, help anything other than satisfying those addicted to one-sided politics? Why not emphasise instead the deep cultural ties between the two peoples? What does it serve to incite enmity and hatred and ignore the mutual influences that have enriched the centuries-old ties? What does it serve to dwell on claims that nourish a policy that the Turks carried out "genocide" against the Armenians and to unilaterally exaggerate sporadic violent events that occurred between the two communities? There is no place in science for attitudes harboring one-sided prejudice to serve unbalanced claims.

⁸³ Ali Rıza Yalman (Yalkın), ed., Sabahat Emir, *Cenupla Türkmen Oymakları*, Vol. I, Ankara, Kültür Bakanlığı, 1977, pp. 80-668; II, pp. 259-260.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, II, pp. 172-174.

THE POLITICAL MILIEU OF THE ARMENIAN QUESTION

Yılmaz Öztuna

The Origins of the Armenian Question

In 1877-78, the Ottoman Empire entered into a full-scale war with Tsarist Russia. It had no allies. Mediation efforts by the Great European Powers were to no avail. It was possible, even easy, to diffuse the situation; and yet, the ambitions, shortsightedness and mistakes of a few Ottoman statesmen had made war unavoidable. The only hope was that Britain, as it had done a quarter of a century previously, would side with the Sublime Porte to prevent Russia from advancing south. When this was not forthcoming either, the only option remaining was to trust that the modern armies and sophisticated navies of the Ottomans would be sufficient to defend against the Russians. Despite some strong offensives and a few important victories, Ottoman commanders mismanaged the war that ended in total defeat.

The war ended with the signing of the Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878), which in effect meant the complete retreat of the Ottomans from the Balkans. As such, it was not acceptable to the European Powers. A conference was convened in Berlin, resulting in the Treaty of Berlin (13 July 1878), which officially ended the Ottoman-Russian War and established a new political equilibrium in Europe.

Only the seven Great Powers attended the Congress of Berlin: Turkey, Russia, Germany, Great Britain, France, Austro-Hungary and Italy. German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, in the zenith of his power and influence, presided over the negotiations. The Congress, sometimes in direct repudiation of the basic articles of the 1856 Treaty of Paris, signed by the same seven states, laid the foundations for a new Europe. The Treaty of Paris had proclaimed the seven signatory states as Great Powers and had denied this status to other nations. Only these seven states could designate ambassadors, and all others had to be satisfied with appointing

only plenipotentiaries in dealing with each other and with the Great Powers. Important nations such as the United States of America, Japan, China and Spain fell into this latter category, although the U.S. and Japan were elevated to the status of Great Powers at the end of the 19th century.

The Treaty of Berlin was the second important step, after the 1699 Treaty of Carlowitz, designed to limit Ottoman influence in Europe. With the 1913 Treaty of London, which ended the Balkan War, the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire had been drawn back from the shores of the Adriatic to the Maritsa River in European Thrace. After the Treaties of Vienna (1815), Paris (1856) and Versailles (1871), the Treaty of Berlin was the last convention of the 19th century to shape the geography of Europe.

Other than the Kingdom of Greece, about a third of the size of the modern-day country, it created three new Balkan states: the principalities of Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, which were severed from the Ottoman Empire to become independent states. Rumania in 1881, Serbia in 1882 and Montenegro in 1913 became kingdoms. An autonomous Bulgaria, with its capital in Sofia, and a semi-autonomous East Rumelia, with a capital at Filibe, were also created within the Ottoman state.

Although these states gained independence and autonomy because of Russia, in terms of foreign policy they leaned towards Germany, France and Britain. Despite huge sacrifices on its part in the war of 1877-78, known in Ottoman history as the "war of '93", Russia did not gain the land and territory it had hoped and, moving away from the Balkans, turned its attentions instead to the Caucasus. Here too, as its border neighbour, it faced the Ottoman Empire.

During the war of '93, the Ottoman Empire, in terms of importance and military strength was classed fifth among the world states behind Britain, Germany, France and Russia. Defeat in the war and huge war compensations meant that it could no longer retain this position. Abdülhamid II (1842-1918), ruling between 1876 and 1909, had taken over complete power from the Sublime Porte. Not only did he suspend the constitutional monarchy and dissolve the parliament, Abdülhamid thereafter ruled the country as an autocrat. In 1878, democratic rule was in place in Britain, France and Italy; in Germany and Austro-

Hungary, despite the existence of upper houses, the rule was autocratic; Russia was fully autocratic, even totalitarian.

Russia's traditional state policy centered on advancing south to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. In the war of '93, it had hoped to reach the Aegean *via* Bulgaria. It now tried to move forward through the Caucasus. For this, it needed to enter eastern Anatolia in order to reach the Gulf of İskenderun, or the Gulf of Basra (the Persian Gulf), then part of the Ottoman Empire. Obviously not feasible to do this outright, it focused its long-range policies, from then on, using the Armenians of eastern Anatolia. To this end, it manipulated with Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty, which exacted reforms for eastern Anatolian Armenian subjects of the state.

Nations in the Last Quarter of the 19th Century

Before discussing the Armenian question, it is worthwhile to look at the political situation in Europe and the world in the last quarter of the 19th century. The world population was 1,326 billion in 1875, 1,491 billion in 1900, and 1,782 billion in 1915. The number of independent states were 58 in 1875, 53 in 1900, and 55 in 1915. The majority of the population was living in villages, hamlets and small towns. In 1875 the urban populations were as follows: 8 cities with over one million, 14 cities between 500,000 and one million, 168 of 100,000-500,000, 192 of between 50,000-100,000. By 1915, there were 25 cities with a population over one million, 50 between 500,000 and one million, and 327 numbering 100,000-500,000.

As one can infer from the number of states compared to today, the world was mostly ruled through a policy of colonialism. The Europeans had divided up Asia, Africa and Oceania between them. The greatest colonialists were Great Britain, France and Holland, followed by Portugal and Spain. Germany, Italy and the U.S. were late in following the trend. Even Belgium had huge colonies in Africa. Russia did not possess colonies as such, but was keen to rule over non-Russian groups. There was no policy of motherland-colony division in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. The Ottoman Government ruled far provinces, such as Bosnia, Libya and Yemen as natural parts of the state.

There were fewer and fewer independent states remaining in Asia and Africa. By 1915, independent states in Asia numbered

Turkey, Japan, China, Iran, Afghanistan, and Siam (Thailand), and in Africa, Ethiopia, and Liberia. Greece had separated from the Ottoman Empire in 1830, and by 1878 it had a population of 1,532,000 and territory extending 51,371 km². Gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, Rumania's population was 5,300,000 and its territory 135,156 km²; Serbia had a population of 1,564,000 and territory of 45,427 km² while Montenegro possessed a population of 180,000 and land measuring 9,427 km².

The United States abolished slavery in 1865, much later than Turkey. Russia and Brazil were even further behind. Europe was leading the world with its hefty accumulation of capital and industry. At the end of the 19th century, oil and electricity were replacing traditional sources of energy. Steam ships totally eradicated sailboats. Telegraph lines and railroads were rapidly criss-crossing the landscape. The telephone went into use in the U.S. in 1876. The Ottomans were quick to adopt these technological innovations but failed in distributing them fully throughout its vast territory. The Ottoman Empire extended across three continents. Although embracing this technology much later than the Ottomans, Japan was in a position, due to its narrow geography, to install it quickly throughout the country.

The first Ottoman telegraphs line between İstanbul, Varna and the Crimea went into operation in 1855. By 1870 it had 36,059 km of line, putting it fifth behind the U.S., Britain, Russia and France. Railroad construction began in the same years with the İzmir-Turgutlu track. By 1875, its railroads extended for 4,632 km, the ninth largest in the world. In the same year, China and Japan had yet to start construction.¹

In this environment, the Ottoman Empire began experiencing problems with its Armenian population, just as it had with its non-Muslim subjects in the Balkans.

The Status of the Armenians

The Armenians were a distinct tribe of peoples from the South Caucasus. They lived under Byzantine rule for six centuries (395-1071), during which time they scattered throughout the Byzantine Empire. Although Orthodox Christian, they were reluctant to enter the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Constantinople.

¹ *Almanach de Gotha*, 1873, p. 869.

This was considered heresy according to the Byzantine rulers, and they were driven from Constantinople. Their highest religious authority is the Armenian Gregorian Patriarch who resides in Echmiadzin in the Caucasus.

From 1071 onwards, they were subjects of the Seljuk Empire. Between the 15th and 16th centuries a majority of all Armenians were living under the rule of the Ottomans. The remainder lived in the Persian Safavid Empire. When Sultan Mehmed conquered Constantinople in 1453, there were no Armenians there. Designing Constantinople as a cosmopolitan seat of power, he resettled some Anatolian Armenians in various quarters of the city. Acting under his title of "Roman Emperor", the Sultan created (1461) an Armenian Patriarchate rather than handing them into the fold of the Ecumenical Patriarch. It is only natural that prayers at the Armenian Patriarchate in İstanbul were offered, from time to time, for the soul of the Sultan, who had created that independent church structure.

The Armenians were a hardworking people, known for their good craftsmanship and financial abilities. They were scattered throughout the state, although nowhere did they make up a majority of the population. During the 1878 Berlin Convention, Armenians of all denominations within the Ottoman Empire numbered around one million.

Some Armenians, particularly in the 19th century, converted to Catholicism from Gregorian Orthodoxy. The Ottoman Administration appointed a Catholic Armenian Patriarch in İstanbul. The Sublime Porte, although not happy with the conversion, did not meddle in the matter: Catholic Armenians were bound to the Pope, and the Pope was constantly provoking the European states against the Ottomans. Moreover, there were millions of other Catholics within multi-religious the state in Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Lebanon, in some areas of Bosnia and Albania and in İstanbul itself.

Although in small numbers, some Armenians in the 19th century, under the influence of Anglo-Saxon missionaries, converted to Protestantism. The Ottomans tolerated this new development and, again, did not interfere. There is no historical evidence that they intervened in their religious faith, their churches, masses, their capital or professions. The Armenians were particularly adept in domestic trade, foreign trade, banking,

jewellery production, construction work, architecture and medicine. Noted Armenians of the day were proud of their family history and lived in luxury in the capital. There is not the slightest evidence that their wealth caused any feelings of jealousy or resentment among the Turkish Muslim population. The situations of the Armenians in Anatolia, in the Arab countries, in the Balkans and in the other Ottoman territories were similar. Their Patriarch occupied a high position in the official state protocol and met freely with the high Ottoman dignitaries. They are referred to in Ottoman documents as the *millet-i sâdika*, the "loyal community". They refrained from breaking the law. The Ottoman Greeks, always in greater numbers than the Armenians, at times hated them; a point alluded to in the writings of ambassadors and travellers.

It is even possible to say that, among the non-Muslim groups, the Armenians adapted most to Turkish culture. They all knew Turkish and learned Armenian in the church schools. Many Armenian folk poets wrote their poetry in Turkish rather than Armenian. There are hundreds of Turkish words in the Armenian language. Their cuisine is the same as Turkish. Their customs are largely taken from Ottoman tradition. Many travelled to Europe for educational purposes, particularly to Italy. Armenian church and classical music is based on Turkish musicology. They trained many musicians and composers in classical Turkish music. One encyclopaedia of Turkish music lists over one hundred Armenian composers. Many Turks know of Baba Hamparsum, Asdik Ağa, Nikogos Ağa, Tatyos Efendi, Bimen Şen and Artaki Candan who all flourished under the patronage of Sultan Selim III.

With the Reform Edict of 1856, Armenians, like other non-Muslims, were able to become public officials. In the last 66 years of the empire, Armenians occupied all levels of public office on an equal footing with Turks. Ninety percent served their country loyally. It was generally thought to be extremely discourteous to treat Armenians differently from Turks. From 1856 onwards, Armenians, hitherto free in their private lives, served the state at the official level as well. In the military, they were employed as medical officers; some were even elevated to the status of *paşa* or 'civilian general'. No other minorities produced medical officers; although there was no official ban on joining the armed forces, they did not choose to enter the military academies. From 1915 to the present day, Armenians have been serving as reserve officers.

It is worth reiterating that between 1856 and 1922, Armenians served at all levels of government. This was a period when it was considered out of the question for Muslims in European countries to be employed similarly. The highest position in the Ottoman Empire was that of *vezir*, equal to that of marshal in the army. Dozens of Armenians rose to this level. Hundreds of ranks, such as *Bâlâ* (equivalent to full general), *ûlâ* (comparable to lieutenant general), *ûlâ sânisî* (like major general) and *mütemâyiz*, filled by Armenians, are listed carefully in the state almanacs, or the *Sâlnâme-i Devlet-i Âliyye-i Osmâniyye*. As ministers, they were members of the Ottoman cabinet. One Armenian, Gabriel Noradounghian Efendi, even served as Foreign Minister. Abdülhamid II entrusted his huge financial estate to another Armenian, Minister of the Treasury, Agop Paşa.

Towards the end of the 19th century, however, the world's leading colonialist countries, Great Britain, France and Russia, were to meddle with the Ottoman Armenians and open the way for mutual bloodshed.

The Origins of the Armenian Question

Defeated by Russia, the Ottoman Government was forced to accept the Treaty of Berlin. According to Article 61, the Ottomans were to enact reforms for the Armenian minority in six of its eastern provinces: Sivas, Erzurum, Harput (modern day Elazığ), Diyarbakır, Bitlis and Van. There are now 21 smaller provinces occupying the same land area. These provinces were, then, divided into sub-provinces, called *sanjaks*. The Armenians made up a small minority in each province and *sanjak*. Despite some other Muslim and non-Muslim groups, the majority of the population was primarily Turkish and Kurdish.

Despite its goodwill, it was impossible for the Ottoman Administration to enact reforms for such a small and widely scattered minority in a region where the predominantly feudal populace lived in villages, and where significant urban centres were few and far between. It was a move that would threaten Muslim-Armenian relations; and that is exactly what happened. Although up until then Armenians, like other non-Muslims, had lived side by side with the majority Muslims, hatred and suspicion would no doubt now rear its head. In that case, what exactly did the Western nations want?

Firstly, they wanted to exert influence over a Christian group in eastern Anatolia, as they had done in the Balkans. The Greeks, followed by Rumanians, Serbs and Montenegrins, had all split from the Ottoman Empire to form independent states. The Bulgarians were awarded autonomy. There was even a tiny Maronite Catholic Arab autonomous state on Mount Lebanon. Nothing had yet been achieved for the Armenians. If an Armenian state could be founded in eastern Anatolia, they would forever be pawns to the European power that worked most towards this goal. Russia, Britain and France were all keen to reap this reward. Germany, as yet, did not exert enough influence in this region.

Secondly, even if no autonomous state came about, eastern Anatolia would be in turmoil. This scenario, too, was successful. When the bloodshed began, the Europeans would have the perfect excuse to exert pressure on the Sublime Porte and demand concessions. At the very least, they could occupy Ottoman attention and weaken the state. Not only would the Ottomans be undermined in the Caucasus, Ottoman links with its southern Arab provinces would also be severely disrupted.

This method of 'reform after reform' had succeeded in paving the way for autonomy for Bulgaria and Crete. The Turks there, however, had made up half or less of the total population, whereas the Muslim population in eastern Anatolia constituted an absolute majority. The area where reform was demanded was extensive, including even Sivas.

Since 13 February 1878, Abdülhamid II had been reigning single-handedly over the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan had dissolved the Parliament, had not decreed new elections and although he stopped short of breaking up the Senate, he had not allowed it to convene again. The Constitution theoretically remained in force, but the first constitutional monarchy had ended. For over thirty years, Sultan Abdülhamid ruled an autocratic regime. Although rated third in the world, he had no trust in his navy, which had proved inefficient during the war with Russia. His faith in the army fared no better, since he saw its interference in politics in 1876 as irreparably damaging to the empire. He did accept, however, that a strong army, was of the utmost importance to his policies. He therefore maintained his seven armies, even at a period of time when the state was saddled with foreign debts. The army alone was costing the empire seven

million gold coins annually. The sultan was reluctant to use his armies, still among the world's greatest, in war with any nation. He had learnt that a victorious army would not necessarily gain anything from the Great Powers. He also realised that they would also be agitated if the army was used in internal turmoils. Despite this, he was forced to declare war on Greece in 1879. As discussed below, the Fourth Army, based at Erzincan, was used against the Armenians in 1894-95. Later developments proved that the use of the army against the Armenians was both extremely costly and also produced one diplomatic note after another from Europe. Paramilitary units were therefore formed to patrol eastern Anatolia. This prevented needless strain on the army and also allowed it to continue in its defence of the Caucasus border.

Eight years had passed since the Congress of Berlin. The Great Powers began to warn the Porte that Article 61 was not being implemented, that reforms for the Armenians in eastern Anatolia had still not been forthcoming. Sultan Abdülhamid's policy was one of playing the Great Powers off against the small Balkan states to prevent them from forming a bloc against the empire. He continued this policy for thirty years.

It was clear that Britain, France and Russia wanted to have control over events in eastern Anatolia. However, Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy, as the other signatories of the Berlin Treaty, also felt they had rights over the region. Abdülhamid knew that Italy did not have the strength to meddle in the Armenian matter and therefore concentrated on separating Germany and Austro-Hungary from the triumvirate of Britain, France and Russia. Eastern Anatolia was not a part of the foreign policies of these two nations. Berlin and Vienna would gain no benefit, but rather quite the reverse, from British, French or Russian influence over the Armenians in the region. Knowing this, when Abdülhamid declared to the German Ambassador in İstanbul in 1895 that Article 61 was ridiculous and impossible to implement and that he would rather die than try to execute it, Berlin did not protest. Neither did Vienna.

The Russians were the first to take the Armenians in hand, by planning Armenian operations in eastern Anatolia. Although Russia was distinctly Pan-Slavist, it tried to break the Ottoman hold on the region and advance through to the Mediterranean by making use of the non-Slavic Armenians. For this plan to succeed,

it had to be certain that the Armenian minority was powerful in as many places as possible and to rid the region of the Muslim populace. The Muslims were mostly Turkish, but there were some Kurdish majorities in some sub-provinces. Other Muslim groups were less important.

Although it seemed a rather fantastic idea, the Russian-Armenian plan had proved successful elsewhere. Russia, for example, had succeeded in reducing the Turkic Tatars in the Crimea to a minority. Only recently it had driven the Azeri Turks from Yerevan, and what had once been an area with a 90% Muslim Turkish population bordering the Ottoman Empire, became a haven for resettled Armenians. The region from that point on was known as Armenia and became, with Russia's support, a base for attacks on eastern Anatolia.

While Russia was working towards creating an Armenian principality on Ottoman land, France and Britain were watching closely and waiting for opportunities. France and Britain could never accept Russian penetration into eastern Anatolia, and its control of the routes leading to İskenderun and the Gulf of Basra. France had strong connections to the Armenians starting from the time of the Crusades; the Ottoman Armenians included an important Catholic contingent, which had put its trust in France. Britain was a world power; it had faith in its international policies, its mighty navy and its economic power.

Russia started sending arms and weapons to east Anatolian Armenians. It is important to stress that all denominations of the Armenian Church took the lead in betraying the Ottoman State. Some church leaders and İstanbul bishops were also involved. Officially, Russia was neutral. The Armenians seemed to be rising against the state alone. Russia had the Armenians organised around committees. Russian Armenians formed the Marxist Hinchag group first in Geneva (Switzerland) in 1887. Their goal was to rid eastern Anatolia of Muslims and persuade İstanbul to found an autonomous Armenian principality there. They started aggressive propaganda activities on the Ottoman Armenians. The "committee" killed those Armenians who would not contribute to the cause either financially or by providing men.

When the Hinchag reign of terror began to make even the West anxious, Russian Armenians formed the Dashnag committee in Tiflis (Georgia) again. This group differed by propounding a

socialist ideology. Their methods, however, were no different than those of the Hinchag, and they joined forces several times for attacks. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Armenians were content with their administration and did not show any inclination to rise against their own state.

Armenians in eastern Anatolia, armed and organised by the Russian Armenians, began to pillage and kill in raids on predominantly Kurdish-speaking Muslim villages. No mercy was offered to the old, women or children. The documents pertaining to these massacres are presented in scholarly articles in this book. Many countries have innumerable, detailed documents on this issue in their state archives. There are records of people left to die, pregnant women slain through the stomach, men castrated or finger, hands, arms, legs cut off. Muslims were herded into mosques, dervish lodges and religious schools set on fire. Rape was a particularly constant form of their violence, even applied against young boys and girls. The gangs retreated only after the Muslim villages, crops and vegetation cover included, were razed to the ground. Their aim was to terrorise the non-Armenian population into fleeing the region. Amidst the carnage, some gangs dressed up in Turkish clothing to raid Armenian villages, and publicise it to the West as clear evidence of Turkish brutality.

Russia was concerned about these over-enthusiastic methods, anxious that Russian Armenians could perhaps act in the same way towards their country; it also feared the emergence of Pan-Armenianism, moreover bolstered by alleged principles of socialism. Slowly, it started to withdraw its support, at least for the time being.

The Armenian population within the Ottoman Empire at this time was around one million. They were represented within the administration above their numbers. Fearful of the Armenian terrorist groups, they had put their trust in the European nations. The Armenian matter was now a regular item in the European and American press, its constant motif being 'Ottoman oppression'. The Armenian churches, clerics and European missions throughout the Ottoman Empire supported the movement. Many churches and consulates had become depots for storing arms. Weapons were routinely buried in the mountains to be later unearthed for use.

In 1894, on the instructions of Abdülhamid II, Müşir Zeki Paşa, the head of the Fourth Army in charge of eastern Anatolia, began a

swift, harsh clampdown and recaptured the Kurdish villages. The European press immediately started an ugly campaign against the sultan and the operation. The Europeans had thought that the Ottomans would sit down for negotiations with the Armenians and their European patrons. This act of self-defence therefore came as a surprise. The famous French historian Albert Vandal used the term *Le Sultan Rouge*, for the first time, to describe Abdülhamid II.

Abdülhamid's administration was committed to protecting its Muslim subjects. The Armenians, firm in the belief that Russia, England and France would intervene any day, even organised some bloody demonstrations in important Ottoman centres such as Sivas, Trabzon, Erzurum, Van and Diyarbakır.

When Abdülhamid realised that his Fourth Army would be needlessly wasted in gang warfare in the mountains rather than in its real role to defend the empire against Russia, he formed a new unit called the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiment that remained until 1908. Well armed and able to act swiftly, the regiment was composed completely of Kurds. The units were mandated with patrolling their own rural areas and ordered to destroy the Armenian gangs whenever they came up against them. Regiment officers were made up of Kurdish tribal leaders and their sons and relatives. The highest rank was that of colonel. These officer ranks were only awarded to the Hamidiye regiment. They successfully protected the mountainous and rural areas of the region. The regular army or the gendarmes already protected the cities and towns.

The regiment, however, was not popular with the West and complaints were often taken to the Porte. This was the case although the sultan had been inspired by European examples of paramilitary legions. The Kurds, at that point in history, were not a favourite cause of the Europeans. They had to be removed from eastern Anatolia as much as possible so that the region could be left over to the Armenians, although there were not enough of the latter to repopulate the whole area. There was a good example to be had from Bulgaria, however. Previously numbering half the population, the Muslims of Bulgaria from 1877 onwards had been driven out or killed so that they were reduced to only a quarter of the total; this move was followed by the formation of an autonomous principality. The example, however, was not an

appropriate one. Bulgaria was tiny compared to the huge area encompassed by eastern Anatolia.

The only Ottoman sub-province, which had the highest Armenian population in comparison to Muslims, was the Sasoun district between the towns of Siirt and Muş. Here, there were 12,000 Armenians to 15,000 Muslims, almost all of them Kurds. This was the overriding reason the district was chosen by the committees as a pilot project. They planned to take over this area and sow the seeds of the Armenian principality.

The Armenian gangs descended in full force on the area and armed the local Armenian population by force. The Ottoman forces, however, were quick to suppress the revolt. Hundreds of Kurds and around 5,000-armed Armenians were killed. Europe was irate. The leader of the revolt, Hamparsum Boyacıyan, had fled. Thirteen years later, he was to become a parliamentary representative for Harput under the Union and Progress Party. The Sasoun incident occurred in October 1894. One month later, some Armenians were killed on account of an Armenian uprising in Diyarbakır.

During the winter of 1894-95, European states exerted great pressure on the Porte. Citing greater Armenian casualties than Muslims in the uprisings, they demanded reforms for the Armenian people. A joint diplomatic note presented by Britain, France and Russia on 11 May 1895, demanded the appointment of new, untainted governors for the six provinces of eastern Anatolia; the abolishment of the Kurdish regiment, and the formation of Armenian gendarme units. On 3 June, the Porte refused the note and stated that none of the demands could be implemented. These were the most critical months of the Armenian question. Sultan Abdülhamid had, however, prevented Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy from signing the note. Britain had removed its fleet from Malta to the Dardanelles. The Porte, nonetheless, had recognised that Russia had no advantages in meddling in the Armenian affair together with France and Britain. France was supporting Britain in remembrance of the Crusades. Britain was, in effect, on its own.

Armenian Uprisings in İstanbul

The Armenians, however, did not understand that the Great Powers had effectively left them alone to make up with the Ottoman state. Committee members had received great sums of

money from Europe and were unwilling to relinquish this lucrative foothold. The European states in their turn continued to pay and protect the committee members since this gave them a means to berate the Porte. The committee also managed to coerce money out of the Ottoman Armenians.

After the successful clampdown on the Sasoun revolts, the Armenian Patriarch of İstanbul, İzmirliyan, planned a similar uprising in the city in full view of European eyes. A few hundred Armenians were armed, most of them living in the district of Kadirga, overlooking the Marmara Sea. They planned to demonstrate against the government outside the Porte on 30 September 1895. When Turkish soldiers at Sultanahmet obstructed them, they retreated in panic to Kadirga, where their houses were stocked with weapons. In Ottoman history, the incident is known as the "first Armenian affray", since up until Turks had caused then many similar disturbances. The İstanbul Greeks had planned a comparable disturbance during the Greek Revolution but had not had the courage to carry it out. The Armenians, therefore, were the first non-Muslim group to dare cause such a disturbance since the conquest of the city. The Turks and Armenians in İstanbul for centuries had lived and worked side by side without enmity, as they do in this day. Within this historical context, rising against their state and running after a European-designed dream of an autonomous nation in Anatolia was incomprehensible to the Turks and greatly harmed relations between the two groups. Despite this, the Turks did not change their behaviour towards the Armenians in this or the second Armenian affray the following year. Even the horrific news reaching the capital from the eastern provinces did not change the centuries' old conduct of the Turks towards their neighbours.

The second Armenian affray took place the following year on 26 August 1896, and was far more destructive than the first uprising; the plans centred around bombing attacks with intent to kill. Patriarch İzmirliyan had urged them forwards with false assertions that the allied navies of the Great Powers were about to pass through the Dardanelles on their way to occupy the city. The Patriarch's words encouraged thousands of Armenians to revolt.

According to the statements of arrested Armenians afterwards, they had planned to dynamite the head office of the Ottoman Bank, to bomb the buildings of the Porte and kill the Grand Vizier

(Prime Minister). They were caught with dynamite and weapons while trying to enter the Bank, since Ottoman intelligence had learnt of the targets. One Armenian did manage to shoot at the Grand Vizier Halil Rifat Paşa but missed. Abdülhamid had been lenient with the first disturbance but, fearing that it would be repeated every year, now acted rather harshly. Ottoman soldiers, gendarmes and the police entered the Armenian district to arrest the perpetrators; they were fired at from the balconies. The ultimate aim, obviously, was to spur the forces to fire back at the civilian population and then protest this to the Europeans. Foreign missions in İstanbul were watching the events closely and sending minute-by-minute news to their capitals in Europe. Soldiers and police were given orders to arrest, not to open fire. In the event not one arrest was made, the soldiers did not force themselves into the houses but retreated immediately from the Armenian neighbourhood.

That night, especially made clubs from the celebrated carpentry workshop at Yıldız, were distributed amongst the İstanbul dock porters, most of whom were Kurds. They were given orders not to carry any firearms or knives. Entering the Armenian district, they beat the young Armenian men, making sure not to touch women, children or the elderly.

After that date, the İstanbul Armenians have shied away from violent demonstrations. Patriarch İzmirliyan was dismissed and sent to Jerusalem. The Great Powers left Armenians to their fate. There were no further incidents involving Armenians in the capital for the next nine years. Even then, remembering what had happened in the past, they hired professional terrorists from Europe.

The Assassination Attempt-21 July 1905

The Armenian committees concocted a plan to kill Abdülhamid II, whom they had unjustly declared an enemy of the Armenian people, in order to draw the attention of the Great Powers and to create disorder in the empire. The plan was drawn in Switzerland, and a Belgian anarchist named Jorris hired. In 1905 nihilist and anarchist factions were active throughout Europe. Anarchist groups were involved in assassination attacks and responsible for the murder of two U.S. presidents, the French president and Tsar Alexander II. Now, assassination plans focused Abdülhamid II, one

of the most heavily protected statesmen of his day and now at the end of his third decade in power.

The Armenians had begun to see him as the only obstacle to the formation of an autonomous principality in eastern Anatolia. Jorris arrived in İstanbul with a group of professionals including women. The most convenient time for an assassination attempt on the sultan was when he attended the mosque for Friday prayers. This was a splendid imperial event, wholly religious within the mosque and full of military ritual on the journey there and back. It was the only opportunity for the citizens of İstanbul, Europeans and Muslim pilgrims from other countries to see the Caliph-sultan. The journey in the past was conducted by horse, but now he was transported in an open carriage so that he could see and be seen by the people. Jorris had a car constructed in Vienna especially for the assassination, and the parts were brought in individually to İstanbul. Inside was placed a *machine infernale*, a highly destructive time bomb, weighing a hundred kilos. The sultan was on his way to Friday prayers at the Yıldız Mosque just outside the palace walls. The ritual was observed closely for some weeks by the assassins to determine how long it took for him to go from the mosque door to his waiting carriage. The carriage carrying the bomb was made to appear like that used by women and positioned in between the mosque and the imperial carriage. As Abdülhamid emerged from the mosque, however, he was unexpectedly detained by Şeyhülislâm Cemâleddin, the chief of religious affairs. During the delay, the pre-timed bomb exploded. Some imperial bodyguards were killed instantly, and many more wounded. The sultan did not suffer any injuries.

The committee members were caught and punished. Jorris was also arrested and interrogated. Under interrogation, he agreed to pass over information on terrorist activities in Europe. He was paid 500 gold coins and released. Later sources, such as the memoirs of the sultan's private secretary Tahsin Paşa, reveal that he did indeed inform the Porte on sensitive intelligence from Europe.

The Adana Uprising: 16-19 and 24 April 1909

The second constitutional monarchy was declared on 23 July 1908. Abdülhamid's rule of despotism ended, but he still remained as the sultan. The first years, and particularly the first months of the constitutional government, were marked by euphoria of freedom. It was as if all restrictions had been lifted. The Armenian

Hinchag and Dashnag committees openly set up bureaux in cities throughout the empire, using them to store firearms and weapons. Neither had Armenian churches diverted from their previous policies. It was a way of reminding both Europe and the state that they were still intent on their aims. The next port of call for Armenian disturbance was the Ottoman province of Adana.

The Bishop of Cilicia, Musheg, ordered the Armenians to revolt. The date of the order, 13 April 1909, "31 March" in the *Rumî* calendar, coincided with a time of intense political internal turmoil in the capital. Heavily armed Armenians went on a rampage of pillaging and death in and around Adana for four days and nights. The Turks retaliated in kind. The uprising ended with about 17,000 Armenian and 1,850 Turkish deaths. The inequality in numbers was cause for natural concern from Europe, and the Minister of the Interior Talât Bey was declared even more of an enemy of the Armenians than Sultan Abdülhamid. Talât Bey sent his close friend Lieut. Colonel Cemâl Bey as provincial governor to Adana, despite his lack of required experience. Rather than investigating how the Ottoman forces had allowed armed Armenians to raid Muslim homes and kill whoever they found for days on end, Cemâl Bey declared a state of martial law and set up a military court for the trials. Only one Armenian was hanged as opposed to 47 Turks, including a religious cleric. This was one of the weaknesses of the Union and Progress Party, which had espoused union between minorities. The aim, ultimately, had been to demonstrate to both Armenians and Europeans an execution of justice. The incident is paraphrased from the memoirs of Cemâl Paşa.

The Armenian Relocation of 1915

The Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on 29 October 1914. Its total Armenian population, Orthodox Gregorian, Catholic and Protestant included, numbered almost 1,300,000. They made up a small part of the population even in the six provinces of eastern Anatolia. The sources for these figures are given in full in other articles in this book.

The Third Army protected the Caucasian front in eastern Anatolia against the Russians. At the end of 1914, Minister of War Enver Paşa arrived from İstanbul to personally take command of the army and direct the celebrated Sarıkamış offensive. The largest battalions of the Third Army froze to death or were taken prisoner

by the Russians. The army started to retreat in disarray from the Russian front, leaving it undefended.

With the arena relatively clear, the Russians began sending weapons to the Armenians. They also started to recruit Armenians from the Ottoman forces into Armenian gangs. The winter was extremely harsh, and the Armenian gangs began to cut off the supply routes of the army as well as attack units and Muslim villages. The latter were totally undefended, their men fighting in the army and the forces completely preoccupied with the Russians. Villages were followed by attacks on towns and cities. The gangs did not spare women and children, and the largely Kurdish Muslims were brutally massacred. Victims were not shot; methods of torture included the amputation of limbs one by one, leaving the mutilated to die slowly. They burnt everything in their paths. Another method was to herd women, children and the elderly into mosques and other buildings and set them alight. Women and children were raped in front of the crowds. The gangs were secure in the knowledge that the remaining Muslim population would flee eastern Anatolia for the west and the south, that a victorious Russia would help them create an Armenian state when the Ottoman Empire had been obliterated for good after the war.

The city of Van was an important provincial centre of the empire. Gangs entered the city on 20 April 1915, killing a great number of the Muslim population. When the Russian Army arrived one month later, they were shocked to find not one Muslim left. Lake Van was filled with corpses, dead and mutilated bodies were scattered throughout the city. The Armenian slaughter had far exceeded Russian expectations and desires. Russian officers reported back that the Armenian savageness defiled their honour as soldiers. As the Turkish forces approached, the Russians evacuated the city on 3 August 1915; the Turks entered two days later and reported the carnage. Van was resettled after 1918, but, at least initially, not one of the new inhabitants was an original citizen of the city.

The still much disputed Ottoman plan for relocation of the Armenians was taken after the massacre at Van. The state was facing the greatest threat to its existence, fighting Russia, France, Britain and other countries on several fronts. During the Armenian relocation, the fate of the empire was being decided in the Dardanelles. If the enemy succeeded in crossing the Turkish

Straits, its imposing fleet could easily take İstanbul. The whole imperial treasury was sent to safety in Konya. Sultan Mehmed Reşad V refused to leave.

Although care was taken in previous uprisings not to retaliate on those not actively involved in the armed conflict, the present situation called for a new approach. The solution decided on had been used effectively by many countries during both world wars and countless other confrontations. The Armenians of central and eastern Anatolia were made to migrate to the southern, Arab provinces of the same state. It is important to note that the provinces of Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut and Baghdad were more prosperous and developed than the land they were leaving. Nevertheless, it was still lamentable that a people had to leave their homeland of centuries for foreign lands. However, it is one of the tragedies of war. We have contemporary examples in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Chechnya. In the Armenian example, however, it must be noted that families were not separated but kept together as much as possible. The Armenian families in the east, then, mainly started to walk in convoys towards the south.

It was still winter, and various contagious diseases were widespread. Worse, the convoys were targets for attacks from groups of Kurdish bandits. The convoys were being accompanied by Ottoman gendarmes, who were not in a position to fire on the attacking Kurds. If they had, they would have faced retaliation and the dawning of a Kurdish question on top of everything else. The marauding Kurds were those who had had their families killed by the Armenians and were in search of revenge.

What is called a "genocide" by Armenians today is this policy of removal and of relocation. The journey also killed many Turkish soldiers, as well as Armenians, through hunger and the cold. It may be estimated that approximately a quarter of the Armenians being resettled died for several reasons. The figures are given elsewhere in this book. Those who reached the Arab provinces found employment and, after the war, large numbers emigrated to France and other countries in Europe and America. If there had been genocide, there would not have been Armenian diasporas in those countries. If there had been genocide, the Armenians living in the capital would not have been spared. Only a few Armenians were arrested in İstanbul. Armenian gangs were also involved in massacres during the journey, firing on the Turkish soldiers and

fighting with the Kurdish tribes. Ziya Gökalp, a member of parliament for Diyarbakır, the General Secretary of the ruling Union and Progress Party and one of its founding members, said that it was not a "massacre", but, in many instances, a mutual killing.

The Armenians had to be evacuated from the region. Minister of the Interior Talât Bey to the provinces and sub-provinces sent the orders, which are currently in state archives and have been quoted in this book. The orders are for relocation and resettlement, not murder. The decision was discussed briefly in government and signed by the Grand Vizier Said Halim Paşa.

Armenian committee members later assassinated Talât Paşa at the age of 47 in Berlin (15 March 1921); Said Halim Paşa at age 58 in Rome (8 April 1921); and Cemâl Paşa at age 50 in Tiflis (22 July 1922). Enver Paşa was then in Turkestan, where he was also machine-gunned.

After World War I: 1918-1920

After the First World War, the Russian Armenians started demanding land from north-east Anatolia, a region they had since then stopped to inhabit. In a period starting from the end of 1918 until 1920 tens of thousands of Azeris in the South Caucasus as well as Turks in Anatolia were killed. At the same time, victorious nations were also demanding revenge. When the British, French and Italian forces occupied İstanbul on 16 March 1920, Britain hoped to form a war crimes tribunal to try Turkey for the Armenian relocation. Not one document ordering genocide was unearthed. The sub-governor of Boğazlayan, Kemâl Bey, was hanged, however. Those arrested, mostly Unionist statesmen, were sent to Malta; there was no evidence to convict them.

When the French forces invaded the environs of Adana, Maraş, Urfa and Gaziantep, they formed Armenian regiments. Turks were murdered here too. France evacuated the region, signed an agreement with the government in Ankara, and retreated to Syria taking the Armenians with them.

Similarly, when the Tsarist regime in Russia was abolished with the 1917 Revolution, the republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were formed in the South Caucasus. Armenia wanted territory from both its neighbours and Turkey and engaged in massacres in the Erzurum-Kars region. The Commander of the

15th Corps, Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, drove the Armenian army back into Armenia. Signing treaties with both Armenia and Russia, the Turkish Government ended the war on the Caucasian front. The sultan and the Parliament never ratified the Treaty of Sèvres; so, although signed, it was never implemented. The Armenians, however, never forgot the independent state promised by the Treaty. With the Treaty of Lausanne, agreements regarding Kars and Gümrü went into effect. When the Soviet Union was abolished in 1991, Armenia declared that it did not recognise these agreements of 1920.

"The Armenian Question" Today

The war with Armenia under Kâzım Karabekir and the treaties signed by the Parliament are covered in detail in the other articles in this book. The Armenian question was now considered finished for good. When the Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923, it regarded the Armenian question as a problem pertaining to the Ottoman Empire and left it as such. In this environment of the 1970s, the Armenian ASALA terrorist group was formed in Lebanon. The Turkish consul and vice-consul in Los Angeles, while sitting in a hotel lobby, were shot to death by an elderly Armenian. This was followed by the assassinations of many Turkish diplomats throughout the world. While the Kurdish terrorist organisation, the PKK, was becoming increasingly active, nothing else was heard of ASALA, the Armenian terrorist group. Then, the Armenian diaspora, mostly in the U.S. and France, sometimes in consort with the newly independent Republic of Armenia and sometimes not, began to carry the genocide scenario into the international spotlight.

Although it is both illogical and unacademic for the events of more than eight decades ago to occupy the political arena today, this is exactly what is happening on the threshold of the 21st century. It should be added that during these decades, the Armenians have been successful in duping both politicians and historians with forged documents. Some Western historians have investigated the issue objectively; some of them have been silenced. Armenians have spent huge sums on rewriting history, and they are still continuing. They have raised the younger generations with tales of genocide perpetrated against their race by the Turks. It is even possible to say that for some the subject has become a sort of hobby. Not just Western nations, but also some

Eastern and Muslim countries have become involved, solely to get concessions from Turkey, to agitate and disrupt its external relations. It seems that the issue will remain in the international political agenda for a time yet. But a wealth of reliable documents force us to offer a new set of arguments to place the controversy in proper perspective.

THE POPULATION OF THE OTTOMAN ARMENIANS

Justin McCarthy

Nineteenth and early twentieth century European and American commentators had no idea how many Armenians lived in the Ottoman Empire. Yet this did not stop them from valiantly presenting statistics on Armenian population. Their estimates ranged from fewer than one million to three million, and their supposed methods of collection were as varied as the estimates themselves. American missionary reporters simply increased the numbers of Armenians, often doubling them. Other writers printed Ottoman statistics with completely uninformed "corrections". Ottoman population statistics were sometimes deliberately falsified, either to make a political point or simply because the writer would not admit that he did not know.¹ Europeans who took the simple expedient of asking Armenians their group's numbers drew up many estimates. Travellers constructed total population numbers by multiplying the numbers in the villages and towns they had observed. Enterprising scholars found what they felt were a sure way to statistical truth when they took all available estimates, then averaged them. Hundreds of estimates were made, each as unreliable as the next.²

The many estimators necessarily failed, because the only way to know a population's number is to count it. Reliable data on the

¹ For example, A. Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey*, tr. Lady Easthope, London, 1856. He stated that his figures were based on "the census of 1844", which was a complete fabrication. No such Ottoman population record of eastern Anatolia was made at such an early date.

² For the most quoted estimates, see Esat Uras, *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question*, 2nd pr., İstanbul, Documentary Publications, 1988, pp. 353-366. Nikola Michoff provided the most exhaustive, and entertaining, collection of estimates in his *La Population de la Turquie et de la Bulgarie au XVIIIe et XIXe s.*, 4 vols., Sofia, 1919-1935.

population of Ottoman Armenians only could have come from one of two sources—the Ottoman population registration system or the Armenian Church. The former was a well-ordered system of registers of population, which were both updated routinely at the local level and in nation-wide updates (erroneously called censuses). The latter, many assumed, must have kept records of Armenians, analogous to Western European baptismal records.

Knowing that Armenian Church figures would have carried weight in the deliberations of the post-World War I peace conferences that were creating a new Armenian state, Armenian apologists duly presented "Armenian Patriarchate Statistics". As might be expected, the Patriarchate Statistics gave a very high figure for the Armenian population, but that was not enough to make the case that Armenians were a majority of the population in eastern Anatolia. The Patriarchate Statistics therefore made every effort to divide the Muslim population. The category "Muslim" was broken down into Turks, Circassians, Persians, Laz, Gypsies, Sedentary Kurds, and Nomadic Kurds. Under "Other Religions" were listed "Kizilbashis, Zazas, Chareklis, and Yezidis". The intent was obviously to show that there were more Armenians, counted at 1,018,000, than Turks, set at 666,000. This was an understandable tactic, one that avoided the question of whether these ethnic groups would have preferred Muslim or Armenian rule. As will be seen below, however, even these figures could only be derived by adding considerably to the Armenian numbers and subtracting from the number of Turks. An even more telling point, though, is the question of how the Armenians could ever have known how many Muslims were ethnic Kurds, Turks, Circassians, etc. The Ottomans had never counted the population by ethnic group or any category other than religion, and no one else had counted the Muslim population at all. In 1912, no one knew the ethnic groups of Ottoman Muslims, surely not the Armenian Patriarch.

Table One. Ottoman Registration Data and the "Armenian Patriarchate Statistics" for the "Six Vilâyet".

	"Armenian Patriarchate Statistics"		Ottoman Registration Statistics	
Armenians	1,018,000	(39%)	784,917	(19%)
Other Christians	165,000	(6%)	176,845	(4%)
Muslims	1,432,000	(55%)*	3,173,918	(77%)
Turks	666,000			
Circassians	62,000			
Persians	13,000			
Laz	10,000			
Gypsies	3,000			
Sedentary Kurds	242,000			
Nomadic Kurds	182,000			
Kızılbaş	140,000			
Zazas, et al.	77,000			
Yezidis	37,000			
Jews	0	(0%)	2,955	(**%)
Total	2,615,000		4,138,635	

* Note that the original figures do not include any figure for Muslims as a group.

** Less than 1%.

The "Patriarchate Statistics" claimed six *vilâyet*s (provinces) as "Turkish Armenia", excising the portions of those provinces that, it was admitted, had very few Armenians.³ Although exact geographic designations were not given in the Patriarchate Statistics, it is possible to ascertain approximately the Ottoman provinces that corresponded to the "Patriarchal" borders and compare Ottoman and Armenian statistics. The Ottoman figures in Table One have been corrected for undercounts of children and adult females, but this does not affect the proportion of Armenians and Muslims, because the same correction factor is applied to all religious groups. Thus, the Armenian population is assumed to have been as much undercounted as the Muslim—a necessary procedure which, however, adds selectively more to the Armenian population,

³ "Exclusive of the regions of Hekkiari, those situated to the south of Segher of Bitlis, the south of the province of Diyarbakır, the south of Malatia, and the West and Northwest of Sivas". Because these are not descriptions of actual administrative districts one can only find rough correlations in Ottoman statistics. The Ottoman figures in Table One approximate the borders in the Patriarchate Statistics.

which was more urban and thus better enumerated. In order to be comparable to Ottoman registration data, the various Muslim ethnic groups in the Armenian figures have been added together as Muslims.

In fact, the Armenian Patriarchate Statistics were pure invention, and the dubious source of the so-called Patriarchate Statistics reflects on their accuracy. No one at the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul has ever claimed them.⁴ Indeed, there is no record of registration statistics on Armenian population ever having been kept by the Patriarchate. Unlike the situation in Western Europe, no baptismal or marriage records were generally taken or retained, much less centrally collated. Even had there been such records, how would that have given population figures on Muslims and other Christians? These "Patriarchate figures" did not appear at the Patriarchate, nor in Istanbul, nor even in the Ottoman Empire. They appeared in Paris on 1913, in a book written by Marcel Léart (a pseudonym of Krikor Zohrab).⁵ It does appear that the Armenian Patriarchate may have collected estimates of Armenian population from Armenian bishops, but these numbers are different than those of the Zohrab inventions and do not include any data on Muslims. As seen in Appendix Three below, they are only slightly different than the figures in Table Two, which are Ottoman counts corrected for under-enumeration of women and children.⁶

To find the actual Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire one must rely on the type of governmental population statistics that are the staple of demographic studies throughout the world. The principle is the same everywhere: the only way to know a population is to actually count it. The Ottoman Government counted its population through a registration system that recorded births, deaths, and migration. Unlike the Patriarchate figures, the Ottoman population figures were used for internal governmental

⁴ The Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople only printed estimates on Armenian population in 1878, for use at the Congress of Berlin. At the time, the Patriarch stated that there were an amazing 3 million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, a figure obviously not drawn from any actual count.

⁵ *La Question arménienne à la lumière des documents*, Paris, Augustin Challamel, 1913. The figures were later quoted and represented as authoritative in a number of post-war propaganda documents, such as *La Population arménienne de la Turquie avant la guerre*, Paris, 1920, and Kevork Mesrob, *L'Arménie (autorisé par la commission des documents du conseil consultatif national arménien)*, Constantinople, 1919. These spurious figures are often quoted as accurate today.

⁶ What may be actual statistics from the Patriarchate (Appendix Three) also indicate an Armenian population far lower than these "Patriarchate Statistics".

purposes, not propaganda. Although the modern Ottoman population registration system began in the 1830s, not until just before World War I did the Ottomans publish any of the data in a western language, only in Ottoman Turkish, indicating the published statistics were not meant to affect foreign opinion. Internal population documents, never intended to be seen outside the administration and only recently found in archives, and those published statistics were consistent with each other. In short, the intent of the Ottoman Government was to produce the type of usable, accurate population statistics that were seen in other countries.

As in most developing countries, particularly Middle Eastern countries, the Ottomans consistently undercounted women and children. The undercounts have been corrected through the use of standard demographic techniques.⁷ These, it might be noted, do not favor any one sub-group of the population. Armenian population is corrected (statistically increased) at the same rate as that of Muslims and other groups. Table Two gives the Ottoman population figures corrected for the undercount of women and children.⁸ Figure One is a graphic representation of the Armenian and Muslim populations in Anatolia, Istanbul, and Edirne Vilâyeti, the region that contained all but a small amount of the Ottoman Armenian population.

⁷ See Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: the Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*, New York, New York University Press, 1983; "The Population of Greater Syria and Iraq, 1878 to 1914", *Asian and African Studies*, 15/1, and "The Population of the Ottoman Balkans", *Proceedings of the Third International Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey*, Istanbul, The Isis Press, 1990. Statistical calculations take more space than is available in a short article. The calculations are found in these sources.

⁸ The figures for Ottoman Asia are primarily based on the final population publication of the Ottoman Empire, *Dahiliye Nezâreti, Sicil-i Nüfus İdare-i Umumiyesi Müdüriyeti, Memalik-i Osmaniye'nin 1330 Senesi Nüfus İstatistiği*, Istanbul, 1330 M. (See *Muslims and Minorities*.) This source is deficient for the Istanbul Vilâyeti, however, probably because it was composed after the Balkan Wars, which considerably confused the demographic picture, and perhaps because of changes in the definition of resident population. The figures for Istanbul in Table Two are those of the *1313 İstatistik (Nezâret-i Umur-i Ticaret ve Nafia, Devlet-i Âliye-i Osmaniye'nin 1313 Senesine Mahsus İstatistik-i Umumisi)*, Istanbul, 1315). They have not been corrected for undercounts or projected, because the present state of knowledge of migration to and from Istanbul makes this impossible. There may be slight undercounts. The figures in the table are for Ottoman provinces as they were through most of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. At the very end of the empire's life, some of these provinces were divided (e.g., Asir separated from Yemen, Kütahya and Afyon Karahisar taken from Hüdavendigâr). The provinces have been "reunited" to ease comparisons. Çatalca and Şehir Emaneti are included in the Istanbul figures.

Table Two. Armenian Population of the Ottoman Empire, 1912

	Armenian Population	Total Population	Percent Armenian	Armenian Population	Total Population	Percent Armenian
Europe						
Istanbul	162,134	1,032,839	8.8	191,156	611,391	31.3
Edirne	33,650	1,426,632	2.4	Mamuretülaziz	680,241	16.3
Selânik	87	1,347,915	*	Diyarbakır	754,451	11.8
Yanya	0	560,835	*	Van	509,797	15.6
Manastır	9	1,064,789	*	Erzurum	974,196	16.8
İskodra	0	349,455	*			
Kosova	0	1,602,949	*	Syria		
Cezair	140	359,474	*	Suriye	1,017,322	.2
Western Anatolia				Beyrut	979,702	.4
Hüdavendigar	97,616	1,919,789	5.1	Cebelilübnan	235,169	*
Aydın	25,059	2,194,419	1.1	Kudsişerif	352,813	.7
İzmit	69,225	389,490	17.8	Zor	83,120	.3
Biga	2,805	183,077	1.5	Iraq		
Northern Anatolia				Mosul	850,000 †	*
Kastamonu	13,702	1,350,390	1.0	Baghdad	1,400,000 †	*
Trabzon	68,326	1,505,490	4.5	Basra	1,200,000 †	*
Central Anatolia				Arabia		
Sivas	182,912	1,472,838	12.4	Hijaz	2,500,000 †	*
Ankara	125,616	1,444,139	8.7	Yemen	5,000,000 †	*
Konya	24,856	1,690,388	1.5			
Southern Anatolia				EMPIRE	1,698,301	4.4
Adana	74,930	666,578	11.2			
Haleb	123,129	1,189,678	10.3			

* Less than 1/10 of one percent.

† Rough estimates.
Sources: McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities*; "The Population of Ottoman Europe"; "The Population of Ottoman Syria and Iraq".**"Ottoman Armenia"**

Despite the continued European use of the term, demographically there was no "Ottoman Armenia". The area claimed as Armenia, the "Six Vilâyet" (Figure Two) was only 17% Armenian. Indeed, if all the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Southern Caucasus took up residence in the Six Vilâyet, Muslims would still have outnumbered Armenians by 40%. In the entire region claimed by Armenian nationalists - Erivan and Kars provinces of Russia, the Six Vilâyet, and Cilicia (Adana Vilâyeti) - 21% of the population was Armenian, 73% Muslim.

The political implications of the population numbers in what was called Armenia cannot be avoided. If an Armenia had been created in the entire area, it would perforce have been a state in which a distinct minority ruled over a majority, or a state in which that majority had been expelled. Alternatively, a smaller state that drew in Armenians from other regions could have been created. This is what occurred, but only after a sanguine disaster for both the Armenians and the Muslims.

Distribution of the Ottoman Armenians

As can be seen in Table Two, Armenians were distributed throughout all of Ottoman Anatolia, with small Armenian communities in Ottoman Syria. Armenians were also well distributed throughout the Russian domains in the Southern Caucasus. Given the geographical poverty of their homeland, it was natural for large numbers of Armenians to leave for better opportunities. Much of this migration took place before the last quarter of the 19th century. Ottoman statistics for the period from 1878 to 1914 indicate only slight Armenian migration to most of western Anatolia and Ottoman Europe.⁹ The exception was Istanbul. A considerable number of Armenian males came to Istanbul for work. In the first half of the 19th century, Ottoman records showed that more than one-third of the Armenian males in Istanbul were bachelors who had come as workers.¹⁰ While later

⁹ There are no detailed statistics on internal migration, but the Armenian populations of these provinces increased only slightly more than would be expected from natural increase, indicating few in-migrants.

¹⁰ See Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914*, Madison, Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 1985, p. 203. Large numbers of Greeks and, to a lesser extent, Muslims were also recorded as bachelor migrants. Statistics from Istanbul suffered from what can be called a lack of definition. Ottoman population statistics usually recorded

publications of population do not offer this data, it is obvious that the phenomenon must have continued. It is known, for example, that 24% of the Armenian males (and virtually no females) in the city of İstanbul in 1882 lived in inns or shops, not in houses or apartments, a sign that they had come to the city to work.¹¹ Armenian population in İstanbul also showed a markedly higher number of males than females, much higher than could be accounted by an undercount of women, another indication of migration for employment. Judging by standard practice in the Middle East, the settled Armenian population of Ottoman Europe and north-west Anatolia was probably augmented when male migrants found employment and sent for their wives and families.

The Ottoman Armenians did not have the compact population mass upon which national states normally were founded. The density (population per square kilometer) of Armenian population reflected the migration of the Armenians from their homeland. The densest Armenian populations were in İzmit and İstanbul, far from eastern Anatolia (Figure Three). Yet the Armenian migrants did not simply blend into the overall population of their new provinces. In the core Armenian provinces of eastern Anatolia Armenians were well distributed, with sizeable numbers of Armenians in almost all districts (*kazas*). In other regions they tended to settle together in certain localities, often in larger cities. As mentioned above, Armenians were largely an urbanized population. Population figures for most cities are not available, but in the Six *Vilâyet*s of eastern Anatolia 38% of the Armenian population lived in the districts that included the largest towns. In the rest of Anatolia, 45% of the Armenians lived in the districts of the largest towns. By comparison, throughout Anatolia only 20% of the Muslim population lived in these same districts. The Armenian population was twice as urbanized.¹²

legal residents. Perhaps recognizing that applying this definition in İstanbul would not give a very accurate picture of the population, "temporary" residents, many of whom in fact remained in the city until their deaths, were often included in the registers. This was not done consistently, however, so comparisons over time are often impossible. Complete İstanbul registers exist, but only in archival form, and few have been willing to undertake the task of sorting through them. On these registers, see Alan Duben and Cem Behar, *İstanbul Households: Marriage, Family, and Fertility, 1880-1940*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

¹¹ Karpat, *op. cit.*, pp. 204 and 205. These figures do not include suburbs of İstanbul or the Asian (Üsküdar) side of the city.

¹² Picking the districts (*kazas*) for this analysis is somewhat arbitrary, but including other districts would little affect the results. For the Six *Vilâyet*s the districts are all the chief

Armenian Population Prior to 1912

Although they had not been a majority in any province of the Ottoman Empire since well before 1800, Armenians were a larger proportion of the population of eastern Anatolia at the beginning of the 19th century than they were in 1912. The main reason the proportion of Armenians decreased was out-migration.

In each of the Russo-Turkish wars of the 19th century, large numbers of Armenians took the side of the Russians when the Russians invaded Ottoman territory in north-eastern Anatolia. The Russians were each time forced to abandon part of their conquests by the terms of the peace treaties that ended the wars. As the Russians retreated, large numbers of Armenians joined them, fearful of retribution from Muslims. Others left to take advantage of tax incentives and free land offered them by the Russians. The Russians had expelled hundreds of thousands of Muslims from their conquests in the Southern Caucasus; they encouraged Armenian in-migration to repopulate the land.

Numbers of the Armenians who left Ottoman for Russian territory are very rough estimates, because the migrants were very seldom counted. Perhaps 50,000 Anatolian Armenians left for the Russian Southern Caucasus during and immediately after the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29. They joined an estimated 40,000 Armenians who had migrated as a result of the 1827-29 Russo-Iranian War.¹³ The Crimean War generated further Armenian migration, but numerical data is very limited. Anecdotal evidence in consular reports indicates that an estimate of a further 50,000 Armenian migrants after the Crimean War is reasonable. After the 1877-78 War, an estimated 25,000 Armenians left the Ottoman dominions for regions that had been conquered by the Russians.¹⁴

districts of *vilâyet*s plus Muş, Mardin, Erzincan, Malatya, Amasya, Tokat, and Karahisar-i Şarki. For the rest of Anatolia: the chief districts of each *vilâyet* plus Urfa, Maraş, Kütahya, Afyon, Kayseri, Eskişehir, Samsun, Bolu, Antalya, Bilecik, Yozgat, Antep, and Manisa.

¹³ The estimate of H.F.B. Lynch (*Armenia: Travels and Studies*, Beirut, Khayats Reprints, 1965). It is somewhat corroborated by the far more precise statistical study of George Bournoutian (*Eastern Armenia in the Last Decades of Persian Rule, 1807-1828*, Malibu, California, 1982, p. 69), who stated that 45,000 Armenians had come to the Erivan Province alone by 1832. Higher estimates of up to 100,000 were fanciful and do not agree with Bournoutian's more convincing analysis. See Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, Princeton, The Darwin Press, Inc., 1995, especially Chapters Two and Four.

¹⁴ As estimated by H. Pasdermadjian in *Histoire de l'Arménie*, 3rd ed., Paris, 1971, p. 311. This is surely only a guess, but it is consistent with the limited reports of consular officials on the migration.

Armenian out-migration continued at a far lower rate after the 1877-78 War. This was primarily economically-based movement. Armenians, particularly those in the Black Sea Region and Erzurum Vilâyeti, left for better opportunities in the Russian Empire. Others fled unsettled conditions in the south-east. Numbers of these migrants are unknown, but an estimate of approximately 1,000 per year is consistent with known demographic data.¹⁵

Armenian migrants to the United States were relatively well counted. Robert Mirak has examined U.S. immigration statistics and found that 66,000 Armenians came to America from the Ottoman Empire from 1834 to 1914 (Table Three). Connections with the American missionary establishment and open immigration laws facilitated Armenian in-migration. Other countries, many of which were to welcome Armenians during and after the First World War, were not targets of mass migration before the war. According to Armenian figures, before World War I, only 1,000 Armenians went to Canada and Latin America and fewer than 5,000 Armenians immigrated to Europe.¹⁶

Table Three. Armenian Migration to the United States

Years	Armenian Migrants
1834 - 1890	1,500
1891 - 1898	12,500
1899 - 1914	51,950
Total	65,950

(Source: Mirak, "Armenian Emigration".¹⁷)

Deaths in war and civil upheaval were not the most significant cause of decrease in the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire before World War I. Civilian mortality accompanied the

¹⁵ See Appendix Two.

¹⁶ Figures quoted in Sarkis J. Karajian (Karayan), "An Inquiry into the Statistics of the Turkish Genocide of the Armenians, 1915-1918", *The Armenian Review*, Boston, 25/4 (Winter 1972), p. 22. They can only be taken as very rough estimates. In the same article Karayan decreases the actual numbers of Armenian migrants to the United States by one-third and vastly overstates Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire, as well as misstating Ottoman statistics. However, in this section he only quotes others, and the numbers of pre-World War I migrants to Europe, Canada, and Latin America are so small that they have little effect on calculations.

¹⁷ Robert Mirak, "Armenian Emigration to the United States to 1915", *Journal of Armenian Studies*, 1/1 (1975), pp. 5-42.

Russian invasions of Anatolia in 1828, 1855, and 1877, and the Armenians were naturally a part of that mortality. Unless reliable statistical evidence of differential loss is found, it must be assumed that the proportion of Armenian deaths was approximately the same as that of Muslims and other groups, leaving the figure for the Armenian proportion of the population unaffected. Armenian mortality (like Muslim mortality) in the rebellions of Kurdish tribes in 1834, 1836, 1847, and 1879 is unknown. However, the effect of civil disorder was most likely that the Armenian population did not grow, just as the Muslim population did not grow, in the period before 1878.

Outside of wartime, the greatest amount of Armenian mortality took place in the provinces of İstanbul, Van, Erzurum, Adana, and Haleb (northern) during Armenian demonstrations and rebellions in the 1890s and in the Adana rebellion of 1909. The number of deaths, both Muslim and Armenian, has been the subject of much contention. The careful study of Kâmurân Gürün indicates that 20,000 Armenians died in the events of the 1890s.¹⁸ Between 17,000 and 20,000 Armenians died in the 1909 rebellion in Adana.¹⁹

Table Four. Armenians Before 1912, Estimates.*

Year	Population
1900	1,527,000
1880	1,226,000
1860	1,223,000
1840	1,292,000
1820	1,254,000

* in the area of the Ottoman Empire in 1912.

Table Four projects the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire (1912 borders) back to earlier dates, taking into account

¹⁸ *The Armenian File: the Myth of Innocence Exposed*, London, K. Rustem & Bro. and Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd., 1985, pp. 127-162. Figures as high as 300,000 dead have been given for the period, but such massive mortality would have left denuded regions and demographic effects that would be most noticeable and were not, in fact, present. Gürün's estimate may, in fact, be an underenumeration, and the actual numbers may have reached 30,000. There is, however, no way to establish this, and it is only an educated guess. It seems better to use Gürün's figures, admitting the possibility of an underestimation.

¹⁹ See *Death and Exile*, pp. 119-121.

mortality from war and civil disturbance and out-migration as delineated above. Outbreaks of plague and cholera have not been calculated, because their effect on eastern Anatolia is largely unknown. These figures are crude estimates, based on available information. They should not be taken as anything but approximate. Too much is unknown of the environment of the early 19th century to make more accurate projections.²⁰

The increase of the Armenian population from 1880 to 1912 was primarily due to the general lessening of mortality that was seen by all groups of Ottoman Anatolia and Europe after the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War. Improvements in civil order and transportation extended life spans and, in particular, decreased infant mortality. Prior to 1880 the cause of Armenian population decrease was primarily migration to the Russian Empire and the United States. Due to unsettled conditions, rebellions, and warfare, Armenian natural increase before 1878 must have been at or near zero, as it was for other population groups.

World War I and the Turkish War of Independence

During World War I, the Armenians of Ottoman Anatolia were caught up in the worst disaster to strike the modern Middle East. Estimates of the number of Ottoman Armenians who died in World War I and the Turkish War of Independence that followed have grown larger over the years. At the end of the wartime period, Armenian representatives to the Paris Peace Conference and Armenian publicists estimated that 600,000 to 800,000 had died. In recent times, the figure 1.5 million is frequently asserted, sometimes rising to 2.5 million in less temperate pronouncements. Even the smaller of these numbers would mean that nearly all the Armenians died, a contention belied by the existence of those making the estimates.

The method of finding the actual number of Armenian dead is deceptively simple—subtract the number of Armenians who survived the wars from those who were present at war's beginning. This does not strictly provide statistics of mortality, but rather "population loss", because an unknowable number of children were born in the wartime period and a number of adults and children would have died of natural causes under normal

²⁰ The figures for natural increase from 1878 to 1912 are those found in **Muslims and Minorities** for the provinces with significant Armenian populations. They average to a growth rate of approximately .013 per year.

circumstances. The result, however, is a good surrogate for mortality.

It is commonly believed that the Armenians of Ottoman Anatolia were nearly all deported to the Arab Provinces, and that high Armenian mortality was a result of the deportation. This was not the case. Because some deportees who were sent to Syria and Iraq moved to Egypt and Europe during and after the wars and some returned to Anatolia, it is impossible to estimate the number of the deportees with absolute accuracy. It can be seen, however, that the largest group of Armenian refugees were those who fled to the Southern Caucasus. These were not deported to Syria or Iraq. They fled north in three waves: The Russian Army invaded eastern Anatolia in May of 1915, relieving the Armenians of Van, who had seized the city from the Ottomans. When the Russian Army was temporarily forced to retreat from Anatolia, the Armenians of the region the Russians had conquered accompanied them. The Russians returned in 1916, conquering most of eastern Anatolia, and many Armenians returned to their homes. In 1918, the Ottomans advanced, and Armenians departed for the Southern Caucasus once again. Many of these returned after the Ottomans surrendered to the Allies in October of 1918, but they left once again when Turkish Republican forces retook the region in 1920. The 400,000 refugees in the USSR in Table Five were the survivors of a much larger group. Contemporary accounts indicate that the refugees starved to death in great numbers, even being forced to resort to cannibalism. Well in excess of 500,000 must have gone north. In addition, many, perhaps most, of the Armenians who went to Europe and the Americas were never deported. Those who fled to Iran were likewise not deported. It can thus be seen that most Anatolian Armenians were not deported, although their fate as refugees was misery and death.

More Armenians were forced migrants from the eastern Anatolia war than were deported, and they unquestionably suffered higher mortality. Muslims joined in their suffering. When the Russians and Armenians advanced it was the turn of the Muslims to flee. More than a million Muslims were forced migrants.

There were 1,465 million Armenians in Ottoman Anatolia in 1912, before the wars began. (This does not include the 28,000 Armenian residents of Southern Haleb Province, which became part of Syria after the world war nor the Armenians of Istanbul Province and Ottoman Europe, who were neither killed nor deported during World War I, although some were conscripted.) At

wars' end, 881,000 remained alive, a loss of 584,000, or 41%.²¹ Most of these were victims of the war fought between the Muslims and Armenians between 1915 and 1920, directly or indirectly through starvation and disease. To put the Armenian loss into perspective, it should be noted that the Muslims of the war zone suffered equally horrific loss: The Muslim population of the Van Province decreased by 62%, that of Bitlis by 42%, that of Erzurum by 31%. Not coincidentally, these were the provinces of greatest conflict between Ottoman and Russian armies and between Muslim and Armenian civilians.

Table Five. Armenian Survivors

Surviving Armenian Migrants To	Number	Surviving Armenian Migrants To	Number
USSR	400,000	Syria	100,000
Greece	45,000	Lebanon	50,000
France	30,000	Iraq	25,000
Bulgaria	20,000	Palestine&Jordan	10,000
Cyprus	2,500	Egypt	40,000
Other European Countries*	2,000	Iran	50,000
North America	35,380	Others†	1,000
Total Refugees		810,000	
Remaining in Turkey		70,000	
Total		880,000	

* Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Italy, United Kingdom.

† Japan, China, India, Latin America.

(Source: McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities*)

²¹ Note that this figure includes mortality in western Anatolia during the war between the Turks and the Greeks. It is also necessary to note that these figures on Armenian mortality do not take into account those Armenians who converted to Islam and remained behind in eastern Anatolia. Enumeration by language group was imprecise in the 1927 Turkish census and, in any case, many of these Armenians spoke Turkish or Kurdish as their primary language and would have been so registered. These Armenians were counted as Armenian in the Ottoman pre-war registration and Muslim in the Turkish census. This has the effect of falsely increasing Armenian mortality, because Armenians after the war were subtracted from Armenians before the war to arrive at the figure population loss. Muslim mortality is correspondingly falsely decreased. The numbers involved are relatively small.

The massive mortality in Anatolia was the product of total war in which no quarter was given, as well as years in which no crops were harvested and disease ravaged populations already ravaged by hunger. All shared starvation and disease; each side killed the other mercilessly. It is no wonder that death tolls were so high. Those who elevate the mortality of one group or ignore the mortality of another mistake the lesson of the times, which is not of persecutors and the oppressed, but of general inhumanity.

Appendix One. Russian and Armenian Statistics

The Russian Empire took only one actual census in the Southern Caucasus. Like all population counts in the region, it was imperfect. Its figures, however, were the best available, because they were the only ones based on actual enumeration of the population. Though the discrepancy was less than that seen for the Ottoman Empire, the actual figures and "Armenian Patriarchate" figures for the Southern Caucasus were quite different.

Table Six. Armenian and Russian Statistics on Armenian Population in the Southern Caucasus.

Province	Armenian Statistics 1914	Russian Census 1897
Erivan	669,871	439,926
Elizavetpol	418,859	298,790
Kars	118,217	72,967
Tiflis	414,277	230,379
Baku	120,067	52,770
Chernomorsk	18,061	6,223
Daghestan	4,752	1,652
Kutais	38,455	24,505
Total	1,802,529	1,127,212

Some of the discrepancy between the two sets of data can be explained by the seventeen years between the two statements, but not very much. Under the best of conditions, the Armenian population might have increased by 300,000 in those seventeen years. This would still leave a discrepancy of more than 350,000. In-migration of Armenians in the period could only account for a small portion of the difference. As there were no independent

Armenian sources of information on the population (and no one has asserted that the Russians ever allowed an army of Armenian census-takers to spread out across the region), it must be assumed that the Armenian Patriarchate Statistics on the Southern Caucasus, like those for the Ottoman Empire, were simply invented. Interestingly, the author of the Patriarchate Statistics did not much undercount Muslims in the Southern Caucasus. Armenian numbers were artificially inflated, but Muslim numbers left relatively unchanged.

Appendix Two: Armenian Migration to the Southern Caucasus

Except for major migrations resulting from wars, there is very little evidence on migration of Armenians from the Ottoman Empire to Russia. It is known that this migration existed, but no registration figures have been found. Most likely the Armenian migrants were never counted. This has not kept some from making fanciful estimations: Supposedly a yearly average of 10,000 Armenians went to Russia from 1845 to 1870, 15,000 a year from 1870 to 1900, and a total of 150,000 from 1900 to 1914.²² Ignoring the fact that such a massive migration would have been mentioned in Ottoman documents and European consular reports, which it is not, statistical analysis proves it to have been impossible.

In order to analyze various statements on migration to Russia, a simple computer program projected the Armenian population of the Russian Southern Caucasus from the figures in the 1897 census back to 1826 (immediately before the Russians conquered the Erivan Province—"Russian Armenia"). The program assumed various rates of natural increase (i.e., without major migration). When the figures for migration estimated in this article (1828-29 War: 50,000; Crimean War: 50,000; 1877-78 War: 25,000; and yearly migration of 1,000 in other years), the resulting population for 1826 is reasonable—between 395,000 Armenians (.01 yearly growth rate) to 613,000 Armenians (.005 growth rate) in the Southern Caucasus. The actual figures lay somewhere in between these two extremes. If the fanciful estimations of migration as given above are used in the program, there would have been only between 26,000 (.01 rate) and 144,000 (.005 rate) Armenians in the entire Southern Caucasus in 1826. These figures are absurdly

²² See the sources listed in Karajian, p. 21.

small, far below any estimates, including those of Armenian scholars.²³

The 1897 Russian census supports these conclusions: The census registered 10,187 of the inhabitants of the Erivan Province, 38,664 of the Kars Province, and 101,066 in the entire Southern Caucasus as born in the Ottoman Empire. Figures for Armenians alone are not available, and these figures include many non-Armenians.

The only inference that can be drawn is that the estimates of large-scale migration from the Ottoman Empire to Russia outside of years of war and immediately following war are totally unrealistic. As stated in this article, the estimate of migration in "normal" years of 1,000 is speculation, but it is speculation that fits the demographic possibilities. It thus cannot be far from the truth.

Appendix Three. Armenian Patriarchate Statistics

A set of Armenian Patriarchate Statistics, drawn from the Armenian Archives, was published by Raymond H. Kévorkian and Paul B. Paboudjian in 1992.²⁴ It appears to be far superior to the other "Patriarchate Statistics". According to this source, the Armenian Patriarch collected this data from Armenian bishops throughout the Ottoman Empire in 1913. The most likely explanation of these statistics is that an order went out to the Armenian bishops, who took Ottoman statistics and local information from Armenian parishes, correcting them for perceived undercounts. As might be expected, this produced some exaggeration. However, comparison to Ottoman data corrected by demographic techniques does not show great differences. For some cases, the corrected Ottoman data shows more Armenians than does the Armenian data. It is to be hoped that a more complete set of the Armenian data will be published, as the authors promise. It should be possible to give a better evaluation of this data. It would be especially valuable to investigate material on how the data was collected.

²³ Various other assumptions, including very low or nonexistent growth rates before the 1870s, return similar results. Under any reasonable assumptions, the population record does not support the possibility of large-scale migration.

²⁴ Raymond H. Kévorkian and Paul B. Paboudjian, *Les Arméniens dans l'Empire Ottoman à la veille du génocide*, Paris, 1992, Chapter IV. I thank the professor who acquainted me with these statistics.

Table Seven. Patriarch Statistics for 1913.

Province	Population	Armenian Province	Armenian Population
İstanbul	163,670	Konya	20,738
Edirne	30,316	Adana	119,414
Hüdavendigâr	118,992	Haleb	189,565
Aydın	21,145	Bitlis	218,404
İzmit	61,675	Mamuretülaziz	124,289
Kastamonu	13,461	Diyarbakır	106,867
Trabzon	73,395	Van	110,897
Sivas	204,472	Erzurum	202,391
Ankara	135,869		

Total 1,914,620²⁵

None of the conclusions drawn in this article on Armenian population would be upset if the slightly higher figures in these patriarchate statistics were true, with the exception of the number of Armenians who were lost during the World War I period, adding approximately 250,000 to the death toll. In fact, these figures provide support from an Armenian source for the above analysis of the demographic place of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.

²⁵ The figures as printed add up to 1,915,560.




Figure One: Muslims and Armenians in Anatolia, İstanbul, and Edirne.




Figure Two: Population in the Six Vilâyet and Cilicia.




Figure Three: Armenians per square kilometer.

THE 1915 ARMENIAN REVOLT IN VAN: EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY

Hüseyin Çelik

Van is a city in eastern Anatolia, situated on the shores of the lake bearing its name, where Muslims and Armenians lived together for centuries in peace. Islamic armies first conquered the region in 638 but it is known that the Abbasids acquired the basic hegemony after the last quarter of the 9th century.¹ In the city, in which the Ayyubids, Khwarizmshahs, Seljuks, Karakoyunlus, Mongols, Akkoyunlus, Ottomans, Safavids and again Ottomans held sway, the Armenian population continued to live until the First World War. According to the Ottoman traveller Evliya Çelebi, who came to Van in 1653, the only non-Muslims who lived in the city were Armenians.² Certainly, not a single document has been uncovered showing Greeks, Jews or other non-Muslims resident in the city.

The Armenians, wherever they were, remained loyal to the Ottoman state up to the last quarter of the 19th century. One of the first signs that Armenian loyalties were beginning to shift occurred in 1878 when, following their defeat of the Ottomans, Russian forces temporarily occupied the İstanbul suburb of Yeşilköy (Ayos Stefanos). There the commander of the Russian army was visited by the Armenian Patriarch Nerses Varjabendanyan, who requested that he convey to Grand Duke Nicholas his desire that an Armenian state be established in eastern Anatolia under the patronage of the Russians.

The Province of Van was at the center of the area envisaged by the Patriarch for his proposed independent Armenia state. It and neighbouring Bitlis were the two Ottoman provinces with the largest Armenian populations. According to the 1914 official

¹ Hakkı Dursun Yıldız, *İslâmiyet ve Türkler*, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1980, p. 154.

² Orhan Kılıç, *XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıllarda Van*, Van, Van Belediye Başkanlığı, Kültür ve Sosyal İşler Müdürlüğü, 1996, p. 253.

population statistics for the city of Van, it contained 67,792 Armenians and 179,389 Muslims.³ One has to keep in mind that the administrative district of Adilcevaz, which today is attached to the Province of Bitlis, was at that time a provincial subdivision of Van. According to the aforementioned statistics, the ratio of Muslims to Armenians in the city of Van itself was three to one.

The first rebellion that the Armenians carried out in Van was in 1895. According to the testimony of the Russian General Mayewski, also Tsarist Consul-General in Van and later in Erzurum, the Armenian revolutionary committees who incited the rebellion went so far as to brutally murder those Armenians who opposed their terror and anarchy. Typical of these actions was the murder on 6 January 1895, of the Priest Boghos who was struck down while on his way to church.⁴ Most of the incidents that occurred in Van were not perpetrated by local Armenians but rather by outsiders, in particular by Russian Armenians. General Mayewski while at every opportunity describing the losses suffered by the Armenians in the course of the 1895 rebellion, provides one passage in which he acknowledges that the suffering was in no way one sided: "Nevertheless, the losses among the Turks during the course of these events (no one ever even recalls this), added up to a large total. No one could make a move to protect the Muslims against the bombs of the Armenian rebels who were in revolt".⁵

Prior to the Second Constitutional period, the Armenians who were always creating problems at every opportunity used the administration of Sultan Abdülhamid II as an excuse. Neither did the declaration of the Second Constitution satisfy them. Van's British Vice-Consul, Lieutenant Bertram Dickson, provided detailed information about the activities of the Armenians in Van in a report dated 30 September 1908, that he dispatched to the British Ambassador, Sir Gerard Lowther, in İstanbul.⁶ According to Dickson, the Armenians had two parties in Van—the Dashnag and the Armenakan. The Dashnags at the same time enjoyed close political relations with yet another Armenian party, that of the

³ Azmi Süslü, *Ermeniler ve 1915 Tehcir Olayı*, Ankara, Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü Yayınları, 1990, p. 22.

⁴ General Mayewski, *Van ve Bitlis Vilayetleri Askeri İstatistiği*, tr. Mehmet Sadık, ed. Hamit Pehlivanlı, Van, Van Belediyesi Yayınları, 1997, p. 77.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁶ Salâhi R. Sonyel, *İngiliz Gizli Belgelerine Göre Adana'da Vuku Bulan Türk-Ermeni Olayları*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988, pp. 7-10 (Note 371/560/1/37689).

Hinchags. In the first parliamentary elections held in the aftermath of the Second Constitution, it was the Dashnags who had Dr. Varhad Papazyan elected parliamentarian from Van. The Armenakan candidate Terzibaşıyan lost the election. The Dashnags were basically much more a revolutionary organisation than a political party. The leaders of this organisation in Van were Aram, Doctor Papazyan, Sarkis and İşhan. None of these were natives of Van, rather they had all come to the city from Russia. With the proclamation of the Second Constitution all of the Armenian revolutionaries who had been incarcerated for one or another crime were freed. British Vice-Consul Dickson also states in his report that the Armenians in Van and vicinity had been secretly armed, that these weapons had come from Russia, and many Armenian revolutionaries and volunteers were walking around Van.

The purpose behind the stockpiling of weapons by the Armenian revolutionary committees became clear in the spring of 1915, just one year after the Young Turk government took the decision to enter what became the First World War on the side of Germany. In late March of that year, shortly after the Russian armies had begun driving south into north-west Anatolia, the Armenian revolutionary committees in Van staged an armed uprising with the intent of assisting the Russian advance by seizing control of this key city. It was this successful act of wartime treason that ultimately led the government to adopt the decision to deport Armenians away from the state's frontier zones.

Between the years 1978 and 1981, I conducted interviews in Van with elderly citizens who had witnessed the Armenian revolt in Van in 1915 and the subsequent Russian occupation. I recorded their memories of that era on tape. The interviews with these grandfathers and grandmothers were subsequently published in 1993 as a book entitled: **Görenlerin Gözüyle Van'da Ermeni Mezalimi (The Armenian Uprising in Van Through the Eyes of Witnesses)**. The tapes of all of these eyewitnesses whom I interviewed nearly twenty years ago are preserved in my personal archive and available to any interested scholar. Today, two decades later, all of the twenty people with whom I spoke about their memories of the Armenian issue are deceased. The testimonies which are cited in this study are all those of individuals who actually witnessed the events they describe. In each case their personal identity documents (birth certificates, military

documents, etc.) were examined and photographed for posterity. In most instances, the children and grandchildren of these eyewitnesses are still living in Van today and are among my constituents.

The people whose eyewitness accounts I recorded (and whose testimonies are cited throughout this paper), are the following: Nafia Çabuker, Ahmet Çinkılıç, Zahide Coşkun, İbrahim Sargın, İsmail Perihanoglu, Şadiye Talay, Celâl Şener, Bekir Yörük, Akif Yurtbay, Hacı Ömer Selçuk, Hacı Şevket Çaldağ, Mehmet Delibaş, Hamit Ekinci, Hamit Camuşçu, Cemâl Talay, İsmail Başibüyük, Refik Özkanlı, Mustafa Boysan, Salih Taşçı and Osman Gemicioğlu.

Additionally, in the booklet *Zeve*, published in 1963 by the Van Tanıma ve Tanıtma Derneği (Association for the Promotion and Recognition of Van), are recorded the testimonies of Hamza Dayı, Güllü Bacı, Esmâ Nine, Menveşe Bacı, Nafia Ana and Kıymet Başibüyük, as well as an interview with Mehmet Reşit Efendi conducted by Dr. Ergünöz Akçora.⁷ As these individuals were deceased or unavailable at the time I was conducting my interviews (1978-1981), I have occasionally utilised their testimonies in *Zeve* for comparative purposes.

Collecting the memories of the eyewitnesses under certain rubrics will provide us a better understanding of the topic:

The Pre-1915 Status of the Van Armenians & Relations with the Muslims

All the eyewitnesses with whom I met spoke of the very good relations they had enjoyed with the Armenians. Zahide Coşkun of Köprüköy said: "We had Armenian neighbours both in our village (at the time she was living in the village of Göllü) and in the neighbouring villages. We got on with these neighbours of ours just as we got on with Muslims. Everything was good. Later, the world was suddenly spoiled. Our Armenian neighbours betrayed us".⁸ İbrahim Sargın from the village of Zeve said that "from time to time some quarrels had broken out between Armenians and Muslims

⁷ Ergünöz Akçora, "Yaşayanların Diliyle Van ve Çevresinde Ermeni Mezalimi", *Yakın Tarihimizde Van Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, Ankara, Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1990, pp. 149-154.

⁸ Hüseyin Çelik, *Görenlerin Gözüyle Van'da Ermeni Mezalimi*, Ankara, Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1993, p. 38.

but these had been the same kinds of arguments that happened between two Muslim neighbours".⁹

According to Celâl Şener, "the Armenians of Van led a very comfortable life. All of the trades and crafts were in their hands. From the shoemaker to the tailor, all of them were Armenian. They were the richest people in the area. They even sent their children to Europe for their education. These youngsters who went to Europe were misled there".¹⁰ What Bekir Yörük related corroborated the statements of Celâl Şener: "In Van there were nearly a thousand shops. Eighty percent of these belonged to the Armenians. Trade, profits, crafts were in their hands. We got on well with those non-believers. Until the time, the Hinchag and Dashnag committees began interfering; it was at that time that everything was spoiled. The Armenian youngsters were enrolled in these committees".¹¹

In local elections held after the proclamation of the Second Constitution, the people of Van elected an Armenian, Bedros Kapamacıyan as mayor. Bekir Yörük evaluated the election of an Armenian as mayor in a city where the majority of the inhabitants were Muslims, in the following way: "We Muslims also gave our support to him. Our people had confidence that he would be the most successful".¹² According to Mehmet Delibaş, Kapamacıyan really carried out an impartial mayoralty. Because he fined an Armenian shopkeeper, that is because he did not support the Armenians outright, the head of the Dashnag committee in Van, Aram Paşa, blacklisted him, and his own son was ordered to kill him. Mayor Kapamacıyan's son was taken to a tavern and liberally plied with liquor, and then he killed his own father with five bullets as the mayor was passing through the city in his carriage.¹³ In İsmail Başibüyük's statement Kapamacıyan was not just a very rich Armenian, prior to becoming Mayor, he was known as someone who never left an Armenian without work or a trade.¹⁴ Mehmet Reşit Efendi, who was interested in the fact that Kapamacıyan had been killed by his own son, said: "They (the revolutionaries) were also not letting those Armenians who would

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 54.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

not help them live. For example, there was a mayor here. If I'm not mistaken, his name was Kapamacıyan, and they had his son kill him because he wasn't being very supportive of them".¹⁵

In 1915 it was not just the crafts and trades that were in the hands of the Armenians. Four-hundred ships and sailing vessels, large and small, that handled the transport on Lake Van, also belonged to the Armenians. On this subject Hacı Şevket Çaldağ said: "Almost all the seamen were Armenian. Certainly, most of the craftsmen in Van and the traders were Armenian. There wasn't one in a thousand who would take Muslim children on as apprentices".¹⁶ Another eyewitness, Mehmet Delibaş, could not continue without describing as follows his exceptional situation of having been a shoemaker's apprentice to an Armenian named Cengüloğlu Agop in Van at the time that World War I started: "The Armenians never easily took us Muslims on as apprentices. But, however, it happened that this man took me to work for him as an apprentice".¹⁷

There is one particular truth that all of the eyewitnesses agreed upon and that was the fact that shipping on Lake Van was exclusively in Armenian hands. So, the last name of Hacı Osman Gemicioğlu (Ship Owner's Son), with whom I had an interview in 1981, surprised me. How can one be a Muslim from Van and at the same time have the last name Gemicioğlu? I said to Hacı Osman Efendi: "There is a problem here. Either you are not from Van and in fact are from the Black Sea region, or there is something wrong with your last name". When I said this, Gemicioğlu told me that he was originally an Armenian whose family were seamen who lived in the ferry-landing village.

If one were to look at what both written sources and eyewitnesses relate, the Armenians may be seen to have generally lived on the shores of the lake and in villages with productive fields, while the Kurds were more likely to be found in mountain villages. In 1915 the Van Armenians' educational situation in terms of reading and writing was much better than that of the Muslims. Prior to the beginning of their resettlement, the

¹⁵ Akçora, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

¹⁶ Çelik, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

Armenians had two newspapers called **Van Kartalı** and **Araratlı** that were published in Van.¹⁸

The Second Constitution and the Armenians

According to what Britain's Van Vice-Consul Dickson related, with the proclamation of the Second Constitution the Armenians were granted previously unrecognized legal provisions. With the proclamation of the Second Constitution, all those prisoners and those being held in custody who were Armenians and who claimed the largest contribution for the new regime, were freed. Dickson evaluated the winds of freedom that blew following the Second Constitution in the following manner: "The Armenians in Turkey will possess a freedom unequalled up to now".¹⁹

Eyewitness Celâl Şener, evaluated the situation following the proclamation of the Second Constitution as follows: "Before the war began the Armenians had a very enjoyable life,"²⁰ Mehmet Delibaş who worked as an apprentice for an Armenian shoemaker summarized developments following the proclamation of the Second Constitution this way:

"One morning when I opened the shop, the master said to me, 'stay here for I have to go some place. After a bit, the master went. When he returned, he said, 'Now there is freedom. Freedom has been announced; we are going to celebrate it'. In those days words like 'Freedom, Justice, Equality, Long Live the Nation' were on everybody's lips. Our Muslims and the Armenians celebrated freedom together. In town the drums and flutes began to play. The Armenians were very happy about this. They were much more excited than we were. After there was freedom, strangers began to frequent my master's shop...We also were thinking that everything was over now that there was freedom. Our religious teachers and their priests embraced one another. In short, as events proved later, they deceived us".²¹

As for Mehmet Reşit Efendi, he corroborated Şener and Delibaş, saying, "At the time of the Second Constitution things like Freedom, Equality and Justice only helped to spoil them even

¹⁸ Kâmuran Gürün, **Ermeni Dosyası**, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983, p. 165.

¹⁹ Sonyel, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

²⁰ Çelik, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

more".²² The atmosphere that the Second Constitution produced became an occasion in which all kinds of separatist activities could occur more freely. From the beginning it was inescapable that the Armenian revolutionary committees that were in contact with the Young Turks over bringing a constitutional administration to the country, following the overthrow of Sultan Abdülhamid II, would sufficiently benefit from the proclamation of freedom.

No Local Armenian Support for Revolt

All the eyewitnesses were in agreement that initially none of the local Van Armenians, especially those who lived in the city, had any intention of rebelling. However, the eyewitnesses also agreed that once the Russian Armenians, and the revolutionary committees that they directed misled the local Armenians, they got the same idea. One may take a look at what the eyewitnesses had to say on this subject:

Celâl Şener: "When the time came that the committees formed in Van, it was then that the Armenians began to be led astray. Basically, most of the Armenians who were natives of Van were not supporters of rebellion".²³ Bekir Yörük: "At the time the Hinchag and Dashnag committees laid hands on the matter, everything was spoiled. The Armenian youngsters were enrolled in these committees".²⁴ Akif Yurtbay: "We were living together with the Armenians in Van. At first, there was not even the slightest mutual aversion between us. Later, the committees began to appear in Van. Everyday many Armenians who weren't from Van were coming to our town. These foreigners were continually agitating our local Armenians to rebel. They were all coming from Russia. The committees in Van were commanded by an unbeliever named Aram Paşa".²⁵ Hacı Ömer Selçuk: "The Armenians lived for years without paying any particular attention to the government. The committees were the reason why we clashed with the Armenians. The committees continually agitated the people. The committee members were constantly running up against our soldiers. Before the committees were agitating they never were injured by us nor we by them. At the time when the committees settled in Van, they agitated the locals, and so the Armenians were diverted and led

²² Ergünöz, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-150.

²³ Çelik, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

astray. If not, our people would absolutely never have put them in an unjust position. For years they lived with our ancestors. The Russians and the other states promised them autonomy. They gave them weapons and money".²⁶ Hacı Şevket Çaldağ: "If the committees hadn't agitated, the local Armenians in Van wouldn't have raised a voice. All the opportunities were in their hands".²⁷

Mehmet Delibaş narrates how in the 1970s he met an Armenian originally from Van named Karapit Nedeniyan selling carpets in İstanbul's Grand Bazaar and how regretful the latter was. He said: "Ah, they were the reason, may their homes be destroyed! We were living so beautifully. We were enjoying a good life that the Muslims did not have. They deceived our young people and got them to work for their own aspirations. Now, we're scattered everywhere around the world".²⁸ In the same vein, Şeyh Mehmet Reşit Efendi, who was one of the most respected people in Van, relates how he met an Armenian tradesman in Mosul who was originally from Van, and when they embraced he spoke of his longing for his homeland: "May God curse that Aram Paşa. He was the one who deceived us saying that he would establish a state for us. Instead, he set fire to us. We have never forgotten the humanity that we saw from the Turks. While those had won the world for us, while they treated us with benevolence, we kicked them. It was because of this that God visited calamity on us. We were scattered everywhere".²⁹ That Armenian tradesman was one of the thousands who had reached Mosul from Van unmolested. According to Boghos Nubar, the head of the Armenian Delegation at Versailles (1919), 360,000 of them reached their destinations.

Similar statements fill the testimony of the eyewitnesses: For instance, Hamit Çavuşçu: "There was a time when I was attending the Armenian Central School in order to improve my French. There the Armenian priest and the teachers looking right into our eyes were filling the Armenian youngsters with the seeds of hatred and anger against the Muslims".³⁰ Refik Özkanlı: "When the Armenian youths established committees, then the Armenians openly showed their enmity towards us".³¹ Müştak Boysan: "The

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

²⁹ Ergünöz, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

³⁰ Çelik, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

Armenians rebelled in Van twenty years prior to the beginning of the war. But before the war began, in general, they seemed good to our faces. What I've said was the attitude of the tradesmen and local Armenians. But those who came from Russia, and the Armenian youths who had gone to Europe and been educated there, tried to belittle the Muslims with condescending words".³² Salih Taşçı: "The elderly Armenians were not supportive of the rebellion. However, the youngsters who had been educated in Europe forced them to get involved".³³ Osman Gemicioğlu: "If you want the truth, the Armenians in Van who were in their right minds did not support the rebellion. Because why should they revolt? Everything was in the hands of the Armenians; the entire wealth was theirs. As soon as the committees were established, they forced the tradesmen to revolt. They were looking at anyone who did not join in as if he was a traitor".³⁴

The reports from the English Consulate fully endorse the tone of what we have given above as extracts from the eyewitnesses. In the aforementioned reports it is stated openly that the Armenian revolutionary committees resorted to violence against those Armenians who did not approve and join them.³⁵

The Arming of the Armenians

All the eyewitnesses I interviewed spoke of the very secretive manner that the Armenians were armed in anticipation of a widespread rebellion. The biggest weapons cache in Van was uncovered, thanks to the warning of an Armenian. The story is as follows: An Armenian youth named Davit, himself a member of the revolutionary gang, was in love with an Armenian girl named Vatan. Davit, in order to get married had to obtain permission from Aram Paşa (Aram Manukyan), because he happened to be a Dashnag member. However, Aram Paşa did not give Davit permission to marry in spite of the latter's protestations. At this point Davut broke with Aram Paşa, who immediately put a black cross against Davit's name. He gave the order to kill Davit to his closest friend, Dacat, who, nevertheless, warned Davit to escape and disappear. In response, Davit not only became a Muslim, he went further and provided the authorities all the information he

³² *Ibid.*, p. 90.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

³⁵ Sonyel, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-10.

possessed about the locations of all the Armenians' weapons caches. Davit was inducted as a lieutenant in the Turkish army, and took the name Mehmet. He was subsequently known as "Mehmet the Informer". One day, in the Quarter of Hamamönü Davit ran into Dacat. He did not deem it likely that his friend would kill him but Dacat shot Davit to death.³⁶

Following Davit's warning, in many localities in which the Armenians were located, and in particular at Yedikilise, and in schools and churches, large amounts of weapons and munitions were confiscated. The British Vice-Consul in Van (Dickson), in a report that he wrote on 31 March 1909, drew attention to the arming of the Armenians in Van.³⁷

All the eyewitnesses stated that the Armenian weapons smuggled into Van had been hidden in kerosene barrels that were transported by camels to the region. Finally, in April 1915, when the Armenian revolt began in Van it became all too clear just how well the Armenians had been armed. Rafael de Nogales, a Venezuelan, who served as an officer in the Ottoman army against the Armenians during the Van rebellion, wrote, in his memoirs: **Four Years Beneath the Crescent**,³⁸ (Cuatro Años bajo la Media Luna) of the extent to which the Armenians were well armed. In this work, which is generally supportive of the Armenian position, he says the following concerning the Armenian revolt which began in early 1915: "The difficulties that the Armenians who were fighting to the last breath for Armenia's place and the victory of the pious amid the blackened ruins of their homes gave us were great. But I curse the time I spent working for the disaster of my religious brethren because of bad luck".³⁹ He frequently speaks of the Armenians' superiority in weapons *vis-à-vis* the Muslims. However, what must not escape the eye is that the weapons in the hands of

³⁶ For versions of this incident related by different eyewitnesses, see Çelik, *op. cit.*, pp. 63, 71 and 78.

³⁷ Sonyel, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

³⁸ Nögalis (name so spelled in the Turkish version) was an adventure-seeking officer who applied to the allied powers to be a soldier but he was refused. Later he came to İstanbul, met Enver Paşa and began service as an expert in the Third Army. He was assigned to Governor Cevdet Bey in the province of Van with the permission of Goze, the German officer commanding the Third Army. For details of his position and Nögalis' lack of consistency, see Rafael de Nögalis, **Hilâl Altında Dört Yıl ve Buna Ait Bir Cevap**, tr. and criticized by District Officer Hakkı, İstanbul, Büyük Erkan-ı Harbiye Reisliği Onuncu Şubesi Yayını, 1971, pp. 58-76.

³⁹ Rafael de Nögalis, **Hilâl Altında Dört Yıl**, çeviren ve tenkit eden Kaymakam Hakkı, İstanbul, Büyük Erkan-ı Harbiye Reisliği Onuncu Şubesi Yayını, 1931, p. 20.

the Muslims belonged to the Ottoman state, while the weapons in Armenian hands belonged to the separatist Armenian revolutionary committees in a province that was a sovereign part of the Ottoman state. Nogales describes how:

"The Armenians were well armed with Mauser pistols. They obtained good results with these pistols at short range. They were really like machine guns. They fired four or six pistols mostly at the same time at the same target. Apart from this, they had invented a type of bore screw. With this they quickly penetrated the brick walls of houses. After the Armenians fired from one place, pistols would begin to appear from many of the holes in another; until we understood what form our duty had to take, these handed out death with their fire".⁴⁰

Nogales reported that the Armenians had been through a long period of preparation for the rebellion and had prepared resistance places in eighty commanding positions. He adds: "The Bağlar district [the place where today's Van has been established. H.Ç.] consists of separate summer residences surrounded on the sides by brick walls. The Armenians skilfully bound each one of these residences to each other and strengthened the places by this means. Other Armenians from this installation that could resist our artillery, had made 80 support positions around Van; the firepower from these commanded the surrounding areas".⁴¹

What linked the Armenian houses together, as mentioned by Nogales, were skilfully constructed subterranean tunnels. The overwhelming majority of the eyewitnesses I interviewed mentioned these tunnels, and describe how the Armenians communicated with one another by this means and supported each other with weapons and men. Again, by means of the same tunnels they could reach Muslim houses or military positions and blow them up. In his day-by-day description of the Van rebellion, Nogales' entry for 28 April 1915, describes how the Armenians blew up half of the Reşadiye district by these means. The note he provides on this incident reads as follows: "Today the Armenians with the help of a sewer blew up half of the Reşadiye district; in this district Captain Reşit Bey and the Bargiri District Officer had been in

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

control of the large part of Bağlar District through their firepower".⁴²

Nogales speaks not only about the weapons that the Armenians had stockpiled in anticipation of revolt, but also about the artillery pieces they had manufactured. He says:

"The artillery in the hands of the besieged [Armenians - H.Ç.] were shells that they themselves had personally manufactured. They would keep this artillery inside brick houses; they could easily dispatch these everywhere from among the houses to corners, entrances and streets that could be defended from barricades. The Armenians had in their houses in addition to thousands of Mauser pistols, many carbines and rifles; they had purchased and stored these for years. Among the Armenians there were also ample hand grenades that could cause us great damage".⁴³

Almost all the eyewitnesses recalled with bitterness the troubles they experienced due to the superior state of the weapons in the hands of the Armenians, and complained about those distributed by the government, as being basic old-fashioned rifles. Hamza Dayı from Şeyhine village even related with great chagrin how during the clash with the Armenians at the village of Zeve, the primitive rifles' barrels exploded after just a few shots.⁴⁴ On the one side there were rifles that were cooled down by rubbing them with onions to prevent the barrels from exploding, and on the other modern weapons brought from Russia.

Nogales, in spite of all his pro-Armenian sympathy, could not refrain from making the following comment: "For the Armenians every house had become a fortress".⁴⁵ The Armenians did not just open fire from each one of the houses that had become fortresses; they also converted the churches into sites from which to launch offensives. One of the most important of these churches, both from a functional point of view and in terms of architectural style, is the Church of Peter and Paul in the center of Van. The Armenians fired on Muslims from the dome of this church.⁴⁶ In contrast to the superiority of the Armenians' weapons, the local Muslims who

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁴⁴ Zeve, İstanbul, Van'ı Tanıma ve Tanıtma Cemiyet Yayınları, 1963, p. 12.

⁴⁵ Nogales, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

were resisting them had basic weapons and very limited ammunition. Nogales describes this situation in the following sentence: "The Kurds in order to economize on cartridges were using hand weapons (like knives and bayonets)".⁴⁷

Armenian Revolutionaries versus the Muslim Militia

In 1915 when the Eastern Front was split, all the military units in Van were sent north in an attempt to block the invading Russian forces. Left to defend the city were a miniscule number of combat units and gendarmes, so few in fact that they could be considered to be almost non-existent. They were faced with close to 30,000-armed Armenians who were planning to take control of the city in conjunction with the advancing Russian forces.⁴⁸

In the face of the growing Armenian revolt, the Governor of Van Cevdet Bey distributed weapons to the local Muslims for purposes of self-defence. He also organised the formation of voluntary militia units. The eyewitnesses I interviewed were clear in stating that all of the men who could actually fight were put under arms in various areas of the city, and the remaining old men and youngsters, who could be described as newly weaned, were enrolled in the militia.

One of the eyewitnesses Ahmet Çinkılıç said: "In Van there weren't any real Ottoman soldiers; the Armenians took advantage of this and put Van's population to the torch".⁴⁹ İbrahim Sargın, another eyewitness gave voice to the same sentiment when he stated: "In Van there was no one who could be called a soldier; the Russians and Armenians made common cause to take advantage of this situation".⁵⁰ In those days, Celâl Şener was a student at the city's military academy and he described the combatants in the following terms: "There were only very few gendarmes in Van, and they were used to ensure public security. The governor distributed arms to those among the people who were capable of holding weapons. They comprised the reserve forces. But to what purpose? The weapons were basic, there was no ammunition, and no trained soldiers".⁵¹ In connection with the same situation, Bekir Yörük said: "Our soldiers here had gone to the relief of Erzurum. There

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁴⁹ Çelik, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

were a few gendarmes and militia forces rounded up from the people. The militia forces were made up of old people and youngsters like us".⁵² Akif Yurtbay corroborated this assessment, when he said: "In Van there weren't any people who could be termed soldiers with the exception of a few gendarmes. Later, a four hundred man Circassian gang came to the aid of Van. Forty of these Circassians were killed in front of the Hamutağa Winter Barracks. The weapons of the Muslims were slight when compared with the Armenian weapons".⁵³

These and similar expressions were used by almost all the eyewitnesses. In point of fact, all the Hamidiye Regiments in Van had already been mobilized into the regular army and dispatched to the Kotur Valley in the face of the Russian invasion. Consequently, there was no possibility of utilizing the Hamidiye Regiments in the defence of Van against the Armenian revolutionaries.

The Armenians frequently exaggerate the role played by the Kurds, with claims that their ancestors were hung or cut to pieces by them. It is well known that a feudal structure existed in eastern Anatolia at the time, vestiges of which are still discernable today. The Kurdish tribes in the region have carried out blood feuds with one another for generations. Likewise, between the Armenians and the Kurdish tribes, from time to time, similar unpleasant incidents occurred. However, it is impossible to claim that such events were regular and systematic. So, it is rather interesting that Russian General Mayewski heard the following from a prominent Armenian whose guest he was in the Norduz region of Van: "There is no doubt that the Kurds are an uncivilized nation. In their nature there is some savagery, violence and no concept of submission. But there never has been blame attributed to them unjustly. Naturally, among them there are highwaymen and brigands. But in general, they prize and possess honor, pride, friendship and rectitude".⁵⁴

Though Nogales also complains of a barbarianism that the Kurds showed from time to time and characterizes them as "a nation that had not been contaminated by the corruption of

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁵⁴ Mayewski, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

previous civilizations", he also states: "I consider them a suitable element for a proud generation in the Near East".⁵⁵

The Armenian uprising in Van that began in early April 1915 lasted for nearly a month. Many people on both sides died during the clashes. When the Russians began to advance on Van from the Muradiye and Saray areas, and the Russian Armenians who were in advance of these joined the thousands of Armenians in Van, they left no chance to the Muslims to organise resistance. The Governor of Van Cevdet Bey in a telegram, dated 24 April 1915, that he sent to the Interior Ministry, stated that it was impossible to protect the Muslim population of Van from the Armenians and that he had no option but to send the Muslim civilian population to provinces further west and requested authorization to do so.⁵⁶ Coincidentally, on the same date the Interior Ministry had issued orders for the arrest of the Hinchag and Dashnag committee leaders; however, there had been no preparations for a general relocation of the Armenians as yet.

The 'Great Flight' of the Van Muslims

When Governor Cevdet Bey received authorization for the evacuation, he announced it throughout the Province, and the people of Van set out on the road ('*Büyük Kaçgın*', the Great Flight) at the beginning of an early spring when it was still cold. According to the statements of the eyewitnesses, the Muslims left everything behind and only those who had mounted their riding animals started west. One group took the land route west from Tatvan to Bitlis and from there to Diyarbakır, Urfa, Antep, Aleppo, Adana and Konya; others preferred to sail across Lake Van on the Armenian-owned boats which ran between Van and Tatvan. A large number of those who chose this second route were handed over by the Armenian sailors to Armenian volunteers who were especially waiting for them at Adilcevaz. Most of these people, (women, elderly, children and wounded) were killed by the Armenians.

Because Van is a region with a temperate climate and cold water, people who migrated to the hotter southern provinces never got used to the air and water there, and many lost their lives to cholera and typhus outbreaks in Diyarbakır. The first four lines of

⁵⁵ Nögalis, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁵⁶ Erich Feigl, *Bir Terör Efsanesi*, İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları, 1987, p. 112.

the famous Ali Paşa folk song, which was composed at that time, describe what the people of Van experienced during the 'Great Flight', and preserve a sense of the drama and trauma experienced by the evacuees:

I sowed the barley and couldn't reap it
I had a nightmare and couldn't interpret it.
As I had grown used to cold water
I couldn't drink the warm.

Truly, the Muslim citizens of Van had to leave without reaping the grain they had sowed and had to abandon their homes without interpreting the nightmares they saw. He could never find the ice-cold waters of Van's Kehriz and Zernebat in the hot clime of Diyarbakır or Adana.

The testimonies of the eyewitnesses were punctuated with their tears as they recalled and talked about the 'Great Flight'. The drama of the women who gave birth and died, the hunger of the elderly who couldn't stand the rigours of the road, the cries of the babies dying of hunger and illness, and, in brief the whole migration tragedy. As if all these things were not enough, their journey was punctuated from time to time by Armenian attacks, and other unpleasant incidents, in the course of their flight from place to place. These were the underlying reasons that completed the tragedy of the people of Van who fled their homes in the face of the Armenian uprising.

A large portion of those who were unable to flee for various reasons were killed by the Armenians, and women especially were subjected to being used very badly. Female eyewitness testimony that was related by Nafia Çabuker, Zahide Coşkun, Şadiye Talay, Esma Nine and Güllü Bacı, contained elements that made my hair stand on end. The women who were collected from the villages in the Tımar Township were taken together to Van and many of them threw themselves into the Mermit River because they were afraid that their honor would be besmirched. The people from the seven villages of the Tımar district came to Van in order to join the migration. However, Armenians subjected them to crossfire in the villages by the pier and the fortress. And those who hoped to go by way of the lake took refuge in the village of Zeve, where they were surrounded and massacred by both Armenians from Van and by the Russian Armenians who were in advance of the Russian army. Of the eyewitnesses, Hacı Osman Gemicioğlu (himself an Armenian

who converted to Islam), related how during the Zeve massacre he had been at the nearby ferryboat landing. On the following morning he set out with a group of other children to collect an empty bee hive and stumbled upon the scene of the massacre. He described the carnage as follows:

"When we arrived at Zeve, the village couldn't be passed through because of the stench. It was as if the bones in our noses would fall off...There were bodies everywhere. We saw a weird scene on the threshold of one house: they had filled the house with Muslims and burned it, and so many people had been burnt that the fat that had oozed from under the threshold had turned back into the trench in front of the door. That is, it was as if the river of fat had risen and later receded. The fat was still fresh. The entire village had been destroyed and was in this situation. I saw this with my own eyes, and I'll never forget it. We heard that they did the same thing to the Muslims on Çarpanak Island. The Armenians told me about the latter; I did not see it for myself".⁵⁷

This is but one of many similar stories I listened to from the surviving eyewitnesses. It is enough. Nogales offers the following comment on learning of the Armenian perpetrated massacres of the Muslim women, children, and elderly who remained behind in Van, from Governor Cevdet Bey who had just left Van and was on the Başkale road:

"Such an abominable scene wasn't even to be found among the Kurds. The Kurds only killed men and behaved more temperately towards women and children; nothing was done to them openly. This story reminded me of an incident that we experienced during the siege of Van.

"In order to observe our artillery fire, I was in a garret with a number of policemen. On the roof of a house in the vicinity, an old Muslim woman was hanging clothes out on a line. As soon as the Armenians saw this, they opened deadly fire and finally riddled the old woman's body. Then, they fired on us. When they had killed half the policemen, the Armenians felt excessive pleasure at having killed such unfortunate people".⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Çelik, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁵⁸ Nögalis, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

When Van passed into the hands of the Armenians the historical Muslim city that was located to the south of the fortress was burned to the ground. When the Russian occupation was completed, the commander of the Armenian revolutionary committee in Van, Aram Manukyan was appointed the governor of the city.

The Muslims who were fortunate enough to have fled the city, and succeeded thereby in remaining alive, began to very slowly return to their homes after the liberation on 2 April 1918. In order to give an idea of what they found we should listen again to some of the eyewitnesses who migrated with a large number of their family members, and returned home three years later. For example, Cemâl Talay said that he and twenty family members had abandoned Van and when they left Suruç in 1921 and came to Van only he himself and a brother were still alive.⁵⁹ Mehmet Reşit Efendi had emigrated from Van with a family of twenty-three people and when they returned he stated that only three were still alive.⁶⁰ As for Refik Özkanlı, after the liberation of Van he was inducted into the army and on his return, he said: "I had no one left but God".⁶¹

I believe that the above examples are sufficient to explain the tragic fate of the Muslims at the hands of the Armenian revolutionaries of Van. Nor must we forget that these events transpired prior to the decision of the Ottoman Government to remove the Armenians.

Is the Relocation the Reason for the Revolt?

In the propaganda activities that the Armenians carry out worldwide, it is argued that the Armenians rebelled only when they were being forcibly deported. This is a classic case of putting the cart before the horse. As the present study has repeatedly stressed, the Armenian uprising in Van began in the first week of April 1915 and continued until the arrival of the Russian army (and the flight of the Muslims) one month later. However, the Relocation Law that ordered the relocation of Armenians away from the war zones, was promulgated on 27 May 1915.⁶² The decision of relocation was not the cause of Armenian revolts; it was

⁵⁹ Çelik, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

⁶⁰ Ergünöz, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

⁶¹ Çelik, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

⁶² Süslü, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

the treasonous activity of the Armenian Revolutionary Committees (who collaborated with the invading Russian enemy and took up arms against their own state in wartime), which directly led to the decision to relocate the Armenians.

Were the Armenians in Van the Victims of Genocide?

When I enquired of the eyewitnesses as to whether or not the Muslims had killed Armenians, I received many interesting answers. Many of those eyewitnesses who had resided in villages said that they had taken salt and bread, symbols of welcoming guests, to the Armenians, but the Armenians killed those people who brought them salt and bread. Among their answers to my queries in this regard were the following:

Celâl Şener: "Of course they were also killed. Were we to look in their mouths while they were killing us? But this happened after they revolted".⁶³ Bekir Yörük: "Our consciences kept us from acting unjustly. Not a single Muslim would insult helpless people in their own situation. But if someone were to come and trample on your honor, what would you do? So, the Armenians who were killed in Van were those who were led astray by the agitation of their committees and engaged in butchering the Muslims. Our religion commanded us to engage in self-defence, that is, were we to kiss their hands when an Armenian weapon was being stuck in our eyes?"⁶⁴ Akif Yurtbay: "Can one even touch a man who sits without doing any mischief? Of course, when they revolted, our people went after them willy-nilly".⁶⁵ Hacı Ömer Selçuk: "They did not sit still. God too visited trouble on them. Think about it my brother: our state accepted them as citizens, as soldiers, and then they began to strike our soldiers from behind".⁶⁶ Mehmet Delibaş: "They did not revolt saying that they had been treated unjustly; they revolted saying 'we will set up an independent state.' So, after we returned from our migration, we sent to Russia as many as 600,000 completely healthy Armenians who had escaped to the mountains".⁶⁷ Hacı Şevket Çaldağ: "Muslims also killed them as well, but they did so in self-defence. While the man sat peacefully at home, the Armenian would forcibly attack his house. What was

⁶³ Çelik, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

this man to do if he did not kill the Armenian? Our religion never accepts bowing one's head".⁶⁸ Hamit Ekinçi: "God gives everybody what they deserve. Now they have all been scattered somewhere. They brought disaster on our heads. God visited it on them".⁶⁹ Şadiye Talay: "It was like this my brother: While they were sitting on our laps they also pulled on our beards".⁷⁰ Salih Taşçı: "In the times when they began to assault our people, our people reacted against them. Otherwise, we would never have assaulted them if they hadn't assaulted us".⁷¹

Conclusion

According to what I could discern from these eyewitness accounts the following scenario occurred: Influenced by the revolutionaries, the Armenians gave way to their ambitions, that is, they were overtaken by a desire to establish an independent state in the East. To achieve this aim they were willing to use any and all means, including terror. The local Muslims met the Armenians who were engaged in these activities and 'offered them salt and bread'. But this did not suffice to stop them. Some Armenians were killed either by Muslim citizens or by government security forces not because they were Armenians, but because they had been engaged in rebellion and assault. Nowhere in the world are people engaged in armed assault met with bouquets of flowers, and this is particularly true when they revolt during wartime. If the Ottomans had wished to commit genocide against the Armenians, they would have done it in the 16th century, during the time of Sultan Süleyman the Lawgiver. People carry out the annihilation of their enemies when they are at their strongest, not their weakest. One must remember that in 1915 the Ottomans were engaged in fighting a World War on many fronts stretching from Galicia in the West to Yemen in the East. How could they plan and carry out a genocide against Armenians to whom just three years earlier they had entrusted important governmental ministries? This is not only untrue, but defies logic as well.

Faced with an armed Armenian revolt in wartime, the Young Turk government did what any state would do. They ordered their own Muslim population to evacuate the area in the face of the

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

Armenian-aided Russian advance. Subsequently, confronted with the fact that the Armenians of Van had taken this important eastern Anatolian city by force of arms and turned it over to the invading Russian army, they decided that they could no longer trust the loyalty of Anatolia's Armenian population and ordered their deportation away from potential war zones. Under the special circumstances of the province of Van in the year 1915 one should not speak of genocide but of legitimate resistance on the part of the Turks. It is a depressing truth that bloodshed creates bloodshed.

There are few nations that have not fought with each other. At Çanakkale the Turkish nation lost 250,000 of its sons. It buried its fallen soldiers and has continued to maintain normal relations with England. Likewise, it has not attempted to keep alive the memory of past wars with Russia with whom it has fought throughout recent history. History is the science of admonition. To learn lessons from the past provides a way of building for today and providing a healthy path to the future. If opening the wounds of history serves peace and friendship, let us do it. The Armenian diasporas in Europe and the United States must come to the realization that their striving in the name of justice for alleged past wrongs, neither helps themselves nor their compatriots in the Republic of Armenia. The latter, faced with numerous problems of their own, need the support that healthy relations with neighbouring Turkey can ensure. What neither they nor Turkey need is the rubbing of salt in historical wounds.

REALITIES BEHIND THE RELOCATION

Yusuf Halaçoğlu

Why Were They Relocated?

The disturbances which the European Powers and Russia stirred up across the Ottoman realm as part of an intervention strategy, fashionably called the "Eastern question", had taken a course which threatened to culminate in the proclamation of an independent Armenian state. Armenian orchestration of great power meddling, the massacre of Muslims by armed bands of Armenians followed by uprisings at Van and Zeytun which were timed with the outbreak of World War I, and the Armenian support to Russian armies invading Anatolia, compelled the Ottoman Government to take forceful measures.

Indeed, as the Armenian uprising raged at Van, reports that Armenians had also risen up in other provinces, that they were robbing travellers, raiding villages and killing off their population kept arriving in İstanbul. Occupied in the battlefields, the Turkish army was unable to deal with these events behind the frontlines. So, Enver Paşa, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, sent the following dispatch to the Interior Minister Talât Bey (later, Talât Paşa) on 2 May 1915:

"The Armenians around the periphery of Lake Van, and in other regions which are known to the Governor of Van, are engaged in continuous preparations for revolution and rebellion. I am of the opinion that this population should be removed from this area, and that this nest of rebellion is broken up.

"According to information provided by the Commander of the Third Army, the Russians, on April the 20th, began expelling their Muslim population, by pushing them without their belongings across our borders. It is necessary, in response to this action, and in order to reach the goals that have been outlined above, either to expel the Armenians in question to Russia or to relocate them and their families in other regions of

Anatolia. I request that the most suitable of these alternatives be chosen and implemented. If there is no objection, I would prefer to expel the creators of these centers of rebellion and their families outside our borders, and to replace them with the Muslim refugees pushed across our borders".¹

With the above directive seen as the first signal of the decision for relocation (deportation), Enver Paşa sought to disperse the Armenians in a way that they would no longer be able to rebel. Dividing the Armenians into small communities spread across the empire instead of keeping them massed in one place would rob them of the chance to stage further uprisings. Again from this directive, it is understood that its implementation is requested only in places where the Armenians staged rebellions and disturbances. In fact, special care has been shown to this point in the first deportation.

In the face of the delicate situation, Interior Minister Talât Bey was forced to start the removal without seeking a Cabinet decision and without waiting for the legislation of a provisional act, shouldering the responsibility by himself.²

Aim of the Relocation

So far as it is clear from the documents, the relocation, which Talât Bey set in motion and was subsequently endorsed by the Cabinet, was carried out solely in areas where the security of the borders were under threat. First of these was the Erzurum, Van and Bitlis area which constituted the rear of the Caucasus and the Iran front. Second was the Mersin-İskenderun area, the rear of the Sinai front. The Armenians in these areas were found to be collaborating with the enemy and were engaged in activities aimed to facilitate possible landings. The move was later expanded so as to cover Armenians living in other provinces where they rebelled, collaborated with the enemy and harbored Armenian terrorists. Although Catholic and Protestant Armenians were initially excluded from the scope of relocation, the ones engaged in harmful activities among these, too, were later sent away.

¹ *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi* (Journal of Military History Documents), 81 (December 1982), Document No. 1830.

² Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi* (History of the Turkish Revolution), III/3, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991, p. 38.

Therefore, a circular dated 22 June 1331 (5 July 1915), was sent to the provinces of Adana, Erzurum, Bitlis, Aleppo, Diyarbakır, Syria, Sivas, Trabzon, Mamuretülaziz as well as to the Directorate of Abandoned Property in Adana and the prefectures of Zor, Maraş, Canik, Kayseri and İzmit, informing them that the areas allocated for the settlement of Armenians were enlarged out of necessity. This meant that they would be settled in proportion of 10% to the Muslim population, in the following manner:

(1) At the eastern and southern regions of the Mosul province including the *sanjaq* of Kirkuk with its villages and townships as near as 80 kilometers to the Iranian border;

(2) East and south of the *sanjaq* of Zor, including the settlements in the valleys of Euphrates and Habur rivers, 25 kilometers inside the border of Diyarbakır;

(3) All the villages and towns at the east, south and southeast of the Aleppo province except the north, at towns and villages 25 kilometers from the railroads, including the *sanjaqs* of Havran and Kerek in the province of Syria.³

Assailed by the adverse propaganda of the Western powers and their press, Talât Bey was compelled to furnish repeated assurances that the measures taken against the Armenians were not aimed at massacring them. Indeed, in a coded telegram sent to the governors or prefects of Hüdavendigâr, Ankara, Konya, İzmit, Adana, Maraş, Urfa, Aleppo, Zor, Sivas, Kütahya, Karasi, Niğde, Mamuretülaziz, Diyarbakır, Karahisar-ı Sahib, Erzurum and Kayseri, the aim of deportation was explained thus:⁴

"The objective sought by the government in evicting the Armenians from their settlements and moving them to the areas marked for resettlement is rendering this ethnic element unable in engaging in anti-government activities and prevent them from pursuing their national aim of founding an Armenian government. The annihilation of these people is, not only out of question, but also the authorities should ensure their safety during their movement and see to it that they are properly fed, making the necessary expenditures from the

³ T.C. (The Republic of Turkey), Başbakanlık (The Prime Minister's Office), Osmanlı Arşivi (The Ottoman Archives, hereafter BOA), Cipher Desk, No. 54/315.

⁴ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 55/292.

Refugee Fund. Apart from those evicted and moved, the Armenians allowed to stay should be exempt from further evictions. As communicated earlier, the government has taken a firm decision not to move families of soldiers, sufficient numbers of artisans as well as Protestant and Catholic Armenians. Firm measures should be taken against those who attack the moving parties or any gendarmes or officials who instigate such attacks. These people should be immediately expelled and court-martialed. Provinces and *sanjaqs* will be held responsible for the recurrence of any such events."

Earlier, in a secret dispatch sent to the Ankara province on 14 May 1331 (27 May 1915), the following was noted: "The measures taken against the Armenians are solely based on the need to establish and safeguard order in the realm. That the government does not follow a destructive policy against the Armenian element is evident from the fact that Protestant and Catholic Armenians observed to have taken a neutral position for the time being were not touched..."⁵ In fact, in another coded message sent to the provinces of Erzurum, Diyarbakır, Mamuretülaziz, and Bitlis on 1 June 1331 (14 June 1915), those in charge were ordered to protect the lives of Armenians on the roads and even when measures become inevitable against deportees who try to escape or attack their guards, to make sure that the local people do not intervene. They were also ordered to prevent the outbreak of incidents between Armenians and Muslims that could result in fatalities and a bad image abroad for the Ottoman state.

In a coded telegram he sent to the 4th Army Command on 10 May 1331 (23 May 1915), Talât Bey provided information concerning the Armenians to be deported and listed the places he wanted to be evicted as follows: (1) Provinces of Erzurum, Van and Bitlis; (2) *sanjaq* of Maraş except the city itself; (3) with the exception of administrative center of the Aleppo province, all towns and villages attached to İskenderun, Beylan (Belen), Cısr-ı Şugur and Antakya; (4) *sanjaqs* of Adana, Sis (Kozan) and Mersin (except the cities themselves) and the *sanjaq* of Cebel-i Bereket.

⁵ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 53/4.

The Armenians evicted from the provinces of Erzurum, Van and Bitlis would be settled at the southern part of the province of Mosul, the *sanjaq* of Zor and the *sanjaq* of Urfa except the administrative center. The Armenians removed from the Adana-Aleppo-Maraş area would go to places marked by the government at the eastern part of the Syrian province and the east and south-east of the Aleppo province and would be settled there. To supervise the process of transportation, State Inspector Ali Seydi Bey and Hamid Bey were assigned to the Adana area and Aleppo-Maraş areas respectively. Ali Seydi Bey reported at his post, accompanied by another inspector and a special treasury official. Upon reaching their destinations, the Armenians would either be resettled at the houses they were to build at the existing towns or villages, or at new villages they would set up at government-specified places depending on the situation and conditions in the area. It was decreed that the Armenian villages would be at least 25 kilometers away from the nearest railroad. The transportation and resettlement of the Armenians who had to be moved again were left to local authorities. Likewise, protection of the lives and property of the Armenians distributed to their final settlements were the responsibility of local officials on the route who would also make sure they were served meals and allowed to rest. The deported Armenians were allowed to take with them all their movable property. As to the unmovable, it was decreed that a detailed set of guidelines would be published and communicated to those involved.⁶

To ensure that the Armenians to be moved from the eastern and some of the south-eastern provinces to the south of the Diyarbakır province, the Euphrates River valley and to the vicinity of Urfa-Süleymaniye would not become hotbeds of subversion, the High Command issued certain warnings. In a note sent to the Interior Ministry, the High Command stated that officials should pay due attention to the following: (1) The population of Armenians in their new homes should not exceed 10% of the local tribes and Muslims; (2) Villages to be set up by deported Armenians should not have more than 50 houses; (3) Resettled Armenian families

⁶ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 53/94.

should not change their domiciles even through travel or house-moving.⁷

Coinciding with the time the Interior Ministry was busy with these measures, Russian, French and British Governments issued a joint declaration on 24 May 1915. They charged that in eastern and south-eastern Anatolia, to which they referred as "Armenia", pogroms were carried out against the Armenians. Ignoring the murderous campaign launched against the Turks by the Armenians they incited and supported, they stated that the Ottoman Government would be held responsible for the incidents.⁸ After the issue thus assumed international dimensions, Talât Bey decided that he could no longer shoulder single-handed responsibility for the deportation and sought to provide a legal basis for the action and thereby spread the responsibility to other Cabinet members as well.

Hence, he sent Memorandum No. 270, dated 26 May 1915, to the Prime Minister's office.⁹ In that document, Talât Bey explained how the aggressors with designs on Ottoman territory sowed seeds of discontent among the Armenians and backed their insurgency, how the insurgent Armenians did everything to obstruct the operations of the army against the enemy, prevented delivery of supplies and munitions to the soldiers on battlefronts, collaborated with the enemy and how some of them joined the enemy ranks, launched attacks against the army units and innocent civilians, committed murders, plundered cities and towns, provided supplies to enemy warships, and pointed out fortifications to the enemy. Then, he pointed to the need for effective measures for the state's security and therefore, noted that it was decided to move Armenians creating unrest in combat areas to elsewhere. Beside the details of the decision on deportation, including the places to be evacuated and the destinations of the deportees, the memo assured that they would be provided with new accommodations and land, commensurate with their former stature, from the Refugees Fund. It also assured that the needy would be given aid, and the state would support their production-

⁷ General Staff, No. 1/1 File No. 207, F. 2-3, referred to by Kâmurân Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası* (The Armenian File), Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1985, p. 213.

⁸ Bayur, *op. cit.*, III/3 p. 37.

⁹ BOA, Bâbîâlî Evrak Odası (BEO), No. 326758.

oriented activities by providing tools, materials and seed. As for their property left behind, the memo assured that they would be registered in an official book, and a decree would be drafted to that effect.

The Interior Ministry's memorandum was channeled to the Council of Ministers by the Prime Minister's office with another memorandum, dated 29 May 1915, which repeated the arguments of Talât Bey, endorsed the already-started implementation and called for the provision of a legal framework for it.¹⁰ On 30 May 1915, the Council of Ministers put its stamp of approval to what was being done. The text said the crackdown on such subversive activities, which negatively affect the ongoing struggle for the protection of the state, had been absolutely necessary and timely. It added that a decision had been taken to issue a declaration concerning the unmovable property of deported Armenians, that they would be registered by committees that would be appointed, that the deportees would be granted work opportunities suiting their positions and aid from the Refugees Fund. It finally called for dispatch of necessary directives to the officials to ensure that the deportees could be moved in security.¹¹

The directive sent from the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministries of Finance, War, and Treasury on 30 May 1915, set forth the guidelines for deportation:¹² (a) The Armenians would be moved to places reserved for them with due care to the safety of their lives and property as well as their comfort. (b) Until they were settled in their new homes, their upkeep would be provided from the Refugees Fund. (c) They would be given houses and land commensurate with their former financial status. (d) The government would build houses for the needy; equipment and seed would be provided for the farmers. (e) Their movable property left behind would be forwarded to them; the immovable, following registry and appraisal, would be distributed to Muslim refugees to be settled there. Olive grooves, berry and citrus orchards, vineyards and such assets as shops, inns, factories and warehouses which remain outside the expertise of the immigrants

¹⁰ Council of Ministers Letter, Book No. 198, Decision No. 163; Bayur, *op. cit.*, III/3, pp. 37-38; Gürün, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-214.

¹¹ Bayur, *op. cit.*, III/3, pp. 40-42.

¹² BOA, BEO, No. 326758.

would be auctioned or rented and their revenues would be collected and registered in trustee funds to be given to their owners. (f) Special commissions would implement this directive once it was drafted.

On 14 May 1915, a day after Talât Bey presented his memorandum to the Prime Minister's Office, "The Provisional Law Concerning the Measures to Be Taken by the Military Against Those Who Oppose the Actions of Government During Wartime" was enacted.¹³ The first article of this provisional law¹⁴, which entered into force with its publication in the **Takvim-i Vekayi** (Chronicle of Events) on 1 June 1915, empowered the army, corps or division commanders to take immediate military action against anyone opposing government orders, the country's security and order, and, in the event of armed attacks or resistance, to annihilate the rebels. The second article empowered the same commanders to deport individuals or whole populations of villages of townships and settle them elsewhere if they engage in espionage or treason. Thus, this provisional law transferred the conduct of deportation, arbitrarily started by the Interior Ministry, to the army.

With the directive dated 10 June 1915,¹⁵ properties of the deported Armenians were taken under protection. "Abandoned Property Commissions" were set up, comprising a president and a representative each from the administration and the treasury. These commissions would identify the properties belonging to Armenians in evacuated villages and towns and would keep detailed books. One of these books would be kept at the local church, one would be handed to the local government, and a third would be given to the commission. Perishable goods and livestock would be auctioned, and the proceeds would be kept in custody. In places where no commission was sent, local officials would carry out the directives. Both the commissions and local officials would be responsible for the safekeeping of the abandoned property until the return of the Armenians.

¹³ Bayur, *op. cit.*, III/3, p. 40; Gürün, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

¹⁴ **Takvim-i Vekayi**, 1 June 1915, Yr. 7, No. 2189; Bayur, *op. cit.*, III/3, p. 40.

¹⁵ **Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi** (Journal of Military History Documents), 81 (December 1982) Document No. 1832.

Movement to Resettlement Areas

To be distributed to the areas of resettlement, groups of deportees were assembled at such centers as Konya, Diyarbakır, Cizre, Birecik and Aleppo sitting on the crossroads. According to the documents, the closest routes were picked for the movement of groups to cause least difficulty to the deportees. Considerations of the security of the groups also played a role in the choice of the routes. Indeed, those deported from Kayseri and Samsun were moved over to Malatya, and those coming from Sivas, Mamuretülaziz, Erzurum and its environs were moved over the Diyarbakır-Cizre road to Mosul.¹⁶ But sometimes-overcrowded roads and possible unrest at certain *sanjaqs* made detours necessary.¹⁷ Those going from Urfa *via* the Re'sulayn-Nusaybin road were re-directed to Siverek road to protect them from raids of Arab tribes and other clans.¹⁸

Groups coming from Western Anatolia over Kütahya-Karahisar-Konya-Karaman-Tarsus were sent to Zor over Kars-ı Maraş-Pazarcık road.¹⁹ In the planning of the routes, those with railroads and river transport facilities, considered safest at the time, were preferred. In fact, train moved all the deportees from western Anatolia to their new settlements.²⁰ Those sent over the Cizre road were also moved either by train, or riverboats called "*Shahtur*".²¹ In places lacking train or river transport, the groups were brought by pack animals or carts to certain centers and moved by train from there on.

Despite the war conditions, the Ottoman Government has shown due care to the orderly implementation of the transport and protection of groups from possible harm. It has used every available means to facilitate the transport. But it is understood that shortages of transport and a host of other difficulties had been encountered during the process, since railroads were kept busy by the transport of soldiers and provisions to the battlefronts. Indeed, there were great congestion at the railway stations, and

¹⁶ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54-A/157; No. 56/280; No. 56/387.

¹⁷ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 56/278; No. 56/280; No. 56/308.

¹⁸ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 57/277.

¹⁹ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 65/95.

²⁰ Interior Ministry, Directorate of Public Security (EUM), Dept. 2, No. 68/99, Dept. 2, No. 68/94; Dept 2, No. 68/81; Dept 2, No. 68/67; Dept. 2, No. 68/96.

²¹ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept 2, No. 68/101.

transportation was occasionally disrupted due to lack of adequate number of carriages.²² Because the harvest time increased the local demand for animals and carts and limited their availability for other purposes, the deportee parties could move with difficulty.²³

Despite all these, a foreign diplomatic mission acknowledged the fact that the government has succeeded in moving the deported Armenians to their new settlements in an orderly fashion. In a report he sent to Ambassador Henry Morgenthau on 15 August 1915, Edward Nathan, the U.S. Consul in Mersin, noted that the rail route was packed with Armenians from Tarsus to Adana. From there onwards, the Armenians could buy tickets and travel by train, Nathan wrote. Despite the misery caused by the congestion and tiresome procedures, the diplomat noted that the government was handling the case quite efficiently, that it did not permit violence or disorder, it provided enough tickets for the deportees and gave aid to the needy.²⁴ Observations of the American consul are supported by the reports Ottoman officials sent to the capital. In contrast, by keeping up their attacks even during the deportation, the Armenian insurgents showed how right the state had been in adopting the measure. In fact, the letter dated 12 Şevval 1333 (23 August 1915) sent by the U.S. Consul Leslie A. Davis in Mamuretülaziz, to Ambassador Morgenthau in İstanbul, details the atrocities the Armenians carried out in the province center and the villages.²⁵ The letter bearing the register number 1080, had been intercepted by the Ottoman security service, translated and read, closed again and sent on.²⁶

Attacks on Armenians and Measures by the State

The need to finish transportation of Armenians quickly and the adverse conditions the war has brought were topmost among causes making it difficult to provide security for the transiting groups and to distribute food. It is estimated that some 20-21,000 Armenians have succumbed to contagious diseases on the way.²⁷

²² BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54-A/393.

²³ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54-A/59; No. 54-A/96.

²⁴ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 2D/13.

²⁵ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/83.

²⁶ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2., No. 68/84.

²⁷ For instance, with the coded telegram dated 26 June 1915, provinces of Trabzon, Erzurum, Sivas, Diyarbakır, Mamuretülaziz and Bitlis and the prefectures of Maraş and

For instance, the document dated 8 Zilhicce 1333 (17 October 1915) noted that typhoid fever and dysentery claimed 70-to-80 lives daily among the deportees which were in Hama and ordered immediate adoption of measures.²⁸ Furthermore, a number of Armenians seem to have died in armed raids mounted mostly by the Arab tribes, particularly between Aleppo and Zor. For instance, the documents show that on the roads to Meskene just an hour to Aleppo, close to 2000 Armenians were killed in raids, launched by the Arab tribes to rob the deportees.²⁹ The same documents also note that a further 2000 deportees being sent from Diyarbakır to Zor and from Suruç to Aleppo *via* Menbiç were attacked and robbed by the Arab tribesmen.³⁰ Documents also cite intelligence reports to the effect that bandits had rounded up further batch of some 2000 Armenians, among the deportee groups assembled in Diyarbakır area, drove them to Mardin and killed them.³¹ On the news that a 500-strong group of Armenians were attacked and murdered by Kurds on the Erzurum-Erzincan road, a coded telegram was sent to Diyarbakır, Mamuretülaziz and Bitlis on 14 June 1915, ordering the authorities to use every means to prevent attacks by bandits and peasants during the transit of deportees, and curb those attempting murder and robbery.³² Another document, dated 27 June 1915, quoted Erzurum provincial officials as reporting that local bandits in the Dersim area had intercepted and murdered the Armenian groups sent from Erzurum, and it had not been possible to save them. The government responded with a strong rebuke, saying such acts were impermissible, ordering the officials to take immediate measures that would ensure safe transit of the deportee groups.³³ From the above records, it is seen that some 9,000 Armenians, or around 10,000 had died during the deportation as a result of

Canik were requested to report the number of Armenians killed because of illness or rebellion since the start of the war (BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54-A/112) Furthermore, it is understood that at Ereğli and Mosul, such contagious diseases as typhus, dysentery, and malaria were pretty widespread. (Telegram dated 8 June 1915 sent to Konya, BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 57/337; Telegram sent to Zor prefecture dated 3 February 1916, BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 60/219).

²⁸ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 57/51, 71

²⁹ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 59/244.

³⁰ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 56/140; 55-A/144.

³¹ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54/406, 54-A/73, No. 54-A/248.

³² BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54/9.

³³ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54/162.

bandit attacks. This is the final sum in Ottoman documents, which lack any other record of mass murder.

It is clear that while fighting at the front, the Ottoman state was at the same time exerting a massive effort to feed the Armenians on the move and provide them security. Indeed, once the murders and robberies became known, the government has immediately sent directives to the scenes of incident, ordering officials not to send on the deportee groups without gendarme escort, and take all necessary measures to ensure safe transit. In another directive sent to officials of every province falling under the scope of deportation, the government sought the apprehension and punishment of the bands attacking the Armenians, while ordering stronger escort to the passing convoys. In a coded telegram it sent to the affected provinces in connection with the above directive, the government asked how many of the attackers were caught and punished.³⁴

As another measure to enforce discipline, the government set up investigation committees to identify officials who did not do their jobs properly during the transit or engaged in corruption. One such committee, led by First Judge Asım Bey of the Interrogation Court and including State Inspector Muhtar Bey of the Ankara province and Lieut. Col. Muhiddin Bey, the gendarme inspector for the İzmir area, was sent to cover the Adana, Aleppo, Syria, Urfa, Zor and Maraş areas.³⁵ Another committee, led by the Appeals Court President Hulusi Bey and including İsmail Hakkı Bey of the State Accounting Office, was dispatched to the Hüdavendigâr, Ankara, İzmit, Karasi, Kütahya, Eskişehir, Kayseri, Karahisar-ı Sahib and Niğde areas.³⁶ A third committee, chaired by former Bitlis governor Yaşar Bey and including former İstanbul chief prosecutor Nihad Bey and gendarme Major Ali Naki Bey, was sent to Sivas, Trabzon, Erzurum, Mamuretülaziz, Diyarbakır, Bitlis and Canik. In a coded telegram sent to the third committee chairman Mazhar Bey, who set up a shop in Sivas, the committees were requested to regularly send their investigation results to the capital.³⁷

³⁴ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 55-A/84.

³⁵ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 56/186.

³⁶ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 58/38, 56/335.

³⁷ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 56/267.

Under directives given to the investigation committees, implicated gendarme, policemen, public officials and their superiors would be sent to the martial law courts depending on the investigation results. A list of those sent to such courts would be supplied to the Interior Ministry. The results of the investigations against governors or prefects would be forwarded to the Interior Ministry first, and any further action would wait for instructions from the Ministry. In case the martial law court presidents, judges and military officials were implicated in corruption or misconduct, they would be reported to the army commands they were affiliated to.

In the light of the investigation committee reports, many officials were relieved of their posts for misuse of power (in the form of stealing money or property from the transiting deportee groups, not providing sufficient protection and thus exposing the parties to attack, detracting from deportation orders, rape, etc.) Some were court-martialed and were handed down heavy sentences.³⁸

Armenians Spared from the Move and the Converts

As noted above, the decision for deportation was not applied to all Armenians. At first, some of the Armenians living in certain places (towns of Germeş and Birecik in Urfa, Erzurum, Aydın, Trabzon, Edirne, Canik, Çanakkale, Adapazarı, Aleppo, Bolu, Kastamonu, Tekirdağ, Konya and Karahisar-ı Sahip) were excluded from the scope of deportation.³⁹ But later, when these, too, were seen to engage in acts of treason, most of them were sent away.⁴⁰ The sick and blind were allowed to stay, and those from the Catholic and Protestant creeds, civil servants, soldiers and their families, tradesmen, some construction workers and foremen were also excluded from the scope of deportation. Indeed, with telegrams sent to the Maraş and Adana provinces, the government instructed the officials not to send away the sick, blind, invalids and the elderly and see to it that they were settled in cities.⁴¹

³⁸ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 58/278; No. 58/141; No. 55-A/156; No. 55-A/157; No. 61/165; No. 57/116; No. 57/413; No. 57/416; No. 57/105; No. 59/235; No. 54-A/326; No. 59/196.

³⁹ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54-A/155; No. 56/114; No. 56/225; No. 56/226; No. 57/89; No. 59/218.

⁴⁰ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54-A/271; No. 54-A/272 (22 Temmuz 1331/4 August 1915).

⁴¹ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 56/27; No. 67/186.

In a telegram sent to the concerned provinces on 3 August 1915, and in a subsequent one sent on 15 August 1915, officials were ordered not to deport Catholic and Protestant Armenians, settle them in their original cities and report their numbers.⁴² These were settled in various towns within their respective provinces.⁴³ Those who were mistakenly deported were sought out and settled at the cities they were at the time.⁴⁴ But when some of those allowed to stay were seen engaged in harmful activities, they, too, were deported irrelevant of their creed.⁴⁵

A coded telegram sent on 15 August 1915, to provinces of Erzurum, Adana, Ankara, Bitlis, Aleppo, Hüdavendigâr, Diyarbakır, Trabzon, Konya as well as to the prefectures of Urfa, İzmit, Canik, Kayseri, Afyon, Karesi, Maraş, Niğde, and Eskişehir delivered instructions to local authorities to keep the Armenians serving as officers, doctors or medics in the Ottoman Army in their original places and exclude them from deportation.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the Armenians employed in the main and provincial branches of the Ottoman Bank, Tobacco Administration, and some foreign consulates were allowed to stay, provided they remained loyal to the state and displayed good conduct.⁴⁷

Beside these, orphaned children and widows were allowed to stay, taken under protection in orphanages or villages, and were given material aid.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, the children orphaned during the course of deportation were sent to Sivas and placed in the orphanage there.⁴⁹ An order was published on 30 April 1916, concerning the Armenian families needing care. The order stipulated that: (a) Families whose men folk were deported or serving in the Army would be settled at villages and towns with no

⁴² BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54-A/252; No. 55/20; No. 55/292 (App. XXVI).

⁴³ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 56/112 (19 September, 1915, to Konya province).

⁴⁴ On this, orders were sent to Sivas on 26 Sept. 1915 (BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 56/176), Mamuretülaziz and Diyarbakır provinces (BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 56/172); and on 14 Nov. 1915, to Konya (BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 58/2) and to Ankara provinces (BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 58/159).

⁴⁵ A telegram was sent to Adana province in this direction (Cipher Desk, No. 55-A/23) on 2 September 1915. See also BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 61/186; No. 61/192; No. 61/122; No. 61/290; No. 61/210; Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, 2F/11.

⁴⁶ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 55/18.

⁴⁷ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 56/36 (16 Sept. 1915); No. 56/243 (30 Sept. 1915); No. 56/3360 (11 Oct. 1915).

⁴⁸ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54/411; No. 54/450; No. 54-A/325.

⁴⁹ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 61/18-20.

Armenian or other foreign population and would be supported from the Refugees Fund; (b) if local orphanages were not adequate, children up to the age of twelve would be given to rich Muslim families for their upkeep; (c) low-income Muslim families would be paid 30 *kuruş* from the Refugees Fund for the upkeep of children; (d) young and widowed Armenian women would be allowed to marry Muslim men if they so wished.⁵⁰

During the deportation, some Armenians were seen to have converted to Islam not to be sent away. But the Ottoman Government decided not to accept such applications obviously aimed at circumventing deportation. A circular, dated 1 July 1915, sent to the provinces and *sanjaqs* in connection with this, warned that some of the deported Armenians were renouncing their religion singly or collectively in order to be allowed to stay, that such people should in no way be trusted, that they would continue with evil deeds under the guise of Islam, and ordered the officials to deport renegade Armenians as well.⁵¹ Similarly, a coded telegram sent to the prefecture of Karahisar-ı Sahip on 29 October 1915, reveals that even conversions of soldiers' wives were not acknowledged.⁵² But with the deportation drawing to its end, the state adopted a more favorable attitude and from the end of October 1915, applications for conversion were accepted.⁵³ Indeed, a circular sent to all provinces and prefectures on 4 November 1915, said that the Armenians were allowed to stay in their original places, or those allowed to return after deportation were free to convert.⁵⁴

After this circular, the applications of those who converted in Menteşe were accepted,⁵⁵ and their properties were returned.⁵⁶ A coded telegram sent to Sivas on 9 March 1916, also made clear

⁵⁰ This order has been sent to the provinces of Adana, Erzurum, Edirne, Aleppo, Hüdavendigâr, Sivas, Diyarbakır, Mamuretülaziz, Konya, Kastamonu and Trabzon as well as the prefectures of İzmit, Canik, Eskişehir, Karahisar-ı Sahip, Maraş, Urfa, Kayseri and Niğde (BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 63/142) and to the Ankara province (BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 64/162) on 30 May 1916.

⁵¹ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54/254; 20 July 1915, No. 54-A/49; No. 54-A/232; No. 55-A/83; No. 56/88.

⁵² BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 58/146.

⁵³ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 57/115.

⁵⁴ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 57/281.

⁵⁵ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 57/344.

⁵⁶ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 58/201.

that the properties of the Armenians allowed to stay due to conversion or other reasons would not be liquidated.⁵⁷ As for the applications from deported Armenians, their conversion were accepted after their arrival in their respective destinations.⁵⁸ Some applications, from Armenians allowed to stay, were accepted on condition that they would not bar possible future deportation.⁵⁹ When some of the converts were later deported, it was decided not to write their new religion on their identity papers and issue them documents only showing their original domiciles.⁶⁰ The purpose was to prevent the infiltration of terrorists back into the country under the guise of conversion.

The Ottoman Government also adopted measures concerning Armenians coming from abroad or going out of the country. Male Armenians with Ottoman citizenship aged between 17 and 55 were forbidden to leave the country.⁶¹ Armenians who were nationals of neutral countries were allowed to leave on condition that they would not return until the end of the war. As for Armenians wanting to enter the Ottoman realm, they were refused permission regardless of nationality.⁶² A tactic frequently used by the Armenians to avoid deportation was showing themselves as foreign nationals. Such claims have led to serious problems during the deportation. It is understood that the American ambassador intervened on behalf of some Armenians claiming to be U.S. nationals and requested the government to halt their deportation. The government was hard put to authenticate such claims. A telegram sent to the Mamuretülaziz province on 8 July 1915, instructed the officials to list any "real" American Armenians and give up deporting them.⁶³ The U.S. consuls in the area and representatives of other countries appear to have followed the deportation very closely. While the American consuls toured cities to investigate the fate of the Armenians,⁶⁴ some German officers were reported to have taken pictures of Armenians being moved by rail at Aleppo, Konya and Adana with the intention of using them

⁵⁷ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 61/253; No. 61/225.

⁵⁸ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 59/83.

⁵⁹ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 60/58; 61/221.

⁶⁰ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 61/71.

⁶¹ Age limit has been raised to 60 from 2 Aug. 1915 (Cipher Desk, No. 54-A/251).

⁶² BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 53/334; No. 54-A/251; No. 54-A/309.

⁶³ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54/356.

⁶⁴ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54-A/291.

to criticize the Ottoman Government. When it became clear that foreign officials were using rumors or fabricated news they gathered from Armenian civil servants to fuel a propaganda campaign against the Ottoman state abroad, the government sent coded instructions to the concerned provinces for the adoption of measures to prevent acts or incidents that the foreigners could exploit to embarrass the country.⁶⁵

Caring for the Deported Armenians

Before starting the deportation, the government sent letters to all the provinces, requesting the authorities to make necessary preparations and stock food to ensure that all needs of the passing deportee parties would be met.⁶⁶ Numerous orders and instructions were given to the Directorate for the Resettlement of Tribes and Refugees for the provision of supplies.⁶⁷ Director Şükrü Bey was personally charged with the task of identifying the needs and meeting them.⁶⁸ The documents show that 400,000 *kuruş* was sent to Konya to help meet needs of the transiting parties; 150,000 *kuruş* was sent to the *sanjaq* of İzmit, 200,000 to the *sanjaq* of Eskişehir, 300,000 to the Adana province, 300,000 to the Aleppo province, 100,000 to the Syria province, 300,000 to the Ankara province⁶⁹ and 500,000 to the Mosul province⁷⁰ for a total of 2,250,000 *kuruş*.⁷¹

While the provinces dipped into their own resources as well to supplement the state aid, there were occasional requests from the government for additional money.⁷² Meanwhile, some money sent from the United States for the Armenian deportees were distributed by American missionaries and consuls with the government's knowledge.⁷³ Beside this, documents show that

⁶⁵ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 55-A/217.

⁶⁶ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 55/291; No. 55/341; No. 57/345; No. 57/351.

⁶⁷ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 55/152; No. 55/291; No. 55/341; No. 55-A/17; No. 55-A/77, No. 55-A/135; No. 57/110.

⁶⁸ BOA, Cipher Desk, NO. 55-A/16 (Telegram dated 31 August 1915).

⁶⁹ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 55-A/17.

⁷⁰ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 53/305.

⁷¹ The 1915 budget of the Directorate for the Settlement of Nomadic Tribes and Refugees was 78,000,000 *kuruş* and its 1916 budget was 200,000,000 *kuruş*. The funds were spent for the deported Armenians, Greeks and Arabs as well as Muslim refugees coming in from territories invaded by the enemy. (BOS, BEO, No. 334063).

⁷² BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 53/305; No. 55-A/118.

⁷³ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 60/281.

Armenians living in the United States also collected some money and secretly delivered it to the deportees.⁷⁴

Apart from spending considerable sums of money for the deportation, the Ottoman Government either postponed or erased the debts the deported Armenians owed to the state or individual creditors. In a telegram he sent to the Maraş prefecture on 1 August 1915, Talât Bey called on the officials not to collect the debts of Armenians.⁷⁵ Another order sent to all provinces on 4 August 1915, requested the officials to postpone the farm tax and other taxes collected from Armenians subject to resettlement.⁷⁶ The government also assigned medical personnel to the deported parties to treat the sick.⁷⁷ Legal proceedings against the criminals and suspects were also postponed.⁷⁸

Property of Resettled Armenians

As noted above, with a circular published on 10 June 1915, the property of deported Armenians were put under state custody. The same circular stipulated that perishable goods, livestock, or production facilities which had to be kept operating would be auctioned by special commissions and the proceeds would be sent to the owners. It is understood that the Ottoman Government has shown utmost scrupulousness in the implementation of the instructions. Great care has been shown to prevent corruption. The properties were sold on market value by the Abandoned Property Commissions on behalf of the deported owners who were paid the proceeds.⁷⁹ On hearing rumors surrounding the auction, the government sent a coded telegram on 3 August 1915, to the prefectures, provinces and the Abandoned Property Commissions, banning state officials from buying property through these sales on the grounds that it will inevitably foster corruption.⁸⁰ But subsequently, the ban was lifted in some provinces on condition

⁷⁴ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 60/178.

⁷⁵ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 53/200.

⁷⁶ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54-A/268.

⁷⁷ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54-A/226.

⁷⁸ In a letter sent by the Justice Ministry on 14 Dec 1915, the Prime Ministry was informed of the decision that the trial of the deportees would be conducted at places they were sent to, while those allowed to stay would be tried at their hometowns.

⁷⁹ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 53/303.

⁸⁰ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54-A/259.

that the property was purchased with cash on its true value.⁸¹ The government has not withheld other measures designed to prevent every form of corruption. Indeed, a coded telegram sent on 29 July 1331/11 August 1915, to the chairman of the Abandoned Property Commission in Sivas, measures are requested to prevent corruption and embezzlement.⁸² Another telegram bearing the same date sent to all the provinces listed the measures and practices to be adopted.⁸³ This directive stipulated the following: (a) No suspicious people will be allowed to enter the evacuated areas; (b) in case some people were found out to have bought property below the normal rates, the sale would be annulled, and property will be auctioned again on true value so as to prevent the illegal acquisition of wealth; (c) deported Armenians will be allowed to take with them any property they wanted; (d) among the belongings which cannot be carried away, those that will deteriorate will be sold, but the durable ones will be protected in the name of their owners; (e) for the unmovable, care will be shown that such transactions as rent, transfer or mortgage will keep linked with the owner and transactions concluded in violation of these articles after the start of the deportation will be annulled; (f) no disputes will be allowed concerning the ownership of these properties; and (g) deported Armenians will be allowed to sell their property to anyone they wished except the foreigners.⁸⁴

The Ottoman officials have tried to implement these stipulations with utmost care. The artistic and commercial institutions left behind by the deportees were turned over with their true value to the housing companies set up for the purpose.⁸⁵ The proceeds from the sold property were paid to the exiled owners through the Abandoned Property Commissions.⁸⁶

⁸¹ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 55/107.

⁸² BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54-A/385.

⁸³ For the texts of the legislated laws concerning the property of deported Armenians, see "Provisional law on the property, debts and the settlement of the left assets of the people deported to other areas", *Takvim-i Vekayi*, 27 Sept. 1915, No. 2303, Yr. 7, and Y. H. Bayur, *Türk İnkılabı Tarihi* (History of Turkish Revolution) Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1957, III/3, pp. 45-46.

⁸⁴ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 54-A/388.

⁸⁵ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 61/31; No. 60/275; No. 60/277.

⁸⁶ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 57/348; No. 57/349; No. 57/350.

Repercussions Abroad and Relocation in Documents

Foreign observers at the areas of relocation have written that despite the difficulties entailed by the war, the Ottoman Government had carried out the resettlement in an efficient and orderly way. But some countries including Russia, Britain and the United States and the Western press in general have painted a distorted picture of the events. Although U.S. Consul Edward Nathan in Mersin reported that the transport of deportees proceeded smoothly in general, despite certain defects, and that the deportees were provided train tickets as mentioned before,⁸⁷ U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau reported the events to his country in a completely different light. The American press used these reports to attack the Turks. The newspapers alleged that Morgenthau had bribed the Ottoman Government to buy the freedom of some Armenians and sent them to America. The U.S. ambassador was also deified as the savior of British, Russian and French nationals in İstanbul. All these baseless reports, published in the newspapers, were reported to İstanbul by a Turkish citizen living in the United States at the time.⁸⁸ Beside the U.S. Ambassador,⁸⁹ the spread of the contentions that Armenians were massacred can be mainly attributed to Lord Bryce⁹⁰ and the German Protestant priest Johannes Lepsius.⁹¹ Furthermore, Arnold Toynbee,⁹² a member of the Wellington House, was another avid user of information supplied by Morgenthau. The writings of these people have become a chief source for the subsequent books written on the so-called Armenian "genocide".

Similarly, contentions such as the massacre of one million Armenians, contained in the reports of the British consuls in Iran, inflamed the British Parliament, which protested the Ottoman

⁸⁷ See: Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 2D/13.

⁸⁸ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept 2, No. 2F/6.

⁸⁹ See: Heath W. Lowry, *The Story Behind Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, İstanbul, The İsis Press, 1990. In this work (pp. 69-77), Lowry says that Morgenthau's memoirs were published almost simultaneously in Europe and the United States, and reveals relations of Morgenthau with Lepsius and Bryce.

⁹⁰ Great Britain, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*, London, H.M.S.O., 1916.

⁹¹ *Le Rapport secret du Dr. Johannes Lepsius sur les massacres d'Arménie*, Paris, Payot, 1918.

⁹² *Armenian Atrocities : The Murder of a Nation*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1915; *The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1917.

Government. Furthermore, in a **Blue Book** published in Britain over the deportation, it was claimed that a third of 1.8 million Armenians said to be living in Turkey had been murdered.⁹³ Despite these biased articles, a part of the Western press conceded that the incidents were purposefully distorted. In a newspaper published in Stockholm, an article entitled "Massacres in Ottoman Provinces where Armenians Live Peacefully", such claims were brushed off as ludicrous and reasons for their fabrication were explained.⁹⁴

The Ottoman Government has denied British allegations with a statement signed by the Foreign Ministry Undersecretary issued on 4 January 1917.⁹⁵ The statement argued that the Armenian population hardly reached a million in the Ottoman state, and the total had in fact decreased through successive emigrations before the outbreak of the war. The same document also referred to an article in *The Times*, in which Germans, too, were held responsible for the massacre of Armenians.⁹⁶

From then until our day, a lot has been written in the West and the United States on deportation. But none were based on genuine documents. Hiding behind fake documents, the Armenians succeeded in deceiving the world for a long time. The tales of Armenian massacre, starting at first with a figure of 300,000 to eventually reach 3 million, have all been based on books that keep referring to each other. But as will be seen from this chapter (the extensive version of which appears in my latest book in Turkish entitled **The Armenian Resettlement and Facts: 1914-1918**) based on secret documents of deportation kept by the Cipher Office and General Security Directorate (Police), the Ottoman Government officials have repeatedly stressed that the deportation, launched as a necessity dictated by national security, was never aimed to annihilate the Armenians. On the contrary, the state has shouldered heavy financial burdens to provide security and rations for the deportees. Sure of its conduct, the government has even sought the investigation of deportation and its background, in hopes of silencing the Western allegations of massacre. On 13

⁹³ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, File 1, Document 23.

⁹⁴ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 2/105.

⁹⁵ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 2D/17.

⁹⁶ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 59/19.

February 1919, it communicated notes to the Governments of Sweden, Holland, Spain and Denmark, calling on them to contribute two independent jurists to the proposed commission.⁹⁷ In their reply sent on 6 May 1919, these states turned down the request.⁹⁸ During deportation and resettlement that lasted about a year and a half from May of 1915 to the October of 1916, the state could largely protect the lives and property of the deportees through directives sent from the center, or measures taken locally, despite the difficult conditions of the time and an ongoing war. It has shouldered administrative, military and financial burdens as if a new front had been opened. In contrast to what was being done, Russia drove about one million Muslim refugees to the Ottoman territory in hunger and misery at about the same time. Hence, the Ottoman Government had to settle and feed this flood of Muslim refugees, too.

As will be seen from the new documents to be cited below, the transfer of Armenians to their new settlements, the first planned population movement of the century was conducted in great discipline. The number of Armenians in the places they left and in those they arrived were constantly monitored so as not to allow the resettled Armenians to concentrate in one place and disperse them to different towns and villages. The table below was compiled from the documents published in this book concerning the deported Armenians and those allowed to remain behind.⁹⁹

Provinces and prefectures	Deported	Remaining
Adana ¹⁰⁰	14,000	15-16,000
Ankara (Center) ¹⁰¹	21,236	733
Kalacık ¹⁰²	257	-
Keskin	1,169	-
Haymana ¹⁰³	60	-
Nallıhan	479	-

⁹⁷ Foreign Ministry, Truce, No. 43/17.

⁹⁸ Foreign Ministry, Truce, No. 43/17.

⁹⁹ Meanwhile, Armenians in Kastamonu, Balıkesir, Antalya, İstanbul and Urfa, the Protestant and Catholic Armenians as well as the sick, teachers, orphans and solitary women have not been deported.

¹⁰⁰ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/77.

¹⁰¹ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/66.

¹⁰² Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/79.

¹⁰³ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/66.

Sungurlu	576	-
Aydın ¹⁰⁴	250	-
İzmir ¹⁰⁵	256	-
Dört Yol ¹⁰⁶	9,000	-
Eskişehir ¹⁰⁷	7,000	-
Aleppo ¹⁰⁸	26,064	-
İzmit ¹⁰⁹	58,000	-
Karahisar-ı Sahip ¹¹⁰	5,769	2,222
Kayseri ¹¹¹	45,036	4,911
Mamuretülaziz ¹¹²	51,000	4,000
Sivas ¹¹³	136,084	6,055
Erzurum ¹¹⁴	5,500	-
Diyarbakır ¹¹⁵	20,000	-
Trabzon ¹¹⁶	3,400	-
Yozgat ¹¹⁷	10,916	-
Kütahya ¹¹⁸	1,400	-
Birecik ¹¹⁹	1,200	-
Konya ¹²⁰	1,990	-
Kırşehir ¹²¹	747	-

¹⁰⁴ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/250.

¹⁰⁵ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 69/260.

¹⁰⁶ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/89.

¹⁰⁷ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/72.

¹⁰⁸ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/76.

¹⁰⁹ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/67.

¹¹⁰ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/73.

¹¹¹ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/75.

¹¹² Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/70.

¹¹³ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/84.

¹¹⁴ Interior Ministry, Cipher Desk, No. 54/9; Interior Ministry, Cipher Desk, No. 54/162. Both documents report that of the deported Armenians, a 500-strong party had been massacred by Kurds between Erzurum and Erzincan. The other document says that the Armenians sent from the Dersim area were killed to a man by the Dersim bandits. Since it is not known how many deportees were in these parties, a putative figure of 5,000 has been accepted.

¹¹⁵ The documents do not clarify how many Armenians were deported from Diyarbakır. But since other documents note that a total of 120,000 deportees, including those who came from other places, were sent on, it is estimated that 20,000 Armenians were sent from Diyarbakır itself.

¹¹⁶ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/41.

¹¹⁷ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/66.

¹¹⁸ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/93.

¹¹⁹ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/101.

¹²⁰ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 69/34.

¹²¹ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/66.

Giresun ¹²²	328	-
Perşembe	390	-
Ulubey	30	-
Sürmene	290	-
Tirebolu	45	-
Ordu	36	-
Görece	250	-
Maraş ¹²³	-	8,845
Total	422,758	42,766

In a telegram, dated 5 October 1331/18 October 1915, sent from Aleppo by Şükrü Bey, director of the Office for the Resettlement of Tribes and Refugees, it was noted that the number of Armenians sent to Aleppo was estimated to be 100,000.¹²⁴ Meanwhile, about 120,000 Armenians had been assembled in Diyarbakır by 5 September 1331/18 September 1915, to be sent to Mosul and Aleppo, while 136,084 had assembled at Cizre by 15 September 1331/28 September 1915.¹²⁵ The documents show that some of the people from these groups were resettled at the following areas:¹²⁶

Province of Syria	37,702
Menc-Bab-Maarra prefectures	5,700
Urfa-Zor-Mosul	29,957
Kerek and Havran	65,147
Hama-Homs	12,000
Kuneytra-Baalbek-Tebek and Doma	492
Rakka and Obik	25,000
Zor	6,120
Aleppo	30,000
Total	212,118

¹²² Figures for Giresun, Perşembe, Ulubey, Sürmene, Tirebolu, Ordu and Görece were supplied in the same document. Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/41.

¹²³ Interior Ministry, Cipher Desk, No. 63/110.

¹²⁴ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/80.

¹²⁵ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/71; Dept. 2, No. 68/84.

¹²⁶ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/80; No. 69/5-6-7-8-9.

In a telegram sent from Nizip on 21 October 1915/3 November 1915, Şükrü Bey reported that the transfer was proceeding smoothly.¹²⁷

Of the people included in resettlement but shown as remaining behind in the above list, those left in Adana were subsequently moved to areas of resettlement.¹²⁸ The number of the Armenians resettled in the south, thus, totaled 438,758 while those reaching the resettlement area numbered 382,148. So, there is a difference of 56,610 between those who set out and those who made it to their new homes.

This difference stems from the following events according to documents: 500 people were killed between Erzurum and Erzincan, 2,000 more were killed at Meskene between Urfa and Aleppo, and a further 2,000 were killed by bandits and Arab tribes near Mardin. Although no firm figures are available, it is estimated that a similar number, that is, about 5,000 or a little more, were killed in the Dersim area by bandits attacking groups of transiting deportees.¹²⁹ In the light of these data, it is estimated that about 9-10,000 Armenians were killed during their deportation. It is also understood from the documents that some others starved to death on the road.¹³⁰ Apart from these, another 25-30,000 deported are believed to have succumbed to such diseases as typhoid or dysentery,¹³¹ raising the number of casualties to some 50,000. As for the rest, some are believed to be those put on the road but later settled at the city they reached when the deportation was suspended. For instance, on 26 April 1916, instructions were cabled to the province of Konya that the Armenians on the roads within the provincial borders should not be sent on, but settled within the province.¹³² Meanwhile, it is believed that some Armenians marked for deportation had been smuggled out of the country and taken to Russia, Western Europe and the United States. In the documents there are records that about 50,000 of

¹²⁷ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/101.

¹²⁸ Although the number of deportees arriving at Aleppo was reported to be "around" 100,000 (Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/80), the number has been taken as 100,000.

¹²⁹ See: fn. 29-32.

¹³⁰ Interior Ministry, Cipher Desk, No. 57/110.

¹³¹ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 68/81; see also Interior Ministry, Cipher Desk, No. 57/51; No. 57/71.

¹³² Interior Ministry, Cipher Desk, No. 63/119.

the Armenians under arms had defected to the Russian Army and 50,000 others were trained in the U.S. Army for the past three or four years to fight the Turks. A letter sent by an Armenian living in the United States to Murad Muradyan, a lawyer in Mamuretülaziz, contains such information.¹³³ The letter explicitly states that some Armenians had been spirited into Russia and the United States, and about 50,000 American-trained soldiers were about to leave for the Caucasus. All these documents make clear that large numbers of Ottoman Armenians were dispersed to many countries, headed by the United States and Russia, before and during the war. For instance, in a letter he sent to General Security Directorate on 19 January 1915, Artin Hotomyan, an Armenian on a trading visit to the United States, wrote that thousands of Armenians were being smuggled into America, and that they were living in hunger and misery.¹³⁴ The same letter informed the officials that an İstanbul-based network had been smuggling the Armenians in the Ottoman state into the United States in return for material gain. One member of the gang was identified as Aramoyis from Kayseri, the son of Karabet, a shoemaker. This man was hiding the clothes of deserting Armenian soldiers, and were helping them escape to America or other countries in return for five or ten lira, the informer wrote. At the end, Hotomyan wrote that the reason he supplied this information was not connected with any feeling of grudge or personal hatred, and asked it to be accepted as a humanitarian duty and a service to the country.

Such information show that there is no great discrepancy between the number of Armenians deported from Asian and European provinces of the domain, and the number of those who reached their destinations, and that there had been no deliberate and systematic murders on the road as alleged. Meanwhile, since the number of deported Armenians were about half a million, the total Armenian population of the Ottoman state appears to be somewhere between 600,000 and 800,000, including Catholic and Protestant Armenians, the Armenian community of İstanbul that was likewise exempted from deportation, and finally the Armenians living in provinces partly or fully occupied by the Russian Army, like Erzurum, Van and Kars. In fact, in a 1918 report he sent to

¹³³ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 2F/14.

¹³⁴ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, No. 2F/94.

Monsieur Gout, the representative of the French Foreign Ministry, Armenian Delegation Chief Boghos Nubar Paşa gave the breakdown of Armenians dispersed to various areas after the deportation as follows:

Caucasus	250,000
Iran	40,000
Syria-Palestine	80,000
Mosul-Baghdad	20,000

The Armenian representative argued that the number of the deportees was not confined to this total of 390,000, but actually ran into 600-700,000 that he said, excluded the exiles dispersed to here and there in the deserts.¹³⁵ But it is clear from the figures supplied by Boghos Nubar Paşa, that 290,000 were those who left Ottoman territory without being exiled -since none were sent to Caucasia or Iran. So, if one subtracts 290,000 from the "600-700,000" deportee number given by the Armenian representative, then one arrives at the 400,000-plus total we have given, using authentic data taken from the government or police archives of the time. This also proves that the bulk of the deportees had safely reached their destinations, leaving no support for the claims of genocide. Indeed, following a meeting with Zenop Bezjian, the representative of Protestant Armenians, U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, has noted in his diary, his deep surprise over Bezjian's remarks. In the following passage, Morgenthau describes his conversation with the Armenian dignitary:

"Zenop Bezjian, Vekil (Representative) of Armenian Protestants, called. Schmavonian introduced him; he was his schoolmate. He told me a great deal about conditions (in the interior). I was surprised to hear him report that Armenians at Zor were fairly well satisfied; that they have already settled down to business and are earning their livings; those were the first ones that were sent away and seem to have gotten there without being massacred. He gave me a list where the various camps are and he thinks that over one half million have been displaced. He

¹³⁵ Bilâl Şimşir, *Les Déportés de Malte et les allégations arméniennes*, Ankara, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1998, p. 49 (from: Archives des Affaires Etrangères de France, Série Levant, 1918-1928, Sous Série Arménie, Vol. 2, folio 47).

was most solicitous that they should be helped before winter sets in".¹³⁶

The passage above is illustrative in that it shows how the ambassador was taken aback on learning the contentment of the Armenians from the mouth of another Armenian.

As explained above, the decision on deportation had been taken after the Armenians, seeing the time as ripe for breathing life to the dream of an independent Armenia, stabbed their state in the back when it was occupied with the war. The documents reveal how the Russians deceived and instigated the Armenians.¹³⁷ Taken in by the Russian promises that the territories captured in war would be given to them and their independence would be recognized, Armenians have set up several revolutionary associations.¹³⁸ A verse written by the son of an Armenian named Murad shows the intentions of the Armenians without any room for doubt.¹³⁹ Having started their acts of terrorism before the deportation, they were seen to keep them up during the transit of deportees as well. The fact that they have collaborated with the enemy and engaged in massacres against the Muslim population, not only at the border areas, but also deep inside were borne out by Turkish as well as Russian documents.¹⁴⁰ There are documents showing that the Armenian atrocities continued even after the war. One example what were in store for the Muslims was displayed in 1920, when a 1200-strong unit entered Nakhechevan under the command of an Armenian named Hanov.¹⁴¹ It is also clear from the cables dated 18 and 22 February 1336/3 and 7 March 1921 sent by Mümtaz Bey, the vice-governor of the Mamuretülaziz province, the Armenians who came under French protection were dreaming of an independent Armenia stretching from the Amanos Mountains to Adana.¹⁴²

¹³⁶ Lowry, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

¹³⁷ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 45/115 (With the telegram dated 23 Sept. 1916, the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Mamuretülaziz, Adana, Diyarbakır and Sivas were given instructions in this respect).

¹³⁸ BOA, BEO, No. 328331; No. 337081; BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 56/382.

¹³⁹ Interior Ministry, EUM, Dept. 2, Folder 1, doc. 45/2.

¹⁴⁰ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 61/50; No. 62/24; No. 63/175; No. 64/92; No. 64/163; No. 64/194; No. 66/51; No. 66/56; No. 66/192; BOA, BEO, No. 343464.

¹⁴¹ Letter from the Interior Ministry sent to the Prime Ministry on 1 Febr. 1920 (BOA, BEO, No. 341351).

¹⁴² Interior Ministry, EUM, No. 2 F/3; Interior Ministry, EUM, File 2 F/5.

In the end, the Ottoman Government decided on publishing the documents of 'Armenian atrocities' in a book, and sent instructions to all provinces for the collection and dispatch of such documents describing the Armenian acts of cruelty and the pictures of captured arms and bandits.¹⁴³ In the light of these documents, **The Objectives and Revolutionary Activities of Armenian Committees Before and After the Proclamation of Constitutional Monarchy** was published.¹⁴⁴

Armenians after Resettlement

During its course, there were times when the deportation was halted due to congestion or climatic reasons. With instructions sent to the provinces after 12 November 1331/25 November 1915, the officials were informed that deportation was provisionally stopped because of winter.¹⁴⁵ On 21 February 1916, all provinces were ordered to stop sending off deportees. But it was clarified that the order did not cover those engaged in anti-government activities, who would be immediately rounded up and sent to the *sanjaq* of Zor.¹⁴⁶ But just twenty days later, the Ottoman Government issued another general order on 2 March 1332/15 March 1916, announced that relocation was terminated "due to administrative and military reasons", and the provinces were told not to send away Armenians on any account.¹⁴⁷

Meanwhile, because the Armenian population was largely sent to Syria and nearby provinces, the Armenian Patriarchate in İstanbul was abolished and moved to Jerusalem on 28 July 1332/10 August 1916. In a parallel move, Sis and Akdamar chapters were combined and likewise transferred to Jerusalem.¹⁴⁸ Sahak Efendi, the former Catholicos of Sis, was appointed as the head of the new patriarchate.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴³ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 62/21 (App. LX).

¹⁴⁴ İstanbul, Matbaa-i Orhaniye, 1332 (1916).

¹⁴⁵ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 57/273; No. 58/124; No. 59/123; No. 60/190.

¹⁴⁶ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 61/72.

¹⁴⁷ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 62/21 (App. LX).

¹⁴⁸ For the new regulations set for Armenian Patriarchate in 1916, see Bayur, **Türk İnkılabı Tarihi** (History of the Turkish Revolution), III/3, p. 57-59.

¹⁴⁹ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 66/202; No. 66/220; No. 63/136.

The Decree for Return

After the end of World War I, the Ottoman Government issued a decree, announcing that the deported Armenians were free to return. In a letter to the Prime Minister's Office dated 22 December 1334/4 January 1919, Interior Minister Mustafa Paşa informed that the necessary instructions were sent and preparations were made to arrange the transport of Armenian deportees who wished to return to their original places.¹⁵⁰ According to the government decree for return dated 18 December 1334/31 December 1918, (a) only those who wished to return would be sent, and no others would be touched; (b) necessary measures would be taken to ensure that those repatriated would not suffer on the roads and on their return would find shelter and livelihood; to prevent any surprises, returning deportees would be sent only after the officials of the place of return were contacted and necessary measures were completed; (c) those returning under these terms would be given back their homes and land; (d) any refugees settled in the homes of returning deportees would be evicted; (e) not to leave anyone without shelter, several families would be provisionally accommodated together if necessary; (f) buildings like churches or schools and their revenue-bringing assets would be returned to the community; (g) if so wished, the orphaned children would be given to foster parents or the community to be looked after; (h) those who had converted would be able to return to their former religion if they wished; (i) of the women converts, those married to Muslim men would be free to take up their former religion; if they return to their original faith, the wedlock with their husbands would automatically dissolve; matters pertaining to those who do not want to return to their original faith or part with their husbands would be settled by courts; (j) untouched Armenian property would be returned to their owners, while the return of the property turned over to the Treasury would be subject to the approval of the local estate officials; detailed guidelines would be published for such transactions; (k) the real estate sold to (Muslim) refugees would be handed back to the returnees; article 4 will be strictly implemented in this respect; (l) if the refugees had done repairs or extensions to the houses and shops in their possession to be returned to their former owners, officials would see to it that rights

¹⁵⁰ BOA, BEO, No. 341055. This letter from the Interior Ministry has been transferred by the Prime Minister's Office to the Justice Ministry.

of both sides would be safeguarded; (m) the cost of transport and food for the needy returnees would be met from the War Ministry funds; (n) the Government would be told how many people were sent back, and with immediate effect would be sent regular reports on the 15th and the end of each month, showing the number and destinations of returnees sent back; (o) the Armenians who left the Ottoman country by themselves would not be allowed to return until further notice.

The articles of the above decree also applied to the returning Greek refugees.

Conclusions

One can conclude that the deportation of the Armenians who betrayed the Ottoman armies on the Caucasus front in World War I and assisted the Russian occupation of the Ottoman provinces of Van, Kars and Erzurum should be seen as legitimate self-defence to which every nation is entitled. The armed terrorism carried out by secret societies and armed bands of independence-seeking Armenians instigated by great powers such as Russia, Britain, France and Germany, bent on partitioning the Ottoman state, has resulted in the massacre of large numbers of defenceless Turks. The massacres carried out in the Kars, Van, İzmit, Erzurum, Bitlis and other Ottoman provinces assumed dimensions, which caused even the commanders of the Russian occupation forces to revolt.¹⁵¹ Indeed, documents expose that in Kars and Ardahan alone, about 30,000 Muslims were murdered by the Armenians and Russians,¹⁵² with the number going up to several hundred thousand when calculated for all Ottoman provinces.

As a precaution, the Ottoman state had to recourse to forced resettlement, starting with Armenians in the areas closest to the theatre of war. When the Armenian gangs kept up their atrocities and continued to supply information to the foreigners detrimental to the security interests of the country, the scope of the deportations was expanded to include all other Armenians, except the populations of İzmir and İstanbul, as well as the Protestants, Catholics, orphans, solitary women and the sick. The Armenians known to be loyal to the state were also excluded.

¹⁵¹ Foreign Ministry, Great War, Folder 173/5.

¹⁵² Foreign Ministry, Great War, Folder 122/4; Folder 122/6.

The deportation, of course, was painful. Displacing thousands of people suddenly and resettling them is not an easy task. Yet, advance planning of the routes and staging areas, wide use of railway stations as dispatch centers, the use of trains to transport the bulk of deportees, distribution of rations by the state, assignment of medical personnel and gendarmes to the departing parties, have turned the deportation into one of the most orderly population movement of the past century. Of course, during the deportation, moving groups occasionally came under attack from vengeful people and about 9-10,000 Armenians were massacred.

Besides, there had been deaths due to contagious diseases, which is normal in such massive population movements as seen during the immigration of European Turks to Anatolia. No doubt, none of these were things desired by those who gave the order for deportation. Indeed, the government continuously took measures against corruption, and those seen to have engaged in immoral behaviour were punished. With the end of the war, the decree permitting the return of deportees was issued.¹⁵³ Those who converted to avoid deportation were allowed to return to their original faith. Orphaned Armenian children kept by Muslim families were turned over to a commission set up by the Armenians;¹⁵⁴ the returnees received state rations for a while,¹⁵⁵ committees were set up to investigate complaints and identify those who have mistreated the Armenians,¹⁵⁶ their property were returned to those who came back,¹⁵⁷ travel expenses of the returnees were met,¹⁵⁸ they were exempted from certain taxes,¹⁵⁹ their belongings kept safe at public offices were returned,¹⁶⁰ and commissions were set up to look into matters concerning the return of property.

All these show, once again, that the Ottoman Government had no intention to subject the Armenians to genocide, that it resorted to deportation as a precaution for its security and implemented it

¹⁵³ Foreign Ministry, Truce, No. 43/34.

¹⁵⁴ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 96/248.

¹⁵⁵ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 96/279.

¹⁵⁶ BOA, Cabinet Letters, No. 213/60.

¹⁵⁷ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 99/35.

¹⁵⁸ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 95/124.

¹⁵⁹ Interior Ministry, Political Div., No. 53/2.

¹⁶⁰ BOA, Cipher Desk, No. 96/230.

only during the war, and that it allowed the Armenians to return after its end. In fact, large numbers of Armenians accompanied Russian, British and French forces that occupied Turkey at the end of the war, and again large numbers of Armenians left Turkey after the occupation forces withdrew. The decisions and measures mentioned above are not the ones that a state aiming at genocide would normally take. Secret documents, kept in the archives of the Cipher Office and Directorate of General Security attached to the Interior Ministry, do not contain even a single article that might be regarded as suggesting an intention of massacre or genocide. Documents show that deportation was closely monitored and photographed by many foreign observers and diplomats, particularly the U.S. consuls. Strangely, however, in Europe and in the United States, deportation has been presented to the public as genocide against the Armenians, with the claim largely based on the reports of the U.S. ambassador in Istanbul and some Western journalists. This hostile attitude may be attributed to the feeling of frustration when the Ottoman Government launched deportation as a means of disrupting the plans for the partition of the country.

Some historians of the countries that accuse Turkey of genocide have been studying the Ottoman archives for years. Researches of foreign scholars have been published in their respective countries and have made important contributions to the understanding of history. The archive documents made available to historians were referred to as first-hand sources in the books they published. That makes it difficult to understand how the Western critics can cast doubt on the authenticity of the documents concerning the Armenians in the Ottoman archives to which over 6,000 foreign scholars have attached great importance. It is surprising and saddening to see that books published by Turkish researchers are undermined with the same political bias that prevailed in 1915. I think it will be futile to propose a comprehensive joint research by American, European and Turkish scholars, extending from the outbreak of the first Armenian rebellions, to the end of the deportation; from the sources of Armenian arms, to the charges of genocide, with unrestricted access to the Ottoman, Russian, German, British, French and American archives, as it will be rejected just like the Ottoman proposal in 1919 for the appointment of a neutral commission to investigate the allegations. How else the blood-baths carried out by the French in Algeria, by the British in India and Africa, by the

United States against the so-called "Indian" population, by Germans against the Jews, by Russia also against the Jews and later the Turks can be erased from public memories and guilty consciences?

MASSACRES OF THE TURKS AND MASS GRAVES

Enver Konukçu

The First World War was a disaster for the Ottomans on the Trans-Caucasian Front. Tsarist Russia, regarding the bombing of Black Sea harbours as a *casus belli*, attacked the Ottomans in eastern Anatolia at the end of 1914. The Third Army at first won some victories under the Acting Commander-in-Chief Enver Paşa in the Allahuekber and Sarıkamış Mountains, but the sudden onset of winter conditions, bringing extremely cold weather compared by the Russians to that of Siberia, resulted in large numbers of Turkish soldiers freezing to death. One of the main factors in the Turkish defeat on this front was inadequate supplies of food and medical equipment. The Russian fleet blockaded the Trabzon harbour, and the railways and roads leading eastwards from İstanbul *via* Eskişehir, Ankara and Kayseri were unsuitable.

Following the victory at Sarıkamış, the Russians marched on Hasankale and Erzurum. Impervious to winter conditions, General Nikolay Nikolayevich Yudenich captured the Erzurum Fort (16 February 1916).¹ Since the Commander of the Turkish Third Army, Mahmud Kâmil Paşa, had ordered the garrison to withdraw, losses were slight. Abdülkerim Paşa had simultaneously withdrawn with the rearguard through the İstanbul Gate to the Ilıca line. The population of Erzurum once more became refugees, fleeing under the extremely difficult conditions towards Sivas.²

Enver Paşa and the government concealed the fall of Erzurum and its occupation by the Russians from the Turkish public.³ In

¹ General Yudenich (1862-1933) is better known as the Tsarist commander of the White Army in the Baltic area after the Bolshevik Revolution. He had emerged a general from the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). He commanded all Russian forces in the Caucasus in 1914-1915, and again in 1917. Michael T. Florinsky, ed., *Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961, p. 617.

² Enver Konukçu, *Selçuklulardan Cumhuriyete Erzurum*, Erzurum, Erzurum Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası, 1992, pp. 378-379, 386.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 385.

Moscow spirits were high, because few had believed that General Yudenich would be able to take the city. When news of the fall of Erzurum was confirmed through Tbilisi, a mood of celebration swept through Moscow and the palace. Tsar Nicholas II rewarded Yudenich with medals and decorations. The Russian Army continued its march westwards between February and July, and on 25 July 1916, captured Erzincan. The Third Army had set up its headquarters at Suşehri. It was at this time that on the orders of the Acting Commander-in-Chief, Vehib Mehmed Paşa was appointed the Army Commander. Since his troops were now exhausted and their numbers depleted, General Yudenich called a halt to the fighting. The two sides reinforced their defences at transit points of strategic importance, and certain areas were mined. Frontier posts were set up. In the spring of 1917 General Yudenich decided to launch a general offensive, the plans for which were drawn up in Sarıkamış and Tbilisi.

Now, however, uprisings commenced against the Tsarist Government, and the October Revolution broke out. Russia was thrown into chaos. Lenin was engaged in a struggle to bring the Bolsheviks to power. The troops at the front were exhausted. They had been fighting for a long time, and their families were poverty stricken. Bolshevik agents from Trans-Caucasia won many supporters among them with promises of relief for their problems. Before long, the Russian Army was showing signs of disintegration. Officers found it increasingly difficult to make the soldiers obey their commands. General Yudenich left his post and returned to Russia at a time when extremely dangerous clouds were gathering on the horizon. Generals Przevalsky, Lebedinsky, Vishinsky and others, who had gained considerable experience in the course of war against the Turks, began to realise that it was hopeless to continue fighting on the Turkish front.⁴

At this juncture, Acting Commander-in-Chief Enver Paşa called the Third Army Commander Vehib Paşa from his headquarters in Suşehri instructing him to conclude a peace. Meanwhile, the Russians were after peace with Germany, and moves had been taken for preliminary talks at Brest-Litovsk. The Third Army commander sent Lieutenant Kahraman to Refahiye to contact the vanguard post. The commander in Erzincan was sympathetic towards the Ottoman peace initiative, but for the moment there

⁴ Ibid., p. 387.

was nothing he could do. The Turkish lieutenant stayed that night with the Russians, who learned from him the intentions and proposals of Army Commander Vehib and the İstanbul Government.

Erzincan contacted Erzurum, Sarıkamış and, via Kars, the general headquarters in Tbilisi. It was decided to accept the Ottoman proposal, and General Przevalsky immediately sent a delegation to Erzincan. Ottoman-Russian talks (on 17 and 18 December 1917) were concluded with an immediate truce, known as the Erzincan Armistice.⁵ After both sides signed the terms of the truce, the Russians began to withdraw to behind the former frontier. The same would follow for Erzurum.

On 11 January 1918 (29 December 1917), the *dekret* (decree) of 'Turkish Armenia', signed by the Chairman of the Soviet People's Commissars (V.I. Ulyanov-Lenin), People's Commissar for Nationality Affairs (I.V. Dzhugashvili-Stalin), Chairman of the Administrative Affairs of the Soviet People's Commissars (V. Bonch Bruevich), and Secretary of the Soviets (N. Gorbunov), was promulgated. This resolution,⁶ made public right after the Erzincan Armistice, opens with these words: "The People's Commissars declare to the Armenian people that the Russian Workers and Peasants Government supports the right of the Armenians in 'Turkish Armenia' which is under Russian occupation to determine their own fate freely, even to the extent of achieving full independence".

The four articles of the decree and its Annex (*Primechaniye*) are important in throwing light on what was to come. It states that in order to protect the property of the people of 'Turkish Armenia' following the withdrawal of the Russian army, an Armenian People's Militia should be established immediately; that Armenian emigrants in various countries should be allowed to return without any obstruction; that Armenians forcibly moved to the interior provinces of Turkey by the Turkish authorities during the war should be free to return to 'Turkish Armenia'; that this subject should be insisted upon in peace negotiations with the Turkish

⁵ Stefanos Yerasimos, *Kurtuluş Savaşında Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri: 1917-1923*, İstanbul, Gözlem Yayınları, 2000, pp. 38-40. For the text of the *dekret*, see: Ministerstvo Inostrannih Dyel SSSR, *Dokumenti Vneshney Politiki SSSR*, Tom Perviy, Moskva, Gosudarstvennoy Izdatel'stvo, Politicheskoy Literaturi, 1957, pp. 74-75. Also: *Dekreti Oktyabr'skoy Revolyutsii*, Tom Perviy, Moskva, Partizdat, 1933, pp. 393-394.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 40-42.

authorities by the People's Commissars; and that a provisional government to be called the Armenian Soviet of People's Representatives should be set up in 'Turkish Armenia'. Provisional Extraordinary People's Commissar for Caucasian Affairs, Stephan Shaumyan, was to be appointed "to implement these provisions for the people of 'Turkish Armenia', to organise the withdrawal of Russian troops from 'Turkish Armenia', and to provide every kind of assistance for the establishment of a joint commission". The Annex to the decree states that the Armenian People's Representatives elected on democratic principles from the inhabitants of the neighbouring provinces in question would decide and determine the geographic boundaries of 'Turkish Armenia' in conjunction with the Provisional Extraordinary People's Commissar for Caucasian Affairs.⁷

This document, dated 11 January 1918, prompts certain problems and answers. The term "Turkish Armenia" used by the Soviet leaders was, even at the time, not the official name for the region, either in political or geographic terms. Contemporary Turkish sources referred to it as *Vilâyât-ı Şarkıyye* (the Eastern Provinces), or by narrower definition as *Elviye-i Selâse* (the Three Sub-Provinces). Whether intentionally or not, the Soviets exposed the unfounded claims of our day.

Under the Statute of Relocation, some of the Armenian population of Erzurum and its environs were forced to migrate, but as of May 1916, they returned to Erzurum and other places under Russian occupation. This was organised by offices established by the Armenians in Erzurum, Erzincan, Van and Bitlis, and settlement was rapid. Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership was violating Turkish rights by demanding that a provisional government be established in what was called 'Turkish Armenia'. The Dashnag Armenians had launched a movement of this kind in Tbilisi, appointing Dr. Azaryev. The decree of 11 January 1918 runs entirely contrary to the Erzincan Armistice.

Following the armistice, the Third Army made some changes in its command echelons. Colonel Kâzım Karabekir was appointed Commander of the First Caucasian Army Corps. Hüsâmeddin (Tuğaç), who had been a prisoner of war for nearly two years, managed to return to Turkey and finding his way to the

⁷ Ibid., p. 42.

headquarters of the Third Army, provided very valuable information about new Russia and the changing Russians. It was from him that Vehib Paşa discovered that the Russian army was actually melting away. Kâzım Karabekir immediately moved to Refahiye and made a speech to the troops of the First Caucasian Army Corps, telling them that everywhere up to the Russian border, including Erzincan, Erzurum and Sarıkamış, would be eventually liberated. Soon afterwards, he went to Suşehri to discuss operations with the commander of the Third Army.⁸

The First Caucasian Army Corps was ready to march in January 1918. A task of crucial historical importance lay ahead. Despite limited means and deficient numbers, the march eastwards commenced on 10 February 1918. They liberated Erzincan, Tercan, Erzurum, Hasankale, Horasan, Kötek, Sarıkamış, Kars, and Gümrü. Thus, the campaign that began in February 1918 was successfully completed by the middle of May. Kâzım Karabekir, Halit Bey and Rüştü Bey played major roles in liberating those places from Armenian occupation and brutality. The role of the militia was also significant in the Erzincan operation and the taking of Erzurum. It was in the former that the Armenians were first disappointed in their aspirations, and in Garin -that is, Erzurum- which they had chosen as the capital of an imaginary Armenia, that these aspirations were extinguished altogether. Their attempt to cling on to Kars failed despite the efforts of some Russian officers. With the recapture of Gümrü, the Turkish Army had swept back the Russians and other enemies to beyond the former frontier.

In Erzincan, Tercan, Aşkale, Bayburd, Ilıca, Erzurum, Hasankale, Horasan, Karaorgan, Sarıkamış, Kars, Iğdır, Kağızman and around Göle in Ardahan, the Armenians carried out systematic massacres on a large scale. They razed cities, towns and villages in their path, and murdered the inhabitants, including women, children and the elderly. Mass executions were carried out. People were herded into buildings that were then set alight. They were seized on the pretext of working on road building projects, taken away and slaughtered. Some were shot, others stabbed to death with bayonets. Whole groups of people were

⁸ Kâzım Karabekir, *Kâzım Karabekir'in Kaleminden Doğu'nun Kurtuluşu (Erzincan ve Erzurum'un Kurtuluşu: Sarıkamış Kars ve Ötesi)*, Erzurum, Erzurum Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası, 1990, pp. 57, 61-63.

gathered at river fords and shot through the neck or the head. Bodies were thrown into wells.

Kâzım Karabekir documented these massacres in Erzincan, Erzurum and Kars. He had photographs taken and reports drawn up. He informed the Third Army, and this documentation was sent to İstanbul.⁹ About the findings in these three cities, Kâzım Karabekir wrote:

"Erzincan: I had reports drawn up about the Armenian atrocities, and photographs taken. I also recorded the account by a Russian officer, whom we took prisoner, of what he had witnessed on this subject...Erzurum: On 15 March 1918. I talked to Russian officers whom we had taken prisoner and to Lieutenant Colonel Tverdo-Khlebov. He told me that the Armenians numbered 6000, and that they had perpetrated many atrocities. He promised to sign his statement describing these. He wrote two reports in Russian, which were translated into Turkish and French. These include a history and memoirs, our operation and the actions of the Armenians...Kars: On 4 May 1918. The commander of the Third Army asked that the photographs of the massacres and murders committed by the Armenians be sent. Today, I sent a total of 55 photographic plates, 44 of which had not been developed, together with a letter, reference number 1398 and dated 11 May 1334[1918], with Assistant Chief Physician Fahri Bey of my army corps to Commander Vehib Paşa in Batum. I have no plates left".

Subsequently, a report was drawn up on the massacres and atrocities carried out by the Armenians in Erzurum and other eastern cities, printed at the army corps press, and given to General James G. Harbord on 24 September 1919.¹⁰ This report is an official document recording the massacres carried out in Erzincan, Gümrü and Iğdır. Witnesses of the Armenian atrocities, among them Kazimir, Mrs. Passy, Tverdo-Khlebov and Ivan Pilyat, presented accounts of what they had seen to the Turkish authorities. The statements were given by the free will of those concerned, motivated by humane values. Captain Ahmed Refik

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 77, 151, 362.

¹⁰ General Harbord was the commander of a commission, sent to Anatolia by the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson to determine local feelings about the post-war settlement. He is also the author of the Harbord Commission Report (16 October 1919). Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. II, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 331, 346-347.

and a number of foreigners and Turkish journalists travelled to Trabzon, Gümüşhane, Erzincan, Tercan, Aşkale, Ilıca, Erzurum, Hasankale, Horasan, Sarıkamış, Yeni Selim, Kars, and Ardahan in May 1918 as observers. The atrocities carried out in Erzincan and Erzurum by the Armenians were made public. The observations of Abdullah Efendi and pictures taken by photographer Necati Bey, who were sent especially from İstanbul, form the most reliable documents of all. Unfortunately, only a typescript of this document exists, although I have a copy in my private library. Western sources refrain from mentioning the Armenian massacres in Erzincan, Erzurum and Kars. Those who reported the events of 1914-1916 on a daily basis to the press organs in London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, New York and Chicago were now silent. The American missionaries, charity organisations, consuls, military attachés, doctors, nurses, and others who were there, wrote not a line about the systematic destruction of the Turks in this region. Documents in the Armenian archives in Erivan and in Tbilisi await researchers, if permission is given. The imagined genocide which Armenian researchers allege so frequently has fallen into the confusion of technology. In books written on the subject, the terminology is seen to change over time from atrocity and massacre to genocide, and, at the present time, even to *Holocaust*.

The names of those who planned and carried out the systematic massacre of the Turks in eastern Anatolia are recorded in documents: Antranik, Tero, Heço, Muradyan, Torkom, Arşak, Sebu, Dro (Drastamat Kanayan), Mardiros, Canbulat and Armen Garo. The last-mentioned was from Erzurum and belonged to a wealthy and respected family. He had served as a deputy for Erzurum in the Ottoman Parliament, then joined the Dashnag Committee and became a militant leader. The enmity he displayed for the Turks between 1916 and 1920 was manifested in the fact that it was he who ordered and organised assassinations of members of the Committee of Union and Progress. Dr. Azaryev was an organiser of the atrocities in Erzurum after 3 March 1918. Muradyan played a role in almost all the massacres, beginning with the incidents that took place in Şarki Karahisar. It was he who gave the orders for the massacres of Erzincan and Erzurum, and sent bands of militants to the villages for this purpose. Kötürlü Antranik was responsible for the deaths of thousands of Turks. Unfortunately, the Armenian diasporas and Westerners know him as a "national hero". Knowing well that one who may be

a "patriot" for a group may be a "murderer" for another, my considered opinion, judged by the bloodshed caused, is that he was nothing more than a bandit and gang leader.

Under pressure from Armenian lobbies, the United States, France and Britain have debated the subject of genocide in their parliaments, some of which have recognised an Armenian genocide. Now a campaign for genocide is being continued, the latest example being displayed by the Greeks. The genocide allegations of the Armenians are entirely unfounded. No documentary evidence exists. The alleged total of 1,500,000 Armenian deaths is tremendously exaggerated. It has even been claimed that Hitler learned mass extermination from the Turks. This only demonstrates the weakness of Armenian and Western sources. At the same time, examples such as Algeria, Azerbaidjan, Russia and the like are never brought up at all. The Kathryn Woods, and Bab-ı Yar, which has been the subject of a novel, seem to have been forgotten. No one wishes to remember the innocent people systematically killed by the Armenians in eastern Anatolia, or the Turkish people who had to flee their homes in 1916 and lost their lives in the mountains.

For this reason Atatürk University launched a study of mass graves, and between 1986 and 1999 conducted field research in areas where, according to documentation, the Armenians carried out massacres in the provinces of Erzincan, Erzurum, Kars, Iğdır and Ardahan. Mass graves have been found at Alaca, Yeşilyayla and Tımar in Erzurum, Subatan in Kars, Oba and Hak Mehmed in Iğdır, and Zeve in Van.¹¹

Alaca

This site is near Ilıca, west of Erzurum, on a hill on an upper tributary of the Euphrates. The testimony of Kâzım Karabekir, the ATASE Archive (attached to the Turkish Chief of Staff) and İsmail Efendi were examined. Kâzım Karabekir wrote in a report dated 10 March 1918: "I moved my headquarters from Tazegül to the village of Alaca. First, I went around the village. The most dreadful disaster has taken place here. The weeping and mourning over bayoneted or burnt bodies were spine chilling. Some mothers

¹¹ Cevat Başaran, "Son Gelişmeler Işığında Iğdır-Oba Köyü Toplu Mezar Kazısı ve Yankıları", *Iğdır: Tarihi Gerçekler ve Ermeniler Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, 24-27 Nisan 1995, Ankara, Iğdır Valiliği Kültür Yayınları, 1997, pp. 53-56.

holding babies stabbed by bayonets were tearing out their hair. I think few eyes on earth have seen so fearful a scene. We are among those to have grieved at such a bloody sight. With mortification we saw how human beings, when deprived of humane emotions, can become creatures more brutal than animals".¹² They buried all the people who had been burnt or bayoneted to death at Alaca in a mass grave in the barn. This was uncovered in 1986, and 284 skeletons were counted, although documents put the death toll at around 600. The excavation was reported on television and in the press. The former Turkish President Kenan Evren visited the village and inaugurated a memorial there. Memorial ceremonies are held here annually on 11 March.¹³

Yeşilyayla

This village, previously also known as Arzuti, is at the foot of Yılanlı Tepe, north of the Erzurum Plain. The Karasu River runs south of here. Eyewitnesses of the massacre were Dumluoğlu Durak Ağa, Şöhret Nine and Kâzım Karabekir. In addition, Abdullah Efendi recorded the Yeşilyayla incident in May 1918. The report of the Eastern Front Command General Staff Intelligence Office, dated 10 July 1922, established the following:

"The atrocity which took place in the village of Arzuti [Yeşilyayla] while the Armenians were withdrawing during the advance of 1918 was described by one of the survivors, the 65-year old Dumluoğlu Durak, who escaped after being wounded in eighteen places: 'Following the fall of Erzurum, the Armenians began to withdraw, at which 17 Armenians in the village of Arzuti rounded up 120 Muslims and slaughtered them all. The names of some of the dead are thus: Arapoğlu İsmail Ağa, Mevludoğlu Muharrem, Mevludoğlu Alişan, Alişanoğlu Nâzım, Hurşidoğlu Ziya, Hocaoglu Abdullah, Mehmedoğlu Ramiz, Rıdvanoğlu Ali, Mehmedoğlu Hakkı, Osmanoglu Hamza, Tosunoğlu Kadir, Alioğlu İbrahim, İbrahimoglu Halil, Mehmedoğlu Musa, Mehmedoğlu Receb, Hüseyinoğlu Receb, Hüseyinoğlu Mustafa, Hüseyinoğlu Dursun, and Mustafaoğlu Yusuf".¹⁴

¹² Karabekir, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

¹³ Enver Konukçu, the "Alaca file" in the author's private library.

¹⁴ Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi/Hariciye, Siyasi, No. 2878/89.

Based on this source and local investigation, Atatürk University conducted an excavation, which uncovered numerous skeletons. The excavation was carried out on 7 October 1988, in the presence of members of the press. When skeletons began to appear, the representatives of the foreign press agencies who had been invited began to leave the site. The Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) and the CNN reported the news, and a book was later published on the subject.¹⁵

Tımar

This village lay in the district of Pasinler in the province of Erzurum, and is now in the catchments area of a dam. In March 1918 the inhabitants of the village were shut up in a barn, which was then set alight and fired upon by Armenians from Hasankale. On 7 June 1994, Atatürk University participated in excavations here based on the statement of Necati Efendi in May 1918 and local research. Armenians systematically murdered 321 people here.¹⁶

Subatan

This settlement is on the road between Kars and Anı, close to the border. Kâzım Karabekir, Taşdemir of Anı, Mehmed of Daynalık, and İsmail Ağa of Subatan recorded the massacre here. Kâzım Karabekir wrote on 23 April 1918: "According to reports received this evening, the Armenians are withdrawing from every direction towards Gümrü. It has been learnt that four days ago (19 April 1918), over two-hundred men, children and women from the Turkish inhabitants of the village of Subatan were killed in the village haybarns".¹⁷ Other villages in the vicinity of Subatan close to the Arpa River suffered a similar fate. Burhanoglu Taşdemir and Mehmed, son of Zeynel Ağa from Daynaklık, said in their accounts that the entire populations of Korhane and Daynalık were killed. Their livestock, provisions and property were looted. Most of the inhabitants of the village of Anı were also killed. Very few managed to escape. Everything they owned was plundered. There were many Muslim skeletons in the mosque in Anı.¹⁸

¹⁵ Enver Konukçu, *Ermenilerin Yeşilyayla'daki Türk Soykırımı*, Ankara, Atatürk Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü Yayınları, 1990.

¹⁶ Enver Konukçu, *Hasankale/Pasinler*, İzmir, Nil Yayınevi, 1998, pp. 199-202.

¹⁷ Karabekir, *op. cit.*, p. 347.

¹⁸ Resmî Belge, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi/Hariciye Siyasi, No. 2878/81.

This document reflects the terrible situation at the historic site of Anı. The Armenians herded the people of Anı into the mosque next to their holy church in the ruins and burnt them. One of those who witnessed the Subatan massacre was Alioğlu İsmail Ağa from the village. His account includes the following words: "There were a hundred houses in the village. Its population was 516. The Armenians seized 800 cattle, 1500 sheep, 93 horses, and all our property and food stores. Only ten houses escaped the plunder. The other inhabitants were forced into their houses and burnt. The girls were dishonoured. Their mouths and noses were severed".¹⁹

An official document on this subject in the Ottoman Archive is classified under BOA/Hariciye, Siyasi, No. 2878/81. On the basis of this document, and local investigations here and in the neighbouring villages, it was decided to conduct an excavation. With the assistance of Atatürk University, the site near the mosque was excavated, revealing the skeletons in a mass grave that had been photographed by Kâzım Karabekir in 1918. This was concrete evidence of the inhuman murders carried out by the Armenians in April 1918.

Oba

Oba is a village in the province of Iğdır, south of the Aras River. On 1 March 1986, a mass grave in the barn was opened. The remains of over one hundred people, massacred by Armenian militants, were found. The site was located on the basis of an account by a local woman, Sekine Aksu Hanım, and guided by M.A. Köprülü. This site is important as the first mass grave of people massacred by Armenians to be excavated. Dashnag members Alikamerli Haçatur Ağa and General Dro, and the Yezidi Cihangir Ağa are known to have taken part in the massacres here.²⁰

Hak Mehmed

This village lies on the Iğdır Plain, south of the Aras River, on the road to Oba. This massacre is related to the one that took place in the latter village. In Hak Mehmed the bodies were tossed into the well next to the mosque in the village square. Extensive excavations that took place here on 5 and 6 October 1999, found

¹⁹ *Idem.*

²⁰ Enver Konukçu, "Oba Kazısı", *Iğdır: Tarihi Gerçekler ve Ermeniler Sempozyumu*, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-51.

the remains of those who had been massacred in the well, and this discovery was made public. At other places in Erzincan, the people were also thrown into wells on the orders of Muradyan and Major Morel. An international symposium was held on the subject of the Hak Mehmed excavation. A memorial was erected to commemorate those who died in Oba, Hak Mehmed and other villages in Iğdır, and a book written on the subject of Hak Mehmed and the symposium.²¹

Zeve

Zeve is an abandoned settlement on the shores of Lake Van. The village, whose name is a corruption of the word *Zaviye*, originally had around 2000 inhabitants. Armenian militants attacked it, and many people were killed. The excavation, carried out here by Yüzüncü Yıl University on 4 April 1990, revealed the truth of what happened in 1918 and the Armenian massacres of the Turks. A more extensive excavation is required here.²²

* *

Hundreds more mass graves remain to be excavated in Erzincan, Ardahan, Erzurum, Iğdır, Van, Muş, Bitlis, Doğubayezid, Kağızman and elsewhere. There is documentary evidence of further mass graves in Erivan, Gümrü, Serdarabad, Aştarak, Talin and the like. The Armenians, not only killed Turks, but many others who opposed them around Karakilise, Delican and Gümrü.

As we enter the 21st century, spurious charges of genocide are still continuing. Intellectuals are certainly aware of the myths that have been built up around Armenian history. The Armenians have to stop regarding every church and its environs as a part of Armenia.

²¹ *Türk Ermeni İlişkileri: XXI. Yüzyıla Girerken Tarihe Dostça Bir Bakış*, Ankara, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2000, pp. 163, 219, 235-249.

²² *Yakın Tarihimizde Van Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, Van, 2-5 Nisan 1990, Ankara, Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü Yayınları, 1990, pp. 76-77.

THE ARMENIAN LEGION AND ITS DESTRUCTION OF THE ARMENIAN COMMUNITY OF CILICIA¹

Stanford J. Shaw

As the Allied armies occupied Turkey starting in late November 1918, Turks reacted largely with silent acquiescence. They were willing to accept that since the war had left their country devastated and most of its people starving, the victorious Powers of Europe occupied their country in order to help them rebuild it in the lands of the Ottoman Empire that remained with large Turkish majorities, in accordance with Point Twelve of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points declared earlier the same year. As was the case in western Anatolia, however, where Allied intentions to deprive the Turks of their homeland combined with Greek atrocities against the settled population drove the Turks to support a Turkish national resistance, so also those in Cilicia were soon driven to resist violently against the abuses and atrocities which the French occupation troops inflicted on them during the two years that followed.²

Many of these troops were poorly organized and lacked sufficient numbers to maintain order. Some of their officers seem to have treated the occupation mainly as an occasion for personal enrichment.³ Most of the soldiers, moreover, were only nominally

¹ This article is an elaboration and extension of various sections regarding the Armenian Legion in my recent study, *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918-1923*, 5 vols., Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000.

² Cilicia as a province never existed in the four-hundred years of Ottoman administration in the area. The name was resurrected by the Allied occupation powers, with as wide a definition as possible, in order to justify the area that they were authorized to control by the Armistice of Mondros. In general terms, it coincided with the modern Turkish district known as Çukurova, and included the Ottoman province of Adana, the district of Maraş, and adjacent areas. See Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: the Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*, Princeton, New Jersey, The Darwin Press, Inc., 1995, pp. 202-204.

³ British High Commissioner in İstanbul Horace Rumbold to Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, İstanbul, 19 November 1920, in G. B., Public Record Office, Foreign Office files (hereafter abbreviated as FO) 371/5210 no. E14888; High Commissioner's

French since the French army had been decimated on the Western Front during the World War that had just come to an end, and the people of France were unwilling to sacrifice more in order to secure nebulous conquests in far off lands such as Turkey. Some of the soldiers were in fact Tuaregs from Algeria. Most, however, were members of a section of the French *Légion d'Orient* called the Armenian Legion (*Légion Arménienne*), commanded by French General Louis Romieu. The Armenian Legion had been organized starting in 1916 under Romieu's command in Cyprus, until 1878 part of the Ottoman Empire but starting on 4 November 1914, transformed into a base for assaults against the Islamic Middle East. Training and provision of arms was carried out largely under British auspices, at a base located near Monarga (Boğaztepe), north of Magosa, chosen because of the existence of an Armenian monastery nearby. Turks on the island were severely restricted under a regime of martial law to prevent them from interfering. Their arms were confiscated and turned over to the Legion, depriving the Cypriot Turks of the ability to defend themselves against the long-standing attacks against them by the local Greek population.⁴ Substantial military support was provided by the French and British forces training nearby in preparation for their assault on Gelibolu (Gallipoli) along with arms brought with the British expeditionary force sent from Egypt. Financial resources for arms and other equipment for the Armenian Legion, as well as for the salaries of officers and men, came largely from popular subscription campaigns mounted throughout the war in the United States and Great Britain nominally intended to feed 'starving Armenians', but which in fact were used to mount terrorist attacks against Turks throughout Anatolia as soon as an Ottoman defeat and Allied occupation of the country made it possible.⁵ Cypriot Greeks contributed substantially to the Legion,

Representative, İzmir, to High Commissioner, İstanbul, 5 June 1920 in FO 406/44, p. 75, no. 48; cited in McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, op. cit., p. 242.

⁴ The district between Magosa and Monarga was in fact made a closed military zone, with its entire Turkish population being evacuated to concentration camps. The camp of Arab militants trained at nearby base to support the Arab revolt were transferred to a more distant location. Halil Aytekin, *Kıbrıs'ta Monarga (Boğaztepe) Ermeni Lejyonu Kampı* Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000, pp. 60-66.

⁵ Aytekin, op. cit., pp. 37-89, 165-178 provides details on the organization and training of the Armenian Legion during World War I. The American financial campaign was spearheaded by American missionary leader James Barton and retired President Theodore Roosevelt. John D. Rockefeller led the donors with a gift of \$25,000. See: Aytekin, op. cit., pp. 90-93.

providing food, clothing and logistical support for the soldiers while they were in training.

Large numbers of young Armenians came to Cyprus to join the Legion, mostly as a result of recruitment campaigns organized by the son of the former Prime Minister of Egypt, Boghos Nubar Paşa, who stirred them with romantic tales of establishing an Armenian empire stretching from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean while at the same time, gaining revenge against Turks and other Muslims. Armenian soldiers who had served in the Ottoman army during the war and had been captured by the British and imprisoned in concentration camps in Cyprus also were separated from their Turkish colleagues and enrolled in the Legion. As time went on, the initial force of Armenian refugees was enlarged by the transfer to it of Armenian soldiers in the British and French garrisons on the island and in Egypt as well as Armenians captured by General Edmund Allenby's army that was advancing from the Sinai Peninsula through Syria during most of 1917.

Difficulties in disciplining and training the Armenians prevented the Legion from being used in any of the campaigns mounted against the Ottomans in the latter stages of the war except for a few who were sent to Allenby's force, largely to help get local Syrian Arabs and Armenians to support the campaign in cooperation with the Bedouin raids coming out of the desert as part of the Arab Revolt. The Armenian Legion therefore remained on Cyprus until the armistice was signed. In the end it was brought to Turkey, not by the British, but as part of the French army sent to occupy Syria and south-eastern Anatolia as a result of the Armistice imposed on the Ottomans at Mondros in late October 1918. When it entered Turkey as part of the French army, this Armenian force consisted of four battalions of 4368 soldiers and 66 officers.

Starting with their initial landings at İskenderun (Alexandretta) a month later, and continuing as the French army moved into Anatolia, members of the Armenian Legion indiscriminately assaulted and pillaged Arab and then Turkish villages and towns, killing hundreds of Muslims in the process. Local Armenians remaining in Cilicia, together with Armenians brought from southern Russia and central Anatolia also joined the French forces as they attacked the Turks, initially in the areas of İskenderun and

İslahiye, later extending to the areas of Toprakkale-Dörtöl, Mersin, Adana, Tarsus, Pozantı and Maraş.⁶ As the surviving Muslims fled into the adjacent hills to escape massacre, members of the Armenian Legion pillaged their homes and shops and left village after village in flames. When their French officers attempted to stop the atrocities, the Armenian soldiers mutinied and often deserted their units, joining local Armenians and Armenians arriving in Cilicia from central and western Anatolia in continuing their attacks on the remnants of the settled Turkish population.⁷

The Ottoman army and gendarmerie made numerous reports to the Ministry of War, the Gendarme Department, and the Prime Minister's office based on communications sent by local mayors, district and religious officials, describing the carnage inflicted by Armenian soldiers wearing French uniforms:⁸

Atrocities perpetrated by Armenians wearing French uniforms against the population of Maraş.

It has been established that nearly all the French soldiers who supplanted the British soldiers are Armenians. These soldiers have used force to strip off the veils of Muslim women and

⁶ Ministère de la Défense (France), Etat Major de l'Armée du Terre, Service Historique, General du Hays, *Les Armées françaises au Levant*, Tome I: *L'Occupation française en Syrie et en Cilicie sous le Commandement Britannique, novembre 1918-novembre 1919*, Tome II: *Le Temps des Combats 1920-1921* (Chateau de Vincennes, Paris), I, pp. 111-114 (hereafter cited as AFL); from 'Le tableau de stationnement du 5 février, AG, Chateau de Vincennes, no. 2141 in carton A 2-3; and the situation effectifs on 01 February 1919 in no. 359/G of 9 March 1919 in carton 1 C 2; Robert F. Zeidner, "The Tricolor over the Taurus: The French in Cilicia and Vicinity, 1918-1922" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Utah, 1991), pp. 153-157, 205; later in book form: Robert F. Zeidner, *The Tricolor over the Taurus: the Franco-Turkish War for Cilicia, Crucible of the National Liberation Movement*, New York, Peter Lang Publ., 1996; PRFRUS, 1918, supplement 1, 1, pp. 885-891. For an Armenian effort to whitewash the conduct of the Armenian Legion, see R. G. Saakian, *Franko-Turetskie Otnoshenia i Kilikiia: 1918-1923*, Erivan, 1986. Richard Hovannisian's massive *History of the Armenian Republic*, while citing the same French sources mentioned in this study, and in particular AFL, fails to give any information on what the French reveal about the Armenian Legion's violent conduct during its occupation of Cilicia.

⁷ United States Department of State Decimal File 867. 4016/407, 13 March 1919. McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, pp. 205, 243; Assistant British High Commissioner Webb to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, London, 27 March 1919, in FO 371/3658/no. 58433; United States High Commissioner Admiral Mark Bristol, Istanbul, to Secretary of State, 11 December 1919, in U. S. Department of State Decimal File 867/1076; Comte R. de Gontaut-Biron, *Comment la France s'est installée en Syrie: 1918-1919*, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1922, pp. 54-55.

⁸ I have inserted in the footnotes the original dossiers and reports on which the translated reports were based.

assault them in the marketplace, leading the local Muslims to resist. They also have insulted the people. The French commanders have been encouraged by the Armenians to sieze the arms and ammunition of the Muslims. In each convoy of French soldiers occupying Maraş, about three to five hundred Armenians have come, disguised as French soldiers. The Armenians at Zeytun also were armed. As the French soldiers were occupying Maraş, the Armenians welcomed them shouting 'Long live Armenia' while randomly shooting Muslims in the streets and insulting Turkish national values.

19 Safar 1338 (13 November 1919)⁹

⁹ BOA. HR. SYS. 2543- 5/27, 28. Based on the reports in the following dossier: Bâb-ı Âli, Dâhiliye Nezâreti, Emniyet-i Umûmiyye Müdiriyyeti Dârende Kâ'im-i makâmı'ğının 11 Teşrin-i Sâni [1]335 târihli tahrîrâtı sûretidir: Maraş'da zuhûru istihbâr kılınan hâdisâtın kazâ ahâlisince heyecân-âmiz bir vaz'iyette oldukları kazâya muvâsalat-ı âcizide görülmesi üzerine sükûn ve i'tidâllerini muhâfaza için nesâyihde bulunulmuş ve mes'ele bir mübâlağadan ibâret olduğu tefhîm edilmiş ancak mezkûr mes'elenin esâsını yakından anlamak çâresine tevessül edilmesi tavsiye edilmiş ve bunun üzerine mütehayyızân-ı mahalliyye tarafından tertib ve Maraş'a gönderilüp bu kerre avdet eden adam-ı mahsûsdan alınan ma'lumât ber-vech-i zîr arz olunur. Maraş'daki İngiliz askerlerini mübâdele eden Fransız askerleri içinde kırk Cezayirli Müslim üç bin râddesinde Ermeni olup Maraş'a vürûdlarından bir gün sonra müsâfirlikden hânesine avdet eden yüzü peçeli bir İslâm kadınına Fransız askeri ünvânı altındaki Ermenilerden bir kaç ta'arruz ve daha peçeli gezecek misiniz? Serbest olunuz, sözleriyle yüzündeki nikâbı cerhden vefât ettiği ve kaldırıldığı ve şu hâli müşâhede eden ahâlî-i müslimeden bir kaç zât tarafından men' ve tarafeyince edilen müdâfa'a ve müsâdeme neticesinde Fransız askerlerinden birisi cerh ve ertesi günü eser-i İslâmlardan ikisi mecrûh düştüğü ve bir hafta sonra da bir polis ile ahâliden bir şahsın şehid edildiği ve İslâmlar yedindeki esliha ve cebhânenin toplatdırılması husûsu Ermeniler tarafından Fransız kumandanı nezdinde teşebbüsâtta bulunulduğundan bu sebeble Maraş ahâlisi umûmiyetle silâh be-dest olarak ufak bir ta'arruzla neticesinde vehâmet kesbedecek bir i'tişâş-ı dâhilî zuhûruna her an mecbûrî muntazır bulundukları ve ileri gelenlerinden bir kaç zâtın da firâren Elbistan'a ilticâ eyledikleri ve etrâfdan peyder-pey Maraş'a Fransız askeri nâmiyla her kâfilede üçer beşer yüz Ermeni gelerek ictimâ' ve kuvvetlerini tezyid eylemekte olduğu ve Fransızlar tarafından Maraş kal'asıyla Yarbaşı'ndaki Katolik kilisesi, tahkîm ve Zeytun ahâlisi teslîh edilmekte olduğu ve ahâlî-i İslâmiyye, vilâyetimizden kuvve-i mu'âvene intizâr eylemekte oldukları alınan bir varaka-i mahremânen ve giden adamdan başkaca alınan izâhdan anlaşılmış ve ma'a-mâ-fih şu hâl-i esef-iştîmâl kazâ-yı âcizî ahâlisinin hissiyât-ı diniyyelerini rencide etmesinden ve bu bâbda muzâheret ve mu'âvenete ihtiyâc görüldüğü takdirde bütün mevcûdiyetleriyle mâlen ve bedenen âmâde bulundukları berây-ı ma'lumât ma'rûzdur. Ol-bâbda.

Bâb-ı Âli, Dâhiliye Nezâreti, Emniyet-i Umûmiyye Müdiriyyeti Dârende Kâ'im-i makâmı'ğının 13 Teşrin-i Sâni [1]335 târihli tahrîrâtı sûretidir: Mütekaddem 11 Teşrin-i Sâni [1]335 târihli arıza-i husûsiyye-i çâkerâneme zeyldir. Maraş'da İngiliz askerlerini mübâdele etmek üzere dört makineli tüfengle Maraş'a dâhil olan Fransız askerlerini Maraş Ermenileri ellerinde bayraklar ve müzeyyen elbiseleri lâbis oldukları hâlde istikbâl ve şehr içerisinde "Yaşasın Kilikya Ermenistan, kör olsun çekemeyenler" diye nümâyişlerde bulundukları ve ferdâsı günü beş Ermeni Fransız

Armenians attached to the French Occupying Army at Maraş have been attacking Muslim civilians in the neighboring villages as well.

During the incidents that occurred as a result of the French action of lowering the Ottoman flag from the government house at Maraş, an Ottoman gendarme was killed. In Adana, an Armenian soldier killed three persons and three other Muslims were thrown out of a passing train and also were killed. Armenian soldiers attached to the French army entering the village of Lefkeni in the neighborhoods of Ulukışla wounded all the men in the village and raped some of its women. Seven people were attacked in the vicinity of Ömerli village. Their eyes were carved out and they were then bayoneted.

26 Safar 1338 (20 November 1919)¹⁰

askeri kıyâfetinde hükûmete giderek jandarma nevbetcisinden umûmhâneler nerede, defterleri nerede bulunduklarının kendilerine gösterilmelerini teklif eylemeleri üzerine nevbetciler tarafından keyfiyet Mar'aş Jandarma Kumandanlığı'na ma'lûmât verilerek kumandan tarafından merkûmünün hükûmetden tardedildiği ve bunun üzerine Ermeniler çarşı derûnuna girerek simidci dükkânından simid alup Türklerin yedikleri bunlar mıdır?" diyerek ayaklar altına alup çiğnemekle tahkirâtda bulundukları ve aynı günde Fransız istihbârât Ermeni zâbiti hükûmete gelerek keşide edilen Osmanlı sancağının indirilmesini musırın teklif etmesi ve diğer beş nefer Ermeninin de rastgeldikleri ahâlî-i İslâmiyyeye ve polis ve jandarmalara ta'arruz ve tecâvüzâtla darba kıyâm eylemeleri üzerine vukû' bulan mudârebe ve müsâdemeye iştirâk eden jandarmalıktan müsta'fî Çakmakçı Sa'id'in kurşunla cerh ve eser-i cerhden müte'essiren şehiden vefât eylediği ve jandarmanın mecrûh ve kendilerinden de bir maktûl düğüğü ve Ermeni askerleri tertibât ve kuvvetlerini tezyide çalışdıkları gönderilen adam-ı mahsûsun ifâdesinden anlaşıldığı berây-ı ma'lûmât ma'rûzdur. Ol bâbda.

Aslına mutâbıkdır

Mühür

¹⁰ BOA. HR. SYS. 2602- 1/163. Based on the following report from the Ministry of War to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Erkân-ı Harbiyye-i Umûmiyye Dâ'iresi Şu'be: 2 Numara: 4682

Hâriciye Nezâret-i Celîlesine

Devletlü efendim hazretleri

İstihbârât-ı muhtelif hulâsası ber-vech-i zir arz olunur:

1- Mar'aş'ı işgâl eden Fransızlar şehir etrafında tahkîmât yapmışlardır. Ve Elbistan yolunu tarassud ettirmektedirler. Mar'aş Hükûmet Konağı'ndan Osmanlı sancağını indirmek istemişler ise de muvaffak olamamışlar ve bu münâza'a esnâsında jandarma tufengçisi Sadullah Efendi şehid olmuştur.

2- Adana'da Fransız Administratörünün tercümânı Kemâl, Evkâf Müdürü Şefik, Polis Cemâl efendiler bir Ermeni nefer tarafından katledilmişlerdir. Esâretten avdet eden altı neferden ikisiyle bir Müslüman bakkal trenden atılmak sûretiyle itlâf edilmişlerdir.

3- Ulukışla şarkındaki Kocak karyesi civârında Lefkeni [Lefkere] köyüne 6/11/35 gecesı gelen Fransız Ermeni askerleri köyün erkeklerini darb ve kadınların bir kısmının ırzlarına tecâvüz etmişlerdir. Ömerli karyesi civârında yedi kişinin gözleri oyularak süngülenmişlerdir.

Protected by the French, Armenians attacked the Muslim population in Adana.

Contradicting their claim that they have come to establish peace and freedom, the French armed forces that entered Adana behaved treacherously against the Muslim population. This emboldened the Armenians who while continuing their attacks on Muslims, set up a mock court with fake judges and extorted the properties and goods of the Muslim people. On the allegation that they were Unionists or had injured Christians, local Muslims were jailed and exiled with their families from their homes. In Gavurdağ, bandits claiming they were Muslims, who had in fact no political identity, raided Muslim villages. When, however, they came to raid the village of Şeyh Murad, which was inhabited almost entirely by Armenians, incidents broke out and spread, resulting in the murder of five Muslims and the wounding of five others. After that, security forces and British soldiers intervened and prevented further attempts to murder Muslims. Following these disorders the French sent Armenian forces to pursue the bands of brigands and to destroy Muslim villages. An Armenian band charged with pursuing brigands raided the Muslim villages of İnepli, Kayalı and Arapköy, looting goods and properties, beating innocent people they saw working in their fields and then killed them. Following the occupation of Adana by the French armed forces, Armenians began killing one or two Muslims each night. Attacking Muslim religious leaders, they arrested the Müftî (Muslim jurist-consult) of the district of Dörtöl and interfered with the appointment and dismissal of other Müftis. Families, which previously had converted to Islam, were forcibly taken from their homes and sent to the headquarters of the Armenian delegation together with Muslim orphaned children. In the village of Kurtkulağı in the district of Yumurtalık, Armenian soldiers have prohibited the daily Muslim ritual calls to prayer for the past seven months.

4- Zaho ve Musul havâlisinden İngilizlerin çekileceği hakkında alınan haberler 9 Teşrîn-i Sâni sene [1]335 târihine kadar te'eyyüd etmemişdir. Ol bâbda emr ü fermân hazret-i men-lehül-emrindir.

Fî 25 Safer sene 1338

Fî 20 Teşrîn-i Sâni sene 1335

Harbiye Nâzırı

İmza

14 Rebiülevvel 1338 (7 December 1919)¹¹

¹¹ BOA. HR. SYS. 2878/9. Based on the following report from the office of the Şeyhülislam: Bâb-ı Fetvâ, Dâ'ire-i Meşihat-ı İslâmiyye, Tahrîrât Kalemî Adana Merkez Müftülüğü'nin 14 Rebî'ü'l-Evvel sene [1]338 ve 7 Kânûn-ı Evvel sene [1]335 târîhli tahrîrâtı sûretidir. Ahâlinin sa'âdet ve hürriyetini te'mîn için geldiklerini i'lân eden Fransızların Adana Vilâyeti'nde ahâlî-i İslâmiyyeye karşı icrâât-ı ihânetkârânelerinin hâtırda kalan bir kısmı ber-vech-i âtî arz olunur. Şöyle ki: Adana'ya vürûdlarından birkaç gün sonra Baş Administratör "Bremont'un" âilesi Madam Bremont otomobil ile Pamukcu-zâde Aziz Efendi'nin hânisi önünden geçerken mûmâ-ileyh Aziz Efendi'nin beş yaşındaki kerimesi pencereden otomobilin içerüsüne tükürdüğüne binâ'en pederi Aziz Efendi'nin ma'a â'ile muntika hâricine teb'idine veyâhud beş bin lira cezâ-yı nakdiyyenin te'diyesine muhayyer olarak mahkûm edilüp teb'idden tahlîs-i giribân için meblağ-ı mezkûr beş bin lirayı te'diye etmiştir. O vakitten bi'l-i'tibâr merkez-i vilâyet ve kazâlarda Ermenilerin Müslümanlar aleyhinde müzevvir da'vâlarını rü'yet etmek üzere birer hey'et-i hakîme teşkil ile Müslümanların mallarını cebren alup Ermenilere verdikleri gibi ittihadçı olmak veyâhud Hristiyanlara ikâ-ı zarar etmiş olmak bahâneleriyle ashâb-ı nâmusdan olan birçok Müslümanları birer birer mahbese ilkâ ile aylarca habsde bulundurdudan sonra pey-der-pey muntika hâricine teb'id etdiler. Muntika hâricine teb'id keyfiyeti nisvâna dahi teşmil edilüp Kozan livâsında zevceleri Ermeni tehlikesine ma'rûz bulunduklarına binâ'en Konya'ya firâr edenlerin otuzdan ibâret â'ileleri de Konya Vilâyeti'ne teb'id edildi. Ve bunlar miyânında Kozan livâsı müftisinin kerimesi de dâhil idi. Tabî'dir ki dâ'ileri muktezâ-yı diyânet olarak bu gibi icrââtlarında derhâl şifâhen ve tahrîren vazife-i şefâ'atî ifâ ederdim. Ve ba'zen şefâ'atim icâbına iktirân ediyordu. Ez-an cümle Kozan'dan teb'id edilen â'ileler ile Cebel-i Bereket livâsından teb'id edilen Hasan Fehmi ve Hasan Faris vesâ'ir rûfekâlarının avflarını istihsâl ile memleketlerine avdetlerini ve Adana, Ceyhan ve Erzincan ahâlisinden birkaç zâtın mahbesden tahlîslerini te'mîn etdim. Ancak bu gibi teşebbüsât-ı müsmirem icrâ olunan mezâlîme nisbeten lâ-şey kabilinden idi. Nihâyet iki mâh mukaddem Gâvurdağı'nda sekiz on kişiden mürekkeb bir Müslüman eşkiyâ çetesi zuhûr etdi. Câlîb-i nazar-ı dikkatdir ki, çetenin bidâyet-i zuhûrundan nihâyetine kadar Cebel-i Bereket livâsı "guvertörü" Mösyö Andre bu çete ile dâ'imâ temasda bulunup çetenin meslek-i şekâvetkârânesini teşvîk etdiği mütevâtîren söylenmekte idi. Nihâyet çete altı yedi yüz nefere bâlîğ oldu. Ve siyâsî bir mâhiyeti hâ'iz bulunmadığına binâ'en dâ'imâ Türk karyelerini nehb ü gâret ediyordu. Çetenin esnâ-yı fa'âliyyetinde Fransızlar ehemmiyet ve neticeden ârî bir sûrette ta'kîbât yapıyorlardı. Yüz elli neferden mürekkep çetenin bir kısmı Adana'ya dört sâ'at mesâfede bulunan Şeyh Murad karyesine tesâdüf eder. Karye Ermeni ile meskûn bulunduğundan eşkiyâ Ermenilerin mukâvemetine ma'rûz kalmagla bi'l-müşâdeme ikisi kadın olmak üzere dokuz Ermeni maktûl düşer. Karye-i mezkûreden bir Ermeni kadını şehre azîmetle şehir dâhilinde bağırıp mukaddesât-ı İslâmiyyeyi sebbederek Ermeni kulübüne gider. Bu sûretle Ermeniler heyecâna gelir. Çarşuda Müslümanlara hücum ederler. Dört Müslümanı katl ve beş Müslümanı cerh ederler. Kuvve-i zabîta ve İngiliz askerinin müdâhalesiyle Ermenilerin gâyesi bulunan Müslümanları katli'âm keyfiyeti akîm kaldı. O günden i'tibâren Fransızlar idâre-i müdhişelerine yeni bir germi verdiler. Ermenilerin mu'tâd olan ahbâr-ı kâzibeleri üzerine eşkiyâ ile münâsebetdârdır diyerek bir çok Müslümanları tevkîf etdiler. Ve Ermenileri teslîh ile zâhiren eşkiyâ ta'kîbine ve hakikaten Müslüman karyelerinin tahribine gönderdiler. Derhâl dâ'ileriyle ulemâ ve eşrâfdan bir hey'et Baş Administratör Bremont ile mülâkât talebinde bulunduk. Makâm-ı vilâyetde hey'etimizi kabûl ile Ermeni çetesinin eşkiyâ ta'kîbine gönderilmesi adâlete muvâfık bir netice vermeyeceğinden bahsederek çetenin geriye çağırılması ricâsında bulunduk. Çete Fransız zabîtinin taht-ı kumandasında bulunduğu ve hiçbir vukû'ata meydân verilmeyeceğini beyân ile teklîfimizi reddetti. Ertesi günü Ermeni çetesi İnepli (?) Kayırlı ve Arabköy karyelerini basmış, ahâlinin mallarını yağma ve bir çok kimseleri şiddetli bir

sûrette darb ile tarlalarda tesâdüf etdikleri çiftçileri katlettiklerini ve İnepli (?) karyesi eşrâfından Mustafa oğlu Ali Ağa nâmında nâmuslu bir zâtı eşkiyâdandır diyerek elleri kelepçeli olduğu halde Ermeniler tarafından şehre getirilirken liva Mutasarrıfı Norman şehrin kenârında bunlara tesâdüf eder. Bu adam kimdir (?) diye getiren Ermenilere sù'âl etmesiyle eşkiyâdandır cevâbını alınca derhâl kurşuna dizilmesini emreyleyler ve akabinde mûmâ-ileyhin kurşuna dizildiğini haber aldık. Binâ'en-aleyh derhâl keyfiyeti tahrîren İngiliz başkumandanına protesto etmekle tahrîren dahi baş administratöre istikâda bulundum. Bunun cevâbında Norman'ın mührüyle memhûr tehdid-âmîz bir mektûb aldım: "Eşkiyâyı kurşunla katleden bi'z-zât benim ve bütün kabâhatlı olanları böyle yapacağım" cümleleri muharrer idi. Bu mektûbdan haber alan İngiliz istihbârât şu'besi mektûbu aldılar ve General Allenby'e gönderdiklerini söylediler. Ve bu vak'adan bir gün sonra şehirde mukîm ve Arabköy karyesinde çiftlik sâhibi bulunan Duran Ali nâmında bir zât Şeyh Murad karyesi hâdisesi günü eşkiyâ miyânında bulunduğu da'ir bir Ermeni karısının ihbâr-ı kâzibine binâ'en tevkîf edildi ve o gün kurşuna dizilmesi mukarrer olduğu haber alındı. Dâ'ileri baş administratöre bir tezkire ile mûmâ-ileyh Duran Ali ashâb-ı nâmusdan olup eşkiyâ ile münâsebeti olmayacağından başka Şeyh Murad karyesinin hâdisesi günü olan perşembe günü sabahdan akşama kadar Adana'da bulunup hârice gitmediği ve bir hayli Müslümanın şehâdetinden mâ'adâ Ermenilerden falan falan eşhâsın şehâdetiyle de sâbit olacağına binâ'en serbest bırakılması ricâsında bulundum. O gün akşam namazından sonra polis müfettişi olan bir Fransız zabîti fakîrhânemin kapusuna otomobil ile geldi. Hükûmete Norman'ın makâmına gitmek üzere otomobile rûkûbunu teklîf etdi. Bu da ihtirâm şeklinde dâ'ilerini tehdîd için idi. Norman'ın makâmına vardığımda tezkirede isimlerini yazdığım şahidleri huzûrunda istimâ' arzusunda bulunduğunu beyân etdi. Şehâdetleri Duran Ali lehinde tezâhür etmekle şühûdun tevkîflerini emr verdi. Ermeni bulunan şahidler Duran Ali ile temâsda bulundukları gün perşembe günü olmayup çarşamba günü olduğu şimdi hâtırıma geldi demek sûretiyle ifâdelerini değışdirdiklerinden serbest kaldılar. Müslümanlar ise ifâdelerinde sebât etmekle el-ân da mahbesde bulunmaktadırlar. Ertesi günü Duran Ali kurşuna dizilmek sûretiyle kâfile-i şühedâyâ iltihak etdi. O gün eşrâfdan İzzet Efendi nâmında bir zât çiftliğinde bulunduğu sırada eşkiyâ ablukada iken onlara firâr yolunu göstermesi töhmetiyle i'dâma mahkûm edilüp kurşuna dizilmek üzere meydân-ı siyâsete gönderilmesi için arabaya bindirilmiş olduğu hâlde İran Kâr-perdâzı İsmail Âsaf Hân'ın teşebbüs ve iltimâsıyla i'dâmı on bin lira cezâ-yı nakdiye tahvîl edilmiş ve mûmâ-ileyh İzzet Efendi'nin meblağ-ı mezkûru tedârikden âciz kaldığına binâ'en müşârûn-ileyh kâr-perdâzın iltimâsât-ı mükerreresiyle meblağ-ı mezkûr üç bin beş yüz liraya tenzîl edilmiş ve İzzet Efendi üç bin beş yüz lirayı te'diye etmek sûretiyle hayâtını tahlîs ile serbest bırakılmışdı. Kurşuna dizmek keyfiyeti eşhâs-ı ma'rûzaya münhasır olmayup on beş gün zarfında âhar kazâlardan ve köylerden getirilen Müslümanlardan eşkiyâ şeriki diye yevmiye dört beş Müslümanın kurşuna dizildiği müşâhede ediliyordu ve ta'kîbât çetesi olan Ermeniler tarafından dahi bir hayli Müslüman itlâf edildiği muhakkaktır. Ancak Müslümanlar teşkilâtdan mahrûm bulunduklarına binâ'en itlâf edilenlerin aded ve hüviyetleri ta'yîn edilememişdir. Fransızlar işbu icrâât-ı ma'rûzalarıyla Adana'yı işgâllerinden beri Ermeniler tarafından her gece hafiyen birer ikişer Müslüman katledildiği ve cinâyetler ba'zen ma'lûm bulunduğu ve vesâ'it-i inzibâtıyye Fransızların elinde bulunduğu hâlde cânîleri ta'kîb ve tecziye etmediklerinden Müslümanların imhâsı aksâ-yı emelleri olduğu bâriz bir sûrette anlaşılmaktadır. Fransızların me'mûrîn-i dîniyyeye ve diyânet-i İslâmiyyeye karşı revâ gördükleri ihânet-kârâne icrââtlarına gelince yedi mâh mukaddem Dörtöl kazası müftisini taht-ı tevkîfe aldılar. Teşebbüsât-ı dâ'iyanemle serbest bırakılmış ise de derhâl Osmaniye'ye teb'id edilmiş ve bu sûretle kazâ-yı mezkûr yedi mâhdan beri müftisiz kalmıştır. Ba'dehû Bağçe kazası müderrisi Mehmed Sâlim Efendi dinini ve milliyetini menfa'atine fedâ etmiş bir zât olmalı ki Fransızların âmâline mûmâşât-kâr zanneylediği cihetle üç mâh mukaddem Baş Administratör Bremont'dan makâm-ı dâ'iyaneme bir tezkire geldi. Bağçe Müftisi Mehmed

Emin Efendi'nin derhâl azliyle yerine Mehmed Sâlim Efendi'nin ta'yinini mısırran taleb ediyordu. Dâ'ileri müftülerin azl ve nasbı munhasıran Makâm-ı Meşihat-penâhiye â'id olmağa Meşihat-ı Celile sebeb-i azli muhakkak görmezse azletmez. Binâ'en-aleyh bu azl ve nasb imkân dâhilinde değildir diye cevâb yazdım ve akabinde Müfti Mehmed Emin Efendi ma'zûlen Osmaniye'ye teb'id ve yerine Sâlim Efendi ta'yin edildi. Ve derhâl müftülük imzâsıyla makâm-ı dâ'iyânemle muhâberât-ı resmiyyeye ibtidâr etdi. Tabî'dir ki dâ'ileri cevâb vermedim. İşte bu sûretle ma'a'l-esef memâlik-i İslâmiyye'de ulemâ-yı İslâmiyye'den bir zât Fransız müftülüğini kabul ettiği ilk def'a sahife-i târihimize geçecektir. Mûte'âkıben Amerika hey'etinin vürûdundan bir hafta mukaddem Fransız himâyesinin talebine dâ'ir bir kıt'a mahzarı dâ'ilerine irâ'e ile temhîrini teklîf etdiler. Tabî'dir ki kemâl-i salâbetle teklîf-i vâkı'ı reddetdiğimden Fransızlar dâ'ilerine muğberr oldular. Amerika hey'eti muvâcehesinde şifâhen ve tahrîren verdiğimiz cevâb-ı vatan-perverâne dahi Fransızların dâ'ilerine olan iğbirârını tezyîd etdi. O sırada Yafalı Ermeniler tarafından hükûmet dâ'iresinde katlolunan Kemâl Bey'in taht-ı idâresinde ve a'zâ-yı ulemâ-ı İslâmiyyeden Trablusşamlı Adana Evkaf Müdürü Şefik Efendi ile Adana Türklerinden defterdâr mu'âvini Hamdi Bey ve üç Ermeniden ibâret Fransız ikinci istihbârât şu'besi tarafından dâ'ilerinin salâbet-i dîniyye ve vatan-perverliğimden bahs ile Adana'da Fransız nüfûzunun tekarrürüne mâni' olduğuma dâ'ir baş administratöre bir rapor verildiğine İngiliz istihbârât Şu'besinden haber aldım. Mûte'âkıben baş administratör teb'idimi için Ceneral Allenby'e mükerreren yazmış ise de dâ'imâ cevâb-ı redd almışdır. Hayli yekûn teşkil eden bu bâbdaki evrâkı İngilizlerde gördüm. Son zamanda İngilizlerin Adana'dan râbitayı kat' etmeleri ile müstakillü'r-re'y kalan baş administratör teb'idimi tasmin etmiş ise de ahâlinin mürâca'atı üzerine İran Kâr-perdâzı İsmail Âsaf Hân'ın iltimâsıyla matrûdiyetim me'zûniyete tahvil edilmiş ve vâlî vekili vâsıtasıyla Makâm-ı Meşihat-penâhidem me'zûniyetim istihsâl edildiğine binâ'en Dersâ'âdet'e hareket etdim. Birkaç mâh mukaddem baş administratör muhtediye â'ilelerinin Fransız me'mûrlarına lüzûm-ı teslimine dâ'ir bir karârname neşretti. Bu karârname mücebbince muhtediyeler bir hafta müddetle bir Hristiyan hânesine teslim edilüp ba'dehû Fransız me'mûrlarının huzûrunda vicdânlarına mürâca'at edilecekti. Müslüman kalmak isteyenler serbest bırakılacaktı. Bunun üzerine Müslümanlar ile mûte'ehhile bulunan muhtediye kadınlar âkile ve bâliğe oldukları ve Müslümanlardan evlâd sâhibi bulundukları hâlde Ermeni polisler tarafından Müslüman hânelerine bi'd-duhûl cebren ağlayarak Ermeni Murahhashânesine götürülüyordu. Ermeni Murahhashânesine gönderilen muhtediye â'ilelerin hükûmete celbi için dâ'ileri teşebbüsde bulundum. Polis ile berâber bir Fransız zabiti muhtediyeleri murahhashânedan almak üze gitmiş ise de murahhashâne teslimden imtinâ' etdi. Binâ'en-aleyh dâ'ileri karârname-i mezkûrun netâyici cebren bir Müslümanı Hristiyan yapmakla mu'âdil bulduğundan ve hiç bir devletin kânûnuna tevâfuk etmediğinden bahsle karârnamenin ilgâsını taleb etdim. Baş administratör karârname mâ-fevk emriyle neşredildiği cihetle ilgâsı kâbil olamayacağı ve ancak ba'de-mâ muhtediyeler bi-taraf bir Hristiyan hânesine gönderileceğini ve dâ'ileri hâzır olduğum hâlde ifâdeleri alınacağını yazıyordu. Bu sûretle bir kısım muhtediyeler istirdâd edilmiş ise de bir kısmı cebren mürtedd edildi. Bu esnâda ana ve babası olmayan bir hayli Müslüman çocuklar dahi Müslümanların elinden alınmış ise de teşebbüsât-ı dâ'iyânemle kısm-ı a'zamı istirdâd edildi ve bir kısmı Ermenilerin elinde kaldı. Adana'da Ermenilerin mukaddesât-ı İslâmiyyeyi sebbetmeleri kâ'ide hükmüne girmiş idi. Bunun men'i için şifâhen ve tahrîren hayli teşebbüsâtda bulunmuş isem de bir netice vermedi. Hattâ Yumurtalık kazâsının Kurtkulağı karyesinde altı yedi mâhdan beri Ermeni askerleri ezan okumayı men' ettiklerini Bremon'a ahâlinin şikâyeti üzerine tahrîren bildirdim. Fa'illerini şiddetle tecziye edeceğini yazıyordu. Fakat bir netice vermedi. Fransızlar Adana'ya gelmeleriyle siyâsetle alâkası olmayan ve abone ashâbına gelen Sebîlû'r-reşâd, Hablû'l-metîn ve Ceride-i Sûfiyye gibi cerâid-i dîniyyeyi ve hattâ Meşihat-ı Celile'nin ceride-i resmiyyesi olan Ceride-i İlmiyyeyi müsâdere ediyorlardı. Fransızlar dîn ve me'mûrîn-i dîniyyeye

Armenians kill Muslim travelers and attack Muslim women near Haçin.

Armenians killed some Muslim travelers from villages near Haçin and kidnapped their wives; Armenians dressed in French uniforms savagely killed three villagers who were on their way to Antep. In the township of Magara they assaulted, abducted, and raped almost all the Muslim women. Since the French has disarmed the Muslims, they are exposed to Armenian attacks without ability to defend themselves. Muslims living in Maraş and Elbistan, however, are determined to get ready and be prepared to defend themselves. 9 Rebi II 1338 (1 January 1920).¹²

Turkish local notables demand that French stop the atrocities perpetrated against Muslims by Armenians serving in the French Army.

In a meeting held between a French major appointed to care for the civil and administrative supervision of Maraş, the commandant of the Eastern Province, French General Kert and the notables and *ulema* (Muslim doctors of law and interpreters of the Qur'an) of the region, it has been agreed that in order to restore peace and order, the attacks against Muslim villages

karşu sâlifü'l-arz icrââtlarından me'âliyyât-ı İslâmiyye'nin inkişâfına mâni' olmak fikrinde bulundukları ve belki menâbi-i İslâmiyye'nin kurulması lüzûmuna kâni' bulundukları vâzihan anlaşıldığı arz olunur. Ol bâbda.

Ashına mutabıktır

¹² BOA. HR. SYS. 2543- 6/22, 23 Based on the following report from the Third Army Corps:

Sivas'da: Üçüncü Kolordu'dan Harbiye Nezâret-i Celîlesine mevrûd fi 27/28 Kânûn-ı Evvel [1]335 târih ve 1497 numaralı şifre sûretidir.

1- Aziziye vâsıtasıyla Haçin kazâsı dâhilinden alınan ma'lûmâta göre Aziziye'den sür'atle ma'lûmât ahzı için Haçin'den Sivas ve Adana vilâyeti hudûdları üzerinde bulunan Şab karyesine kadar telgraf temdid ve merkez küşâd edilmiş olduğu Haçin Müslümanlarının silâhlanmasında Kozan Jandarma Kumandanı Ali Sâ'ib Bey'in tertibât-ı mahremânesini Hükçe Takım Kumandanı Mağara nâhiyesine merbût EEMH(?) ve muhtârânı bi't-tazyîk işkence ile i'tirâf ettirdiği ve Ermenilerin bir kaç gün mukaddem Sa'dâbât nâhiyesi PSNDN [Pasin'den] bir muhâciri Çürük (?) nâm mahalde katl ve Karakilise karyesinden Haçin'e giden sekiz on müslim içinden bir kadını cebren zevcinin yanından alarak dağa götürdükleri ve el-yevm yanlarında bulundurdıkları Mağara nâhiyesinde Müslüman kadınlarının hemân kâffesinin nâmûsuna cebren ta'arruz edilmekte olduğu ve evvelce İslâmlar yedindekisi esliha Ermeniler tarafından alındığından Ermenilerden her zamân tecâvûze ma'rûz bulundukları ve Sarız'dan birkaç kişi itlâf ile eskârı tedhiş emeliyle geçende 19/12/[1]335 Aziziye hudûduna da dâhil olmuşlarsa da bir çâr-yek sâ'atde her hedefde seksene karîb Kuva-yı Milliyye yetişmekle HEZBEB (?) çekildikleri ve Kuva-yı MLFKFHDN [Milliyye'den] korktukları bildirildiği mâ'rûzdur. Fî 27/28 Kânûn-ı Evvel sene [1]335

must stop and Armenians dressed in French uniforms who have killed Muslims must be discharged from the French Army. Otherwise, it is clear that the atrocities perpetrated against Muslim villages will intensify, more blood will be shed and the French will be held responsible.

1 Cemazi I. 1338 (22 January 1920)¹³

French and Armenians bombard Maraş.

A telegram sent by the Governor's office of Maraş states that the French together with Armenians opened machine gun fire on and bombarded Muslims from churches, where they took up their positions. There were many casualties among the Muslims and fires broke out in the city. 8 Cemazi I. 1338 (29 January 1920)¹⁴

¹³ BOA HR. SYS. 2544.

Based on the following report from Sivas:

Erkân-ı Harbiyye-i Umûmiyye Dâ'iresi

Sivas'dan: Harbiye Nezâretine

Mar'aş Mutasarrıflığı vekâletinin vak'adan evvel kolorduya keşide etmek üzere gönderdiği şifre sûreten aynen zîrde ma'rûzdur.

Fi 22 Kânûn-ı Sâni sene [13]36 Üçüncü Kolordu Kumandanı Selâhaddin

Zeyl fi 20 Kânûn-ı Sâni sene [1]336

Umûr-ı mülkiyye ve bütün devâ'iri kontrol etmek üzere Eyâlet-i Şarkıyye Kumandanı Ceneral Keret tarafından ta'yîn kılındığını arzettiğim Binbaşı Kasrabi (?) bugün kable'z-zuhr hükûmete gelerek bu husûsda kendilerine vesâyâ icrâsı için daha evvel celb ve ihzâr edilmiş olan ulemâ ve eşrâf-ı mahalliyye hükûmete iştirâkden maksad buraya gelmek bir arada olmayup ancak âsâyiş ve intizâmı muhâfaza ve te'minden ibâret olacağı ve Mar'aş'ı başka bir tarzda idâre edeceğini ve ceneralin de bu husûsda evâmîr-i kat'iyyesi olup ma'a-hâzâ bunda mücib-i havf ü hirâs bir cihet olmadığını dermiyânla celb-i meyillerine çalışmış ise de hâzırûn-ı mûmâ-ileyhim âsâyişin te'mini İslâm köylerine tecâvüz ve ahâlî-i İslâmiyyeyi katleden Fransız askeri kisvesinde ve kıta'ât içerisindeki Ermenilerin def ve ihrâcıyla mümkün ve bunların bâki oldukça köylülerin envâ'-ı felâkete ma'rûz kalacağı bedihî olacağı ve sulh neticesine kadar burada İngilizlerin tatbik ettikleri vaz'iyetden başka bir idâre ve müdâhale kabul etmeyeceklerini ve aksi hâlde kan döküleceği cihetle bunun da mes'ûliyeti Fransızlara â'id olacağı sûret-i münâsibe ve kat'iyyede müttefikan beyân ve ifâde etdiler. Binâ-berin binbaşı-i mûmâ-ileyh hâzırûnun ellerini sıkarak ceneral ile görüşmek üzere karârgâha azîmet ve akşama kadar bir daha avdet etmediği ve ma'a-hâzâ bu bâbda iktizâ eden tedâbir-i siyâsiyyede kusûr olmadığı ma'rûzdur.

¹⁴ BOA. HR. SYS. 2544- 4/7 Bâb-ı Âli, Dâhiliye Nezâreti, Emniyet-i Umûmiyye Müdiriyyeti Mar'aş mutasarrıf vekili tarafından Maksudlu merkezinden çekilen 29 Kânûn-ı Sâni [13]36 târihli telgrafnâmenin sûretidir.

Bugün Fransızlar kışla ve şehre iki üç nevbet top ve mitralyöz ve bomba ateş etdi. Mukaddemâ Ermeni askeri ve mühimmât-ı harbiyye techiz etmiş oldukları Katolik ve Ermeni kilisesinden nukât-ı hâkimeden İslâmlar üzerine mütemâdiyen mitralyöz ve bombalar atıldı, mu'azzam binâlar yıkıldı, yangın zuhûr etdi, birçok Müslümanın rûhu ervâh-ı şühedâya katıldı, vaz'iyette tebeddül olmadı. Müdâfa'a-i Hukûk-ı Milliyye Cem'iyyeti bugün de top ve mitralyöz isti'mâl etmedi.

Atrocities committed by Armenians and French soldiers against Muslims in the areas of Antep, Maraş and Adana.

A French detachment of a hundred and fifty soldiers, including Armenians, entered the village of Büyükarablar in area of Antep, breaking down the doors of houses, dishonoring women, and looting goods. In reaction, the Muslim villagers fled into the mountains. As they returned to their houses in the morning the detachment fired on them with machine guns. In Maraş Armenians joined the French soldiers in slaughtering the population, which unable to leave, remained in the city as it was destroyed by the detachment's artillery. In addition many people who attempted to bring help to Maraş were barred by French cannons and machine guns fire from entering the city. The situation in Adana and neighboring villages became unbearable for the Muslims, many of whose villages were burned. Armenian villagers were armed and sent to attack Muslims. The horrors perpetrated in Maraş aroused great indignation and the Muslim population staged large demonstrations demanding that such incidents be brought to an end. (1 February 1920)¹⁵

Aslına mutâbıktır.

Mühür

¹⁵ BOA. BEO. Siyasî 345945 Based on the following dossier of reports:

Bâb-ı Âli, Dâhiliye Nezâreti, Kalem-i Mahsûs, 8964/66

Huzûr-ı Sâmi-i Hazret-i Sadâret-penâhiye

Ma'rûz-ı çâker-i kemîneleridir

31 Kânûn-ı Sâni [1]336 târihli ve 8961 numaralı tezkire-i çâkerâneme zeyldir. Mar'aş'da ahîren vukû'a gelen fecâyî'den dolayı ahâlinin galeyâna gelerek hükûmet ve beledi dâ'ireleri önünde bir ictimâ' akd ile bu hâle bir an evvel nihâyet verilmesini talep ettikleri ve cevâb vürûduna kadar dağılmayacaklarını musırın ifâde ettikleri Amasya Mutasarrıflığı'ndan bildirildiği gibi Sivas Vilâyeti'nden alınan telgrafnâmede de heyecân içinde bulundukları anlaşılan Amasya halkıyla Sivas ahâlisine hükûmet-i merkeziyyece teşebbüsât-ı lâzîmede bulunulduğu yolunda tahîren ve şifâhen te'minât-ı kaviyye i'tâ edilmiş ise de teşebbüsât-ı vâkı'anın âsâr-ı fi'liyyesi görülmedikçe ve Mar'aş mezâliminin durdurulduğuna ve o havâlideki kuvve-i işgâliyyenin çekilip gittiğine dâ'ir ma'lûmât-ı resmiyye alınmadıkça dindâşlarını kurtarmak yâhûd ölmek için oraya girmek azminden kat'iyyen ferâgat edemeyeceklerini ve bunun için de nihâyet beş gün kadar intizâr edeceklerini ifâde ettikleri Ayntab'dan kolordu kumandanlığına gelen telgrafnâmede ise Mar'aş ve havâlisinde Fransızların vürûduyla başlayan fecâyî'in durması ve her türlü fenâlıkların önünün alınabilmesi için kuvve-i askeriyye i'zâmı talep olunduğu anlaşıldığı beyânıyla günden güne kesb-i ciddiyet ve vehâmet etmekde olan şu ahvâle karşı tedâbir-i âcile ittihâz olunmağa beraber metâlib-i meşrû'ada bulunmakda olan ahâlinin tatmîn-i kulûbu için teşebbüsât-ı vâkı'a neticesinden ma'lûmat i'tâsı iş'âr ve o havâlideki işgâl kuvvetinin sût-i idâre ve eskâr-ı istilâ-cüyânesinden ve istihdâm olunan gönüllü Ermeni efrâdının ahâlî-i İslâmiyyeye karşı gösterdikleri mu'âmelât-ı intikâm-cüyânedir nâşî bir müddetden beri Mar'aş'da sokak muhârebeleri hâlinde muhâsemâtın devâm etmekte ve

top ve mitralyözlerle şehrin bazı mahalleri dögülmekte ve bu yüzden bi-günâh olan bir takım nisvân ve sibyanın telef olmakda bulunduđu istihbâr kılınmakda olmasından dolayı ahâlinin heyecân içinde bulundukları da Ayntab Mutasarrıflığı'ndan başkaca izbâr kılınmış ve Trakya Paşaeli Müdâfa'a-i Hukûk-ı Milliye Cem'iyeti Hey'et-i Merkeziyesi'nden gelen telgrafnâmede de Mar'aş'daki mezâlim ve kıtâlin derhâl men'iyle müsebbiblerinin cezâlandırılması lüzûmu ricâ edilmiştir. İş'ârâtı vâkı'aya nazaran Mar'aş fâci'asının ahâli-i İslâmiyye üzerinde pek derin bir hiss-i infî'âl tevli'd ettiği anlaşılıp her ne kadar hükûmetçe teşebbüsât-ı lâzime icrâ edilmekde bulunduđu yolunda icâb eden vilâyât ve elviyye te'minât-ı mukteziyye i'tâ olunmakda ise de fâci'a-i mezkûrenin müddet-i kalîle zarfında önüne geçilmez ise daha büyük fenâlıkların zuhûru pek muhtemel olduğundan şîme-i medeniyet ve insâniyetle gayr-i kâbil-i te'lîf olan şu ahvâl-i mezkûreye bir an evvel nihâyet verilmesi esbâbının te'mini sûret-i mahsûsada temennî olunur. Keyfiyet Hâriciye Nezâret-i Celîlesi'ne de yazılmışdır. Ol bâbda emr ü fermân hazret-i veliyyü'l emrindir.

Fî 10 Cemâziye'l-Evvel sene [1]338 ve Fî 1 Şubat sene [1]336

Dâhiliye Nâzırı

Bende Mehmed Şerif

Erkân-ı Harbiyye-i Umûmiyye Dâ'iresi, Şu'be: 1

Sûret Diyarbakır'dan Harbiye Nezâretine mevrûd şifrenin halidir.

Ayntab civârındaki Büyükarablar köyü vak'ası hakkında Ayntab kaleminin raporu ber vech-i âtidir:

1. Sakçaközü'ne müteveccihen şehr-i hâlin on ikisinde Ayntab'dan hareket eden piyâde bir takım süvâri ve dört cebel topuyla altı makineli tüfengden mürekkebe olan yüz elli kişilik bir Fransız müfrezesi 12/13 gecesi sâ'at yedide Büyükarablar köyüne vâsıl olup gerek Fransız ve gerekse bu müfrezedeki Ermeniler evlerin kapılarını kırarak mal ve ırza tasalluta başlayınca köylüler civâr köylere ve dağlara ilticâya mecbûr sabâhleyin müfreme yoluna devâm ederek köy nihâyeti köyden bir kilometre kadar açıldıkdan sonra köylere avdet etmekde olan ahâli üzerine makineli tüfeng ateşi edilerek köylülerden bir maktûl iki mecrûh olmuştur. Ayntab mutasarrıfının riyâsetinde ve Fransızlardan iki yüzbaşının refâkatiyle yapılan tahkikâtta bu husûs sâbit olmuştur. Müfrenenin yollarda müsâdemeye tutuşduğu ve bir çok zâyi'âtla Sakçaközü'ne vardığı haber alınmışsa da henüz iyice mes'ele anlaşılamamıştır.

2. Bu mes'ele üzerine Kilis'deki Senegalli taburunun üç bölüğü Ayntab'a ve Légion d'Orient Bölüğü de Fatma'ya [Fatmalı] gitmiştir. Bu bölüğün İslahiye tarikiyle Sakçaközü'ne gitmesi muhtemeldir. Kezâ Fatma[lı]'dan bir taburla dört toplu bir sahra bataryası Ayntab'a gelmiştir. Fransızların Sakçaközü'nde kuvvet toplayarak Büyükarablar civârındaki kurâyı te'dib edeceklerine ihtimâl verilmekde bulunduđu ma'rûzdur. Harekât 123/112 Harbiye Nezâreti'ne mücâvir kolordulara arz edilmiştir.

Fî 22 Kânûn-ı Sâni sene [1]336 Onüçüncü Kolordu Kumandanı, Ahmed Cevdet

Erkân-ı Harbiyye-i Umûmiyye Dâ'iresi Sûret Konya'dan: Harbiye Nezâretine

1- 21/Kânûn-ı Sâni/[13]36 târihinden beri Mar'aş'da Fransız ve Ermenilerin İslâmlara karşı fecî kıtaller icrâ etmekde oldukları haber alınıyor. Câmî'a-i Osmâniyye'den ayrılmamak için mücâdele eden ve esliha ve cebhâne'den mahrûm bulunan ahâli kadın, aceze ve çocukların Fransız ve Ermeniler tarafından mebzûl vesâ'it-i harbiyye ile imhâ edilmesinin men'i esbâbının istikmâl buyurulması.

2- Mar'aş kıtâli Adana vesâ'ir havâliye sirâyet eylemek üzeredir. Nefs-i Adana'daki tazyikât tahammûl edilemez bir hâl almıştır. İslahiye ve civârında Ceceli, Sarılar, Karalar nâm köylerin yanmakda olduğu bu köylerin mevâşi ve eşyasının Osmaniye'ye getirilerek bi'l-müzâyede satıldığı, Hasanbeyli'de ve o havâlideki bütün Ermeni köylerinin teslîh edilerek Müslümanlar üzerine saldırıldığı ve hâtır ve hayâle gelmeyen zulm ü te'addiler yapılmakda olduğu ahiren Adana'dan haber alınmıştır.

Massacre perpetrated by Armenians against Muslim population in Kozan and Feke.

According to information received from more than five-hundred emigrants who fled to Develi the destiny of the notables and ulemas (Muslim interpreters and doctors of law) taken away from Kozan by Armenians remain unknown, the Muslim population having the throats slit on the streets; many Muslim women had been raped and Feke besieged; the massacre planned by Armenians has been already carried out in Maraş; urgent measures should be taken to stop the massacre.

12 Cemazi I. 1338 (3 March 1920)¹⁶

3- Mar'aş'a tâbi' ve Adana havâlisinde İslâmlara karşı devâm eden kıtâl hasebiyle efkâr-ı ahâli galeyânda olup hükûmet-i merkeziyyenin teşebbüsât-ı âcilesine intizâr edilmekde olduğu ma'rûzdur.

4- Nezâret-i celîleye ve kolordulara yazılmışdır.

Fî 26-27/Kânûn-ı Sâni/[13]36, 12. K. [Kolordu] Kumandanı Fahreddin

Sivas'dan: Harbiye Nezâretine

1- Kolordu muntikasında yeniden şâyân-ı arz bir hâdisе olmamıştır.

2- Mar'aş'dan Elbistan'a gelen 25-26/1/[13]36 târihli rapor hûlâsaten ber vech-i âti tahkik edilmektedir:

Mar'aş'daki müsâdemeyi veya yangınları işiden ve gören etrâf ahâli-i Müslimesi Mar'aş'a takarrüblerinde top ve mitralyöz ateşleriyle karşılandıkları için kasabaya girememişler ise de Mar'aş'ı muhâsara etmişlerdir. Pazarlık tarafından gelenler kasabanın şimâli, Bertiz havâlisinden gelenlerde şimâl ve garb cihetlerini kuşatmışlardır. Muhâsirîn ve mahsûrînün kuvve-i ma'nevîyeleri fevka'l-âdedir. Aralarında muhâbere te'min edilmiştir. 24/1/[13]36'da Beloğlu tarikiyle ve 150 Fransız neferi muhâfazasında İslahiye'den gönderilen cebhâne ve mühimmât yüklü 12 arabanın yolda zabt edilmiş ve muhâfızalarının kolları bağlanarak geriye döndürüldüğü ve ahâliye ta'arruz ve ateşle mukabele edenlerin itlâf edildiği bildirilmiştir. Mar'aş etrâfında tensik ve umûmi bir hücumla hazırlanmakda olan Kuvâ-yı Milliye evvel-emirde beyhûde kan dökülmemesi için kuvve-i işgâliyye kumandanına mühletli bir protesto göndermişler ve cevâba intizârda bulunmuşlardır.

3- Muhtâc-ı tahkik olan bu rapora nazaran da civâr ahâlinin başlarına aynı âkibet geleceği mülâhazasıyla tamamen galeyâna geierek Mar'aş'daki kardâşlarını herçi-bâd-âbâd kurtarmağa koşduğu ve bunun Ayntab ve Kilis gibi havâliye de sirâyeti ve beyhûde kan akması mümkün görüldüğü ma'rûzdur. Kolordulara yazılmışdır.

Fî 26 Kânûn-ı Sâni sene [13]36 3. K. [Kolordu] Kumandanı Selâhaddin

¹⁶ BOA. HR. SYS. 2556- 2/25, 26

Bâb-ı Âli, Dâhiliye Nezâreti, Emniyet-i Umûmiyye Müdiriyeti, Şu'be: Âsâyiş, Husûsî: 300, Mühim ve müsta'celdir.

Hâriciye Nezâret-i Celîlesine

Kozan ahâli-i İslâmiyyesine karşı ikâ' edilen ta'arruzâta dâ'ir.

Devletlü efendim hazretleri

Kozan'da ulemâ ve eşrâfın âkıbeti mechûl bir sûretde celb olunmakda ve İslâmlardan ba'zılarının boğazlanmakda ve nâmûslarına tecâvüz edilmekde olduğu ve Feke'nin Ermeniler tarafından muhâsara edildiği ve telgraf hatlarının kesildiği ve İslâmlar için müretteb katliâmın tatbikine başlanıldığı, istimdâd için oraya hicret eden beş yüz kişinin ifâdesinden anlaşıldığı beyânıyla ahâli-i mazlûmenin büsbütün mahvına meydân

In Maraş Armenians in collaboration with occupying French forces assaulted the population and committed massacres.

Part of the Armenians who were deported to other areas began to return to Maraş once the Mondros Armistice was signed. At the same time many armed Armenians included among the French detachments were inflicting all kinds of cruelties upon Muslims, harassing women and forcing them to remove their veils. Stored arms and ammunition were distributed to Armenians and a Turkish detachment, which saw these acts, was fired on. The French shot down a barber named Ökkeş. The Turkish flag hoisted over the citadel of Maraş was lowered and many persons were killed by Armenian collaborationists. Under pretext of searching for arms they broke into houses and mosques while inflicting tortures even on children; Muslims carrying arms were sentenced to death. A letter sent by the Maraş section of the Society for the Defense of Rights called for the necessary measures to be taken to stop these inhumane acts.

27 Cemazi II. 1338 (18 March 1920) ¹⁷

kalmamak üzre tedâbir-i serî'a ittihaz ve icrâsı esbâbının istikmâli istihâmına dâ'ir Adana ve Kozan eşrâfından olup Develi'de ikâmete mecbûr kaldıklarını beyân eden ba'zı zevât tarafından çekilen 4 Mart sene [1]336 târihli telgrafnâmenin sûreti leffen takdîm kılınmış ve hakikat-i hâl Adana Vilâyeti'nden sorulmuş olmağla son derece vahim bir mâhiyeti hâ'iz bulunan tecâvüzât ve ta'addiyât-ı mezkûrenin men'i zımında icâb edenler nezdinde teşebbüsât-ı mü'essire ve serî'a ifâ ve neticesinin inbâsı mütemennâdır. Ol bâbda emr ü fermân hazret-i men-lehül-emrindir.

Fî 11 Cumâde'l-âhire sene [1]338 ve Dâhiliye Nâzırı

Fî 3 Mart sene [1]336 Ebûbekir Hâzım

Bâb-ı Âli, Dâhiliye Nezâreti, Emniyet-i Umûmiyye Müdiriyyeti

Mahreci: Develi, Telgrafnâme Sûreti

Kozan'da ulemâ ve eşrâfın âkıbeti mechûl olarak celb edildiği, sokaklarda Müslümanların ara sıra boğazlandığı, nâmûsa tecâvüz gitdikçe şiddetini artırdığı; Feke, Ermeni çeteleri tarafından muhâsara edildiği, telgraf hatlarının kesildiği, Müslümanlar için hazırlanmış katliâmın tatbikine başlandığı buraya istimdâd için akın eden beş yüzü mütecâviz Müslümanların ciğer-sûz ifâdelerinden anlaşıldığından mazlûm bi-çâre Müslümanların büsbütün mahvına meydân verilmemek için tedâbir-i serî'anın icrâsını son bir halecân ile arz eyeriz.

Da'vâ vekili iken Everek'de i

kâmete mecbûr Kozanlı

Mustafa

Kozan eşrâfından

Hulûsi

Kozan eşrâfından

Halil

Adana Meclis-i Umûmî a'zâsı iken

el-yevm Everek'de ikâmete mecbûr

Hasan

Feke eşrâfından

Ârif Hikmet

¹⁷ BOA HR. SYS. 2544- 16/16, 17, 22. Erkân-ı Harbiyye-i Umûmiyye Dâ'iresi, Şu'be: 2, Numara: 1108

Hâriciye Nezâret-i Cellesine

Devletlü efendim hazretleri

Mar'aş müsâdemesi başlamadan evvel Fransızlarla Ermeniler tarafından ahâlî-i İslâmiyyeye karşı yapılan harekâta dâ'ir Mar'aş Müdâfa'a-i Hukûk Cem'iyyeti tarafından verilüp Üçüncü Kolordu Kumandanlığı'ndan gönderilmiş olan evrâk sûreti eskimiş olmağla berâber, berây-ı ma'lûmât melfûfen takdîm kılınmıştır. Ol bâbda emr ü fermân hazret-i men-lehül-emrindir.

Fî 26 Cemâziye'l-âhir sene [13]38 ve Harbiye Nâzırı

Fî 18 Mart sene [13]36 İmza

Nakl-i sükkân mu'âmelesine tâbi' tut[ul]an Ermeniler akab-i mütârekede peyderpey avdete başlamış ve haklarında her dürlü mu'âvenet icrâ edilerek huzûr ve emniyet-i umûmiyyeleri taht-ı te'mine alınmış olduğu ve her üç ay sonra şerâ'it-i mütâreke hilâfında te'mîn-i âsâyiş bahanesiyle livâmıza gelerek sekiz mâh kadar kalan İngiliz kuvve-i işgâliyyesi bile vaz'-âmiz-i şikârânemize nazar-ı takdire alarak umûr-ı hükûmet ve millete kat'iyyen müdâhale eylememiş oldukları hâlde kuvve-i mezkûreyi istihlâf eden Fransız kuvve-i işgâliyyesi Fransız forması altında gizlediği bir takım Ermeni çetelerini berâberinde götürüp her dürlü kavâ'id ve zevâbit-i askeriyyeden vâreste bir hâlde çarşu ve sokaklarda gezmelerine ve böyle milletdaşlarını Fransız sıfat-ı askeriyyesinde görmekle te'mîn-i firâk eylemek isteyen fesedenin Müslümanların hayatını rencide edecek nümâyişlere tasaddi eylemelerine ve hattâ Ermeni efrâdının kavlen ve fi'len vukû' bulan ta'addiyât ve tecâvüzât-ı nâmûs-şikenâne ve tâkat-güzârânesine ahâlî-i İslâmiyye tarafından fevka'l-gâye sabr ve tahammül gösterildiği İngilizler tarafından da takdîr olunarak memleketden müfârekatları sırasında İngiliz kuvve-i işgâliyye kumandanının eşrâf ve a'yân-ı memleketi nezdine da'vetle inâyet-i memnûniyyet-kârâne bir tarzda beyân-ı vedâ' ve Fransız kuvve-i işgâliyye kumandanında imtizâc-ı ahâlîyi sâlib-i esbâb karşısında kalmamasına dâ'ir izhâr-ı temenniyât eylediği bir zamânda Fransızlar hod-kâmâne ve dürüşâne hâllere devâm ile yoldan geçen kadınların peçelerini kaldırmak ve iki İslâmî alenen şehid etmek ve bir tarafdand deppoyda bulunan esliha ve cebhâne ve bombaları kendi devriyelerinin himâyesi altında Ermenilere tevzi'-i nakliyatını te'mîn etmek ve buna şahid olan Osmanlı devriyesi üzerine ateş açarak polis me'mûrunu cerh ve ümenâ-yı (?) müslimden Berber Ökkeş bizzât Fransız irtibât zâbiti tarafından katledilmiştir. Deppoydaki eslihanın sûret-i tevzi'i Ayntab'dan gelen hey'et-i tahkikiyyenin netice-i tahkikâtla ve merkûm Berber Ökkeş'in keyfiyet-i katli de zâbit-i mûmâ-ileyhin i'zâmıyla tahakkuk eylemiştir. Fransız kuvve-i işgâliyyesi Ermenileri İslâmlar aleyhinde teslîh ve teşvikiyle berâber bir tarafdand da anâsır-ı Osmanîyyeyi yekdiğeri aleyhinde ikâ'-ı cinâyâta tertib ve igrâ ve bir takım menfa'at-perestân — ve sebük-magzânî de pâre-i me'mûriyyet va'd ve itmâ'ıyla beyne'l-anâsır tuhm-ı fesâd ve nifâk etmek gibi hiç bir devlet-i mu'azzamaya ve millet-i mütemeddineye lâyük olmayacak sûrette prensipler ta'kib ve bi'n-netice âsâyişsizliği ser-rişte ittihazıyla menviyât-ı gayr-i ma'külesini tatbik için hükûmeti müdâhaleye tesaddi edeceğini hisseden erbâb-ı cem'iyyet ve ashâb-ı hasenenin teklifât ve temenniyâtını reddetmesi üzerine Osmanîye'den getirdiği propogandacılar ile teşebbüsât ile feryâdlarından geri kalmamış ve hattâ memleketde nisbiyet-i (?) pâ-yi istila için fikr-i me'âlî sâhibi olan hiçbir devlet-i mu'azzamaya yakışmayacak sûretle memleketi idâre-i Osmanîye'den nez' edercesine tebe'a-i Osmanîye'den olan Ermeniler tarafından çekilen Fransız bandırasıyla dâ'ire-i hükûmete girmek ve livâmızın Kilikya'ya ilhâk ve Osmanîye livâsıyla birlikte Osmanîye Forforu (?) Mösyö Andre tarafından idâre ve her iki livânın Jandarma Alay Kumandanı Sıdkı Efendi nâmında bir şahsa tevdi' edildiğini i'lân ve kal'ada Osmanlı bandırası keşidesine müsâ'ade edilmeyeceğini ve hükûmete keşide edilen Osmanlı bayrağını da cebren indirmek üzre bir zâbit kumandasında Ermeni efrâdı hükûmete sevkeyledikleri ve zâbit teşkilâtı icrâsıyla umûm devâ'ir-i hükûmete me'mûrlar ta'yîn edeceği gibi beyânât ve icrâ'ata başlamışlar ve kal'aya Osmanlı bayrağı keşidesini de men' etmişlerdir. Kuvve-i işgâliyyenin bu siyâset-i sakimesi yüzünden

An American naval officer working along the coasts in Syria and Cilicia reported to Admiral Mark Bristol, commander of the American fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean and American High Commissioner in İstanbul, that American missionaries were playing an important role in the slaughter by spreading anti-Muslim hatred stirring up the local Christians against their Muslim neighbors and providing hiding places for the arms and ammunition which was being used against the settled Turkish population:

"Dr. Nichols I consider a very dangerous man who can do a great deal of harm if given a free hand. He is a religious fanatic

vukû'ât ve hâdisât-ı mü'essife ta'kib eylemekdedir. Ahîren gelen General Keret dahi livâmızın Kilikya'ya ilhâk ve Fransız idâresinin te'sis edileceğini beyân ve resmen i'lân eylemişlerdir. Fransızların İslâmlara karşı gösterdikleri husûmetden hayrân-yâb olan Ermeniler dahi ikâ'-ı cinâyâtdan Fransızlara âdetâ sâbika ediyorlar. Müslümânlıktan başka bir kusûru olmayan bi-çâre bir hammâl sûret-i fecî'ada boğazlanmak ve kulakları kesilmek sûretiyle katledildi. Şeyh mahallesi kahvehânesinde bulunan ahâlî üzerine Fransız kisve-i askeriyyesini hâ'iz birkaç Ermeni anarşisi tarafından bomba atılarak bir şahsın maktûl ve dört şahsın ağır sûretde mecrûh düşmesine sebebiyet verildi. [Mü]tecâsîrler ise Fransızlar tarafından karakol ittihâz edilen kiliseye girdiler. Fransızlar Ermenilerin tahrikâtıyla hod-be-hod ahâlî-i İslâmiyyenin haremelerine kadar girerek taharriyât icrâ ve Nakîb (?) Câmî'inde bulunan iki çocuğu tevkîf ve işkence etmişlerdir. Ve ma'âbide tecâvüzlerini tekrâr eylemiştir. Odun götürmek üz[r]e memleketden çıkan iki fukarâ Müslüman, Fransız karârgâhının on dakika mesâfesinde süngü darbeleriyle şehîd edildi. Firâren ağıs (?) giryân (?) ve câna muvaffak ola[n] arkadaşları kâtillerin kışlaya girdiklerini, şahıslarını ta'yin edeceklerini hükûmete ihbâr eylemeleri üzerine berây-ı tahkîkât Fransız karârgâhına giden jandarma kumandanıyla polis komiseri Ermeni neferleri tarafından elfâz-ı galîza ile tahkîr ve düşnâm olunarak fi'l-i katlin kendileri tarafından ikâ' edildiği ihsâs olundu. Hadd ü pâyân olmayan lâ-yetesavve[r] dâ'ire-i imkânâ çıkamayan bu ta'addiyât ve tecâvüzât elvermemiştir ki; Bu defa da İslâhiye tarîki üzerinde eşkiyâ ta'kîbi vesîle ittihâziyla hükûmete ma'lûmât verilmeksizin harekât-ı askeriyye icrâsına kıyâm ve Ceceli, Gökpınar Şerefoğlu, Şekeroba, Fekser (?) ve sâ'ir karyeleri top ateşleriyle hâk-i yeksân edildi. Memleket ahâlîsinin serbestî-i hayâtından mahrûm bırakmak ve gerek Ermenilerin ve gerek Fransız nüfûzlarının damarlarında deverân eden dimâğ-ı zabt ve kini tamâmiyle teflîc edebilmek ve bi'n-netice memleketin pek elim ve ciğer-sûz fecâyî'a sahne olmasını te'mîn eylemek maksadıyla bu kerre Fransız kumandanının neşreylediği beyânnâmede akşam alafranga sâ'at altıdan sabâh alafranga sâ'at altıya kadar ahâlînin işlerine gitmeleri men' bu sûretle nev'amâ bir idâre-i örflüye i'lân ve üzerlerinde silâh taşıyanlar doğrudan doğruya birer cânî addıyla i'dâm edileceği beyân ve Wilson'un prensiplerinden ve Sulh Meclis-i Âlîsi'nin mukarrerât-ı âdilânesinden kat'-ı ümîd etmeyen biz İslâmlar haklarında âdetâ bir siyâset-i imhâkârâne tatbîk ve ittihâz edilmektedir ki; bu hakikat Kilis'de neşr olunan beyânnâme münderecâtına da kesb-i sübût ve bedâhet eylemekdedir. Binâen-aleyh Fransızlar gibi efkâr-ı âliyye ve imrâr-ı âyineye (?) teveccühkâr olan bir millet-i necibeye değil akvâm-ı vahşîyyeye bile lâynk ve reddolmayan şu tarz-ı idâreyi âlem-i medeniyet ve insâniyyetin enzâr-ı ibtisârına vaz' ve i'lâna müsâra'at ve mevlid ve medfenimiz olan hâk-i vatanın silâh-ı zulm ü i'tisâfla dökülecek kanlarla lekedâr edilmemesi için icâb eden tedâbir-i serî'a ve sâ'irenin icrâsını temennî eyleriz.

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apparently, and anxious to have something sensational take place between Turks and Americans, in order to influence public opinion in the United States. He impressed me as rather glorying in the fight between the Armenians and Turks at Aintab...¹⁸ ...[I]t developed that the first shots fired at the American Orphanage were by armed Armenians from the orphanage with the full knowledge and encouragement of some Americans....¹⁹ ...Turkish police and army searches found anti-Muslim propaganda along with arms and ammunition hidden in American missionary centers in various parts of Anatolia".²⁰

Bristol relied on this report to inform the Department of State in Washington:

"Particular attention is called to the remarks contained in this report regarding Dr. Nichols, who is in charge of the Near East Relief work for the territory embraced within Syria and Cilicia. There are some few of our Americans in Turkey who take this attitude".

The overall French military commander in Syria and Cilicia, General Hamelin, had anticipated trouble from the Armenian troops right from the start on the basis of the British accusations of cowardice and indiscipline against the Armenian troops who fought with the British expeditionary force at Baku earlier in 1918. His requests for their replacement by French troops were, however, rejected on the grounds that French soldiers had to be sent back to their homes now that the war on the western front was over. "Hamelin saw clearly", reports the official French military history of the occupation, that "it was to put powder and the detonator together to send the Armenian legionnaires to Cilicia and Alexandretta. The incidents and the disorders followed without delay".²¹

¹⁸ J. H. S. Dessez, Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Smith Thompson, En route Island of Patmos, to American High Commissioner Bristol, İstanbul, 03 May 1920. Transmitted from Bristol to Secretary of State, 08 May 1920. United States Department of State Decimal File 867. 00/1288.

¹⁹ Dessez, *idem*.

²⁰ See for example: Police report of 25 May 1921, regarding missionary activities at Mamuretülaziz—CA (Ankara), BBK/30/10 kutu 206/dosya 406/doc. 3), report of 30 June 1921 on Talas—CA (Ankara), BBK/30/10 kutu 206/dosya 406/doc. 4.

²¹ Letter from General Hamelin, Détachement français de Palestine Syrie to Ministère de la Guerre, no. 292/G of 26 December 1918. Archives de la Guerre (Chateau de Vincennes), carton Détachement français de Palestine Syrie no. 9, Kemal Çelik, "Millî Mücadele'de Adana ve Havalisi: 1918-1922" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, İstanbul University,

His fears were fulfilled right from the start. The French army confirmed the Ottoman military reports, with even more detail than that provided by the local Ottoman officials, reporting that wherever the Armenians went, they terrorized the Turkish and Arab civilian population, starting the day they first landed in İskenderun (Alexandretta), and during the early months of 1919 going on to the principal points along the İslahiye-Adana railroad, in particular at Pozantı, Dörtöl and, finally at Adana itself, where they began killing, raping, ravaging and robbing everyone and everything, attacking even the Muslim French Algerian soldiers who were brought in to at least attempt to curb their excesses.²² Many of the latter were so outraged by the atrocities being committed against their religious brothers that they deserted the French army, joined the Turkish national forces, and remained in

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1993); published under the same title: Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999.

²² Reports by local Ottoman officials, including the names of the hundreds of Turks slaughtered and tortured by members of the Armenian Legion are given in *Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Kafkaslar'da ve Anadolu'da Ermeni Mezalimi, III (1914-1920)*, Ankara, Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1995, pp. 155-233; accounts of the individual Armenian raids are given on pp. 2-153. A detailed study of the atrocities committed by the Armenian Legion in the Adana area can be found in Kemal Çelik, *Millî Mücadele'de Adana ve Havalisi: 1918-1922*, Ankara, TTK, 1999, and Yusuf Ziya Bildirici, "Adana'da Ermeniler'in Yaptığı Katliamlar ve Fransız-Ermeni İlişkileri" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Kayseri Erciyes University, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1995). See also *Les Armées françaises au Levant*, I, pp. 123-124; Archives de la Guerre (Chateau de Vincennes), carton DFPS no. 1, DFPS to Ministre de la Guerre no. 122/G, 20 November 1918; and report of Lt.-Col. Lebon of 30 November 1918. R. de Gontaut-Biron, *Comment la France s'est installée en Syrie: 1918-1919*, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1923, pp. 53-54; Gustave Gautherot, *La France en Syrie et en Cilicie*, Paris, Libr. Indépendante, 1920, pp. 135-136; Emniyet-i Umumiye (İstanbul Dahiliye), 2 Cemazi I 1337/3 February 1919: BBA DH/\$FR, dosya 96, doc. 44; Emniyet-i Umumiye (İstanbul Dahiliye), to Governor of Adana, 4 Cemazi II 1337/7 March 1919: Başbakanlık Arşivi, hereafter referred to as BBA, DH/\$FR, dosya 97, doc. 58; Emniyet-i Umumiye (İstanbul Dahiliye) to Governor of Adana, 5 Cemazi II 1337/8 March 1919: BBA DH/\$FR, dosya 97, doc. 70; Webb (İstanbul) to the Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (London), İstanbul, 27 March 1919, in FO 371/3658, no. 58433; Webb to Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, İstanbul, 27 March 1919 in FO 371/3658, no. 58433; İstanbul Dahiliye Report, 8 Cemazi I 1337/ 9 February 1919: BBA DH/KMS dosya 49-1, no. 85; TİH I, 96-97, IV, 56, 287; *Harp Tarih Vesikaları Dergisi* (hereafter referred to as HTVD), no. 11, doc. 273; TİH IV, 59; BBA (İstanbul): Report of Osmanlı Ordusu Humayun Baş Kumandanlığı, no. 10291, 14 December 1334. Bab-ı Âli Evrak Odası (Archives of the Office of Grand Vezir), hereafter referred to as BEO 340957 (340934), Grand Vezir-Tezkere-i Sami, hereafter referred to as GV TS 422 to Hariciye (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 16 December 1334/1918. BEO Siyasi Dosya (Political Dossier) 34/54/12. Based on Harbiye Tezkere (Ministry of War Document) 895 of 14 December 1334/1918; All this information is summarized in Justin McCarthy's definitive study, *Death and Exile*, pp. 204-5, 242.

Turkey after the war as citizens of the new Republic established under the leadership of Mustafa Kemâl Atatürk, who classified as Turks all those who accepted citizenship in the new national state regardless of their ethnic or religious origins.

Imitating the complaints of the British officers regarding their Armenian allies at Baku, the French officers in Cilicia complained that the Armenian forces lacked all sense of discipline and refused to follow the orders of their own Armenian officers, let alone those of the superior French officers, desperately asking that at least some real French troops be sent to help control the situation:

"On the whole, the native populations -Turks, Turkomans, Kurds, Circassians- greeted us well. We wanted to conciliate them with us, but they saw with a very bad eye the occupation of their lands by Armenian troops, even though dressed as French soldiers. They therefore normally accused the latter of all the misdeeds, and even invented some or even provoked them to secure the departure of the Armenians....If it had involved real Frenchmen", said the Imperial procureur of Adana to the commander of the Armenian Legion during the course of an investigation, "we would have said nothing, but things arrange themselves, make the Armenians leave".²³

"Until the arrival of the first [French] reinforcements in June of 1919, the Armenian Legion was the only French force in Cilicia. The history of the French Army in the territory during that period was merged with the history of the Legion; it is, unfortunately, especially marked by acts of indiscipline and violence, which did a great wrong to our influence".²⁴

Hamelin regularly reported to Paris on the misconduct and indiscipline of his Armenian troops, though he did attempt to justify their actions as acceptable revenge for Turkish and Kurdish attacks on Armenians in Anatolia during World War I:

"The [Armenian] battalions have been only begun to be organized -an officer per company, a depot with two officers for

²³ Report to Commandant Pauget at the end of March 1920, no. 3931/5. In AG (Archives de la Guerre), Chateau de Vincennes, Paris. Carton 5 Légion d'Orient; AFL I, 121.

²⁴ *Les Armées françaises au Levant* I, 35, pp. 120-121; General Hamelin to Ministère de la Guerre, no. 164/G, 18 November 1918. AG (Chateau de Vincennes), carton DFPS, no. 1).

eight hundred men- without cavalry, without artillery, without food service, without sanitary organization. I was going to cover Cilicia with posts composed of Armenian soldiers burning with a desire to take vengeance for the exactions which they had experienced for so many years, and put them into contact with the Turkish population and soldiers in the same place that ravages had been committed by the Ottomans, notably at Adana in 1909. It would require discipline of iron to force them to act as French soldiers, and I had only one French battalion to enforce their obedience in case of a carrying out of the Armenian reaction, and to restore order in case of the serious troubles that were still possible. In such conditions, I considered myself very fortunate to have succeeded by intimidation and without serious incident to get the administrative and military authorities of Cilicia to submit to the French occupation....²⁵ "Since then, the President of the [Armenian] Committee of Egypt has sent emissaries to the Armenian soldiers, they have had the occasion to invite their co-religionists to renounce their attachment to the French force so that they can carry out individual reprisals against the Ottoman population....Both during their stay in Syria and since their arrival in Cilicia there has not been a day when I have not been apprised by the local Ottoman administrative authorities or by the British authorities, of complaints, unhappily most often very well founded, against the Armenians' excesses of all kinds toward the local populations (thefts, armed attacks, pillages, murders)...."²⁶

He hoped, however, that training would improve the Armenians' behavior:

"In fact, when I applied myself to this matter and succeeded in sending the Armenian legionnaires toward the theater of their legitimate aspirations, their conduct avoided the latter....

"The officers of the Armenian Legion were not, however, discouraged; they continued to devote themselves entirely to

²⁵ General Hamelin letter, no. 22, to Ministry of War, Paris, 4 January 1919. Carton 5 Légion d'Orient and Détachement français de Palestine, Syrie, no. 9, in: AG, Chateau de Vincennes, Paris. Summarized in *Les Armées françaises au Levant* I, p. 120.

²⁶ General Hamelin letter to the French High Commissioner, no. 2077/I of 2 February 1919. AG, Chateau de Vincennes, Carton 5 Légion d'Orient, cited in: *Les Armées françaises au Levant* I, p. 122.

the military instruction of their Legionnaires, to their moral education and their well-being. The majority gave them all satisfaction and answered with good conduct and a good attitude. I hope therefore to see the legion acquire the military discipline and value that will permit them to become the elite troop among the Armenian contingents".²⁷

This hope was shared by British Brigadier-General Archibald Wavell, who reported to the British High Commissioner in Istanbul that many excesses were being committed in Cilicia by "...certain portions of the French Armenian troops", but that disciplinary action had been taken. The "worst elements in these Armenian battalions" were being removed, and the situation in Cilicia "was much improved", to which a Foreign Office minute responded: "General Allenby's report that the French Armenians were unsatisfactory seems more than justified, and I expect that this is a very mild account of what really took place".²⁸

Robert Zeidner's brilliant study of the French occupation of Cilicia, *The Tricolor over the Taurus*, summarized the French reports:

"If...Allenby and the 'easterners' on his staff were sufficiently calculating to foresee the great embarrassment France's Armenian troops were destined to cause her in Cilicia and vicinity, they could scarcely have chosen a better vehicle to discredit French rule in the Levant that permit the expansion of the Armenian element within the *Légion d'Orient*. Although they fought valiantly during the Palestine campaign, the Armenians of the Legion repeatedly revealed a propensity for brawling when off duty. Their French officers found them grossly undisciplined and dangerously divided in loyalty among several extremist parties. Many were Marxists or nihilists of varying persuasions, complying with orders only after reference to their respective soldiers' soviets...."²⁹

The official French military history of the period concluded that these efforts to curb the Armenians by training them were largely

²⁷ General Hamelin letter to Ministère de la Guerre, no. 243/G of 15 February 1919. AG, Chateau de Vincennes, Carton 5 Légion d'Orient. Cited in *Les Armées françaises au Levant* I, p. 122.

²⁸ Brigadier-General A. F. Wavell to British High Commissioner in Istanbul, 15 April 1920: FO 371/4165/79400.

²⁹ Zeidner, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

unsuccessful because they were being inspired to attack Turks and other Muslims by Armenians outside the country, particularly in Egypt:

"The hopes of General Hamelin were to be unfulfilled. As the incidents multiplied and became worse, discipline became harder, the condemnations by military courts more numerous. But the Armenian legionnaires continued to understand only that we were defending the Turks, our previous enemies, against the Armenians who were always our friends. Monseigneur Mouchegh, Armenian Archbishop of Adana, after going around among the Armenian legion units, wrote on 28 April 1919: 'They [the Armenian soldiers] see with what tolerance and what friendship, France treats the Turkish nation, criminal and enemy. They only see the obstacles with which one surrounded the brightness of the Armenian nation that had valiantly fought on the field of battle beside their Allies'. The rancor or hatred therefore turned against us, excited by the Armenian committees, which, abandoning open action of intervention, undertook a secret action of inciting the Armenian soldiers to 'disobedience, revolt, vengeance or patient resignation while waiting the right hour to throw off the yoke of the French oppressors of their country'. The letters, proclamations, and newspaper articles were principally the work of the *Comité d'Egypte*, inspired from Port Said by Madame Mazraff, a true 'Armenian passionaria', who preached 'revenge of blood, not of misery', but also by a huge correspondence coming also from America. The postal censors kept letters that were of a nature to disturb order and discipline, but some of them reached their addresses hidden in packages and newspapers, and their influence was felt.³⁰

³⁰ Report of the Troupes Françaises du Levant to Ministère de la Guerre, no. 1310/G of 10 September 1919. AG, Chateau de Vincennes, carton: *Détachement français de Palestine, Syrie*. Cited in: *Les Armées françaises au Levant I*, p. 123. Zeidner, *Tricolor*, p. 200, reports "Passionately pro-Armenian, André, Brémont and du Véou are understandably laconic on the crimes of the Legion in Cilicia and vicinity. Similarly, neither Georges-Picot nor Hamelin seems to have reported these events to Paris until long after the fact". That the members of the Armenian Legion entered Cilicia with the French army primarily to seek vengeance from the Turks living in the area was also confirmed by the French Commander in Syria, General Henri Gouraud, as reported by his nephew, Philippe Gouraud, *Le Général Henri Gouraud au Liban et en Syrie, 1919-1923*, Paris, Harmatton, 1994, p. 111.

"I earnestly request that the French Government be approached regarding their re-occupation of Cilicia and asked if they do reoccupy whether they will use French troops or Colonials and Armenians. This would be a very serious decision as affecting the safety of our citizens and also as regards the conditions throughout Turkey. Therefore I request that I be informed as soon as possible regarding the action the French will take. The French are peculiarly silent as regards their actions past and future, but this is typical...Bristol".³¹

In a proclamation issued on 12 November 1919 by Mustafa Kemâl in the name of the Representative Committee for the Defense of National Rights In Anatolia and Rumelia, he pointed out that the Allied occupation of Cilicia had violated the conditions of the Mondros Armistice:

"The localities of Urfa, Maraş and Aintab, which were occupied by the English, contrary to the provisions of the armistice and were recently evacuated, have now again been occupied by the French. The Entente Powers therefore are in no way renouncing their plan of depriving our nation of these, the most beautiful parts of our country, and they are carrying out their schemes on the grounds apparently that this occupation is provisional and preventive, without awaiting the decisions of the conference.

"They are unwilling to take into consideration the glorious history of the Ottoman Empire, dating from seven centuries ago, or the circumstances and elements of its prompt and powerful development, or its rebirth. They are working to establish an equilibrium of interests among themselves by dismembering our country. The acts of these Powers are inhuman and such as to be an offense against justice and right, against the principles proclaimed with all pomp and ceremony in the Peace Conference, and against the promises made to Turkey before all the world by article 12 of the principles of Wilson. The massacres, oppression, and atrocities and the policy of extermination carried out in the *vilâyet* of Aidin, which was given to the Greeks to occupy with a view to opening the way to a division of Turkey, are identical with

³¹ Bristol to Secretary of State, no. 150, 21 February 1920, 4 p. m. United States Department of State Decimal File 867. 00/1118.

those perpetrated in the localities of Maraş, Urfa, and Aintab, dependencies of the *vilâyet* of Adana, which the French have occupied, using the Armenians as their instrument. These acts are the last of a series of flagrant injustices of a political nature.

"We protest with all our energy against the illegal proceedings of the Entente Powers up to date, and we hope that they will of their own accord return to more humane and equitable sentiments towards our country and our nation, which will continue resolutely to defend its existence and its lawful rights with all the material and moral forces at its command, rather than consent to dismemberment and slavery.

"We wish to advise the Powers of the Entente that our whole nation, in the widest sense of the word, is united in this legitimate and sublime decision; a continuation of this inhuman policy which the Entente Powers, deaf to the legitimate voice of our nation, are following may entail fatal consequences, not only for a few countries, but also possibly for the two hemispheres. The responsibility before Providence and humanity of such a disaster lies naturally with the Entente Powers.

"We are here acting as interpreters of the desire for unity cherished by our nation, whose only object is the defence of its rights to exist. We wish our legitimate cries to reach the nations of Europe and America, and we are convinced that they will not give their support to all this injustice".³²

Turkish protests to the local French authorities had little effect.³³ Hundreds of public protests to the High Commissioners, to the Paris Peace Conference, to the İstanbul Government, to whomever seemed to have some authority, came from Turkish citizen groups throughout the south-east, condemning the French occupation, stating, according to French intelligence, that "the

³² Mustafa Kemâl (Sivas) for the Representative Committee for the Defence of National Rights in Anatolia, 12 November 1919. Turkish text in Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, *Heyet-i Temsiliye Kararları*, 2nd pr., Ankara, TTK, 1989, pp. 53-54; English text enclosed in Robeck to Curzon, no. 2166, 19 November 1919: FO 406/41, no. 175, pp. 389-390; Bilâl Şimşir, *British Documents on Atatürk I*, pp. 224-225; *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, hereafter referred to as DBFP IV, pp. 535-538.

³³ See: for example, Yalçın Özalp, *Millî Mücadelenin İlk Zaferi*, Ankara, Mevlâna Kitabevi, 1976, pp. 25-27.

French troops, which are composed of Armenians, are attacking the honor of Turkish women and causing the Muslim population to submit to all sorts of tortures". Even the French authorities at İstanbul accepted them and transmitted them to Paris.³⁴

"Just as Greek and Turkish peasants who had lived side by side for generations in western Anatolia became bitter enemies when the former cheered the invading Greek army at İzmir and joined in its ravages, so also relations between Turks and Armenians became very tense throughout Anatolia as a result of the ravages of the Armenian Legion in Cilicia, which also encouraged local Armenians to take up arms against their neighbors with the certainty that the occupying powers would not punish them. Mustafa Kemâl moved to defend the Turks of Cilicia as soon as the Sivas Congress authorized the Representative Committee to act as a virtual government, coordinate the National Forces, and organize national resistance. As a first step, on 11 September 1919, the Representative Committee ordered all Turks and their supporters in Cilicia to institute a mass boycott against Christians living and doing business in areas of Maraş and Antep. Turks also were forbidden to move out of the area, however much they were pressured to do so by the invaders. If lands and other properties had to be sold, they could be transferred only to other Turks, so that Christians and foreigners would not be given any opportunity to legally take over property. All Turks were required to devote all their efforts and property to the achievement of the national goals, with assistance houses being established to help those in need because of their work for the national cause".³⁵

The Turks initially responded to the atrocities in Cilicia with boycotts of Armenian businesses and shops throughout Anatolia in the same way that they had boycotted Greek merchants in the country following the Greek invasion of İzmir and expansion into south-western Anatolia. The boycotts soon developed into widespread attacks on returning Armenians and Greeks alike, who after having been initially welcomed by the Ottoman authorities, were subjected to beatings, robberies, and killings despite the

³⁴ Archives de la Guerre, Chateau de Vincennes, carton A 2-5; AFL II, pp. 231-232.

³⁵ *Türk İstiklâl Harbi*, 7 vols., Ankara, ATASE, 1962-1974; Harb Tarihi Dairesi Arşivi, no. 1/105, dosya 23.

repeated warnings sent out by the Ottoman Government that such actions would only hurt Turkey's position at the Paris Peace Conference. Turks living at Bitlis and other places in north-eastern Anatolia located near the Caucasus border began to assault caravans of Armenian refugees seeking to enter the country from the Russian Caucasus in accordance with assurances of protection given them by the occupying Powers.³⁶ This situation in turn made it relatively easy for Armenian nationalists to convince thousands of Armenians in central Anatolia to react to the boycotts and attacks by immigrating to Cilicia, where French High Commissioner in Syria, Georges Picot, encouraged them to come and settle and promised that the French army would give them all the protection needed to establish an Armenian state to supplant that of the Turks.³⁷ At the same time, Greek nationalists transported Greek peasants from central Anatolia either to the İzmir occupation area or to the Black Sea coast, where they sent out hundreds of terrorist bands who devastated town and country alike in order to kill or drive out the settled Turkish population to establish a homogenous Greek Pontus state.³⁸

Boghos Nubar Paşa sent some of the Armenian settlers from among the refugees gathered in Iraq, Syria and Egypt and from

³⁶ Aşair ve Mühacirin (Department of Tribes and Refugees) (İstanbul Dahiliye) to Governor of Bitlis, 18 Cemazi I 1338/8 February 1920: BBA DH/ŞFR, dosya 107, doc. 36; Aşair ve Mühacirin (İstanbul Dahiliye) to Governor of Bitlis, 12 Cemazi II 1338/3 March 1920: BBA DH/ŞFR dosya 108 doc. 10.

³⁷ Gouraud, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112.

³⁸ French High Commissioner in İstanbul to French Minister of Foreign Affairs Pichon, 27 September 1919. AG, Chateau de Vincennes, Paris, Archives de la Guerre, AAEF-Levant 1918-29 (Arménie), vol. 7, fol. 148: "During the journey which he has just completed, Lieutenant Dubreuil has established that the Armenians of the region of Kayseri are leaving the region; this exodus was not motivated by any sudden fear felt by the Armenians, as they have attested to the security which reigns at least at the present time in the province, but rather by the advice and exhortations which are given to them by their co-religionists and by their bishops who reside in Constantinople, in other cities of Turkey, and even in Europe...." with Dubreuil himself reporting: "I have the honour of informing you that the Christians of the region of Kayseri are abandoning their region *en masse*...at the present time, the Catholic bishop of Kayseri, who is in İstanbul, is one of the main organisers of this exodus, through the advice he provides. The policy followed in Cilicia which aims at making Adana a province solely populated by Armenians is certainly one of the factors behind this departure *en masse*...." Ottoman reports on this mass movement can be found in Aşair ve Mühacirin (İstanbul Dahiliye) to the Governor of Kastamonu, 3 Safar 1338/28 October 1919: BBA DH/ŞFR dosya 104, doc. 96; Kalem-i Mahsus (İstanbul Dahiliye) to governors of Ankara, Konya, Bolu and Teke, 8 Safar 1338/2 November 1919: BBA DH/ŞFR dosya 104, docs. 146 and 147; Kalem-i Mahsus to District Governor of Mamuretülaziz, 15 Safar 1338/9 November 1919: BBA DH/ŞFR dosya 104, doc. 182.

Armenians living in Europe and America. Most, however, were sent by Armenian nationalist organizations from Kayseri, Erzincan, Erzurum, Samsun, İzmit and Adapazarı, which they left because of their quite justified fears that their lives were in danger as a result of their cooperation with the Allied occupation armies. The French also sent several thousand refugees who had settled in Syria and Beirut during the war in order to remove what had become a disruptive element in the population. About 120,000 Armenian settlers were thus brought to Cilicia during these years, of whom 70,000 alone were placed in Adana, 12,000 in Dörtyol, 8,000 in Saimbeyli, and the remainder in Osmaniye, Kadirli and Kozan, in addition to the 50,000 Armenians who had come from İstanbul and elsewhere in Anatolia to Antep, Maraş and Zeytun, all for the purpose of establishing an Armenian state in Cilicia under the permanent protection of France.³⁹

As these refugees arrived in Cilicia, the French commanders seem to have innocently believed that they would settle down peaceably beside their Muslim neighbors, who as a result would be convinced to accept them without resistance. Instead of this, however, the refugees, many of whom were members of General Antranik's guerilla bands sent into north-eastern Anatolia by the nascent Armenian state in the Caucasus that had ravaged the Muslim villages in the area, joined the Armenian Legion in attacking Muslims throughout Cilicia.⁴⁰ In some cases, they were joined in their attacks around Urfa and Rakka by local Arab tribes, who always were happy to ravage the settled towns around them whenever they had the opportunity of doing so.⁴¹ British observers in the area commented that the returning Armenian refugees

³⁹ Paul du Véou, *La Passion de la Cilicie: 1919-1922*, Paris, Librairie orientaliste P. Geuthner, 1954; Zeidner, *Tricolor*, pp. 169-176, 208.

⁴⁰ Richard Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia II*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1974, pp. 325, 416; Antranig Chalabian, *General Andranik and the Armenian Revolutionary Movement*, Southfield, MI, 1988. McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, p. 205; Aram Turabian, *L'Éternelle victime de la diplomatie européenne*, Marseilles, Impr. Nouvelle, 1929, pp. 164-170; Liaison, "Antranik", *Blackwood's Magazine*, 206 (October 1919), pp. 441-477; W. E. D. Allen and P. Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1953, pp. 461, 472-475; "General Antranik, The Armenian Washington", *Literary Digest*, 64 (17 January 1920), pp. 90-92; Erdal Ilter, "Milli Mücadele'de Doğu Lejyonu (Légion d'Orient)'nun Fransız İlgâl Bölgesindeki Fonksiyonu", *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 4 (May 1989), pp. 419-436.

⁴¹ Ankara Bakanlar Kurulu, Kararname 550, 18 January 1921: CA (Ankara) 8572, Dahiliye Kutu 2/dosya 29/no. 6.

demonstrated the same characteristics that had created such tension between them and their Muslim and Jewish neighbors before the war:

"I am just back from Cilicia and Syria and have had an interesting time. You are I am sure filled up with the opinions of politicals, and want to hear no more. I am inclined to think them alarmists and to exaggerate things for the increase of their own importance, and I am not at all sure that they all always do all they can to promote the entente. I saw Picot and Brémond and both expressed themselves satisfied with us now, bar the matter of Armenians who we have been flooding Cilicia. Poor devils, no one seems to want them anywhere, and yet despite all they have gone through, I did not see a thin one amongst a good many thousand I saw, and most looked cheery too. The massacres seem to have been a good deal exaggerated but the destruction of their villages is very complete for hardly a stone remained on another. The women and children seem anyway to have survived, and the former are reported content to live with Turks and have children by them. I don't know what there is about the Armenians, but no one, not even the missionaries, seems to have a good word to say about them...."⁴²

The Ottoman Council of Ministers in İstanbul on several occasions issued orders to stop the movement into Anatolia of deported Armenians who had not originated in the cities toward which they were heading as well as those who had been convicted of crimes before they left the country.⁴³ After this regulation went into effect, however, many refugees responded by first going to their cities of origin, and then immediately moving on to Adana or other places in Cilicia, forcing the İstanbul Government to decree that such returning refugees would have to remain in their original home towns for at least five years before they could move

⁴² Lt. General Sir W. N. Congreve to Chief of Imperial General Staff, General Sir Henry Wilson, Cairo, 19 October 1919. Wilson papers 2/89/64. Keith Jeffrey, *The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, 1918-1922*, Army Records Society, The Bodley Head, 1985, pp. 129-130.

⁴³ Aşair ve Mühacirin (İstanbul Dahiliye) to District Governor of Trabzon, 27 Rebi II 1337/30 January 1919: Başbakanlık Arşivi (BBA), DH/ŞFR, dosya 95, doc. 281; Aşair ve Mühacirin (İstanbul Dahiliye) to governors of Konya, Niğde and Kayseri and all other provinces and districts, 1 Cemazi II 1337/4 March 1919: BBA DH/ŞFR, dosya 97, doc. 41.

elsewhere.⁴⁴ It further declared that since the migration of large groups of Armenians at any time was causing trouble wherever they gathered, they should be allowed to immigrate only individually and not in groups.⁴⁵ Of course, however, since the Sultan's government had no authority or power outside the walls of İstanbul, and since the Allied armies in fact facilitated the entry into the country of these and other Armenians, these orders were never enforced.⁴⁶ The Allied High Commissioners in İstanbul discussed the problems created by these mass movements of returning Armenians:

"Mr. De France observed that it is certain that the Armenian movements can produce disturbances, but how to stop them, moreover, if the Armenians fear, probably with some reason, that they will again be subject to Turkish massacres. They fear what will happen to them if the decisions of the Conference do not conform to the views of their nationalists. These movements take place, in general, on the invitation or at the suggestion of the Patriarchate. Most of these Armenians try to come to Constantinople, but many others are going to the contrary toward Cilicia and towards Adana, where they hope to find protection of the French occupation troops. This movement is prevented by the French authorities for those who come from Arabia or Aleppo since there they are equally under the protection of Allied troops. It is very difficult to stop migrations in Anatolia despite the relative tranquillity at the moment of the Armenian zones. It is necessary to say to the Porte that it does

⁴⁴ Emniyet-i Umumiye to District Governor of Kayseri, 27 Rebi II 1338/30 January 1919: BBA DH/ŞFR, dosya 95, doc. 277.

⁴⁵ Kalem-i Mahsus to governors of Edirne, Ankara, and Konya, District Governors of Bolu, Karasi and Kütahya, 27 Rebi I 1338/20 December 1919: BBA DH/ŞFR dosya 105, doc. 141; Emniyet-i Umumiye (İstanbul Dahiliye) to Governor of Mamuretülaziz (İstanbul Dahiliye), 4 Cemazi I 1338/4 January 1920: BBA DH/ŞFR, dosya 106, doc. 121.

⁴⁶ Elâzığ report to Grand Vezir, 9 November 1919. : BBA (İstanbul): Siyasi karton 34/53, İstanbul Dahiliye 8341/160, 9 November 1335 and İstanbul Dahiliye 8386/174, 15 November 1335/1919; Kalem-i Mahsus (İstanbul Dahiliye) to governor of Kayseri, 4 Safar 1338/29 October 1919: BBA DH/ŞFR dosya 104, doc. 106; Kalem-i Mahsus (İstanbul Dahiliye) to Governor of Diyarbakır, 22 Safar 1338/16 November 1919: BBA DH/ŞFR dosya 104, doc. 229; Kalem-i Mahsus (İstanbul Dahiliye) to District Governor of Eskişehir, 28 Safar 1338/22 November 1919: BBA DH/ŞFR dosya 104, doc. 265; Emniyet-i Umumi (İstanbul Dahiliye) to District Governor of Kayseri, 10 Rebi I 1338/3 December 1919: BBA DH/ŞFR dosya 105, doc. 32; Emniyet-i Umumiye to governors of Ankara and Trabzon and district governors of Canik, İzmit, Kayseri and Niğde, 29 Cemazi I 1338/19 February 1920: BBA DH/ŞFR, dosya 107, doc. 105; Gökbilgin II, p. 191.

not have the right to stop these movements. Hohler thinks that they can say to the Porte that if it continues to refuse freedom to the Armenians to move, the Conference of Peace will be informed so it can take this into account when the moment comes to establish the responsibility of the Ottoman government...Maissa to answer to the Porte, asking an end to limits on Armenian movement in Anatolia; to inform Mixed Armenian Council".⁴⁷

In December 1919, General Gouraud, desperately needing more men to maintain the French occupation of Cilicia, a task that was becoming increasingly difficult because of attacks by the Turkish National Forces, asked for permission to reconstitute the Armenian Legion. No matter how difficult the situation was, however, the response from the General Staff in Paris was very negative:

"...It is not to the interest of France to increase this troop, let alone maintain it, since it does not respond to the need for work of pacification that we have undertaken in Cilicia, which has now envisaged the creation of a battalion of Foreign Legionnaires recruited among the Turks and Kurds for this purpose".⁴⁸

The French army finally felt so dishonored by what the Armenian Legion had been doing to Turkish civilians in Cilicia that, starting in late February 1919, it tried to send the Legionnaires away to guard railroad lines in the middle of the Anatolian and Syrian deserts.⁴⁹ The Armenian Legionnaires, however, refused to obey the orders, stating that they had joined the Legion only to attack Turks and would not accept any assignment that would prevent them from doing so. Many of them simply left their French commanders, deserted their units, came together in rebel groups based at Adana, Mersin, Maraş and Hamidiye, and continued to ravage Turkish villages in the vicinity.⁵⁰ Finally, on 10 January 1920, the Cyprus support camp

⁴⁷ High Commissioners meeting of 27 November 1919: FO 371/4156/510/165711.

⁴⁸ D. M., no. 10. 394-9/11 from l'Etat Major d'Armée, 17 December 1919. Carton 5, Légion d'Orient AG, Chateau de Vincennes, Paris; cited in AFL I, p. 127.

⁴⁹ Order of the 21st Corps, no. G-35/11/72 of 19 March 1919. Carton 5 Légion d'Orient, AG, Chateau de Vincennes. Cited in: AFL I, p. 125; Kasım Ener, *Çukurova'nın İşgali ve Kurtuluş Savaşı*, İstanbul, Berksoy Matbaası, 1963, p. 18.

⁵⁰ Engert (Beirut) to Secretary of State, 20 February 1920, in State Department Decimal File 867/1122; Bristol to Secretary of State, İstanbul, 4 March 1920, in State

was ordered closed. Later the same year, on 1 August 1920, the definitive order was issued to disband the Armenian Legion once and for all.

"The Legion had too many dangerous men in it; it was necessary to proceed with amputations. The Fourth Battalion was entirely disarmed, its men were examined and classified in three categories: those who had to be tried by a Council of War—some fifty men; those who would be restored and sent to one of the three other battalions and then rearmed—about 400 men; and the others, about 400 more, who were grouped into a depot company, disarmed, and sent back to Port Said."⁵¹

"These orders and counter orders, which ended with a veritable putting into quarantine of the battalions of the Armenian Legion, did nothing for their morale, desertions multiplied. On 7 May 1919, 17 Legionnaires, including four sub-officers, of the Air Battalion (2nd Battalion) deserted with their arms and baggages after having sent a petition to the English commander to ask for his protection. They left also a letter to their officers: 'We were all engaged...to save our Country and personally avenge our relatives...and having suffered for two years in military life, we understand that you are associated with the Turkish tyrants who profaned, not long before, our mothers and our sisters, to appropriate our land for yourself. Well, enough, goodbye, in place of serving your imperialist politics, we prefer to free with our own hands our mothers and our sisters who call us to help them....' They were caught on 10 May 1919, after four hours of combat".⁵²

The demobilized Armenian soldiers, however, continued their widespread despoiling of Turkish villages, killing hundreds of Turks and eliciting numerous requests from all sides that something be done to get rid of them.⁵³ American High

Department Decimal File 867/1130-1131; Wenn (İstanbul) to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, İstanbul, 27 March 1919: FO 371/3658/no. 58433; McCarthy, *Death and Exile*, pp. 207, 243; *Les Armées françaises au Levant*, p. 120.

⁵¹ Troupes Françaises de Cilicie to Ministère de la Guerre, no. 331/G of 4 March 1919. Carton 5 Légion d'Orient, AG, Chateau de Vincennes, Paris; AFL I, pp. 124-125; Zeidner, *Tricolor*, pp. 159-160.

⁵² Troupes Françaises de Cilicie to Troupes Françaises du Levant, no. 23 of 14 May 1919 and various documents. Carton 4 C 2, AG, Chateau de Vincennes; AFL I, p. 126.

⁵³ Emniyet-i Umumiye (İstanbul Dahiliye) to District Governor of Kayseri, 21 Cemazi II 1337/24 March 1919: BBA DH/ŞFR, dosya 97, doc. 257; General Hamelin to Ministère de la Guerre, no. 658/G of 14 May 1919. Carton 5 Légion d'Orient, and Ministère de la

Commissioner Mark Bristol reported that his sources told him that all the anarchy and killings going on in Cilicia were due to the French treatment of the Turks as uncivilized colonials and the French mistake in arming and supporting the Armenians:

"A new condition has arisen in Turkey by reason of the French occupation of Syria and Cilicia. This condition is similar to the one that was caused by the Greek occupation of Smyrna. The use by the French of Armenian soldiers and the arming of Armenians brought about an uprising of the local population and assistance being sent by the Turks from the Nationalist forces. In ports of Syria where the French were popular they created antagonism by their tactless method of occupying the country as conquerors and replacing the native flags with French flags, also by assuming all governmental functions.

"Likewise hostile Christian opposition on the part of the Turks, Kurds and Arabs was shown to the French forces. It is reported that the French destroyed villages, outraged women, and killed the natives, and the result has been that a state of war now existing in Cilicia and the French are compelled to retire from Ourfa and Marash. It is reported that the Turks have retaliated by killing the native Armenians and destroying villages, however it is understood that the Armenians left behind by French at Marash are held as prisoners and are not otherwise being molested.

"It is known that American citizens in Aintab, Ourfa and Marash are safe and are not being molested and American property is being respected. However, there is apprehension that these conditions may not continue especially if the French proceed to reoccupy the country. The question of withdrawing our citizens is being seriously considered but difficulties of travelling at this season of the year must be considered. Proper representations have been made to the Turkish Government and the French High Commissioner here. Consultation with the British high authorities reveals they are apprehensive regarding the present condition in Turkey. England has citizens in the French zone of occupation, and I am cooperating with English as regards removal of citizens".

Guerre (Paris) to Troupes Françaises du Levant, no. 4665-9/II of 17 May 1919. Carton 5, Légion d'Orient, AG, Chateau de Vincennes, Paris; *Les Armées françaises au Levant* I, p. 127.

The poison, which the Legion planted, thus remained long after its abolition. Brémont at one point organized a new Armenian militia in eastern Anatolia under the command of John Aram Shishmanian, an Armenian-American officer in the French Foreign Legion, and other veterans of Antranik's guerilla forces, which, though nominally supposed to maintain security and order on behalf of the French administration, continued the Legion's attacks on Muslims in the area, with disastrous consequences.⁵⁴ As a result, no hope remained that the Turks of Cilicia would accept French rule or the presence of Armenian neighbors under any conditions.⁵⁵ Instead, the entire Turkish population now became involved in developing resistance forces. British intelligence thus reported that Kemalist influences were spreading rapidly among the Turks of the south-east, though erroneously assuming that this was the result solely of nationalist 'propaganda' rather than what it was, popular reaction to the abuses inflicted on them by the occupation forces:

"The propaganda of Mustapha Kemal has gained him a number of partisans amongst the Moslems, and his agents are becoming more numerous in the vilayet of Adana. The Chief Administrator considers that the internment of these agents would be the only effective way of stopping the propaganda. News of events in Anatolia is being brought through newspapers smuggled into Cilicia, and this, together with the fall of Damad Ferid's Govt. is helping to keep the Moslems in a state of excitement. The Turks especially are much encouraged and hope that the National movement will save Cilicia from Allied occupation and restore it to the Ottoman Empire. The state of public security is bad. Acts of brigandage are frequent, and the inhabitants of villages are becoming terrorized and show a tendency to migrate towards the towns. Brigands are using the Islamic and National movements as an excuse for crime, making out that they are waiting armed in the mountains ready to support the Cause and that they require money and provisions in order to live. To this end they are sending letters to the richest inhabitants threatening to raid

⁵⁴ Zeidner, *Tricolor*, pp. 215-216, 292-293.

⁵⁵ Order issued on 15 August 1920 to take effect on 1 September 1920. Instruction 1e Division, no. 6062/1 of 15 August 1920. Carton 5 Légion d'Orient, AG, Chateau de Vincennes, Paris; cited in: *Les Armées françaises au Levant* I, p. 128. See also du Véou, p. 44.

them unless certain specified amounts of money, live stock or grain are forthcoming...."⁵⁶

By the summer of 1921, the mounting resistance of the Muslims of Cilicia, combined with resentment over the British tendency to dominate the Allied occupation of İstanbul, finally convinced the French Government to abandon its Allies and make a separate peace with the Turkish nationalists, whose victory over the invading Greek army at the Battle of the Sakarya made it clear that it was with them, rather than with the decadent and powerless government of the Sultan in İstanbul, that they would have to deal if they wanted to retain any sort of economic and political influence in the new Turkey that was emerging from the war. The result was the Treaty of Ankara signed between the Ankara Government and France in October 1921, by which the French agreed, not only to evacuate their forces from Cilicia, but also to leave their armaments and even their uniforms for use by the new Turkish national army being built up against the Greeks on the western front under the leadership of İsmet İnönü.

The Turks of İskenderun and Aleppo were disappointed by the Treaty's provisions that left them under French rule in Syria, but they at least were finally incorporated into the Turkish Republic in 1939. The real losers were in fact the Armenians in Cilicia, since by their welcome of the French occupation, their support of the Armenian Legion, and their participation in the rigorous French administration, they had ended whatever feelings of community that previously had existed with their Turkish neighbors and laid themselves open to violent acts of retribution. As soon as they heard the news of the Treaty of Ankara and the consequent French evacuation, therefore, most Armenians in Cilicia were terrified, and rightfully so. However much both the French and the Turkish nationalists promised to protect them, the Armenians knew that under the conditions that existed in that area at that time they had little chance to escape the vengeance of those Turks who had lost families, homes, and properties as a result of the French occupation and the activities of the Armenian Legion. Almost all the Armenians in Cilicia therefore did the only thing they could do

⁵⁶ "Precis of a Report by the Chief Administrator on the situation in Cilicia during the first week of October 1919", Enclosed in Director of Military Intelligence to Foreign Office B. I/6862 (M. I. 2), 22 November 1919: FO 371/4185/154797: Şimşir, *British Documents on Atatürk I*, pp. 227-228.

under the circumstances. They began to pack up and leave their homes, some going with the evacuating French forces, some sailing on British and French ships that came to the ports of the area to pick them up, some walking overland into Syria, Palestine and Lebanon, where they settled down and made new lives for themselves.⁵⁷ In this, they were encouraged to depart by Armenian nationalist agents who hoped that by doing so they would shame the French, or if not them the Americans and British, to send in new troops which would enable them to establish an entirely Armenian state throughout Cilicia. Thus, when Avetis Aharonian and Gabriel Noradounghian went to French Premier Aristide Briand to complain about the French withdrawal, Briand was the one who complained:

"I ordered an examination and I regret to tell you that, according to my information, the exodus of Armenian population from Cilicia is the result largely of the zealous propaganda which unknown individuals and Gomidehs [Komitacis] have made on the spot. For what earthly reason I do not know. But this propaganda is doubly embarrassing for France. On the one hand, the Armenians are fleeing from Cilicia, a fact that discredits France for having failed to give refugee Armenians the needed protection, and on the other hand the refugees have found no other protector outside of France, and once again we have been forced to care for their needs. Now I ask you, how long shall this abnormal situation continue to last....The Turks have not harmed them; they have kept their promise. What was the need of this wholesale exodus?"⁵⁸

Noradounghian first denied that any such encouragements were taking place:

"I do not think that the people are fleeing as the result of the propaganda. There is a general panic about Turkish rule....I don't know who are the Armenians and what propaganda they

⁵⁷ *Les Armées françaises au Levant* II, p. 302. The files of hundreds of Armenian petitions and pleas to the French not to leave, or to take them with, are found in the AG (Chateau de Vincennes), carton 16 C 2 and *passim*. One of these was my colleague at Harvard University and at the University of California, Los Angeles for many years, Professor Avedis Sanjian, who went from his birthplace in Maraş (now Kahramanmaraş) to Jerusalem and Beirut, and from there to the United States.

⁵⁸ 7 December 1921. Avetis Aharonian, "From Sardarapat to Sèvres and Lausanne", *The Armenian Review*, XVIII/1-69 (Spring, 1965), p. 60.

have made. But it is not difficult to intervene and stop such deeds, and we shall do that very thing...."

Aharonian, however, correctly attributed the exodus to fear of Turkish retribution for the excesses that had gone on during the previous two years:

"I am not in the least surprised if any intelligent individual, intellectual or leader or Gomideh may have advised the Armenian population to flee with your retiring soldiers. I see no malice or any ulterior motives in such an act except the highly intelligible and understandable motive of a wish to escape the sword of the Turks. You must realize, Mr. President, that Turkish rule in Cilicia means the rule of the Grand National Assembly of Ankara, in which are seated the most notorious authors of the massacres of Van, Moush, Erzeroum and Bitlis. The Armenians know that fact well. And who is the well advised and concerned Armenian who, upon an appeal by the father of a family or a poor mother with her children, whether they should remain behind or flee, will have the courage of advising them to remain behind and await the sword of the Turk? This is no provocation, Mr. President, but a simple humanitarian concern...."⁵⁹

American High Commissioner Mark Bristol described the panic:

"One of the effects of the Franco-Turkish pact, recently signed at Angora, has been the throwing into a condition of panic of the Christian part of the population of Cilicia. This is to be turned over to the Turkish Nationalists within a period of two months. Many of these Christians have very closely affiliated themselves with the French against the Turks in many instances, having even gone to the point of bearing arms against the Turks. They fear if they remain in Cilicia they will have revenge in a violent form inflicted on them. However, it would seem the part of wisdom for most of these Christians to remain where they are rather than rushing off into other parts of the world where the difficulty of earning a living will no doubt be very great. It seems a very bad precedent in view of the some two or three million Christians in Anatolia, where no doubt Turkish rule will ultimately be recognized in full force. From private letters from American relief workers at Ismidt it

⁵⁹ 9 December 1921: Aharonian, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

was feared that Americans and Christians generally, in that area, might be in danger, but from an investigation made by the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S.C. no. 96, it appears that there is no visible reason for fears on this score. The government is conducting itself in an orderly and proper manner, and the feeling towards Americans seems very good".⁶⁰

In October 1921, Armenian merchants throughout Cilicia stopped all orders for new merchandise and shipped their stocks toward the coast to be transported to Syria or Lebanon. The Armenian Catholicos of Cilicia sent a telegram to the Patriarchate as well as the High Commissioners in İstanbul informing them that all his people wanted to emigrate from Cilicia *en masse* and asking that the necessary boats be sent to Mersin to carry them into exile. In November Armenian banks and business houses throughout Cilicia were liquidated. The College of Jesuits and the School of the Sisters of Saint Joseph sent their students together to İskenderun. Between November 13 and 22, some 12,000 Armenians embarked at Mersin alone. For the moment the major problem was at İskenderun, where thousands of Armenians arrived from Mersin with absolutely nothing except what they wore and could carry. They had to be fed and clothed by a French administration that hardly could take care of itself. The confusion and suffering were immense.⁶¹ Almost all the Armenians were bitterly unhappy with France in particular, claiming that it had promised to establish an Armenian state for them in Cilicia and had reneged on a solemn obligation to Christians. Telegrams of protest were sent to the League of Nations, the International Red Cross, to the French, to the British Government, in many cases demanding the establishment of a British mandate in Cilicia in place of the French and the mounting of a full-scale expedition to drive the Turks out.⁶²

On 6 November 1921, Hamid Bey, previously Kemalist governor of Samsun and later of Trabzon, and more recently Counselor to the Ministry of the Interior, was assigned by Mustafa Kemâl as Cilicia High Commissioner (literally as Assistant to the Governor/*Vali Vekili*), and later as Governor, to arrange military,

⁶⁰ Report of Operations for Week ending 20th November 1921, Commander U. S. Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters (United States High Commissioner): USDS Decimal File 867. 00/1456.

⁶¹ *Les Armées françaises au Levant* II, pp. 303, 408-409; AG, carton 16 C 2.

⁶² *Les Armées françaises au Levant* II, p. 408; du Véou, *La Passion de la Cilicie*, p. 355.

civilian and political matters arising there as a result of the Treaty of Ankara.⁶³ Arriving in Adana two weeks later, he traveled around to the major cities in Cilicia along with Muhiddin Paşa, special military commander for the Adana area, Franklin-Bouillon, French officials from Syria, and Armenian religious leaders, inaugurating the new Turkish regime amidst celebrations and sacrifices and speaking to Armenian groups in particular in an effort to calm their fears and assure them that the Turkish army would protect them.⁶⁴ Proclamations were issued to assure everyone that their rights would be protected:

"PROCLAMATION: INHABITANTS OF CILICIA

"France and the Ankara Government, desiring to restore peace in the East, have just concluded an agreement. France, respecting the rights of the majority, has spontaneously returned Cilicia to Turkey.

"France and the Ankara Government, equally desirous to have the rights of minorities respected, have decreed a series of guarantees in the Ankara Treaty. But even before these guarantees were published, a methodical campaign was organized by the enemies of peace to throw the Christian populations into alarm and force them to leave Cilicia. Thousands of families have thus been snatched from their homes and thrown onto the roads to exile and misery. Both governments, profoundly moved by this spectacle, have resolved to make a new effort to reassure the populations and destroy the effect of this detestable campaign of agitation.

⁶³ Cumhuriyet Arşivi (Ankara), ABK Kararname 1160, 6 November 1921: CA (Ankara) 8791, Dahiliye Kutu 3/dosya 35/no. 11. Hamid Bey was appointed Governor of Adana for this purpose on 1 January 1922, but left the position on 10 May 1922, after his task of smoothing over the transition to Turkish Government was completed: ABK Kararname 1296, 8 January 1922: Cumhuriyet Arşivi (Ankara) 8825, Dahiliye Kutu 4/dosya 43/no. 11; ABK Kararname 1591, 10 May 1922: CA (Ankara) 8885, Dahiliye Kutu 5/dosya 16/no. 7.

⁶⁴ 22 November 1921. Letter from Sis Catholicos in İskenderun to Armenian National Delegation in Paris, dated 29 November 1921: Kasım Ener, *Çukurova'nın İşgali*, pp. 284-287; AFL II., 304; Yusuf Ayhan, *Mustafa Kemal'in Pozantı Kongresi ve Adana'nın Kurtuluşu*, Adana, İpek Matbaası, 1963, p. 133; *Yenigün*, 25, 29, 30 November, 1 December 1921; HM, 1 December 1921; *Tercümanı Hakikat*, 23 November 1921; *Akşam*, 15 December 1921.

"CHRISTIANS OF CILICIA

"They have said to you that the amnesty will not be carried out: That is false. The amnesty is total and immediate. The past is dead and forgotten. No one, absolutely no one, can be disturbed. They have said to you that you will never be able to move freely; that is false. The Agreement assures you complete liberty of your persons as well as respect for your property. You have all already received passports from the French authorities; the Government of Ankara will respect them absolutely. They have said to you that the law will requisition from you immediately 40 percent of your goods; that is false. This law of requisitions, applied during the Sakarya campaign, has now been abrogated, and no longer exists.

"They have said to you that you will be immediately enrolled [in the army]; that is false. The Turkish authorities have taken the necessary measures to assure that conscription will be applied only three months after the French occupation ends, which will be 4 January 1922. And we can hope that general peace will be established before the end of that time. Moreover, the Agreement stipulates for you all the guarantees assured to minorities in the countries of Europe by virtue of treaties concluded by the Great Powers after the Great War. Both governments are honor bound to make their guarantees respected. Their word is better than that of the agitators who are trying to get you to flee today, and will abandon you tomorrow after ruining you and more families.

"From this time forward, a Franco-Turkish commission, on which are represented all your communities, has been formed to guard abandoned property. All acts of pillage will be pitilessly repressed. Muslims and Christians must equally respect the law. And now, reflect; restore your calm, return to the homes that await you. Liberty and Justice are assured to all".

Adana, 30 November 1921.

M. Franklin-Bouillon Mouheddine Pacha Hamid Bey.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Proclamation to the People of Adana, 30 November 1921; Ayhan, *Adana'nın Kurtuluşu*, p. 134; Yusuf Ayhan, *Adana'nın İstiklâl Beyannamesi*, Adana, Kemâl Matbaası, 1970, p. 14; P. Knabenshue, Consul in Charge, American Consulate General, Beirut, Syria, 6 January 1922: United States Department of State Decimal File 867. 00/1474; Roger de

Gabriel Noradounghian, an Ottoman Armenian who, like hundreds of other Armenians, had risen high in the Ottoman Foreign Service during the previous quarter-century, and who had actually served as Ottoman Foreign Minister for six months in 1912-1913, joined Avedis Aharonian in going to England and France in demanding that France renounce the Treaty of Ankara and end its evacuation of the area in order to prevent the massacres which he insisted were certain to come.

On 19 November 1921 Noradounghian told Lord Curzon:

"The people of Cilicia fought in the ranks of the Allied armies for the liberation of that country and 150,000 Armenians, relying on the word of the Allies, have returned and settled in Cilicia. To turn this people over to the Turks once again means to subject them to massacre. The Franco-Turkish pact in the East will only serve the diminution of Allied prestige and the encouragement of the Turks. If France has financial difficulties, is it not possible to extend her some sort of aid and thus rescue those 150,000 Armenians? To trust the word of the Turks is out of the question. I know them at close hand, the so-called Kemalists, in particular, are the worst sort of bandits, friends of the Bolsheviks, Pan Islamists, and Pan Turanians. Its too bad that France set aside the legal Sultanist Government of Istanbul and aligned herself with those bandits. This unilateral arrangement of the Cilician question is disastrous for the Armenian people from all standpoints. WE INSIST, AND SHALL INSIST ON THE TREATY OF SÈVRES. That must not become a scrap of paper....

"...[T]he issue before the Supreme Council no longer is the safety of the Armenian people, but an Armenian state on Turkish territories which has been promised us, and which in the future shall become the United Armenia together with Caucasian Armenia. The Supreme Council, Mr. President, defined our boundaries for us without our prior consent. Then it found a mediator-arbitrator in the person of the President of the United States, again without consulting us. And finally it drafted a whole treaty whereby we were given our independence as a state, and invited us to sign the document. We signed it without objection and we accepted all that the great powers

Gontaut-Biron et Révérend L., *D'Angora à Lausanne*, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1924, p. 216 (my translation from French).

and our allies dictated to us. And now, in our conviction, it is not the safety of the Armenian people with which the Supreme Council shall concern itself, but with the security of the establishment of an Armenian state. Even as you said that it was on the basis of the Sèvres Treaty that France surrendered Cilicia to Turkey, so on the same basis we expect that France shall endeavor to return to us by peaceful means our territories which have been seized by Turkey...."⁶⁶

On 23 November 1921, Noradounghian told French Premier Aristide Briand that the Kemalists were all murderers and that the Armenians could never trust them or live under their rule:

"It must be stated that the situation in Cilicia has so terrified our people that we are swarmed with telegrams from all sides. We are pained to note that France has signed a pact with the National Assembly at Ankara, which is nothing but a collection of criminals. I know the greater part of them personally. Many of them have gone through under my hand during my twenty-five years of office in the Turkish government. I can confidently state that with rare exceptions, they are all Pan-Islamists, Pan-Turanists, and more especially, xenophobe criminals who know no sanctities. Our people could not imagine that they ever should be turned over to that assassin government. This is a terrible disaster because these men are morally bankrupt and time and again have been proclaimed as such, and to believe their word is impossible, especially since these men were never brought to justice for their crimes, but they were befriended and encouraged. Last March, Bekir Sami came to London with a delegation three of whose members are notorious authors of the massacres....How was it possible that these men could be invited to tea with Lloyd George and others? This fact pierced the Armenians to the heart. Then what shall we say of the solemn declaration of the powers that these criminals would be held accountable for the Armenian massacres? Where is the punishment? And now, after all this, Franklin-Bouillon proposes to trust the word of these criminals. We cannot do this thing, Mr. President. Ankara's promises are nothing but a sham and a deceit, and the Armenian people are bound to

⁶⁶ Aharonian, "Sardarapat to Lausanne", *The Armenian Review*, XVII/4-68 (Winter, 1964), pp. 49-50, 55; quoted partially in Marshlian, *The Armenian Question* I, pp. 313-314, 317.

suffer terribly if we put faith in their word. If they do not stage outright massacres, they know a thousand and one ways of exterminating the Armenians. They all have been educated in the spirit of Abdul Hamid, whereas the world knows that cruel Sultan's education and his spirit were abominable...."⁶⁷

While expressing sympathy, Briand responded simply that France had no other choice since it had been defeated in Cilicia and could not continue pouring its men and wealth into such a losing morass:

"But you also must consider, Gentlemen, that we were forced to sign this agreement. You are familiar with the troubles of France. Our resources do not permit us to keep such a costly army in the East. In our conditions, no parliament will vote such a military budget. We nevertheless waited until the last try was attempted. To wait longer, believe me, is impossible. It is beyond our power. We suffered thousands of casualties in Cilicia and we expended millions. We waited for the Greek invasion, hoping that it would bring a solution to the problem so that we could evacuate our troops. But we saw that the Turks pushed them back and it is highly probable that, in the spring, they will drive them off also from Smyrna. Now when the Turks are through with the Greeks, it is certain that they will turn their arms against us while we neither have the desire, the means nor the possibility of fighting the Turk. Our country will never accept such a war, it does not understand, it does not want it. What can we do under the circumstances but to make peace with the Turk as soon as possible and evacuate our troops from Cilicia and, according to the Sèvres Treaty after all, we are obliged to return Cilicia to them. As to the safety of the Armenians, please believe me that we already have taken the necessary measures; our officers are there to supervise the enforcement of security measures. You have already seen that, at the first instance, the Christians will be exempted from military service. This is a good sign. There will be others, believe me, and finally it must be presumed that the Turks are not fools enough to organize massacres under the present circumstances and destroy their cause completely by raising the whole of Europe against them. No, they won't do that at present. And it is problematic if they shall ever do it in the

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 52; quoted partially in Marashlian, *The Armenian Question* I, pp. 314-315.

future. But we have plenty of time for that. Soon the Supreme Council shall convene and I promise that I shall take this matter there and shall ensure, once and forever the safety of Christians. I told you that we could not wait any longer. France has many troubles."⁶⁸

Since the people who remained in the cities of Cilicia, particularly in Gaziantep, were still living amidst the ruins left by the various French sieges and bombardments, the Grand National Assembly provided them, and all those living in districts rescued from enemy occupation, with special financial assistance and free lumber to rebuild their homes and shops as well as two year tax exemptions to help them get back on their feet.⁶⁹ As promised in the Treaty of Ankara, moreover, on 5 December 1921, the Grand National Assembly issued a general amnesty for all those accused of 'treason against the nation' for all of Anatolia, including Cilicia, thus excusing Muslims and Christians alike for any misdeeds they may have carried out during the French occupation while assuring all that they would be treated fairly and equally regardless of religion or race and urging them to remain calm and not to flee.⁷⁰ At the same time, in an effort to keep the Armenians from leaving, Mustafa Kemâl sent a similar proclamation from Ankara on 5 December 1921:

"PROCLAMATION:

"By virtue of the agreement that has just been concluded with France, our authorities are returning to Adana, which has been an integral part of our country for centuries, but which was militarily occupied after the end of the Great War. We thank God who has permitted the *Vilâyet* of Adana and other regions of our territory to be returned to the Mother Country. I am happy in the name of the Grand National Assembly to greet the populations of these territories at their return to the mother womb. I hope that the entire world will end by recognizing and approving the pacific intentions of our nation and of the Grand

⁶⁸ Aharonian, "From Sardarapat to Sèvres and Lausanne", *op. cit.*, p. 53.

⁶⁹ Cumhuriyet Arşivi (Ankara), ABK Kanun 161, 18 October 1921: *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi* XIII, pp. 252-261, XIV, pp. 1-5, 12-16; *Düstur*, III/2, pp. 177-178; Kanun 169, 8 December 1921: *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, XV, pp. 17-23, 53, 69-70; *Düstur*, III/2, p. 189.

⁷⁰ Kanun no. 168, 5 December 1921. Introduced on 3 November 1921, debated and passed on 5 December 1921: *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, XIV, pp. 423-443, XV, pp. 16-21, 155; *Düstur*, III/2 (1929) pp. 188, 192; *Yenigün*, HM. 6, 20 December 1921, *Vakit*, 7, 8 December 1921; Ayhan, *Adana'nın Kurtuluşu*, p. 142.

National Assembly of Turkey which has been always conscious of the benefits of peace and which desires only recognition of the nations rights to a life of independence, the most natural and elementary right of every nation; and I must thank there the French nation and government who have accepted this point of view.

"The inhabitants of the regions of Adana, Urfa and Antep, who have undergone misfortunes and sadness during the great war, will once again find calm and tranquility resulting naturally from the development and prosperity of the country, but it appears from certain events that bad intentioned people, envying the success of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, are perhaps trying to spread agitation and discord among the populations by spreading rumors, as when General Gouraud said in a proclamation that our action in these regions against our fellow citizens would be contrary to the sentiments of fraternity and that we have already committed reprehensible acts. I wish to answer with a few words on this subject, speaking before the civilized world and humanity. The different elements of Turkey have lived fraternally for centuries in sentiments, which suit the children of the same country, they are united among themselves by the strongest bonds of common interests, and they are tied to this country by dear memories. We cannot hide that in the last years malevolent people and deplorable facts have been produced as the result of the acts of certain agitators who have not judged calm and tranquility in the country to be beneficial to their interests. A full and complete amnesty has just been proclaimed to wipe out all these incidents....The Government wants to make disappear by this measure all the causes which could enable the malcontents to continue to influence the children of this country. There are other duties that fall on the populations, and I speak to all without distinction of race or religion to recall their duties in a few words. The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is a democratic government; the nation and the government cooperate closely in all questions that interest the country. It is therefore useless to explain to us the need for calm and tranquility needed by our country, and it is necessary to deny by deeds the malevolent rumors thrown out by our enemies. It is necessary to affirm and prove that we are the children of a free nation. You have the duty of helping

the Government and to place the interests of the country before personal interests. I am convinced that a people that has shown itself capable of keeping its calm and dignity in the fact of the considerable events and extraordinary incidents can continue to realize the necessity of reciprocal affection in the entire nation without distinction of race or religion. No act of the people can be contrary to reason or logic. I wish to declare here that the Government of the Grand National Assembly will take measures against all those who put the great interests of the nation beneath their own. Rigorous measures will be taken against those who try to avoid the legal paths. I wish to give the following advice to officials; the fate of the territories, which are returning to the Mother Country at the price of great sacrifices, is in your hands. Benefit and prosperity of all people before the law is necessary. All have the same duties regardless of race and distinction. Think always that the extent of your responsibility is in proportion of the greatness and importance of your duties. Give equal justice to all regardless of race or religion. Turn over to the rigor of the law all those who violate them by harming order and tranquility. Do not forget to use all your efforts to establish order and security everywhere and make sure the sovereignty of the laws based on the policies of the Government are respected. In concluding I wish grandeur and prosperity to the nation and prosperity to its populations. 5 December 1337 (1921)

President of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Mustafa Kemâl".⁷¹

As the Turkish nationalist forces replaced the French there was in fact no organized persecution, no general Turkish retaliation, as reported by the American naval detachment patrolling in the area, which was closely monitoring the situation: "The destroyer stationed at Mersina reports that the Turks have that area well in hand and that the lives of Christians are in no danger....The

⁷¹ Ayhan, *Adana'nın İstiklâl Beyannamesi*, pp. 25-27; Ayhan, *Adana'nın Kurtuluşu*, p. 136; Enclosed in P. Knabenshue, Consul in Charge, American Consulate General, Beirut, Syria, 6 January 1922. United States Department of State Decimal File 867. 00/1474 (my translation from the Turkish and French).

destroyers dispatched to Batoum and Novorossisk report that they were cordially received...."⁷²

The waves of mistrust were in any case far too deep, however, for these assurances to have any significant effect. Even if some Armenians believed the promises, they hated the Turks so much that they did not want to live under Turkish rule even if they were protected. The panic therefore continued, stimulated more by fear than fact, as reported by the Chief of the American Mediterranean fleet cruising in the area at the time, Admiral Niblack:

"The withdrawal of the French from Cilicia, in accordance with the Franco-Turkish pact recently signed at Angora, has resulted in a partial evacuation of Christians from Cilicia. Many of the Christians had been closely affiliated with the French even to the extent of bearing arms against the Turks, and they therefore feared some terrible form of punishment from the Turks. In connection with this disturbance, and for the protection of American interests, Read Admiral Bristol has maintained a destroyer at Mersina. His advice to American and other Christian populations in Cilicia appears to have been to remain where they were until the Turks gave some causes to justify their evacuation. He seems to have sized up the situation very accurately, as nothing of consequence has occurred. The evacuation seems to have been based on fear rather than fact".⁷³

An official of the Vacuum Oil Company touring Cilicia during this time as part of a general American effort to find business in the new Turkey, R.S. Stewart reported to the American Consul General in Beirut on what was happening, not only the panic and distrust that was prevalent, but also the almost complete standstill of normal business activity:

"The effect upon the Christian population of the French withdrawal has been sensational in the extreme. Since the first announcement of the Bouillon agreement, emigration has been proceeding through the port of Mersina on a vast scale. Estimates of the number of inhabitants who have left in this

⁷² Report of operations for week ending 22 January 1922. Commander, U. S. Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters (United States High Commissioner). United States Department of State Decimal File 867. 00/1487.

⁷³ Admiral Niblack, Commander U. S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters to Chief of Naval Operations, Pola, Italy, 10 December 1921. USDS Decimal File 867. 00/1470.

manner range between 40,000 and 60,000; made up in the main of the Armenian population of Adana, Tarsus and Mersina. The impelling motive in the instance of the Armenians is, of course, absolute distrust of Turkish intentions in their regard. Hellene Greeks cannot remain on account of the actual state of war between their country and the Kemalists; while in addition many Ottoman Greeks and native Christians have emigrated under the influence of the undoubted general panic. More significant still, all British subjects have been warned by their Government to withdraw before the completion of the evacuation. This latter circumstance is plainly proving a source of decided uneasiness to both Turks and French, the feeling being heightened by the presence of British war vessels at Mersina.

"Commercial. Aside from a certain amount of superficial activity attributable to extensive liquidation and to the movement of essential commodities, trade and industry are temporarily at a standstill. While this condition would be natural enough in any country under similar circumstances, it is intensified in Cilicia by the fact that the machinery of commerce has long been almost entirely in the hands of the very Christian element, which is now in such a state of demoralization. Amongst those of this class who have not already severed their connections with Cilicia, the feeling of uncertainty alone regarding future taxes, possible levies, etc. is at present highly discouraging to any business activity. The crafts also have suffered greatly owing to the wholesale exodus of Christian workmen. Prohibition of the export of gold, and the consequent brisk demand for foreign exchange on the part of the thousands of emigrants, have brot (*sic*) about the depreciation of Turkish gold to a point about ten percent below its value in Syria and Egypt. Turkish paper is on the decline as well, and the whole exchange situation is decidedly unstable. Finally, trade prospects in general are adversely affected by the impossibility of foreseeing what Cilicia's outside relations will be as the result of the change of administration.

"Moral. The psychological reaction to the situation varies according to race and belief, and is highly dramatic. Official proclamations issued jointly by the French and the Turks have done little to inspire general confidence. The hereditary fear under which the Armenian labors is intensified by the

consciousness of having recently indulged in a certain amount of retaliation. Christians in general, while less impressed with the possibility of wholesale massacre, experience a sense of betrayal. All expectation of eventual release from Turkish mastery being decisively cut off, they appear to feel that continued stay in Cilicia offers no attractions. Perhaps the worse fear is that of conscription, or its possible alternative of heavy exemption payments. The Turkish attitude is of course one of exultation, with insolence and an occasional hint of menace very thinly veiled indeed. The White Man's prestige is at the lowest ebb. This is keenly felt by the French officers, many of whom regard the Bouillon agreement as a rather low piece of political work, and highly discrediting to France. Very significant in this respect is the case of General Dufieux, later General Commanding in Cilicia, whose sentiments, and particularly his very apparent distrust of Kemalist assurances, led to his supersedure and practical disgrace....Afterward Mr Bouillon...stated that it was self evident that no public disorders which might result in damage to stocks need be feared, and that as far as Government action might be concerned, he could state positively that business interests would not be imposed upon. While unquestionably there would be new tax fixations, and while the belligerent status of the new Government might necessitate requisition of needful supplies, such requisitions would be made only against adequate reimbursement, as in the actual recent instance of the purchase for cash from the Asiatic Petroleum Company of 1000 cases benzene. Wholesale levies, such as the 40 percent imposition formerly practiced, would be discontinued definitely. Customs duty would be increased from 11 percent to 20 percent".⁷⁴

As the French evacuation began by road *via* the ports of Mersin and İskenderun starting on 4 November, the flight to Syria accelerated, consisting mostly of Armenians but also Greeks and Turks who had opposed the Turkish national movement and cooperated with the French. About 30,000 Armenians, Greeks and other Christians left the Adana district in November and December. Most went by ships that came to pick them up at

⁷⁴ R. S. Stewart, Vacuum Oil Company, to Paul Knabensue, U. S. Consulate General, Beirut, 19 December 1921. Enclosed in P. Knabensue to Secretary of State, 5 January 1922. United States Department of State Decimal File 867. 00/1475.

Mersin and by trains that went to Aleppo. By the end of December, French troops remained only in Mersin along with approximately 10,000 refugees and at Dörtöl, where 7,000 refugees still were gathered. All were evacuated from these two cities as well as from Kilis (7 December), Adana (20 December), Osmaniye (24 December), Antep (25 December), Tarsus (27 December), Mersin (3 January 1922), Dörtöl (4 January), and Adana (4 January), thus completing the evacuation in little less than three months from the time the Treaty of Ankara was signed.⁷⁵ According to French sources, between 1 November 1921 and 4 January 1922, approximately 54,000 Christians left Cilicia, of whom 31,000 settled in French-mandated Syria and Lebanon, and the remainder scattered to British protection in Palestine and Egypt and throughout the Mediterranean area.⁷⁶ By the end of 1923, the total number of Armenians who had left Cilicia are said to have numbered some 175,000, almost all those who had lived there before the war together with those who had emigrated from central Anatolia during 1919 and 1920.⁷⁷ On his return to Paris in late January 1922, General Gouraud reported to a special session held at the Sorbonne that "...overall the evacuation of Cilicia took place in perfect order, without violence, and without a single person being killed or even wounded".⁷⁸

Turkish forces and government officials entered the evacuated cities and towns amidst joyful popular demonstrations celebrating their liberation from the oppressive French occupation, not only in Cilicia, but throughout the entire country.⁷⁹ One of their first acts

⁷⁵ The exact chronology of the evacuation of each city in Çukurova is found in the Archives de la Guerre (Chateau de Vincennes) Carton 12 C 2, summarized in *Les Armées françaises au Levant* II, pp. 325, 409; Turkish accounts of the evacuation are found in *Türk İstiklâl Harbî*, IV, p. 292; T. C., Genelkurmay Harb Tarih Arşivi, ATASE, *Harp Mıntakaları, Şehir ve Kasabaların İşgâl, İstirdat ve Bombardıman Tarihleri*, Ankara, 1940, p. 86; and Ahmet Hulki Saral and Tosun Saral, *Vatan Nasıl Kurtarıldı*, Ankara, Türkiye İş Bankası, 1979, p. 368; On 1 January 1922, the Commander of the United States naval squadron that was sailing in the area reported that all the Armenians had left Cilicia except for about 8,000 that were still gathered in Mersin: "Report of operations for week ending 01 January 1922. By Commander U. S. Naval Detachment in Turkish Waters", United States Department of State Decimal File 867. 00/1478.

⁷⁶ Haut-Commissariat de la République Française en Syrie et au Liban en 1922, Paris, Larose, 1922, B. R. 6/18-1-1922 D27 C1.

⁷⁷ Anahide Ter Minassian, *La République d'Arménie*, Paris, Éditions Complexe, 1989, pp. 255-256.

⁷⁸ Sorbonne Conference held in Paris on 26 January 1922. Quoted in Gouraud, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

⁷⁹ TIH IV, 254-255; AFL II, p. 304.

was to declare invalid all property transfers which had been forced on local Turks and Jews by the French occupation authorities who had turned hundreds of houses and arms thus surrendered over to Armenians and Frenchmen at prices far below their market values.⁸⁰

Thus were the immediate effects of the French and Armenian occupation of south-eastern Anatolia alleviated, though for Turkish and Jewish families who had lost everything, this was small consolation indeed. It would take years of insistence by Mustafa Kemâl Atatürk that the people of the new Turkish Republic that emerged from the war should avoid continued hatreds resulting from past atrocities inflicted on them and their ancestors and seek friendship with all the people of the world, including those who had attacked them so viciously during and after World War I, that the Turks attempted to live in friendship with the other peoples of the area, though in many cases the Christian nationalists in particular, nurtured as they were by hatred and religious bigotry, left the Turks puzzled, unable to understand why their overtures of friendship had been briskly rejected while at the same time France as well as Greece have made no effort to pay to Turkey the billions of dollars they owe it for the terrible material and moral damage that their occupation troops inflicted on the country, uncalled-for damage, far beyond any sort of authorization they had been given by the Mondros Armistice Agreement or the Paris Peace Conference.

⁸⁰ Cumhuriyet Arşivi (Ankara), Ankara Bakanlar Kurulu Kararname 1462, 8 March 1922: CA (Ankara) 1856, Adliye Kutu 4/dosya 51/no. 18.

THE ARMENIAN QUESTION AT THE LAUSANNE PEACE TALKS

Ömer Turan

The roots of the Armenian question in the Ottoman Empire lie in the San Stefano and Berlin Treaties signed at the end of the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78.¹ Reforms open to speculation of various kinds and the "Armenian question" relating to issues regarding the control of these reforms became significant parts of the "Eastern question".

Throughout the 19th century the power of the Ottoman Empire steadily declined, and inciting uprisings to attract the attention of the major powers and, by gaining their support, win new rights became the principal course of action of separatist and nationalist elements during this period. Separatist Armenians used the same means, taking as their example the Bulgarian rebellion of 1876.² The revolutionary Hinchag and Dashnag committees organised sporadic uprisings,³ rebellions, assassinations and raids with the

¹ The Treaty of San Stefano, and the Berlin Treaty which replaced it, provided for reforms by the Ottoman Government in provinces with an Armenian population and notification of these reforms to the major powers which were signatories to the treaty, and for supervision of the implementation of these measures by the major powers. For the debate on reforms in favour of the non-Muslim population in Anatolia, to which the Armenian question was regarded as central, and details of reform programmes, see: Cevdet Küçük, *Osmanlı Diplomasisinde Ermeni Meselesinin Ortaya Çıkışı, 1878-1897*, İstanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1984.

² This uprising and events which occurred in the course of quelling it were the pretext for creating pro-Bulgarian and anti-Turkish feeling in Europe, and led to the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78 which came to create a Bulgarian state and brought an end to Ottoman rule in Rumelia. See: Ömer Turan, *The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria, 1878-1908*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1998.

³ One Armenian insurgent told Cyrus Hamlin, headmaster of Robert College in İstanbul: "The Hentchak bands would watch their opportunity to kill Turks and Koords, set fire to their villages and then make their escape into the mountains. The enraged Moslems will then rise, and fall upon the defenceless Armenians and slaughter them with such barbarity that Russia will enter in the name of humanity and Christian civilisation and take possession...We Armenians have determined to be free. Europe listened to the Bulgarian horrors and made Bulgaria free. She will listen to our cry when it goes up in the shrieks and blood of millions of women and children...We are desperate. We shall do

object of keeping the Armenian question on the agenda of the major powers and bringing about their intervention on the pretext of "supervising proposed reforms". When the Armenians collaborated with the Russians during the First World War, launching attacks on the Turkish army and civilians from behind the front and engaging in acts of sabotage, the Ottoman Government decided to relocate the Armenian population of eastern Anatolia to the southern provinces. Some incidents that took place during this relocation were, in later years, represented as genocide, and these allegations have been used from time to time against Turkey and the Turks.

Following the signing of the Armistice of Mudanya in the wake of the Turkish victory in the War of Independence, the Allied Powers invited the Turkish Government to a peace conference to be held in the Swiss city of Lausanne on 13 November 1922. As well as Britain, France, Italy and Turkey, the conference was attended by Japan, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece. The Soviet Union and Bulgaria sent representatives to discussions relating to the Turkish Straits. The United States of America attended as an observer.

The "Eastern question" was tackled in detail at the Lausanne Conference. Problems going back centuries were debated, and none of the parties gave up their positions without prolonged negotiations. The Allied Powers attempted to dictate conditions to Turkey at Lausanne as they had to the defeated countries at the end of the First World War. Although the conference was originally scheduled to begin on 13 November, since the Allies had not yet completed bargaining amongst themselves, the victorious parties postponed the conference for a week without consulting the Turks. This attitude prevailed in every aspect of the organisation, from the seating arrangement in the conference room to decisions concerning the speeches to be made at the opening session. İsmet Paşa (İnönü), the head of the Turkish Delegation, resisted all these attempts of psychological intimidation, acting as the representative of a state on equal terms in every way. At every opportunity he reminded the Allied delegates of the principle of equality between states and the need to respect it. When his British colleague Lord Curzon kept referring to the Armistice of Mondros during one of

it". William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902*, 2nd ed., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1956, pp. 157-158.

the debates, he declared, "I come here not from Mondros, but from Mudanya".⁴

The Lausanne Conference opened on 20 November 1922, with an inauguration speech by President Robert Haab of the Swiss Confederation. That morning, before the conference opened, the delegates of the three Allied Powers had met to discuss one another's demands. They agreed not to allow Turkey to chair any of the sessions.⁵ At the first session held the following day, the issues to be discussed were divided into three categories, for each of which a commission was formed. The first commission dealt with frontiers and military issues, the second with foreigners and minorities in Turkey, and the third with financial and economic affairs. It was decided that the chief delegates of Britain, France and Italy should chair the commissions. Turkey was represented at the first commission by İsmet Paşa, at the second by Rıza Nur, and at the third by Hasan Bey (Saka).

Turkey's most determined opponent at the conference was Britain. Despite the fact that the British had signed the Mudanya Armistice, they still felt it to be a slur on their pride to sit down to peace negotiations with the Turks.⁶ The Ankara Entente had been signed with France, taking the two countries halfway to peace, and Italy and Turkey had not fought at all. The Italians were not happy about the Greek occupation of western Anatolia. No serious disagreement was expected either with Japan and the Balkan states. It was under such conditions that Britain endeavoured to persuade the Allies to present a united front against Turkey.⁷ Turkey, meanwhile, hoped to get the other Allied Powers on its side in its confrontation with Britain. Lord Curzon, aware of this, parried every move on the part of the Allies that would undermine

⁴ İsmet İnönü, "Önsöz", *Lozan Barış Konferansı, Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, tr. Seha L. Meray, (hereafter *Lozan Tutanakları*) T. I, C. 1, K. 1, Ankara, A. Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1969, pp. v-ix. Ali Naci Karacan, *Lozan*, İstanbul, Milliyet Yayınları, 1971, pp. 77, 78-80, 186-200; Ali Fuad Erden, *İsmet İnönü*, İstanbul, Bilgi Yayınları, 1952, pp. 167-176.

⁵ Public Record Office, Foreign Office, (hereafter FO) 839/4.

⁶ Marian Kent, "Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1900-23", *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, ed., Marian Kent, London, Frank Cass, 1996, p. 193; for the Lausanne talks and Turkey's stance as reported by the British press, see: Mustafa Yılmaz, *British Opinion and the Lausanne Conference and Treaty*, Ankara, İnönü Vakfı, 1994.

⁷ *İngiliz Belgelerinde Lozan Barış Konferansı (1922-1923)*, (hereafter *İngiliz Belgelerinde*), Mim Kemâl Öke, ed., Vol. I, İstanbul, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1983, pp. 243-244, 246-247.

their joint opposition to Turkey. On 22 November, Lord Curzon held a meeting with Poincaré and Mussolini at which it was agreed that the Allies should present a unified front at the conference.⁸

When making their preparations for the conference, the Allies had already earmarked issues of priority importance for themselves and their expectations of the conference. Britain was most concerned with the Straits and Mosul,⁹ France with the capitulations, Italy with the Dodecanese Islands and its mandate,¹⁰ Japan,¹¹ (although not one of the decision-makers at the conference) and Rumania¹² were primarily interested in the Straits. Turkey, as chief delegate İsmet Paşa put it, was "obliged to make peace so long as no vital impediment stood in the way". The government's instructions to its delegation could be described as a slightly expanded form of the National Pact of 1920. This fourteen-article protocol absolutely rejected any discussion of an Armenian state on Turkish territory or on continuing the capitulations, declaring that Turkey would otherwise cut off negotiations if necessary.¹³

⁸ FO, 839/4, FO, 839/14. When in the days following Italy began to deviate from the agreed Allied stance in pursuit of its own interests, Lord Curzon met with Mussolini on 8 December, and threatened that if Italy did not follow the trilateral policy of the Alliance, France and Britain would see that Italy did not get what it wanted. FO 839/14. As the conference proceeded, unity between the Allies, which Britain was so concerned to preserve, deteriorated still further. Lord Curzon complained about this in a telegram dated 31 January, in which he said that not so much Ankara but Paris and Rome were his real enemies. See: **Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939**, W. N. Medlicott, Douglas Dakin, M. E. Lambert eds., Series I, Vol. XVIII, Greece and Turkey, September 3, 1922-July 24, 1923, London, HMSO, 1972, No. 357.

⁹ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, **Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri, 1919-1926**, Ankara, A. Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1978, pp. 257-259; for Britain's expectations and policy at Lausanne see: Michael Dockrill, "Lozan Konferansı ve İngiltere", **70. Yılında Lozan Barış Antlaşması Uluslararası Semineri**, (hereafter **70. Yılında Lozan**), Ankara, İnönü Vakfı, 1994, pp. 109-125.

¹⁰ For Italy's expectations and policies at Lausanne see: Maria Antonia di Casola, "İtalya ve 1923 Lozan Antlaşması", **70. Yılında Lozan**, pp. 15-23.

¹¹ Although Japan wished the capitulations to continue, it realised that this was impossible. Where the Armenian question was concerned, Japanese public opinion was sympathetic to Turkey. For Japan's attitude towards Turkey in the early 1920s and stance at the conference, see: Masami Arai, "Lozan Konferansı Karşısında Japonya'nın Tutumu", **70. Yılında Lozan**, pp. 127-134.

¹² Rumania regarded the Straits "which were the heart of Turkey as the lungs of Rumania", and was closely concerned with this issue. For Rumania's stance at Lausanne see: Mihai Maksim, "Romanya'nın Lozan Konferansı'ndaki Yeri", **70. Yılında Lozan**, pp. 45-51.

¹³ Bilâl Şimşir, ed., **Lozan Telgrafları**, Vol. I, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1990, p. xiv; for the speech by İsmet Paşa (İnönü), who was the head of the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne, on developments prior to Lausanne and the conference itself, see: İsmet

Before issues relating to the Armenians and minorities came up at the Lausanne Conference, the Allies were aware of Turkey's views on these subjects from press statements and bilateral talks. Rabbi Naum, who had previously met with İsmet Paşa, told a diplomat from the British Delegation on 25 November that the Turks regarded the Greeks of Turkey as irredentist, and wished to expel them, but believed that the Armenians should remain in Anatolia. They hoped to reach agreement on the subject with the Armenian representatives.¹⁴ At a meeting between İsmet Paşa and British delegate Sir W. Tyrell on 27 November, these Turkish views on minorities and the Armenians were explained to the British.¹⁵

The views of the Allies on the Armenian question, at the outset of the Lausanne Conference, were as follows: British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon had earlier penned the peace conditions, which after endorsement by Paris and Rome, would be proposed by the Allies for presentation to the Turkish Delegation. The first category of conditions consisted of those considered absolutely essential for any agreement to be reached. The Armenian question was not among them, but listed in the second category along with the other issues concerning minorities in Turkey.¹⁶ Although in the course of the conference the delegates of Britain primarily and those of the other Allied powers put considerable emphasis on minority issues and the Armenians to impress their own public, in private talks these issues were not of crucial importance for Britain. İsmet Paşa related the following conversation between himself and Lord Curzon at the outset of the conference: "Lord Curzon arrived, and I asked him about the minority question, to which Lord Curzon replied: 'Is there any minority left, that it should be a question? The Greeks in Anatolia withdrew at the end of the war, and we did an exchange with the Turks of our own accord. So no such question exists, as I say.'"¹⁷

İnönü, "İstiklâl Savaşı ve Lozan", **Belleten**, Year XXXVIII, Vol. 149 (January 1974), pp. 1-30. The founders of the new Turkish Republic wanted a fully independent state, and were prepared to go to war again if necessary to achieve this. For the secret military plan in the event of the peace conference breaking down, see: İhsan Ilgar, "Türk Genel Kurmayının Gizli Harekât Plânı", **Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi**, Vol. 36, pp. 33-34.

¹⁴ FO, 839/9.

¹⁵ FO, 371/7965, pp. 138-140.

¹⁶ FO, 371/7915, pp. 155-162; **İngiliz Belgelerinde**, Vol. I, pp. 273-274.

¹⁷ See: İnönü, "İstiklâl Savaşı ve Lozan", p. 25. At the end of November 1922, during non-official talks concerning the exchange of minority populations, the British and above all American representatives asked the Turkish Delegation with whom and how the Armenians were to be exchanged. İsmet Paşa was in favour of a population exchange for

The members of the American Delegation attended the Lausanne Peace Conference as observers. Their briefing was to defend American interests and remain neutral.¹⁸ From time to time, the American representatives took an active part in the conference, however.¹⁹ Because of pro-Armenian public feeling generated by American missionaries and their organisations, combined with the presence of Armenian and Greek refugees in America, Turkey's minorities were a sensitive issue in the conference.²⁰ As a result of these activities and sensitivity, James L. Barton, a representative of the American Protestant missionary organisations, was appointed as a consultant to the American Delegation to Lausanne. The United States Government desired the continuation of capitulations and American cultural, educational and religious activities in Turkey; the security of

Turkey's Greek population, but not of the Armenians remaining in Turkey. Ankara, on the other hand, favoured an exchange with Turkish minority populations in Armenia. However, when İsmet Paşa objected that discussion of such an exchange with Armenia with the Allied Powers would lead to a debate about Turkey's eastern borders and the Moscow Treaty; that to discuss this question with the Russians would be to involve them in another matter other than the Straits; and therefore, since no one was left to discuss the question of exchange of the Armenian population with, those Armenians who wished to remain in Turkey should be allowed to do so, Ankara agreed with his view. For the telegrams on this subject which were exchanged, see: *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. I, pp. 124, 143, 162-163, 172, 174, 176. However, those Armenians who had been involved in various incidents and left the country were not permitted to return. For studies carried out by S. R. Sonyel on British policy at Lausanne based on British documents, see: Salâhi R. Sonyel, "Lozan'da Türk Diplomasisi", *Belleten*, Year XXXVIII, Vol. 149 (January 1974), pp. 41-116; Salâhi R. Sonyel, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika, II*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991, pp. 290-357.

¹⁸ Although the United States representatives were present only as neutral observers, the delegates of the Allies, particularly Britain, and the Turkish Delegation all endeavoured to persuade the Americans to take their side. See: John A. Denovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939*, Minneapolis, The University of Minnesota Press, 1963, pp. 138-139.

¹⁹ Turkey's desire to conclude an agreement of amity and trade with the United States at this time may be evaluated in this light. See: Fahir Armaoğlu, "Amerikan Belgelerinde Lozan Konferansı ve Amerika", *Belleten*, Year LV, Vol. 213 (August 1991), pp. 483-493; Joseph C. Grew, *Turbulent Era: a Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945*, ed., Walter Johnson, Vol. I, London, Hammond, Hammond and Co., Ltd., 1953, p. 491.

²⁰ Prior to the Lausanne Peace Conference, the American Government received over a thousand pro-Armenian letters. Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1971, p. 271. On 11 February 1922, the Armenia America Society wrote a letter to President W.C. Harding condemning the Turks in harsh terms, and demanding that "whatever necessary" be done to defend the rights of the Armenians. In the summer of 1922, the US Secretary of State met with them and asked what they meant by "necessary", to which questioned they replied, "go to war if that be necessary". Denovo, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-144.

minorities, including the granting of an Armenian homeland; equal trade opportunities and free passage through the Straits; and reparation for American losses during the war.²¹ On the other hand, the United States Government supported realistic policies. In the written protocol laying down American expectations at the Lausanne Conference, it stated that granting a territorial home to the Armenians might give rise to debate, and that since conditions in Russia had improved somewhat, Russian Caucasus would provide a good refuge for Armenians who left Turkey.²² As this protocol shows, America did not expect an independent Armenia to be established in Turkey.

American delegate Richard Washburn Child and Turkish delegate Celâleddin Arif Bey met at Lausanne on 21 November 1922, and Arif Bey assured Child that under no circumstances would Turkey grant territory to the Armenians or any other minority.²³ In a telegram to Washington the following day, the American Delegation stated that on account of Ankara's resolve on the subject, the representatives of the Allied Powers did not wish to demand Turkish land for the Armenians.²⁴ Washington instructed its delegation to support moves benefiting Christian minorities in Turkey, but to refrain from making any proposals.²⁵ The American Secretary of State agreed with the views expressed in the telegram, and said that although unification of the Armenians of Turkey and the Caucasus was desirable, this did not seem feasible for economic reasons.²⁶

In order to assuage the Armenian lobbies, Protestant missionary organisations and public opinion, the United States delegates, like their Allied colleagues, took some initiatives such as speeches in support of the Armenians at the sessions and discussions outside them.²⁷ As a part of this policy, the American delegate Child sought support for the idea of an Armenian

²¹ Grabill, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

²² Grew, *op. cit.*, pp. 481-485.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 492.

²⁴ For the impressions of American delegate Barton concerning the determination of the Turkish Delegation as regards an Armenian homeland, and the hesitant attitude of the Allied Powers on the same subject, see: Grabill, *op. cit.*, pp. 270-271.

²⁵ Grabill, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

²⁶ Armaoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 516, from *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923*, (hereafter *Papers*), Vol. II, Washington D. C., Government Printing Office, 1938, pp. 902-903.

²⁷ Grabill, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

homeland in Anatolia,²⁸ and at one session, after reminding the Allies of earlier resolutions in favour of granting territory to the Armenians, asked the Allies not to leave the conference table without finding a solution to this question.²⁹

Britain occupied a dominant position at the conference. The British delegates discussed issues first with the other Allied delegates, and presented a joint position at the sessions after reaching agreement with them. The British delegate spoke first at the sessions, after which the delegates of France, Italy and other states repeated what he had said from their own standpoints. The minority and Armenian issues were approached in this manner at the conference. Out of historical habit Britain and the other Allies took the view that they had the right to take the decisions in this matter, and wished to corner Turkey into accepting terms that suited their own interests.³⁰

In order to represent the Armenians at Lausanne, the delegation from the Armenian Republic and the Armenian National Delegation joined to form the United Armenian Delegation. The Armenians wished to participate in the conference with the object of establishing a united and independent Armenia, or, at least as a provisional measure, the acceptance of an Armenian home. With this in mind they held talks with officials of the major powers and launched programs to influence public opinion in favour of the Armenians. On 18 August 1922, they sent letters to the British, French and Italian Governments asking to participate in the preliminary commission on the eastern questions, but this request was rejected on the third day.

On 18 October, the Armenian Delegation applied to the Allied Powers for admission to the conference and for the Armenian question to be put on the agenda. When the Allies discussed this matter among themselves, Britain favoured inviting the Armenian Delegation to present its case. France, however, had misgivings in this regard, on the grounds that it would set a precedent to the Georgians and other peoples of the region. Although Italy did not object to allowing the Armenian delegates to present their case at an appropriate time when the situation of the Armenians was

²⁸ Armaoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 516, from *Papers*, Vol. II, p. 910.

²⁹ *Lozan Tutanakları*, T. 1, C. 1, K. 1, pp. 202-204.

³⁰ Esat Uras, *Tarihî Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselesi*, 2nd pr., İstanbul, Belge Yayınları, 1987, pp. 706-708.

under discussion, it considered that extending unofficial invitation to the Armenian delegates before the Allies had reached a preliminary agreement amongst themselves would be a mistake, setting an undesirable precedent for other groups which, like the Armenians, lacked their own government.³¹ Nonetheless, on 13 November Lord Curzon invited the Armenian Delegation to speak at the Lausanne Conference.³²

On 18 November 1922, the Armenians repeated, in fresh letters to the Allied Powers, their request to participate in the conference.³³ The Armenian Delegation presented a memorandum to the Allied delegates at Lausanne asking that they be kept in mind during the conference. In this memorandum they claimed that the Armenians had taken the side of the Allies during the First World War, that they had carried out their duties towards the Allies to the full, that as a result 1,250,000 of the 2,250,000 Armenians in Turkish Armenia had lost their lives, that 700,000 had emigrated from Turkey, and that there remained 280,000 Armenians in Turkey, all of whom were ready to emigrate at any moment. They declared that it had already been decided that a homeland should be granted to resolve the Armenian question, that this could be realised either by providing land which gave access to the sea for the Republic of Erivan, or by giving Cilicia to the Armenians. In other words, whichever course was taken, an Armenian homeland could only be established on Turkish territory in Asia.³⁴

It was not only the Armenian Delegation which voiced Armenian claims prior to and during the Lausanne peace talks. In addition, notable figures of the Armenian community,³⁵ pro-

³¹ FO, 371/7915, pp. 143-146.

³² In his letter dated 13 November to the British Embassy in Paris, Lord Curzon told the British Ambassador to relate the following to the French Foreign Minister: "You should point out to Monsieur Poincaré that the case of Georgia is quite different. We are only admitting the possibility of hearing Armenian representatives at Lausanne should we desire information regarding Armenian minorities in Turkey during the course of proceedings. The Armenian representatives who may thus be summoned to Lausanne will not be the representatives of the pro-Soviet Armenian Government of the Caucasus, but Armenian national representatives including particularly Turkish Armenians..." *İngiliz Belgelerinde*, Vol. I, No. 189, pp. 268-269.

³³ Uras, *op. cit.*, pp. 708-710.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 710-714.

³⁵ Two Armenian leaders, Varandian and Ahavonian, conveyed the Armenian demands to the Italian and British Governments respectively. In a letter dated 6 November 1922, Varandian expressed the opinion that Armenia had not been admitted to the conference

Armenian societies and church organisations also approached the Allied Powers or their representatives at Lausanne to present their case. The *Ligue Internationale Philarménienne* sent a memorandum signed by chairman E. Naville and general secretary A. de Morsier to the Lausanne Conference (1 December) stating their demands. The memorandum related the losses and damage suffered by Armenians who had taken part in the Allied effort during the war, reminded them of earlier decisions and promises to establish an independent Armenia, declared that the establishment of an Armenian Republic with its capital at Erivan would not end the question of an Armenian homeland, that this question could not be resolved outside Turkey, and asked for the establishment of such an Armenian homeland.³⁶ Lists of churches and Christian organisations in many European countries which supported this idea were submitted to the conference on 4 December, 8 December and 22 December 1922, and on 9 January 1923.³⁷ In addition, the British Armenia Committee gave a memorandum to the British Delegation at Lausanne on 5 December presenting their demands for an Armenian homeland and protection of minorities.³⁸ The Armenia America Society presented a document containing similar demands to the British Delegation at Lausanne on 16 December.³⁹

The Lausanne peace talks took place in two phases.⁴⁰ During the first phase of talks (20 November 1922 and 4 February 1923)

because the country was under Soviet rule, and asked that whatever possible be done for the Armenians in Turkey. Ahavonian made similar requests from Britain. Through its embassy in Rome, the British Government asked the views of the Italian Government, which replied on 18 November 1922, that they intended to tell Varandian that everything possible would be done. As explained above, although not opposed to the Armenian Delegation being heard at the conference, they said they thought it would be inappropriate to extend an official invitation to the Armenian delegates before the Allies had reached a preliminary agreement amongst themselves, and that it would set an undesirable precedent. FO, 371/7915, pp. 143-146.

³⁶ FO, 839/12.

³⁷ For a list of these organisations, see: FO, 839/12.

³⁸ FO, 839/12. In the British Foreign Office file containing the demands of the said organisation, there is a note reading: "A national, i. e., territorial home for Armenians as distinct from the Republic of Erivan is not a practical proposition". However, as will be seen later, due to promises made previously and public pressure, the British delegates did bring up the question of an Armenian home at Lausanne on several occasions.

³⁹ FO, 839/12.

⁴⁰ On the subject of the Lausanne Conference in general and other issues discussed there, see: Cemil Bilsel, *Lozan*, C. II, İstanbul, Sosyal Yayınlar, 1998; *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl, Lozan, (1922-1923)*, Ankara, Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 1973; *Lozan'ın 50. Yılına Armağan*, İstanbul, İ. Ü. Milletlerarası Hukuk ve Milletlerarası Münasebetler Enstitüsü, 1978.

an Armenian homeland was discussed, and during the second phase (23 April and 23 July 1923) the return of Armenians who had left Turkey.

Minority issues, which according to the rules of procedure of the Lausanne Peace Conference were to be discussed by the second commission (the Commission of Foreigners and Minorities), the first commission (the Commission of Land and Military Issues), began to debate them (12 December 1922). In a speech on behalf of the Allies, Lord Curzon, the chairman of the commission and British delegate, declared that one of the reasons why the Allies had entered the war was to protect and save Christian minorities, particularly the Armenians, and that the Armenian issue should be approached, not only with respect to the suffering they had undergone, but also promises made to them regarding their future. He said that the solution to the problem depended on establishing an Armenian home either in north-eastern Anatolia or in the area between south-east Cilicia and the Syrian frontier; and that this was a historic right of the Armenians. French delegate Barrère and Italian delegate Marki Garroni then proceeded to deliver talks in support of Curzon.⁴¹

In a speech made in response to these, Turkey's chief delegate İsmet Paşa explained the rights accorded to minorities in the Ottoman Empire since the time of Mehmed II (1451-1481), and summed up the views of his government in these three points: "(1) Improving the situation of Turkey's minorities depends above all on eliminating all possibility of any kind of foreign intervention and outside provocation. (2) This objective depends first of all on an exchange of the Turkish and Greek populations. (3) The most reliable guarantees for the security and welfare of those minorities not covered by a population exchange measures will be those provided by the laws of the country, and by Turkey's broad-minded policy to all those communities whose members, as citizens of Turkey, performed their duties to the full."⁴²

When İsmet Paşa completed this speech, Lord Curzon took the stand again. He declared that the general public would not permit the Turkish Government to treat the Armenians as it wished, and

⁴¹ *Lozan Tutanakları*, T. I, C. 1, K. 1, pp. 180-187.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 187-200. For further details about this session in telegrams sent by Lord Curzon to London and by İsmet Paşa to Ankara, see: *Lozan Telgrafı*, C. I, pp. 210-213.

asked, "Is there no scrap of land for the Armenians in this huge country?" Then, the Greek delegate Venizelos, the United States delegate Child, and Spalaikovitch, delegate of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, each gave a speech on the rights of minorities in Turkey supporting the views of Lord Curzon. İsmet Paşa spoke again, and responding in particular to the speech by Venizelos, explained that the cause of the suffering of the Armenians was the fact that they had been forced to fight on the Greek side during the Greek occupation of Anatolia; that Armenian leaders in Europe had applied on many occasions to the Greek Government asking that their compatriots be protected from such dangers, but that the Greek Government had ignored these pleas, and that the Greek authorities had endeavoured to blame the Armenians for the burning and destruction which took place following the Greek defeat; and that during the Greek withdrawal from Anatolia, they had forced the Armenians to go with them. "The last government in the world which should dare to publicly express pity for the sufferings of the Armenians is the government which has been the direct cause for the Armenian misfortunes", İnönü declared.⁴³

At the next day's session, İsmet Paşa said that the peace to be concluded would remove the political causes of such suffering; would also eliminate all the reasons for the existence of the Armenian committees operating abroad which saw the Armenian question as a livelihood or as a political weapon; and that thereby Turks and Armenians would be able to bind the wounds of war together. He declared that Turkey regarded any proposal to establish a state of Armenia in any of its part as an attempt to divide the country; that they had concluded treaties with the existing Armenia; and that to accept a second Armenia would be contrary to these treaties.⁴⁴

Lord Curzon, speaking on behalf of the Allies, said that the Turkish reply to proposals concerning an Armenian homeland created an unfavourable impression, and threatened the Turkish Delegation that issues concerning minorities could bring the negotiations to an end.⁴⁵ At the discussions on 14 December, İsmet Paşa explained that the figures given by Lord Curzon for the

⁴³ *Lozan Tutanakları*, T.I, C.1, K.1, pp. 206-207.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 208-212.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 215-217; *Lozan Telgrafları*, C. I, pp. 218, 220, 236.

Armenian population were inaccurate, and that in no period of history had there been three million Armenians in the world, never mind in Turkey, and that the British, French and Turkish documents confirmed that the pre-war Armenian population in Turkey varied from 1,300,000 to 1,500,000. To Lord Curzon's question about whether a corner could not be found for the Armenians in a country as large as Turkey, he reminded him that there were countries whose territories were incomparably larger than those of Turkey.⁴⁶ Curzon's response at the same session was to repeat the request for the establishment of an Armenian home in Turkey.⁴⁷

The intractable British stand on the minority issue, inclusive of the Armenian question, led İsmet Paşa at one point to doubt whether the British really wanted peace at all, and he privately discussed this matter with a diplomat from the British Delegation. According to İsmet İnönü's account of this meeting in his memoirs, the British diplomat told him, "İsmet Paşa! For years we have said much and promised much. We have engaged in many undertakings throughout the world. Why do you find it strange that so much ceremony should accompany their conclusion now?" After this request to respond with forbearance to the commotion on the subject to minorities, the mind of the Turkish Delegation was set at rest, and it maintained its resolute stance on the subject of the Armenians and other minorities.⁴⁸

The first commission, at which minority issues were discussed, decided that following these discussions the issues should be debated by a sub-commission. The Minorities Sub-commission established for this purpose convened on the same day, that is, on 14 December 1922. The sub-commission consisted of the representatives of the United States, Britain, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Rumania, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and Turkey. The Italian delegate Montagna was elected chairman of the committee by unanimous vote.⁴⁹ At the next day's session,

⁴⁶ *Lozan Tutanakları*, T. I, C. 1, K. 1, pp. 219-223.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 223-225. For the telegram on the subject of these sessions sent to Ankara by İsmet Paşa, see: *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. I, pp. 218-224; and for the telegrams sent to London by Lord Curzon see: *İngiliz Belgelerinde*, Vol. II, pp. 387-388, 391.

⁴⁸ İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar*, Vol. II, Ankara, Bilgi Yayinevi, 1987, p. 85.

⁴⁹ The members of this sub-commission were as follows: Dwight and Lamot Belin (United States); Sir Horace Rumbold, Ryan and Forbes Adam (Britain); De Lacrois, Laporte, Bargeton and De Percin (France); Venizelos, Caclamano, Dendramis and Theotokas (Greece); Montagna, Guariglia and Galli (Italy); Sato and Tani (Japan);

Montagna presented a plan comprising the issues to be examined by the committee. According to the minutes of the Lausanne Peace Conference, translated into Turkish from the French originals, the final point in this list of problems to be discussed with respect to minorities read: "A National Homeland for the Armenians". Rıza Nur informed the committee that the Turkish Delegation refused to discuss such a proposal, upon which the Italian, British and French delegates said that rather than refusing to discuss the question, it would be more appropriate if the Turkish Delegation were to present counter-arguments. So the session closed.⁵⁰ In his memoirs, Rıza Nur, the Turkish representative on the sub-commission, claimed that the Allied delegates and their secretaries adjusted the minutes to suit themselves, recording or omitting what was said as appropriate to their own ends, and sometimes altering speeches in the written form; so that it was in this corrupted form that they appeared in the newspapers of the time; that the question of an Armenian homeland was not in fact in the original plan drawn up by Montagna, but was subsequently inserted into the minutes and brought up for discussion.⁵¹ At the third session of the Minorities Sub-commission on 18 December, the Allies presented a draft proposal which was accepted as a basis for discussion. Neither the question of an Armenian homeland nor indeed the Armenians themselves were mentioned in this draft.

As well as demands from Armenian homeland at the official sessions of the Lausanne Conference, the Allied delegates conveyed their requests for an Armenian homeland to the Turkish Delegation during private talks. In mid-December such a talk took place between the Italian delegate Garroni, the United States Delegation and İsmet Paşa. The Turkish standpoint was explained

Contzesco (Rumania); Spalaikovitch and Rakitch (Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes); and Rıza Nur, Mustafa Şeref and Şükrü (Turkey). *Lozan Tutanakları*, T. I, C. 1, K. 2, Ankara, A. Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1970, p. 151.

⁵⁰ For details of this plan and discussions, see: *Ibid.*, pp. 152-159.

⁵¹ According to Rıza Nur, the Armenian homeland proposal was not included in the plan drawn up by Montagna; the section of the French language Lausanne minutes from line 12 on page 448 to the end is spurious; the article concerning an Armenian homeland was inserted afterwards into the session and minutes, with the result that a great deal of debate took place on the subject. Notes were exchanged between Turkey and Britain, and these are not included in the minutes. According to Nur, the Turkish representative in the secretariat responsible for keeping the minutes was alone and too weak to object to this kind of falsification. See: *Dr. Rıza Nur'un Lozan Hatıraları*, 3rd pr., İstanbul, Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1992, pp. 102-103, 116.

to them.⁵² Meanwhile, the son of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested to İsmet Paşa that Turkey occupy Soviet Armenia in return for letting the Armenians have Cilicia as a homeland. In their talks with İsmet Paşa, the Russian Delegation told him that the former Ottoman Foreign Minister Noradounghian wished him to help them on the subject of an Armenian homeland. İsmet Paşa responded by telling the Russians about the latest British proposal, and they dropped the matter.⁵³

According to Rıza Nur, at the end of the sub-commission session held on 22 December, Montagna told the Bulgarian Delegation, which had requested to speak at the sub-commission on the subject of minorities, that they would be invited to speak. This unexpected development gave Rıza Nur reason to suspect that this was a ploy designed to pave the way for listening to the Armenian case. He therefore said that he could not agree to such a thing, and that if the other delegates wished to hear a delegation that was not an official participant in the conference, the Turkish Delegation would not attend that session. The French delegate replied that in the event of the Turkish Delegation declining to attend such a session, the other delegates would not object to hearing them. Rıza Nur countered this argument by saying that sessions in which the Turkish Delegation was not present could have no official status and would be regarded as having never taken place, and that therefore its proceedings would not go down in the minutes.⁵⁴ Despite all this debate, the sub-commission resolved to hear the Armenian Delegation on 26 December, informing the Turkish Delegation of the fact an hour beforehand. At this Rıza Nur wrote a memorandum to the chairman of the sub-commission, while İsmet Paşa wrote memorandums to the commission chairmen, saying that the Armenian Delegation was not authorised to represent the Government of Armenia, and that if they claimed to represent the Armenians of Turkey they

⁵² In the telegram sent to Ankara by İsmet Paşa, he said that the Americans were not insistent on this issue. *Lozan Telgrafıları*, Vol. I, p. 216.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 217-229. İsmet Paşa was of the opinion that this suggestion made by the son of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer reflected the personal view of the young man rather than that of the British Government.

⁵⁴ In his memoirs, Rıza Nur wrote that these discussions were not accurately represented in the French language minutes, but recorded as it suited themselves. For discussions on the subject of the official minutes, see: *Lozan Tutanakları*, T. I, C. 1, K. 2, p. 191; for Rıza Nur's account of the discussions at this meeting, see: *Dr. Rıza Nur'un Lozan Hatıraları*, pp. 109-110.

protested the situation. They added that the Armenian Delegation could only be heard if representatives of all the minorities in Rumania, Serbia and Greece and of all the Muslim countries were also heard, including the Irish delegation.⁵⁵ The sub-commission heard the Armenian Delegation on 26 December 1922, at a meeting that had no official capacity since the Turkish Delegation was not present. The delegation explained how, motivated by the Allies' promises of freedom, Armenians had formed the Eastern Army of the French following the relocation, how they had fought on the frontiers of Palestine and Syria under the command of General Allenby, and finally repeated their views on the subject of an Armenian home as expressed earlier in their memorandums.⁵⁶ Britain and the other Allies tried to keep up the pressure with regard to the Armenian and minority questions, but they also took care not to go so far that the peace negotiations collapsed.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ In his memoirs, Rıza Nur said that the agenda drawn up by the chairman for the sessions of the sub-commission were usually sent to him only an hour before the sessions began, so not allowing him time for research and to prepare responses; and that one day, on an agenda again submitted to him late, he read that the Armenian, Assyro and Chaldean Delegations were to be heard, at which he wrote a note half an hour before the session began and had it presented to Montagna when the delegates had taken their places and the session was about to begin; upon which the session could not take place, but that they listened to the Bulgarians and Armenians etc., saying that this was in an unofficial capacity, and that these would not be recorded in the minutes; yet the secretaries of the Allies Powers still drew up the minutes as they wanted. **Dr. Rıza Nur'un Lozan Hatıraları**, pp. 115-116. İsmet Paşa sent a note to Lord Curzon saying that no state or organisation apart from those officially invited to the conference could be heard at the sessions, and that if this principle was violated Turkey would request that minorities living in Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece be heard; he also intimated that he might ask that the representatives of Egypt, Syria, Palestine and India be heard. At this, he explained, Curzon wrote a reply couched in conciliatory terms the following day, in which he said that the incident had taken place by the authority of the sub-commission, that the Turkish Delegation had not attended the session, and that the issue was closed. See: **Lozan Telgrafları**, Vol. I, pp. 281-284; **İngiliz Belgelerinde**, Vol. II, pp. 416-417; for İsmet Paşa's account of this incident in his memoirs, see: **Hatıralar**, Vol. II, pp. 83-84.

⁵⁶ They reminded the Allies of the decisions taken at previous meetings on the subject of an Armenian territorial home, and declared that the ideal region for such a home would extend from Rize and Hasankale, leaving out Erzurum, and encompass Muş, Lake Van and the area as far as the Iranian border; alternatively but that it could also be established between the Syrian border and the Euphrates, taking in Ceyhan, Sis and Maraş, a region which they thought should be separate and independent from Turkey, but that so as not to cause difficulty for the Allies, they would be prepared to accept a relationship with the Turkish Government like between Britain and its colonies. Uras, **op. cit.**, pp. 723-731.

⁵⁷ In the telegram which Lord Curzon sent to the British representative in İstanbul on 30 December, he described this event in the following words: "What actually passed was that Turkish delegates dissented from proposal of president of sub-commission to hear

A protest similar to that made by İsmet Paşa to his British colleague Lord Curzon in Lausanne was carried out by the Turkish Government to the French representative in Ankara. The disappointment felt at the fact that the sub-commission had heard the Armenian Delegation with the support of the French delegate was conveyed by Turkish Prime Minister Rauf Bey to the French representative in Ankara. Rauf Bey said that this situation gave Turkey the right to listen to the representatives of Muslims, who formed a majority in some countries, at Lausanne. This indirect reference to Muslims in countries under French rule was a veiled threat.⁵⁸

While discussions concerning the Armenians continued at Lausanne, the Armenians living outside Turkey engaged in propaganda using every possible means.⁵⁹ With the commencement of discussions about minority issues at Lausanne, Armenian lobbying and propaganda activities also increased. On 10 December, Noradounghian Efendi, accompanied by one of the

Bulgarians and Armenians at next meeting. President then stated that representatives of inviting powers on sub-commission were at liberty to hear what interested parties they wished but Turks were free to absent themselves. Unfortunately secretariat erroneously issued notice as to meeting of sub-commission to hear Bulgarians and Armenians and similar statement also appeared in some papers. Actually there was no meeting of sub-commission but representatives of inviting powers heard Bulgarians, Armenians and Agha Petros. Mistake of secretariat was satisfactorily explained to Turks who have no reason to complain except on account of slip by secretariat and they showed singular and unnecessary discourtesy in refusing to be present to hear statements of interested minorities. You should explain matter at once Adnan in order that Hassan Bey may not misinform Ankara". FO, 371/9058, pp. 2-4.

⁵⁸ **Lozan Telgrafları**, Vol. I, p. 290.

⁵⁹ For example, at the end of November the Armenian Delegation at Lausanne spread unfounded rumours to the effect that a territorial home for 700,000 Armenians had been agreed, and that Armenians whom it had been decided should remain in Turkey had been forcibly ejected. They even discussed this matter with İsmet Paşa, head of the Turkish Delegation. For an account of pro-Armenian feeling generated and anti-Turkish propaganda at Lausanne, see: Naşit Erez, "Lozan Konferansı ve İsviçre Kamuoyu", **Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi**, No. 34 (Temmuz 1970), p. 33. The truth emerged when İsmet Paşa asked Ankara for information on the subject: the Ankara representative of Near East Relief, an American Protestant missionary charity organisation which had been involved in work with the Armenians, had applied to the government for permission to move its orphanages to Syria. Permission had been granted, and the move had taken place. Meanwhile, due to extraordinary circumstances prevailing in Turkey, both Muslims and non-Muslims were temporarily forbidden to travel. When this prohibition was lifted for a month following the Mudanya Armistice, non-Muslims afraid of war breaking out again took the opportunity to leave Anatolia. The French calculated the numbers of those who left from the Adana region to be around 45,000. For telegrams on this subject exchanged by İsmet Paşa and Ankara, see: **Lozan Telgrafları**, Vol. I, pp. 129, 131-133, 136.

Armenian revolutionaries, visited İsmet Paşa and demanded that an Armenian home be established in any part of Turkey.⁶⁰ On 8 December a Swiss Delegation and on 27 December the American, French and Swiss representatives of an organisation called the *Comité Philarménic* met with the Turkish Delegation to express their desire for an Armenian home. On 16 December a notice concerning the same demand and bearing the signatures of notable French figures was put up in the hotel where the Turkish Delegation was staying. British and American newspapers campaigned vigorously for an Armenian homeland, and in the United States five million signatures were collected in support of this aim.⁶¹

Following speeches by Curzon and other Allied representatives on the subject of an Armenian homeland delivered on 14 December, United States Delegation requested definite instructions on the subject from Washington. The latter responded on 26 December, not with instructions, but with questions about the views on the issue that were emerging at the conference. When the

⁶⁰ *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. I, p. 192. At first İsmet Paşa regarded Noradounghian as someone with whom he could talk seriously and reach agreement, but when Noradounghian became increasingly insistent on the subject of an Armenian territorial home, he told him that this was absolutely out of the question, concluding with the words, "This conference is debating the fate of the empire, of Turkey. You hope to take advantage of this and do not wish to miss this opportunity. Let me tell you that if you wish to pursue your endeavour to the end, feel free to do so. I say only that if you do so, all trust between us will be swept away. I realise that you do not think it is in your interests to reach agreement with me at a time when the claims, which you have been pursuing as a national cause for so long, are being decided. Once the trust and amicability between us have been destroyed, you will come to me again and seek me out. But then it will be impossible for us to talk and moreover unnecessary. Do not forget, when that time comes I will not see: you". İsmet Paşa related that at later stages of the conference, Noradounghian asked several times for an appointment to see: him, but that he instructed his doorkeeper, "I have no time. It is impossible for me to see: him. If he asks the reason, tell him I say he knows what it is". See: *Hatıralar*, Vol. II, pp. 80-81.

⁶¹ *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. I, pp. 182, 215, 229-230, 289; for the full text of this statement, see: *Journal de Genève*, 19 December 1922. The head of the Swiss Delegation insisted on an Armenian territorial home in increasingly strongly worded terms, and when he said, "I will pursue the matter. My predecessor fought for this cause until he died, and I will fight to the end," İsmet Paşa replied, "What you want is a course which will make harmony between the people of Turkey impossible. You are on a misguided course. You cannot succeed. You are proposing the division of my country. After fighting throughout the World War to save our country from fragmentation, we went on to fight another four years. Any struggle that your society might engage in will be negligible compared to the countries and adversities, which we have overcome. You will be far outweighed". See: *Hatıralar*, Vol. II, p. 82.

United States Delegation reported that in their opinion the Allied delegates were using the issue as a bargaining tool rather than debating it seriously, they were given permission to speak on the subject of the Armenians at the sub-commission.⁶² At the session on 29 December the sub-commission discussed passing an amnesty for crimes committed by minorities in Turkey, at which the American representative Dwight said that the Turkish Armenians abroad should be included in the amnesty.⁶³ Dwight presented the views of the American public on the Armenian question at the session on 30 December, and issued a statement to the press on the subject of an Armenian homeland, saying that the United States was sympathetic to the idea of creating an autonomous region as a refuge for Armenians. Letters stating the views and demands of the Federal Assembly of American Protestant Churches and the Americans for Armenia Society were included in the introduction.⁶⁴

Under pressure from missionary societies and Armenian lobbies, the American Government asked its representatives in Lausanne to exert pressure on the Turks or the French for the establishment of an Armenian homeland in Cilicia or northern Syria. However, the United States Delegation at Lausanne saw the resolve of the Turks on this subject and was unable to persist in their demands. There was nothing more it could do. The American President considered that Grew's press statement should satisfy the sensitivity of the American public.⁶⁵ In a telegram sent to Washington by the American representatives on 1 January 1923,

⁶² Grabill, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

⁶³ *Lozan Telgrafları*, T. I, C. 1, K. 2, pp. 221-222.

⁶⁴ FO, 371/9058, pp. 133-141. In another document dated 18 December enclosed in this letter, it was said that a bill had been presented to Congress authorising the American President to grant a loan of 20 million dollars from the Treasury for the purpose, if a sufficiently large piece of land was granted to the Armenians at the conference. See: *Lozan Tutanakları*, T. I, C. 1, K. 2, pp. 241-246; Grew, *op. cit.*, pp. 524-525; Uras, *op. cit.*, pp. XL-XLII. In his memoirs Rıza Nur relates that he responded to this speech as follows: "Since the Americans wish the Armenians to be comfortable for humane reasons, and wish to serve humanity, let them grant them a homeland in the United States...Because there is no comfort in Turkey as yet. The United States is a fully organised, comfortable, happy and rich country. The Armenians will be very comfortable there", at which there was general laughter. When Montagna said, "Tomorrow is Christmas. Give it as a Christmas present", he had responded, "It is not our custom to give presents at Christmas, which is a Christian festival, so since you have such custom, you may give it". However, none of this conversation was recorded in the minutes. See: *Dr. Rıza Nur'un Lozan Hatıraları*, pp. 114-115.

⁶⁵ Grabill, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

he said that in making his presentation concerning an Armenian homeland to the sub-commission, he had made no proposals on the subject, and that so long as the Allied delegates did not propose such a program, the American delegates would not take any initiative, or enter into any undertaking, that there was no question of any real backing on the issue, and that the Turks were aware of this situation.⁶⁶ Barton and Peet, who were included in the American Delegation at the request of missionary societies, saw that there was nothing more to be done, and left Switzerland before the proposal for an Armenian homeland was rejected by the sub-commission.⁶⁷

As reported by the American representative, the Allied delegates had no intention of giving genuine backing to the Armenian question under existing conditions, but continued to use the Armenians to achieve their own military and political objectives, while putting on a show for the benefit of their own publics and Armenian lobbies.⁶⁸ In private Montagna tried to persuade Rıza Nur not to react with such strong measures as absence from the session at which this issue was to be discussed. He promised that he would not allow the Armenian Delegation to be heard, so persuading the Turks to attend a session at which they would merely discuss the matter amongst themselves. Rıza Nur recounts developments in these words: "Montagna said, 'my dear fellow, the British and French have used these people for their own affairs and interests, and thereby offended them. Now they feel a moral obligation to demand a homeland for them. At that time the Armenians believed those promises. Accept it! Let them do it.' I said, 'It is unthinkable. Never! Are we supposed to give them a homeland? We will not permit even the suggestion of such an idea.' At which he said, 'that is not what I mean. They will only say it for the sake of appearances. They will not insist on establishing a homeland.'"⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Armaoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 520 from *Papers*, Vol. II, pp. 941-942; Grew, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 531.

⁶⁷ Grabill, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

⁶⁸ In December 1922, Greek and Armenian volunteers from İstanbul in the guise of labourers were sent to British divisions at Çanakkale. *Lozan Telgrafı*, Vol. I, p. 231; in April 1923, Nestorians and Armenians were employed in the British military manoeuvres in the area of Revandüz. FO, 839/50.

⁶⁹ Dr. Rıza Nur'un *Lozan Hatıraları*, pp. 117-118.

With such promises, the sub-commission convened on 6 January 1923, under Montagna as chairman, and brought up the question of an Armenian homeland again. In the most mild terms, he explained what they meant by this concept in the following words: "Our wish is only for a simple local regime which will allow the Armenians to maintain their ancient traditions, while fully preserving the integrity of the Turkish state. The Armenian home will thus not be a territory closed to others living on Turkish soil, or outside Turkish administration; it will only be a region where Armenians scattered throughout the world will be able to gather." According to Montagna, the Allies would leave the choice of location for the region that would be a home for the Armenians to be decided at discussions between Turkey and the League of Nations, on the grounds that it was necessary to carry out a thorough investigation of local conditions, and that it was more appropriate the issue should not be treated as a political one. At this stage, they only wanted Turkey to accept this proposal in principle.⁷⁰

After Montagna, the British delegate Sir Horace Rumbold made a speech along the same lines. Rumbold said that Turkey possessed extensive land in Anatolia, and that the country had a sparse population, so that it should present no difficulties for Turkey to give the Armenians a homeland. For this purpose, he explained, since as a result of the agreement concluded between France and the Ankara Government the Syrian frontier had been moved some considerable distance to the south, this strip of land whose area totaled 19,000 square kilometers could be given to the Armenians, and would be sufficient to hold a population of 200,000-300,000 Armenians. Political relations between the Armenian home and Turkey could be modeled on those between Britain and its colonies, he explained.⁷¹

Turkish delegate Rıza Nur now took the floor and said that the Allied Powers had the right to make the requests just voiced; that the countries in question were under moral obligation to the

⁷⁰ *Lozan Tutanakları*, T. 1, C. 1, K. 2, pp. 273-275.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 276-277. In the file of The Records of the British Foreign Office containing the minutes for this speech by Rumbold, the following is written: "This shows that we have really made a genuine effort in favour of obtaining an Armenian national home, and so should receive as wide circulation as possible". From these words it is evident that the British realised an Armenian national home would not be achieved, but wished to be absolved as far as possible from public blame. FO, 371/9058, pp. 228-229.

Armenian or Assyrian (Assyro) peoples, and that the Allied Powers were exploiting these peoples as political weapons for attacking Turkey; that for this reason they were responsible for the disasters which befell them; that he therefore regarded statements made under these conditions as if they had never occurred and as invalid; and that rather than listen to more statements of this kind, it would be better to withdraw from the session. Although sub-commission chairman Montagna said that such a move would violate the rules of the conference and asked him to remain and listen to the statement of the French representative, Rıza Nur declared that he could not remain any longer and announced that the Turkish Delegation was withdrawing from the session.⁷²

The Allies sent a protest note to İsmet Paşa,⁷³ who responded in another note, saying that Rıza Nur had done the right thing; that inviting people who were not part of the conference to the sessions and performing *fait accomplis* were unacceptable, and a cause of regrettable incidents; but that nevertheless he would regard the

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 278; Grew, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 530-531. The French representative De Lacroix said that they wished the Armenians to be granted a certain degree of local and administrative autonomy under Turkish sovereignty in an area close to the Republic of Erivan, and pointing out that provisions to similar effect had been incorporated in treaties signed at the end of the First World War, asserted that this was a reasonable demand. **Lozan Tutanakları**, T. 1, C. 1, K. 2, pp. 278-279. In his memoirs Rıza Nur gives the following account of this incident: "I said, 'The Allied Powers have used the Armenians as a political tool and thrown them into the flames. They incited them to rebel against their own country. The result was their chastisement. They were chastised with epidemic disease, starvation and emigration. The entire responsibility for this lies not with us, but with the Allied Powers. If a reward is required, you may give it...You cannot win friends with the property of your foes. You think that the Armenians are oppressed, that they need a home and independence. We are convinced. But the number of oppressed nations in the world is not one but many. How many times has Egypt been in ferment for the sake of freedom; just recently blood was being spilt there. India, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco want freedom and their homeland. For how many centuries, and how much blood have the Irish spilt for their homeland and independence?...You give freedom and homes to them; then we may give to the Armenians. All that you recite is as if it never existed. We cannot remain here under these conditions. I am quitting this session'....They did not record this last part of my words in the minutes. They adjusted the minutes as they pleased and falsified them. What duplicity was this?...Yet my words found their way into the newspapers of the time, repeated *verbatim*. A few days later members of the Irish independence movement wrote me a letter thanking me for mentioning the Irish among the oppressed nations who desired freedom." **Dr. Rıza Nur'un Lozan Hatıraları**, pp. 119-120; *Écho de Paris*, *Gazette de Lausanne* and *Journal de Genève*, 7 January 1923.

⁷³ For the telegram sent by the Allied representatives, see: FO, 371/9058, pp. 152-153; FO, 839/22, No. 928.

matter as closed.⁷⁴ Following these disagreements the Armenian question was not discussed again by the sub-commission. In the accepted texts of the provisions concerning minorities drawn up by the sub-commission, there is no item concerning the Armenians.⁷⁵

In a telegram to Ankara explaining the situation, İsmet Paşa said, "When they deliberately bring up the Armenian question, we are naturally obliged to be firm and unyielding".⁷⁶ In his memoirs, Joseph C. Grew, the American representative at Lausanne, described the Turkish withdrawal from the session as a scandal. Curzon, Barrère and the Italian delegates said in private discussions that the creation of an Armenian homeland or new small distinct regions for the Armenians, or the formulation of any concrete plan aimed at achieving the same did not seem possible. According to Grew, the Turks held firmly to the opinion that so long as the Armenians were not tools to foreign intrigues, those who remained in Turkey would be secure, but that there was no question of Armenians who had left the country returning, even in the event of Turkey losing no land or sovereignty. This was the point on which the Turks were most resolved.⁷⁷ In his address to the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 3 January 1923, Turkish Prime Minister Rauf Orbay declared that there could under no circumstances be an Armenia other than that which already existed. At a meeting between the British representative Henderson and the Ankara representative Hasan Bey in İstanbul on 7

⁷⁴ For İsmet Paşa's letter, see: FO, 371/9058, pp. 185-188. In his memoirs Rıza Nur said that Lord Curzon sent a protest note on behalf of the Allies, and İsmet Paşa wrote that Marquis Garoni had written a protest letter. See: **Dr. Rıza Nur'un Lozan Hatıraları**, pp. 121-122; **Hatıralar**, Vol. II, pp. 83-84.

⁷⁵ For the texts in question dated 11 January 1923, see: **Lozan Tutanakları**, T. 1, C. 1, K. 2, pp. 289-292.

⁷⁶ "From this point on, the Allies began making detailed declarations and claims for an Armenian territorial home, and for Assyro and Chaldean homes. Rıza Nur said that he could not allow this declaration to be made, and insisted to the chairman that he be allowed to speak on time, and finally despite the efforts of the chairman he left the commission with his delegation. This was an unavoidable step in response to the Allies, who were endeavouring to affect a *fait accomplis* in order to speak about Armenian issues and make proposals...In a joint letter written to me by the conference chairman, they spoke of the incident and declared that it showed our contempt. I replied to them that we were aware of the situation, that by being subjected to declarations and claims we had been constrained to defend ourselves, and that the incident might be regarded as closed. Recently, we responded forcefully to another attempt at *fait accomplis*. When they deliberately try to speak of the Armenian question, we are naturally obliged to act with determination and vehemence". **Lozan Telgrafları**, Vol. I, pp. 345-346.

⁷⁷ Grew, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 531.

January, it was reiterated that there was no question of agreeing to an Armenian homeland.⁷⁸

The Allied delegates realised that it was impossible to demand land or special privileges for the Armenians from Turkey, and that tactics designed to force such concessions would not work. Prior to the session on 9 January, they met with the Turkish Delegation and told them that they would deliver short speeches on the subject of homes for the Armenians, Assyrians and Chaldeans, and that if İsmet Paşa briefly rejected these demands, the question would be closed.⁷⁹ Having agreed among themselves to this course of action, the Minorities Sub-commission met for the presentation and discussion of the report drawn up by Montagna on the work of the sub-commission, and the Armenian question was discussed for the last time in very mild terms at this session. In his opening address, sub-commission chairman Montagna said that they were obliged to return the Armenian question and that of the Assyrians and Chaldeans to the commission, and that the sub-commission had met with the refusal of the Turkish representatives. In their addresses Barrère and Lord Curzon said that granting a home for the Armenians would not violate Turkish sovereignty, but that the Turkish Delegation had refused to accept this, and that after peace had been concluded they hoped that Turkey would take some steps in this direction. İsmet Paşa said that Turkey interpreted the question of homelands, as division of the country, and that there had been no change in their standpoint.⁸⁰

In a telegram to London concerning this session at which the question of an Armenian home was closed, Lord Curzon said that the committee's work had been most beneficial and tolerant; that faced with the İsmet Paşa's resolute opposition they had been obliged to discontinue their demands for an Armenian home; that they had no means of forcing the Turks to accept this proposal; and that the Turks attached no importance to world opinion.⁸¹

⁷⁸ FO, 371/9058, pp. 180-181.

⁷⁹ "He confirmed that there would be a brief statement concerning Armenian, Assyrian and Chaldean homes, and that in response I would give a short speech rejecting it absolutely". *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. I, pp. 360-361.

⁸⁰ *Lozan Tutanakları*, T. 1, C. 1, K. 1, pp. 295-319.

⁸¹ "I once again pleaded cause of Armenian, Assyrian, Chaldeans, and Bulgarian refugees. But İsmet Pasha once more refused categorically even to consider the idea of a national home either for Armenians or any other minority and as we have no means of forcing Turks to accept and cannot introduce such a clause in treaty there remain no means of influence or pressure but world opinion to which in their present frame of mind they attach not the smallest importance". FO, 371/9058, p. 198.

İsmet Paşa, in his telegram to Ankara about the same session, described Curzon's speech as, "on the whole quite restrained and conciliatory". "The minorities question may be regarded as satisfactorily concluded", he reported. "The Armenian homeland matter is also drawing to an end. It is notable that the respected American delegate did not participate at all in the debate".⁸² With the speeches at this session, the representatives of the Allied Powers were satisfied that they had performed their final duties towards the Armenians and could now pursue their own interests without distraction. At a meeting between American representative Grew and chief Turkish delegate İsmet Paşa on 14 January, at which both sides expounded their views, the Armenian question was not even mentioned.⁸³ American President W. C. Harding, in a letter dated 15 January 1923 to Secretary of State Hughes, said that the Turkish refusal to grant a national home to the Armenians had disappointed religious circles in America, but that not much could be done for the Armenians, as even their fiercest supporters were not prepared to contemplate war on their behalf.⁸⁴

When the Armenian question was closed in this way at the peace talks, the Armenian Delegation in Lausanne sent a telegram to London on 10 January 1923, asking that the matter be kept on the agenda, and that the British delegates at Lausanne be instructed not to sign the agreement before the Armenian question had been resolved.⁸⁵ Naville, president of the *Ligue Internationale Philarménienne*, visited Lord Curzon on 20 January and together they reviewed the situation. Naville asked that before the conference closed the Allies issue a declaration to the effect that they did not regard the Armenian question as resolved. He explained that such a declaration would keep Armenian hopes alive. Curzon replied that issuing such declaration would be giving false hopes to the Armenians, upon which Naville asked that an international commission be set up to deal with the problems of Armenian refugees in European countries.⁸⁶ On 2 February, the Armenian Delegation reiterated these requests to the Allied

⁸² *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. I, pp. 360-361.

⁸³ Grew, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 534-535.

⁸⁴ Armaoğlu, *op. cit.*, p. 521 from *Papers*, Vol. II, p. 950.

⁸⁵ Concerning this submission, it writes on the British Foreign Office file that the government/Foreign Office had done its best, and that the Armenians should actually blame the French. See: FO, 371/9106, pp. 58-59.

⁸⁶ FO, 839/12, No. 1128.

delegates.⁸⁷ Armenian leaders in Lausanne arranged private talks with a Turkish Delegation and attempted, sometimes with threats and sometimes pleas, to wrest some promises concerning an Armenian home, but to no avail.⁸⁸ The Armenian Delegation also applied for assistance from France and Italy, and the Armenian Friends Society from Russia. France was asked not to recognise the decisions of a conference which had not taken Armenian demands into consideration; while Italy was asked that if the resolution concerning an Armenian home could not be obtained at Lausanne, at least the establishment of an Armenian homeland in principle be incorporated into the treaty, and the implementation of the principle made the responsibility of the League of Nations or a special commission. Russia was asked to conclude a special agreement with Turkey, which would extend the boundaries of the Caucasian Armenian Republic as far as Van and Bitlis. But from no quarter did they receive a satisfactory reply. Russia responded with a letter, dated 25 January 1923, saying only that the country would admit a certain number of Armenian refugees.⁸⁹ When the Armenian Delegation was given no assistance by either the Allied Powers or the Soviet Union for a homeland, they wrote a letter to the League of Nations on 25 January. Referring to resolutions earlier taken in their favour by the League of Nations, they requested that their situation be discussed at the assembly to be held on 29 January, explaining that they had not entirely lost hope at Lausanne, but wished for the backing of the assembly.⁹⁰ A second long letter was written shortly afterwards to the League of Nations by the Armenian Delegation in Lausanne. Speaking of the promises of the Allies, Armenian services to the French in the *Légion d'Orient*, and the situation of refugees in various countries, they declared that the only solution was the establishment of an Armenian homeland for which they asked support.⁹¹

⁸⁷ FO, 839/12, No. 1402.

⁸⁸ Dr. Rıza Nur'un Lozan Hatıraları, pp. 123-128.

⁸⁹ Uras, *op. cit.*, pp. 732-734. In a telegram which İsmet Paşa sent to Ankara on 24 December 1922, he relates a meeting between himself and Georgy V. Chicherin. Apparently, the Armenians had come to Chicherin and asked for land for the refugees, and he had promised to grant land in Russia. Since this meeting took place at the end of December, it is evident that the Armenians had already realised that their demands for an Armenian home would not be met. See: *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. I, p. 273.

⁹⁰ FO, 371/9101, pp. 73-77.

⁹¹ On the file containing this letter in the British Foreign Office Archive, it writes, "most of this is perfectly true. But there is nothing more that can be done". See: FO, 371/9109, pp. 90-98.

When the Armenian representatives realised that they were not going to get what they wanted at Lausanne, they issued a statement on 2 February 1923, and departed. In this statement they spoke of the countless services rendered by the Armenians to the Allied Powers during the First World War; that above all they had formed the nucleus of the *Légion d'Orient* which had won such renown in Palestine and Cilicia; that they had fought alone on the borders of Caucasia in 1918; that they had prevented the Turks from advancing on the British Army and on Iraq; that in the course of these activities they had suffered enormous losses of life and property, for which figures had been given in their previous declaration; that none of the promises made to them at the time of performing these services and in subsequent years by various quarters had been fulfilled at this conference; that the Allied Powers had deserted the Armenian cause; and that they wanted the Allies to turn their attention again to this matter.⁹²

Armenian representatives sent letter after letter to both representatives of the Allied Powers and to the League of Nations, tirelessly reiterating their demands. In the end, the British stopped replying to these letters.⁹³ When the Lausanne talks were discontinued on 4 February 1923, the Armenians saw this as giving fresh hope for an Armenian homeland. But the Allies were not of the same opinion. On 27 March chairman of the Armenian Delegation, A. Aharonian, wrote to Lord Curzon requesting that he revive the question of Armenian home when negotiations resumed. In his reply dated 4 April, Curzon stated, "While it is not anticipated that there will be a new opportunity of raising the question of an Armenian home at the forthcoming negotiations, the matter will be borne in mind in case such opportunity may occur".⁹⁴ France, meanwhile, temporised by giving Armenian Delegation the impression that, although wishing to do something for them, they were hindered by the failure to obtain the support of Britain. On 25 April Armenian delegate L. Pachalian applied to the British Government, saying that France desired the establishment of an Armenian home under the auspices of the League of Nations,

⁹² For the entire text of this memorandum, see Uras, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxvi-xxxviii.

⁹³ Curzon did not even reply to the memorandum sent to him by the Armenian representatives in Paris on 2 February. In response to an application to himself on this subject made on 15 March, it was said: "We have done what we can for the Armenians. We did not think it necessary to reply to the memorandum". FO, 371/9109, pp. 155-163.

⁹⁴ FO, 371/9109, pp. 175-179.

and asking what Britain's opinion was on this matter and what course it intended to take. British documents show that Britain did not take France's promise on this matter seriously: it was said that the French had made no mention to them about establishing an Armenian homeland in Syria, and asked how much money France intended to allocate for such an objective.⁹⁵

After the Armenian question was thus dropped from the agenda at the Lausanne talks, reports were received that even before the peace treaty was signed, Greece and France were arranging for Armenian militants to enter Turkey and encouraging them to engage in seditious activities; upon which the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne sent a note to the conference secretariat on 12 May protesting the situation.⁹⁶ A few days later, news was received that the Dashnag and Hinchag headquarters in Germany had sent two groups to Switzerland to assassinate the Turkish Delegation, and on 16 May 1923, İsmet Paşa wrote letters to the chairmen of the British, French and Italian Delegations in Lausanne informing them of this situation and protesting it. On 18 May Turkey's representative in Paris sent a note to the French Foreign Ministry.⁹⁷ In response to this news the Council of the Armenian Patriarchate in İstanbul issued an announcement accusing the Allies, who had made certain unacceptable demands at Lausanne, of spreading such rumours, explaining that the Armenians now realised where their own interests lay, and wished to maintain amicable relations with the Turks. This announcement disturbed the British.⁹⁸

During the second phase of the Lausanne Conference, the question of the Armenians who had left Turkey being allowed to return was discussed. At a meeting of the first commission on 19 May, Rumbold said that the non-Muslims and particularly Armenians who had left Turkey following the Turkish victory in the War of Independence from fear of harm, and who were not included in the population exchange, had not been able to return; and that the Turkish Government should not prevent them returning. Montagna of Italy and Pellé of France supported him.

⁹⁵ FO, 371/9110, pp. 14-20.

⁹⁶ For the letter in question, see: *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. II, p. 273.

⁹⁷ For the letters in question, see: *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 308-309.

⁹⁸ FO, 371/9110, pp. 58-60.

İsmet Paşa said that he would consult Ankara,⁹⁹ and on the evening of the same day reported on the discussions and asked for instructions on this issue.¹⁰⁰ At the session on 22 May of the General Amnesty Sub-commission, the subject was debated again. In the telegram which İsmet Paşa sent to Ankara the same evening, he said that although he had refused to enter into any undertaking about the return of the Armenians who had left the country, in accordance with the terms of the population exchange agreement it would not be appropriate to object to the return of those who had left İstanbul.¹⁰¹ In Ankara's reply dated 23 May, it was stated that the government was opposed to the return of those who had collaborated with the enemy and fled from Turkey at the approach of the Turkish army.¹⁰²

The Armenian Delegation applied to Britain on 31 May with the request that provisions be incorporated into the treaty concerning the Armenians and Armenian property.¹⁰³ The *Ligue Internationale Philarménienne* sent telegrams on 1 June to the conference chairman and the British Foreign Office asking that provisions be included permitting the return of Armenians to Turkey.¹⁰⁴ The same requests were repeated on 2 June.¹⁰⁵ The British replied that they had done all they could in this regard.¹⁰⁶ At the meeting of the first commission on 4 June, Rumbold brought up once again the question of those Armenians who had emigrated from Turkey. Ryan and Pellé supported him. İsmet Paşa explained that innocent people would not be prevented from returning individually, but that he could give no guarantee that returns *en masse* would be permitted.¹⁰⁷

⁹⁹ *Lozan Tutanakları*, T. II, C. 1, K. 1, Ankara, A. Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1972, pp. 121-125.

¹⁰⁰ *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. II, pp. 323-324.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 335.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 337.

¹⁰³ FO, 371/9110, pp. 91-97.

¹⁰⁴ FO, 371/9110, pp. 81-87; FO, 839/52, p. 646.

¹⁰⁵ FO, 839/52, No. 646.

¹⁰⁶ *Idem.*

¹⁰⁷ *Lozan Tutanakları*, T. II, C. 1, K. 1, pp. 157-163. In his telegram concerning this session, İsmet Paşa said: "Since we had explicitly stated a view on this point, it was to our advantage that the Allies did not insist. If this issue is not instigated again at another opportunity, the question of the return of the Armenian refugees will be closed with our explicit refusal in verbal statements". *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. II, pp. 395-396. In his telegram about the issues still undecided by the conference as of 7 June, and the possible means of resolving these issues, İsmet Paşa said that there was discussion of allowing those Armenians who had left the country earlier or later to return under a

On 2 July the Armenians applied to the British Foreign Office once more asking that those of them who had left the country be allowed to return. The reply, dated 7 July, was a vague "your request will be taken into consideration". On the British Foreign Office file containing this document is a note reading, "it is useless to go on trying to defend an indefensible position".¹⁰⁸ Meanwhile, a pro-Armenian campaign led by the Protestant and Catholic churches was in full flood. On 5-6 May the Federation of Belgian Catholic Societies issued a demand for Armenian independence,¹⁰⁹ and on 28 June the Irish Presbyterian Church asked that promises formerly made to the Armenians be kept.¹¹⁰

At a special session on 11 July, Rumbold announced that a law had been enacted by the Turkish Parliament under which Armenian, Greek and Albanian Turkish citizens who had served the British were to be deported. Subsequently, it was discovered that no such law had been passed.¹¹¹ At the final session of the Lausanne peace talks on 17 July, Rumbold brought up the question of Armenians returning to Turkey again, and the other representatives supported his views. İsmet Paşa again said that they could give no undertaking on this question. The debate came to an end.¹¹² The subject was closed, as Turkey wished.¹¹³

In the Lausanne Peace Treaty, signed on 24 July 1923, there is no mention of the Armenians.¹¹⁴ Subsequently, on 27 July, the Joint Council of British Armenian Societies applied to the British Foreign Office, saying that promises made to the Armenians had not been kept at Lausanne, and that Britain should at least assist

general amnesty, but that they had rejected this suggestion. See: *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. II, p. 410. In a reply from the British Foreign Office to the Armenians on 20 June, it said that the Allied delegates had conveyed their requests concerning the Armenians to the Turkish Delegation; that there was little they could do at this stage; and advising them to win public support through the press. FO, 371/9110, pp. 91-97.

¹⁰⁸ FO, 371/9110, pp. 117-123.

¹⁰⁹ FO, 371/9110, pp. 37-38.

¹¹⁰ FO, 371/9110, pp. 124-128.

¹¹¹ *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. II, pp. 562-563.

¹¹² *Lozan Tutanakları*, T. II, C. 1, K. 1, pp. 190-194.

¹¹³ *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. II, p. 581. At that time Turkish and United States Delegations at Lausanne were holding meetings concerning a possible agreement. In a telegram dated 26 July sent by Ankara to İsmet Paşa, he was asked not to enter into any undertaking that would allow the Armenians to return to Turkey. See: *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. II, pp. 610-611.

¹¹⁴ The Turkish, British, French, Italian, Japanese, Greek and Rumanian delegates signed the Lausanne Peace Treaty. Annexed agreements and protocols also carry the signatures of the Soviet Union, Belgium, Portugal and Bulgaria.

Armenian refugees and with reuniting families that had been separated. This request was passed over with a comment about waiting until Turkey joined the League of Nations.¹¹⁵ On 2 August the Armenians requested assistance for themselves, and that the committee be set up under the auspices of the League of Nations for the establishment of an Armenian homeland, and that this committee either be under the patronage of the Allies or formed by the Allies. This request was rejected on financial grounds, with the comment that only the League of Nations could attempt such an undertaking.¹¹⁶ In letters to the League of Nations and Allied Powers on 9 August 1923, the Armenians expressed their disappointment and opposition to the Lausanne Treaty. They demanded that something be done.¹¹⁷ Britain and the other Allies passed over these letters in silence. A similar letter was sent to the foreign ministries of the Allied Powers on 22 August.¹¹⁸ On 23 August L. Pachalian, on behalf of the Armenian delegates, applied to Britain, saying that the French Government wished the Armenian question to be put before the League of Nations, with a reminder that Britain and Italy had asked them to wait until the Lausanne Conference was over, and asking what Britain's views were on this matter. The British reply stated only that the letter of 23 August had been received.¹¹⁹ A. Aharonian wrote to the Italian Government on 4 September, saying that promises made to the Armenians at Sèvres and in the other treaties had not been kept at Lausanne, and protesting the treaty. The Italians, assuming that the same letter had been sent to the British, consulted the British about their opinion so that their reply would reflect a joint Allied view. In their reply to the Italian Government on 17 September, Britain said that they had received numerous letters to this effect over the previous six weeks; that the intentions of the Armenians were to oblige the Allies to assist them, to enable Armenian refugees to settle in the three Allied countries, or to persuade the

¹¹⁵ FO, 371/9110, pp. 142-147.

¹¹⁶ FO, 371/9110, pp. 152-162.

¹¹⁷ On 9 August 1923, the Republic of Armenia wrote a letter to the League of Nations explaining that the issue had not been resolved but remained unaltered, and asking that it be put onto the agenda again by some means. In a protest document written to the representatives of the Allied Powers on the same date, they said that the Armenian nation, which had fought for its independence as a result of the shining promises of the Allies, had been forgotten; and that they opposed the Lausanne Treaty. For the full text of their letter, see: Uras, *op. cit.*, pp. 736-738.

¹¹⁸ FO, 371/9110, pp. 172-179.

¹¹⁹ FO, 371/9111, pp. 6-10.

British Government to take the problem to the League of Nations; and that they had merely acknowledged receipt of these documents in their replies.¹²⁰

The Lausanne Peace Treaty recognised the existing borders of the Turkish Republic and its status as an independent and sovereign state. The birth of this new state in Anatolia and in the Balkans was completed at Lausanne.¹²¹ At Lausanne, "the age of the Ottoman state, with its territories spread over three continents, sea, estates, property, rights, laws, receivables, debts, commercial privileges, capitulations, and all other paraphernalia, was ended".¹²² The Armenians, who for half a century had been deceived by promises made by the major powers into being exploited against the Turks, with whom they had coexisted for centuries, were thus abandoned by those same states at Lausanne, and left alone with their own sufferings and those they had caused. The Armenian question, which had been a preoccupation of the last period of Ottoman history, was dealt with at Lausanne, and the matter closed along with many others. The Lausanne system remains valid today. Yet despite this, an issue that is quite clearly not for the benefit of the Armenians is still revived by some governments, sometimes from a desire to gain the support of Armenian lobbies at election times, and sometimes as a means of exerting pressure on Turkey to obtain concessions.

¹²⁰ FO, 371/9111, pp. 36-41.

¹²¹ *Lozan Telgrafları*, Vol. II, p. ix.

¹²² *Idem*.

FACING "ORIGINAL SIN" OR "REALITIES": MEDITATIONS ON THE ARMENIAN "GENOCIDE"

Süleyman Seyfi Ögün

Modern law, by separating justice from simple revenge and reprisal, signifies a distinctive jurisprudential achievement. It is this cold-bloodedness of modern law which at the same time has caused a widespread unease in the eyes of the public.

One of the clichés of American detective movies, which we are quite familiar with, deals with this unease. An honest policeman who is duty-bound to bring the guilty man to justice through "strong-arm methods" is, however, prevented by his chief who represents the "establishment". The arrogant behaviour of the guilty man has already convinced us of the justice of these methods. Usually, following this cliché, the policeman's use of these methods results in his dismissal from the investigation. He returns his gun and badge. Indeed, this dismissal is a relief and helps him to finish the case in the way he wishes. In the end of the film, we - to put into Wilhelm Reich's words, the "Little Men" - feel our grievances have been compensated for to a certain level.

If the agreement between crime and punishment at the personal level is so controversial, it will be much more complicated when dealing with more complicated cases. It is certainly true for the historical ones. The relationship between historical events and law is still vague and a matter for legal academics.

One of the practical problems of hearing a historical case, i.e., civil war or genocide stems from an inability to "personalize" the crime. Because it is clear that such cases involve the complex interference of various institutions, which seems hard to "personalize". In other words, it is extremely difficult to identify the murderers and those who give them their orders. Even though the decision-makers, initiators and protagonists can be captured more easily, there still remains a gap to be bridged. The scale of the crime, for instance the number of the victims, is so huge that even

the most rigorous investigations will probably not satisfy the public's conscience.

Such a case is quite obvious in *state-sponsored genocide*.¹ Many participants, who took active part in torture and murder, have defended themselves by saying "we were only obeying orders". The strict hierarchies and official rankings in the modern state enable the guilty people to deny their responsibility. Many accused have resorted to similar clichés when their Nazi pasts were revealed. It is quite clear that in such vague cases the number of people prosecuted will be far less than expected.

The above-mentioned case can clearly be observed in the Nuremberg (Nürnberg) War Crimes Trials that investigated the *Holocaust*. Some of the prominent Nazi leaders, including Hitler, had committed suicide. The Nuremberg Trials only punished those who had given the orders, not the ones who had committed the murders. The number of the suspects, as compared to millions of victims, that is, the Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals and Poles has nullified the entire process. Where were the other participants—the actual murderers, witnesses, the people who ignored what was happening?

The unprecedented gap between the murderers and victims has shaped one of the dominant problematic of post-war moral philosophy. The French moralist, essayist and novelist J. P. Sartre, in one of his masterpieces, *The Altona Prisoners*, tackles this issue. The main character in the play is an aristocrat, an ex-Nazi official. He has imprisoned himself in his ancestral castle. Though the war has finished, he refuses to believe or accept it. He keeps on dressing in Nazi uniform and reading newspapers dating from the 1940s which report the early victories of the *Wehrmacht*. One night, after many years, he leaves his "prison", where time has been frozen and goes into the local town. Hundreds of "happy Germans" are enjoying themselves in a festive, carnival-like atmosphere, drinking and singing. Nobody notices him in his uniform since masked balls are being held at the time. With the word Sartre has masterly philosophised, he feels a deep "nausea". Suddenly, he finds himself in front of a theater where a Brecht play is being performed. He bursts into the hall. He has been

¹ Matthew Krain, "State Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and Policies", *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 41/3 (1997), EBSCHO HOST, Item Number 9707102413, p. 2.

trembling and his mouth is dry. An actor, playing Hitler, is seen giving one of his speeches with the familiar tone, mimics and gestures. A few others have gathered around his podium with their coats and hats on, clapping their charismatic leader. He cannot help jumping onto the stage and turning to the spectators, shouts in an angry voice: "Where are your hats?"

The *Holocaust* shows the widening gap between murderers and victims. Here lies the vagueness of those responsible, or "grey consciences".² The law has found no solution to this problem so far. Because it is nearly impossible to get at the root of the matter. "Grey consciences" may encompass almost an entire society with a wide spectrum of responsibility within it.

The afore-mentioned unbridgeable gap has had a traumatic effect on Western moral life and caused a "Holocaust-obsession syndrome". It seems that the *Holocaust* has become a code that signifies the evil in society.³ Facing the *Holocaust* has been unavoidable in Western consciousness for a few generations. By resorting to Barthesian methodology or Foucauldian genealogy, this indeed can be viewed in the cultural continuum of a deep-rooted Western religious practice, called as "facing original sin" and "confession". Original sin has been preached as an eternal and insuperable fact by the church throughout history. The *Holocaust* now exhibits a similar syndrome as the secular form of it.

The other trend, on the contrary, is to seek new *Holocausts* in the world. Relativisation and reflecting the *Holocaust* seems to be the consequences of "the symbolic effect of the *Holocaust*".⁴ Here, the Western mind seeks new examples of genocide in the world in order to ease the permanent moral pressures that are been applied onto human consciences. These two trends, though seeming to be contrary, in the final analyses are the two faces of the same coin. The historical event referred to by some circles as the Armenian genocide (1915) is the most recent example of this. It is a myth or a fiction. Making sense of the history of "the Armenian question" referring to the history of the *Holocaust* should be seen as a simple historical error that can only be made by some politicians.

² Stephen Eric Bronner, "Making Sense of Hell: Three Meditations on the Holocaust", *Political Studies*, 47/2(1999), EBSCHO HOST, Item Number: 1949222, p. 4.

³ Yehuda Bauer, "The Impact of the Holocaust", *Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Sciences*, 548 (1996), EBSCHO HOST, Item Number: 9701101649, p. 1.

⁴ Bronner, "Making Sense of Hell", *op. cit.*, pp. 7-14.

The *Holocaust*, willingly or unwillingly, has re-shaped the European political moral world. The most striking feature of this process is the degeneration of the limits of the political field. The above-mentioned weakness and the disfunctionalization of the judicial field when met with cases like the *Holocaust* have worked as the basic impetus in this development. Having been disfunctionalised to some extent, the judicial field has left the initiatives mostly to politics and especially to political morality. This denotes the growth of the political field, so as to fall beyond the basic distinction that once was drawn by Montesquieu and put itself in place of judicial power. The recent and most typical example of this is the law passed in the French Parliament, accepting the idea of "the Armenian genocide".

Political Histories, Civil Histories and the Three Variables

Here arises another problematical point, denoting the complex relations between the modern historiographies and politics. Presumably, the materials which were the sources for the French law were derived from one-sided, biased historiographies, mostly published by Armenian or pro-Armenian historians. It may perhaps be more accurate to state that the French politicians were merely after satisfying a section of their electorate. Here, one does not help recalling Paul Valéry's ironic views on history: "History is the most dangerous chemical that has ever been produced in the laboratory of ideas". Using historiographies in politics has always been easy but burdensome as well. Historiographical texts are not unquestionable divine texts, and if the French parliamentarians had studied and used other sources, the result would have been very different.

Findings hitherto have already revealed that the events of 1915 were horrific for both Armenians and Turks. The Armenian population of eastern Anatolia was deported, and many of them lost their lives during their dramatic journey. Moreover, the Armenian insurgents took the lives of numerous Turks, Kurds and Circassians. Recalling Albert Camus, now, we are at a critical point: reject debates involving *the algebra of blood*, instead focus on civil histories, which I believe, would make us aware of the facts such as the extensive co-habitation which existed amongst the grandparents of today's hostile communities. Certain facts have been kept and others neglected in political histories, resulting in one view of the past. The first step to be taken is to bring all the

facts together and by studying the historical co-habitation patterns of various given communities to see if there is hope for the future. If this is done, the real reason why the *Holocaust* is unique will appear. It is the state of absolute despair, the clear historical-civil experiences that the continent had exhibited until the *Holocaust*.

Today, by standing on the historical continuum, we easily come to understand the recorded processes paving the way for the *Holocaust*. In order to judge whether 1915 was a *Holocaust* or a genocide or not, we ought to apply the same variables to the Armenian case. The *Holocaust* appears to be the reasonable consequence of three factors. First of all, it stems from a tradition of an everlasting fanatical religious discrimination in feudal Europe. Secondly, this dark background has been consolidated through the state-building and nation-building processes. To sum up, the *Holocaust* is the cumulative result of three variables: religious discrimination, ethnic discrimination and the irresistible and destructive physical power of the modern state.⁵

The Tradition of Ethno-Religious Fanaticism and The Holocaust

Within the framework of feudal history, we see step by step how Jews were driven into their dark fate through their presence in Europe. Their fate in Europe, indeed, had brought no change in their historical fortune. On the contrary, compared to their previous sufferings, they had experienced in the Ancient World, the new threats were much more frightening. Almost everywhere in Europe they were the subjects of Christian persecution. The hatred of Jews was an unquestionable feature of the pre-industrial era.

As is known, Platonian imperatives give their colour to almost the entire establishment realm of the antique world entailing the strict control of every aspect of "degenerated" life -*doxa*- by *Politeia*, or political power, in a Platonic sense. The heretic realm of *doxa*, according to Plato, should not be left uncontrolled. Excess was the key factor, threatening the stability of *Politeia*, the unique civilized and prudent form of living.

Following his reasoning, the Neo-Platonists of the Alexandria School formulated their master's views by blending them with Stoicism and Aristotle's mildness. Here, one is faced with the

⁵ Bauer, "The Impact of the Holocaust", *op. cit.*, p. 1.

founding principles of Rome. Feudal history, in the cultural sense, means the bursting of Platonian heritage and the atomisation of its components. This also meant returning to the sources of sophism that had been condemned by Plato. It is indisputable that feudal atomisation gave way to the emergence of deep-rooted automian practices and contributed to exploring the pluralistic aspects of life, by which Europe and the West in general today is proud of. But on the other side of the coin, there lies the terrible history of parochialism, intolerance and conflicts among communities.

The advent of the Catholic churches asserting religio-political ideas, provoking and pushing masses into hazardous ventures, in a way, was due to the independency they had obtained in post-Platonic era. It is beyond doubt that, throughout the prolonged history of indoctrination even in the modern era, the most convincing ways of creating hostility amongst communities, where human beings unconditionally accepted killing and being killed, focused on the sphere of organised religious beliefs since they eternally have monopolized the most calming response to the widespread fear of death.

By taking into consideration the remarks above, it can be said that Jews, who have experienced the ancient forms of persecution conducted by the Egyptians, Babylonians and Romans, were now encountering the medieval form of it. There was no way out for Jews. They were being denigrated both for their mysticism and rationalism, poverty and wealth. On the other hand, the hostility directed at them was not limited to Catholicism. They were the subject of a far worse, much more extreme humiliation under the reign of Orthodoxy in Russia.⁶ Besides, Protestantism was, by no means, a salvation for them, since antisemitism was deeply stressed in the writings of Luther.

Mercantile developments in the history of the state, not only inherited antisemitism with all aspects, but also went much further. The organised church could have never been as hazardous as an organised state power. Newly, the profane administrative aspect, maintaining secular desires was now being added to the previous sources of religious discrimination and humiliation. It meant that the potential religious hostilities were prone to be sharpened and much more overtly voiced. In the countries where

⁶ Bronner, "Making Sense of Hell", *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 9.

Catholicism and Orthodoxy were linked to the power of the state, this trend was much more striking. The bloody extermination/deportations of Jewish and Muslim populations in the Iberian Peninsula and the massacres of Protestants by Catholics in France (St. Bartholomew) are the two conventional examples to show this.

The overlapping of religion/church and politics/state have increased the effects of antisemitism and thereby, the sufferings of the Jews. But in the 19th century, a fresh and energetic power -nationalism- was added to the legacy of religious hatred. Ethnocentric ego-expansions, exalted by historical pantheistic worldviews, soon became the secular religion of the modern states. Nationalism, coupled with running debates over the existing frontiers, destabilized the entire continent.

Departing from the early 19th century, having been inspired by the *zeitgeist* of the age, the desire towards nationalist historiography was spreading among the newly awakening intelligentsia of the Balkan countries who had been under the control of the Ottoman Empire. The successful pattern of the Greek uprising was becoming the main model for the others. It should be noted that these movements were fuelled and patronized by the Western great powers that were actively supporting the Eastern question, thereby endeavouring to increase their shares in a possible repartition.

The ethno-religious structures, which had remained untouched up to that time, were the main springs legitimising such interferences. Catholic France and Orthodox Russia, in close contact with native churches, were running effective policies against the Ottoman Empire, thanks to their patronage of their co-religionists. Therefore, at this stage, nationalistic historiography was crucial to anti-Ottoman and separatist indoctrination.

At the beginning of the 20th century (1918) the project of eliminating the political existence of the Ottoman Empire was achieved. Newly born nation-states replacing the Ottoman Empire accelerated and concentrated their efforts on severing all cultural ties which would serve to remind of the Ottoman past.

Strictly engaged in the friend and foe distinction, modern historiographies were anxious to erect sub-histories that they believe belonged to the pure nation. These partial, homogenous histories, though consistent with the standards of scientific

historicism, may be viewed to have brought some aspects of the past into light. However, they are not free from being superficial since they neglect ties linking them to a broader historical environment. To put in other words, throughout the Near East and Middle East, modern historical consciousness is derived from this neglect.

For instance, the average Turkish person accepts 1453 as the departure point of a new age and boasts of achieving their historical mission by ending the "festering" Byzantium Empire. The 29th of May is the day celebrating the 'Turkifying' of Constantinople, which became İstanbul after the capture of the city. Every year this monumental day is celebrated with great celebrations. However, Greeks marking the anniversary of a national catastrophe also mourn the same day. Whilst feasts are held in İstanbul, funeral bells are heard in Athens.

This sort of self-blinding may be seen as a pre-requisite from the viewpoint of modern political ontology. But it denotes a tragic break in the mentalities of millions of people living in the Near and Middle Eastern regions. However, a quick glance at the heterogeneous (at least not as homogenous as it has been assumed) cultural histories, obscured by the mentioned ontological imperatives, will make us feel that they have much more to tell us than the simplifications of historical-political theologies.

Above all, we ought to adjust our mentalities to a broader history, one that partial and purified histories are subject to. If this is done, it will clearly be seen that the emergence of the Ottoman Empire in the Near and Middle East was not so revolutionary by its very nature, causing radical changes in the existing lives of the inhabitants of the mentioned zone. On the contrary, it points out an era of restoration of some deteriorated processes, parallel with the weakening of Byzantium, which native inhabitants in both patrician and plebeian spheres were well acquainted with.

In order to grasp the underlying transformation, one also ought to get rid of the simplification, stressing and exaggerating the replacement of *the cross* with *the crescent*. It is actually not that simple. The formation of the Ottoman Empire does not mean the end of Rome, instead reinvigorating it. The mentioned process means the restoration of the Platonian antiquity in Islamic terms.

Here are a few pieces of evidence to "back-up" this argument. First of all, the Ottoman Empire arose in parallel to the dissolution of the Roman legacy in Europe. The weakening of the Byzantium Empire had destabilized the peace sustained and guaranteed by the political power-*Politeia*. Dissolving processes were aggravating the circumstances of the components that were in close contact with the Turks rather than the central agents to whom they were responsible in word only. This gave way to the birth of new and enriched experiences between the Turks and the local elites. On the other hand, the disintegration of Byzantium increased and hardened local exploitation. The old vendettas between communities, which had been forgotten or shelved under the Byzantines, began to re-surface. The Ottomans, as the time went on, were becoming a promising power, capable of restoring the desired peace and justice in the eye of the plebeian sphere as well as the local patricians.

What is more important is that the Ottoman Empire arose in a historical-geographical zone (the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor) where the Roman way of life, with its traditions and institutions had been deeply rooted. The early formative stages of the Ottoman Empire are somehow obscured in modern historiographies. The early stages of the Ottoman Empire are better to be read as a history of assimilation and transformation of all sides within each other.⁷ In order to revitalize the Platonic norms, rather than the encountering of rival histories and the one-sided assimilation, the mysteries of this over-neglected history seems to be a rich source of information. By focusing on this area, we get a golden opportunity, enabling us to witness-to quote the striking formulae of a distinguished Turkish historian- the establishment of the *Last (Third) Rome*.⁸

Here, the diversity in the belief system is not to be exaggerated. Indeed, the behaviour of the Ottoman sultans sets a good example for us. None of the Ottoman sultans, including Selim I (1512-20), who conquered part of the Arab world, used the symbols of the *Caliphate*. It was only Abdülhamid II (1878-1908), who claimed this title for some practical, mostly defensive reasons. Within the limits of the imperial correspondence some of them preferred to

⁷ Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, California, University of California Press, 1995, p. 22.

⁸ İlber Ortaylı, "Osmanlı Barışı", *Türkiye Günüğü*, Ankara, 58 (1999), p. 17.

use the title of "Roman Caesar" instead of *Caliph-Sultan of Islam*. This manner shows us how they assimilated Roman traditions and portrayed themselves as "quasi-Roman Emperors". The Romans had first met the cultural codes of the Platonic paradigm with the Stoic version of them and later with the Christian version. What the Ottomans did was to convert these into Islamic terms.

The *Third Rome*, as a Platonic structure, represents distinctive characteristics. The most distinctive characteristic was related to the agglomeration of various agents- economy, religion, law, morals, etc. in *Politeia* that crystallized as the supreme establishment. None of these agents could have a separate meaning and act as an autonomous entity. In accordance with the Platonic principles this would mean deprivation.

Within the context of state-religion relations, the Byzantines had adhered to *Caesaropapism*, inherited from the Romans. Here the religious sphere was not left wandering and not allowed to constitute a rival power. To put it simply, the *sword* and the *law* would gain priority and overcome *belief*.

Also, we are aware of the fact that the Ottomans had some historical advantages easing their attempts to meet with the Platonic legacy of the Ancient World. One of them appears to be related to *Sunnism*. Unlike the rival Muslim sect *Shiism*, which at times allowed a disciplined and effective clergy who perceive themselves as independent and above state affairs, *Sunnism*, due to the weakening of the *Caliphate* (especially in the post-Abbasid period), had experienced a different pattern. This ended, first, with the disappearance of the manipulative power of the *belief* over the *sword* and *law-making*. The independence of *law-making* and *warfare* processes in *Sunni* tradition reversed the relations in favour of themselves. Religious agencies would no longer be a rival to them; on the contrary, they would be dependent on their manipulations.

The formation of the Ottoman concept of "*din-ü devlet*" (Caliph-Sultan) shows that the assertions attributing to it a pure Islamic core are worthless. Islam constitutes merely the discursive aspect of the state affairs of the Third Rome. The Ottoman history is much better understood as a pragmatic, but not as a dogmatic history. It is certain that religion kept on playing its crucial role in legitimising the Ottoman policies. But whilst achieving this task,

religious agencies could have never acted by resting on its own initiatives.

The formation of Ottoman power never gave the religious agencies the opportunity of interfering or getting involved in the existing religious conflicts at the level of actual community lives. Since the political sphere, in which serious and critical warfare and law-making processes required prudence -but not fanaticism- was organised to prevent such interferences. *Politeia* would never accept heresies of the heterodoxy that were found to be the most threatening for the establishment,⁹ to be involved in her orthodoxy. The very existence of *Caesaropapism* was the most essential resistance point to such developments. As compared to the Church, which by itself was partisan in religious conflicts with its militant clergy, the Islamic orthodoxy of the Third Rome, with *Sunni* theologians exhibiting moderate and respectful manners, looks very different.

What has been set forth hitherto may help to show that attempts to find a religious, antisemitic like basis for the deaths in the Armenian relocations of 1915 is incorrect. The realities hidden in the Ottoman version of *Caesaropapism* prevent us from drawing such a conclusion. This also self-evidently makes it impossible to draw a parallel between the *Holocaust*-like genocide and the Armenian relocations in 1915. Does this resettlement ever have some roots in the ethnic sphere? Dealing with this question will inevitably force us to focus on two important matters: the *millet* system and *devşirme* system.

The Ethnic Sphere, the Idea of Genocide and the Ottomans

The *devşirme* system refers to large-scale attempts of the political authorities to recruit military and civilian personnel. One of the reasons showing the fallacy of relating 1915 to the *Holocaust* stems from misunderstanding the *devşirme* system. Modern political theologies have considered the *devşirme* system as one of the most tragic aspects of "Ottoman cruelty". Indeed, it seems hard to justify this practice if viewed from the modern humanitarian point of view. Gathering little Christian children at an age when they most needed their parents, erasing their memories concerning their homeland, subjecting them to a disciplined indoctrination

⁹ Colin Imber, "The Ottoman Dynastic Myth", *Turcica*, Paris/Strasbourg, XIX (1987), p. 23.

where they were alienated from everything except their duties in the service of the state are all deemed to be unacceptable in the eyes of the members of modern societies, formed in accordance with family-based bourgeois ideology. But if we can manage to view the *devşirme* system cold-bloodedly for a while, we will get the chance to comprehend it in its normality.

Initially, it can be said that the *devşirme* system as a coercive assimilation, if once compared to the assimilation run by the modern nation-state, can relatively be treated as of little importance. First of all, the assimilation techniques exercised by the nation-state seem to be milder than the coercive techniques of the *devşirme* system. The scale of alienation, on the other hand, which springs from the modern educational processes, is supposed to be much greater and irreversible. One should call it irreversible, because indoctrination hidden in civilized forms of education emerges with the assertion of earning the nation her pseudo "objective past". It is indeed this assertion that makes the alienation process irreversible.

Indeed, the *devşirme* process in the Ottoman Empire is better to be seen as the equivalent of the modern meritocracy in the pre-industrial world. On the other hand, thanks to the *devşirme* process the Ottoman court society isolated itself from the conventional life. This process was designed for the sake of the authority of the state. Due to the *devşirme* process, not only the untouchability of *Politeia* and its qualification were granted, but also conditions were matured convincing and spreading from above to the bottom the idea that the political system belonged to none of the existing ethno-religious entities but embracing them all at once. One of the most crucial concepts of the Ottoman state, creating a world order was interwoven with the *millet* system to serve this aim. Due to the *devşirme* system, many of direct ties with the founding ethnic group -the Muslim Turcomans- were cut off. Resulting from this, it can be said that the *devşirme* system was run against the founding principle of the Turkoman tribes, identifying the state with ethnicity. This was the most crucial point, distinguishing the Ottoman pattern from others, for instance the rival Safavids of Iran. It is also noteworthy that *Nizam-ı Âlem* (General Order) as the key principle guiding the fundamental mission of the state, to a certain degree, meant the authority of it over every-day lives and mostly used authoritative methods but not authoritarian ones.

Ottoman Warfare Tradition and Carnages

The *devşirme* system, though it sounds negative, was a system of privilege as well as responsibility. But what is striking is that the gates of the political and administrative sphere, after the late 15th century -that is, the reign of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror- until the end of the 18th century were restricted to members of those communities that were non-Muslims by birth. Instead, the system was open to talented people (non-Muslims) who passed through the *devşirme* process. This feature of the Ottoman state tradition points out the gap put between the formative discourse of the state -Islam- and Turks who were supposed to be the privileged holders of the mentioned belief-Muslims.

The *devşirme* system, certainly, was a sort of assimilation but it should not be confused with its contemporary counterparts. By assimilating merely a narrowly selected administrative-military group, more coercive assimilative ambitions, which were likely to have arisen in the civil society, indeed were prevented.

The project of *Nizam-ı Âlem* had been within the context of the Islamic laws of war which were quite consistent with the realities of the old world. It is certain that the regular Ottoman armies played a vital role in it. But it should also be stated that the military structures of the Empire were not independent of the agricultural system. This means that military victory was not an end in itself. This is one of the most distinctive characteristics of Ottoman military history to be put forward against the superficial thesis likening it to a barbarian pillager army. Consequently, in the eyes of the Ottomans, battles were just dependent variables of peace that was harder to achieve and required more subtle techniques. Yet, while battles were still raging, Ottoman officials were making conscientious observations and calculations and developing projects on how the newly captured lands were to be reorganised. Cultural demographic inputs were also a very important part of these projects. By adhering to the main principles of these projects (within the norms of the Ottoman warfare tradition), the duration and intensity of pillage was tightly controlled. On the other hand, any unnecessary destruction was prohibited, and any troops found guilty of breaking this rule were severely punished and the victims compensated. The killing of unarmed civilians by Ottoman troops was a very rare occurrence.

The Ottoman Civilization has been conceptualised as *Pax Ottomana*. This concept may also be defined as, the central theme of Ottoman history: Peace was the ultimate goal of the Ottomans. It can also easily be deduced that ethnic-religious genocide was totally inconsistent with the central theme of the Ottoman past.

Turco-Serbian and Turco-Hungarian wars intensified between the 14th and 16th centuries and ended in the absolute victory of the Ottomans. Conventional armies fought these wars. The aforementioned two kingdoms deemed themselves heirs to the Roman heritage and wanted to replace the Byzantium Empire. What is particularly striking is that the triumphant Ottoman forces seemed not to harbour any hostility and take revenge for their losses on Hungarian and Serbian communities. In fact, both these communities were peacefully absorbed into *Pax Ottomana*. They were never asked to change their religions. Referring to the issue of Islamisation of the Bosnians and the Albanians the same statement can easily be repeated here. Balkan history has shown that both Bosnians and Albanians had been in an everlasting conflict and were the victims of mistreatment especially by the Serbians. Some sections of these communities, having become weary of pressures coming from their eternal enemy and having been impressed by the neutrality of the Ottomans in the existing conflicts, found it safer to voluntarily join the Muslim population. It is beyond question that the Turcoman *gazis* were the main proponents of the coming *Pax Ottomana* and played a vital role in the "Islamisation" of the Balkan Peninsula. But their methods are not to be confused with the coercive, assimilative methods used in the colonial era in the 19th century, e.g., the Belgian treatment of the native Congolese people in Africa.

In the world order introduced by the *Pax Ottomana*, communities, including the Armenians, were gathered under the umbrella of the Third Rome, protected by the revived core principles of the *Pax Romana* system. *Pax Ottomana* simultaneously guaranteed the protection of her subjects from each other and from an alien power. The demilitarisation of the civil communities and the monopolization of the right of using sword by the state were the most striking aspects of the project.

The *millet* system refers to the consolidation stage of the Third Rome. In order to secure its authority among its subjects the Ottoman Laws of War were now adapted to the consolidation of

Peace. The basic principle was to isolate each ethnic-religious community from each other and let them live in their own lifestyles. To link this process with the Jewish way of life -ghettoization- would be quite superficial. The Turkish historian, İlber Ortaylı, more correctly, associates the mentioned case with the term -compartmentalization- of the population.¹⁰ Within the *millet* system, each community was given the right to maintain its own cultural, professional, religious and even judicial traditions. Political power would not interfere with these matters.

In various texts, it has been emphasised that the *millet* system was far from being egalitarian. Rankings, which had been stressed in the *millet* system, were the evidence provided to support this assertion. It is true that the *millet* system made a brief classification of subjects. The basic distinction was made between the *dominant* and *subject millets*. The effect of this distinction is evident in the fiscal policies of the empire. The Muslim warfare law created a special tax -*cizye*- for non-Muslim communities while placing them under the patronage of the peace. It also exempted them from military service. This tax was designed to be the price of the guarantees provided to them. In other words, it was the price of peace.

On the other hand, rankings of the *millet* system are better understood if taken as the pre-requisite of *cursus honorum* concerned with the delivery of the prestige. Although it brings to mind discrimination between subjects, it by no means resembled the patterns of hegemonic and discriminative classifications which are specific to modernity.¹¹

A brief study of the career structure prevailing in the classical Ottoman regime will enable one to grasp the above-mentioned situation. Within the *millet* system, at least before the end of the 18th century, a subject who was born as a child of a Muslim family found it difficult to reach certain ranks within the administrative sphere. However, mostly for the Balkan non-Muslims, on the condition that they passed through the necessary stages of the *devşirme* system, it was much easier to reach some

¹⁰ Ortaylı, "Osmanlı Barışı", *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹¹ A. Graham and K. Robert, "Devolution by Revolution: Selective Genocide Ensuing from French and Russian Revolutions", *Mankind Quarterly*, 39 (1998), EBSCHO HOST, Item Number: 1267605, pp. 1-15.

prestigious positions. What was hard for a native-born Muslim in a Muslim state was frequently easy for the convert Muslims.

More importantly, when talking about Armenians, their privileges were particularly generous. From the viewpoint of the rankings of the *millet* system, the qualification given to the Armenians was quite positive, and they were welcome into the system with the title *millet-i-sâdıka* (the loyal nation). Hence, assertions, claiming that the Armenians had been subjected to long term discrimination, including violence and massacres, and that Armenians were treated as a "second class minority"¹² within the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire seem to be gross exaggerations.

The inclusive mentality and applications of the *millet* system were maintained for centuries. The Ottoman Empire, isolated from the mercantile developments interweaving state power with religious power, easily welcomed and integrated French Huguenots and Spanish Jews fleeing persecution in Europe. The effects of this inclusive mentality was maintained even in the 19th century, as can be seen in the acceptance of the liberal nationalists who were the victims of the 1830 and 1848 Revolutions, forced to leave their homelands as a result of pressure from the powers of the Old Regime.

The founding principles of the Ottoman Empire, the overcoming of regional conflicts based on ethnicity and religion, are quite different from the idea of the genocide of a particular community by the institutions of the state. The atrocities perpetrated against the Alevite community in Central and Eastern Anatolia between the 16th and 18th centuries have been put forward as an exception to the generalization set forth above. It should be kept in mind that such atrocities were not the product of ethno-religious prejudices, such as those in Spain directed against the Jews. The rival Alevite groups were Turcoman in origin, as were the Ottomans themselves. Indeed, such atrocities are better understood if they are placed in the context of the Turco-Iranian Wars conducted within the stated period. No matter in what framework, they were, nevertheless, atrocities. Neither Huguenots in France, nor Jews in Spain had taken part in hostile activities

¹² Alison Palmer, "Colonial and Modern Genocide: Explanations and Categories", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 21/1 (1998), EBSCHO HOST, Item Number: 400185, p. 3.

directed against the countries they were living in. However, the Alevite heterodoxy, nourished by Shiite sources and incited by the Safavids in Iran, were in a state of continual rebellion -a "fifth column"- and actively sought to weaken the power of the Ottoman Empire internally.

The Modernization of the Ottoman State and the Idea of Genocide

The relationship between the state and her subjects was conducted covertly and indirectly in the old world. Confrontation was undesirable. However, the modern state has arisen as the product of intertwining confrontation between the institutional forms and the societal ones.

The pursuit of private interests, thereby "personalizing" state affairs can be seen in the Ottoman Empire, too. But they were never overtly expressed. Emphasizing the unquestionable sacred entity of the state pursued private interests, hidden behind the curtain of the state affairs. This prevented the advent of an *open* bargaining regime -i.e., the birth and the maturing of the parliamentary regime stemming from the confrontations of societal forms with the institutional ones.

There could never have been such a problem in Ottoman political history, involving a debate on which the societal partner of the state should be. A question such as "Who is the real owner of the state?" did not exist. Even if it existed, nobody could have addressed this question. Even the royal family would not dare to identify itself with the *Politeia* that was considered to be above all mundane creators. Institutions were held above secular powers in the way Plato had stated. In this tradition, the *raison d'état* - to put into Hegel's concepts - was the *Objective Geist* independent from every sort of subjective legitimacy; a unique standing point in the actions of it.

So, whilst the synthesis between politics and religion as in Spain (Catholicism and Politics), resulted in conversion and expulsion in the modern sense, the socially ownerless character of the Ottoman state, in a way, prevented it from acting in the name of a particular social class. This is the most important reference point differentiating it from the actions of an average mercantile state, reshaping itself by borrowing from the established beliefs of the major community. So, the practical effect of the aforementioned aspect of Ottoman political culture, eliminates the

possibility of finding a departure point in social history which could explain the events of 1915.

Here, one objection could be that the modern state had been designed as a corporate body. It is true that the history of the modern state has witnessed the "impersonalization" of societal-institutional relations. For instance, issues such as how interests were to be depicted and pursued were arranged in the cycle of law. But here one should not be deeply influenced by this process. Instead, one should be aware of the dialectical and transitional character of the process. Indeed, this development is the solution to the problems resulting from the over-personalized relations of early modernization. So, the displacements between these two patterns have become reversible, especially during crises. The Nazi experience gives us a striking example of this transition. The Nazis, by objecting to the principle of the impersonalization of rules, had given a fetishist aspect to the "personalizing" of the establishment.

The inevitability of the modernization of the Ottoman Empire was begun to be acknowledged in the late 18th century. The proud Ottoman statesmen of earlier ages disappeared and were replaced by worried ones who had problems in coping with the expansionist policies of the modern Western states, which began to threaten the very existence of the Ottoman Empire. The solution to this problem was either to use their own methods against them, or simply to begin a process of Westernization. The Ottoman modernization has been viewed as an example of autocratic modernization. The elitist feature of this was quite visible. As there was a lack of societal support, the political elite carried out the modernization process. This meant the reappearance of the *Politeia* in a modern form.

The Ottoman modernizers perceived the modernization process as an intra-state matter. This approach stemmed from the historical background of their occupation. The sole issue they were interested in was the imitation of modern institutions and organisations. They were quite unaware of the basic underlying fact, namely the social dimension of modernity. The Ottoman reformers expected to re-invigorate the authority of political power over their subjects by adopting the centralizing and integrative establishment. They could not see that the compensation of the centrifugal dynamics could only be accomplished on the condition of the affairs of state were open to public debate. Thereby, the Centre's attempts to re-establish the state's authority caused

nothing other than a sharpening of the existing tensions, specific to centre-periphery relations. Each step taken by the Centre was perceived as an intervention and rejected by the peripheral powers. So, these modernist-integrative policies became trapped in a vicious circle and paradoxically led to a widening of the historical gap between the official and non-official spheres. Furthermore, the alienation of the state from her subjects (and *vice versa*) became worse. The integrative aspect of the modernization process led to problems in Europe too. But debates run on it did not question the nature of the process. Instead, debate concentrated on the mechanics of it. Consequently, the character of modernization in the West was linear whereas it was cyclical in the Ottoman pattern.

The classless character of the state continued during the process of modernization as well. The main deficiencies of the Ottoman modernization process once again indicate the organisational inability of the Ottomans to organise a genocide, by associating the *Staatsgeist* with the *Volksgeist*. On the other hand, the Eastern question got the benefit of the paradoxal aspects of Ottoman modernization and masterly manipulated the called centrifugal reflexes by injecting nationalism into them. This means that the process of hostility stemmed not from the original dynamics of Ottoman tradition but was imported from the outside world. This is quite the reverse of the *Holocaust*, which was rooted in a prolonged history of hostility from both the official and non-official spheres.

Ottoman modernization experienced the most extreme form of integrative crises, namely separatism. This tragic aspect of the Ottoman Empire provoked the defensive reflexes of the *Politeia*. In the eyes of the bureaucracy, *Devletin Bek'ası* (the permanency of the State) became top priority. Those aspects of the modernisation process, concerning state-building, were (more or less) carried out successfully. Since the Ottoman Empire had long, deep and practical experience of this phenomenon. The problem at core was the lack a societal entity - which was the nation. The key element of Ottoman modernization -the perpetuation of the state- covertly incorporated the question, which can be formulated as finding out the original owner of the state other than the court society. The solution to this issue, formulated by the *Tanzimat* bureaucracy, was quite moderate and very different from the brutal nationalistic, antagonistic conflicts of the era. This means that, although the

problem faced by the state was so crucial as to be existential, the response was by no means draconian.

What the *Tanzimat* reformers did was an attempt to expand the Ottoman identity which up to that time had been applied only to the ruling dynasty. According to the *millet* system, which was now being reformed by the political elite, communities were allowed to maintain their cultural traditions as they had in the past. However, these were now incorporated into the Ottoman legal system, where the different nationalities were granted equal rights and responsibilities. This trend transforming Ottoman identity into a legal-political concept was by no means nationalistic in essence which might have resulted in a genocide. On the contrary, it was designed to mollify the ongoing separatist demands. It is unjust to identify the Ottomanisation of the population with any sort of assimilative policies, such as the Pan-Slavism of those days.

The outstanding figure of the modernization process, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (1822-95), unlike others, had come to realise the importance of the cultural dimension in the nation-building process. According to him, the necessary societal framework to be carried out by the political elite, due to the institutional reforms, was to be based on Islam that reflected the belief of the dominant *millet*. Ahmed Cevdet stressed the priority of the *Volksgeist* above *Staatsgeist* as the reverse of the generally accepted relationship designed by his colleagues. Even if he was the most radical figure of *Tanzimat* reformism, his pro-nationalistic projects were not welcomed by the general body of the other *Tanzimat* reformers who worried about the rise of separatism. Furthermore, Ahmed Cevdet himself never defended the forced assimilation of the non-Muslims.

Other cosmopolitan empires which, in a sense, were facing similar ethnic uprising dangers, i.e., the Habsburgs and the Romanovs kept resisting such trends by practicing harsh counter state-nationalism. One of the most effective policies they had was to "purify" the civil-military bureaucracy both on the racial and religious levels. Though there were exceptions to this approach, generally one had to be German and Catholic in order to work in the civil service. Likewise, being Slav or Russian was the main recruitment criteria in the Tsarist bureaucracy.

However, the opposite pattern can be observed in the official employment policies of the Ottoman Empire. The *devşirme* system renewed by the *Tanzimat* modernism continued accepting non-

Muslim and non-Turk components in the official realm. The reformed institutions of the empire employed talented Jewish, Greek and Armenian staff. Numerically, their numbers were above those of the Muslims and Turks. State policy did not hesitate to employ an Armenian at the most critical positions-i.e., the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Furthermore, the new version of the *devşirme* system removed the regulation that an applicant for a civil service position had to convert to Islam in order to be appointed.

The dynamics of Ottoman modernization does not show any symptoms which would later develop into the "disease" of genocide. The articulation of the modern state-building process with nation-building process was far from being realized. Even the separationist peripheral movements agitated by the European states were appeased through mild policies. This trend was continued in the latter stages of modernization.

The question seeking the original societal owner of the state, left vague in the *Tanzimat* reformism, was much more passionately tackled by the counter-*Tanzimat* movements, known as the *Young Ottoman* and the *Young Turk Movements*. Here, for the first time, does one witness some intellectual attempts stressing the role of ethnic and religious bonds. This means that *Volksgeist* was becoming much more efficient and more important than *Staatsgeist*. For instance, the most outstanding figures of the Young Ottoman movement, Ali Suavi and Namık Kemâl, stressed and exulted cultural ties. But the official ideology known as the *Osmanlılık* laid stress on the Brotherhood of the Ottoman *millets*. Furthermore, the new stresses were incorporated into Young Ottoman texts in a disorganised manner and were never been set down as an alternative, substituting formulas.

In the post-Young Ottoman Turk Revolution of 1908, the problems that arose during the crises of nation-building began to be debated in a more strict sense. A well-educated Crimean Tatar Turk, Yusuf Akçura had published a long article in the beginning of the century, systematizing and discussing the options standing in the near future: *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Three Styles of Policies). He formulated three policies comparatively. They were Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism. In the post-1908 Revolution period, as if to confirm Yusuf Akçura's ideas, the Ottoman intelligentsia was also divided into three groups. They had their own publications in which some fruitful debates were conducted. What is striking in

these debates is that even in the most radical ones, one cannot witness a trend rejecting the opponent's thesis totally. For instance, in a polemic between Süleyman Nazif defending the Ottomanist policies and Ahmed Ağaoğlu (an outstanding figure of Turkism), the latter advocated that the activities for the sake of Turkism was in a sense supporting Ottomanism, since the Ottoman land or state encompassed one of the essential part of the Turkic world. Ahmed Ağaoğlu used the same reasoning against one of the most prominent figures of the Islamist camp: Babanzade Ahmed Naim Bey. Here again, he advocated that activities for the sake of Turkism also would contribute to the strengthening of the Islamic bonds. The same can be said for the other's thesis. Advocating Islamism was considered to be an efficient way of strengthening the Turkic ties.

If the aforementioned texts are carefully read, it can be seen easily that at each camp radicalism was strictly controlled. On the other hand, the state party, *İttihad ve Terakki* (The Union and Progress) neither involved nor supported any of these theses; instead, it employed at least one representative of each movement in its central committee. Ottomanism was still the official ideology just before World War I. This also means that the political and intellectual climate of the post-revolutionary era of 1908 was still vague and far from creating the "necessary conditions for genocide". It is also true that separatist tendencies, at times supported by Austrian or British diplomacy, were also discernible in the leadership of some Muslim communities of the Ottoman Empire.

Epilogue

The debate over the state ideology took place in "hellish" warfare conditions. The catastrophic fall of the so-called Third Rome meant fire and death. When "betrayal" sprang from agitations, and phantasms of nationalism were added to it, the whole picture becomes clear.¹³ First the Armenians, provoked by the Russians, began to kill innocent Muslim people (Kurds and Circassians as well as Turks). Then followed the resettlement and the death of some innocent Armenians on the way.

¹³ George W. Gawyrch, "The Culture and Political Violence in Turkish Society, 1903-14", *Middle East Studies*, 22 (1986), p. 327.

What happened in 1915 is beyond the limits of this article. Furthermore, the author does not believe in the validity of "document wars". Each new document will do nothing other than sharpening the existing hostile feelings of both sides. What the author has tried to postulate here is not to search for excuses but to direct the attention of both sides to an almost all-forgotten history, which has enabled us to live in peace for six centuries. The knowledge of how two peoples mutually "throttled" each other is useless, but the knowledge of how we lived in peace is priceless. If we, both Armenians and Turks, were parts of European history, we could not talk about such a hope. The interpretative absolutism of the *Holocaust* is true in a sense that nothing positive is observable before it. Neither Armenians nor Turks are part of such an history. This means that we still have hope. Let us put aside the mentality of "the children of the Original Sin" and leave them alone. We should not forget that coordinated reasoning of civilian histories has generated much more positive results than one-sided political judgements.

THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Gündüz Aktan

Introduction

A lot was written on the Armenian incidents that had occurred in the Ottoman Empire in the years 1915-1916, that is, during the early part of World War One. Thousands of works tackling this issue were published, mainly by Armenians. These authors, mostly historians, were inclined to describe the incidents as genocide. Turkish authors too, almost without exception, and a number of foreign writers, held in high esteem, approached the issue from a historical standpoint, maintaining in turn that resettlement is not the same as genocide.

Although the strong emotional context of this issue makes a neutral view of history difficult to prevail, there are undoubtedly ample publications available to give adequate information about the history of the incidents. Despite the claims that the archives in Turkey and in Armenia are not fully accessible, one can safely say that enough archival work has been done and published to permit an assessment of the nature of the incidents.

Historical studies are essential to render understandable the incidents that took place in the second decade of the 20th century. However, if a historian lacks education and/or experience in international law, that person cannot judge whether or not these incidents amounted to genocide. Like historians, academics such as sociologists and political scientists who laboured on these issues, tend to describe as genocide almost any incident, which involves an important number of dead.¹ However, genocide, as an international crime, can be determined only by jurists on the basis of the prescribed legal criteria.

¹ William A. Shabas, *Genocide in International Law*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 7.

Nevertheless, there are very few works of legal nature on this issue. This outcome is due to a variety of reasons. For one thing, the Turks are not known to be legalists, first and foremost. But the Armenians have *deliberately* set aside the legal aspect of the issue apparently because that would weaken their genocide claims. Pro-Armenian writers chose to adopt the historical approach to underline the tragic nature of the incidents so that they could make genocide claims more easily. Probably, one of the reasons why the legal approach has not been preferred is the fact that the "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide" (henceforth to be referred to as the Convention), which had been concluded in 1948 and had taken force in 1951, was not used frequently enough until the mid-1990s. As a result, the jurisprudence in this area was not developed sufficiently. Finally, the difficulties involved in retroactively applying the Convention to incidents that occurred some three or more decades ago, before it entered into force, are all too obvious. The jurists may have failed to display an interest in this issue because it would not be compatible with law to apply legal concepts, "genocide" among them, which did not exist in the pre-Convention period.

This article adopts, on the other hand, a legal approach. To be able to focus adequately on the legality of the issue, it will assume that the reader possesses already an adequate knowledge of the historical background. Chronological data will be referred to only to the extent that jurisdictional assessments require it.

Law Prior to the Convention

According to the 1648 Westphalian system, state sovereignty was an absolute principle—essential and supreme. The matter of minorities was an internal affair for the states, which applied domestic laws to the incidents that occurred within the country. The concept of "international crime" did not exist. Coming to the Ottoman scene, however, the minorities in the Ottoman Empire became, immediately after the 1839 *Tanzimat* Edict, the subject of treaties between nations. That was an exceptional situation. It resulted, on the one hand, from the fact that the Ottoman Empire, a multi-cultural and a multi-national country, found itself in a weaker position in its competition with the predominantly nation-states of the West, and, on the other hand, from another fact, namely that the European governments turned their support of

the Christian minorities in the Balkans into an essential element of their foreign policies towards the Ottoman Empire.

When the Armenian relocation began in the fifth month of 1915, the British, French and Russian Governments, namely the belligerents and the enemies of the Turks in the current war, issued immediately on 24 May 1915, a joint declaration in which they said the following: "...[I]n the presence of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization, the allied Governments publicly inform the Sublime Porte that they will hold personally responsible for the said crimes all members of the Ottoman Government as well as those of its agents who are found to be involved in such massacres". However, the U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, who was clearly not a Turkish sympathizer, is known to have admitted that the Turkish Government had "more or less justifiable" right to deport the Armenians, provided that they lived "within zone of military operations". In an obvious contradiction, a report resulting from an investigation of the war crimes committed by the Christians during the 1912-13 Balkan wars, in violation of the Hague rules (1907), failed to talk about the 'crime against humanity' in the face of the worse tragedies that the Turks had suffered.²

The Hague rules highlighted the crimes a country would commit in war. Those rules had not been envisaged to be applied to the crimes a country would be accused of having committed in its own territories. It is no secret that when, at the Paris Peace Conference (1919), the Greek foreign minister suggested that a new kind of crime against humanity be created and there be a trial for the 'Armenian massacres', President Woodrow Wilson initially objected to that, saying that this would have been an *ex post facto* law. The United States was against the creation of such a crime. The Versailles Treaty with Germany stated that an international tribunal be set up. That suggestion was unprecedented in history. However, the trial could not take place, since the Netherlands refused to extradite Kaiser Wilhelm II who had sought refuge there.

With the Sèvres Treaty signed on 10 August 1920, the Ottoman Empire agreed to a trial to be held in Turkey for the

² Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914, section on 'Extermination, Emigration, Assimilation', pp. 148-158.

crimes in question (Article 226). Creation of the tribunal was a task left to the victors and the Ottoman side pledged to arrest and deliver to the tribunal the persons wanted. Historians know about the 'Nemrut Mustafa' Martial Court set up in occupied İstanbul at the end of the war, and about the defendants, who were taken to Malta—only to be released by the British crown prosecutor due to lack of evidence. The Sèvres Treaty was later replaced by another international agreement, the Lausanne Treaty that was signed on 24 July 1923. The latter included a declaration of amnesty for all crimes committed between 1 August 1914 and 20 November 1922.

It is common knowledge that genocide reached its full dimensions during World War II when Nazi Germany exterminated the Jews, describing it as the "Final Solution". The word 'genocide' was coined by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jewish scholar. When Lemkin was a student, he followed closely the trial of the defendants implicated in the Armenian incidents, which he considered genocide. Lemkin's concept of that crime was a very comprehensive one. His definition embraced the political, economic, social, cultural, moral, physical or biological destruction of the minorities. The law, which evolved in more recent times, came to consider 'genocide' not any act committed with the aim of destroying just any group but only certain groups; and only if those groups were destroyed physically or biologically. In other words, the latter greatly narrowed down the scope of the description originally made by Lemkin, simply by excluding from the interpretation of genocide political, economic, social, cultural and moral 'destruction' of groups.

Since, at the time, what the Nazis did to the Jews in the early 1940s had not been fully known, Britain and the United States especially did not favor of having an international tribunal deal with the crimes committed within the borders of Germany. They were, on the other hand, maintaining that for the crimes committed by that state outside its national borders, that is, in the countries it occupied, the persons responsible should be put on trial. Thus, the respect in the Westphalian system for the sovereignty of the nation-state would continue. The law of war envisaged the officials of a given country to be subject to international adjudication only for crimes committed, *inter alia*, against civilians in another country in times of war. The concept of crime against humanity, though discussed in doctrine, had not yet

become actually part of international law, in a way that would apply to the crimes committed inside the country as well.

As the wide scope of the offences that the Germans had committed against the Jews gradually emerged, the idea that the persons responsible for the crimes committed within the country too should be put on trial, started gaining ground. This step, initiated in 1941, reached a new stage with a proposal the United States presented to the London Conference four years later. It invoked the "Martens Clause" of the Hague Conventions. Thus, it envisaged that if a crime had not been clearly defined in advance, "the principles of law of the nations as they result from the usages established among the civilized peoples, from the law of humanity and from the dictates of the public conscience" would be applied to it. However, since the "Martens Clause" is a concept of the law of war, adjudication of the crimes committed within the country itself has been linked to the concept of starting the war. Thus, the reference to war was creating an excuse for intervention in domestic affairs. The minutes of the London Conference indicate how adamant especially the United States was to ensure that the intervention in Germany's domestic affairs would not constitute a precedent which would allow other countries to intervene in American domestic affairs in the future. This understanding eventually helped to formulate the principles of the Nuremberg Court (which came to be known by the same name) that was to try the German war criminals, including those responsible for the Jewish genocide. The principle, specified as "VI", is as follows:

- a. Crimes against peace:
 - (i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances;
 - (ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i).
- b. War crimes:

Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.

c. Crimes against humanity

Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connexion with any crime against peace or any war crime.

As can be seen from the definition of the crimes against humanity, the crimes committed against the Jews would be a subject for international adjudication even if these were committed inside Germany. The only stipulations were that there should be a link (nexus) between these crimes and the war, and that they should be committed during such hostilities. Thus, the victors could not abandon the principle that in order to be able to intervene in the domestic affairs of a country, one had to be in a state of war with that country. Even the extermination of the Jews and others with a brutality unprecedented in history did not suffice to ensure that the crimes committed in a given country would be automatically subjected to international adjudication. Although the term genocide had been coined by then, the genocide concept was not elaborated among the Nuremberg Principles. The concept of crimes against humanity embodied the crime of genocide. The latter had not gained, at that time, enough clarity and precision to constitute an independent crime category.

The Nuremberg trials began in October 1945 with the reading out of the indictment against 22 Nazi defendants, and it ended a year later. Of the defendants, 19 were convicted, 12 of whom were executed. During the trials, the prosecutor used the term genocide from time to time but the verdict did not refer to that crime.

The U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 96 (1)

The first document of a legal nature containing the term genocide was Resolution No. 96 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1946 soon after the Nuremberg trials ended—in fact, during the first session it held in the wake of the trials. The purpose of that resolution was, as specified in the last paragraph, to demand that the ECOSOC prepare a draft convention on genocide in a year. But, on this occasion, the General Assembly explained what it understood from the word genocide. It was “a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups”. That was likened to homicide as it was “the denial of the right to live of individual human beings”. The reference made to

the right to life, later, caused a link to be formed between human rights and genocide. After all, genocide was, basically, the killing of individuals. Genocide caused the loss of the cultural and other kinds of contributions these groups of people would be making to humanity. Thus, the cultural genocide concept, to which Lemkin attached importance, came to be indirectly included in the resolution. The groups that could be subjected to genocide were cited as “racial, religious, political and other” groups. That was an admission of the possibility that virtually any group of people could become genocide victims. The term also meant, not only extermination of a group as a whole, but also in part.

Probably the most important aspect of the resolution is that genocide was considered a crime according to international law. This deliberation aimed at preventing genocide in a country from being considered that country's domestic affairs on account of the principle of state sovereignty and also to prevent the culprits from evading international penal procedures. The principle thus introduced was that those who committed the crime of genocide should be punished, regardless of their being private citizens or public servants or statesmen. Since the genocide law had not yet developed, adequately as a source, however, the sponsors stressed instead its violation of the ‘moral laws’. In this vein, civilized states were denouncing genocide. The resolution listed “religious, racial, political or any other” reasons as grounds on which genocide could be committed, in association with the groups of people subjected to genocide. In this respect, with the addition of the words “other reasons”, it expanded further the scope of the definition given in the Nuremberg principles (6/c), which pertains to the crimes against humanity.

The preamble of the resolution stated that ‘political groups’ could be the victim of genocide. If the civilians who were part of groups engaged in political struggle (for example, resorting to arms with leftist revolutionary ideological aims or waging a struggle for independence) came to be massacred even in part (not as the entire group but in significant numbers) that alternative would still be considered genocide. The concept of genocide embodied in this resolution became almost totally identical with the concept of crimes against humanity, as defined in the Nuremberg Principles while severing the link between genocide and war. In other words, it admitted that genocide could take place in times of peace as well. It acknowledged also that genocide could be committed, not

only in the territories a given country occupies in war, but also within the national borders of that country itself.

Thus, this resolution recognized any killing of a large number of people, i.e., *en masse*, as genocide regardless of the kind of the group, grounds, time or place.

The Convention

The Genocide Convention was adopted on 9 December 1948, and it took effect on 12 December 1951. The crime of genocide is described in Article 2 of the Convention as follows:

"In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group".

The Convention was debated -on the basis of a draft presented by the U.N. Secretariat- by the *Ad hoc* Committee and the General Assembly's Sixth Committee dealing with legal affairs. Since the Armenian incidents will be reviewed later in this paper within the framework of the Convention, it will be useful to make a brief assessment at this stage of the Convention in general and of Article 2 in particular.

Protected Groups

The groups to be protected under the Convention mentioned in Article 2 are limited to four types, that is, national, ethnical, racial and religious groups. Lemkin, who had defended the inclusion of the political groups, suggested himself during the deliberations on the draft text that the political groups be left outside the scope of the Convention. Unlike Resolution No. 96 (1), neither the 'political

groups' nor the 'other groups' found their way into the Convention text. This modification constitutes a highly important difference because history shows that the most frequently seen struggles -and the ones that claim the largest number of civilian lives- take place between groups with political aims. Accordingly, for example, the massacres committed in Cambodia by the Pol Pot regime causing the deaths of nearly two million civilians did not fall within the scope of the genocide definition given by the Convention. Similarly, the deaths that occurred in the framework of the October Revolution (1917) cannot be considered genocide. In line with many verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, save perhaps some exceptional acts which will be judged in the future trials as genocidal, even the extensive Serbian ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not correspond to the definition of the crime of genocide.

The term 'political group' covers civilians along with the members of the group engaging in politics or waging an armed struggle. At first glance, this inevitably causes confusion. There are those who question why destruction of civilians affiliated with a group described as political should not be considered genocide. But this is a semantic problem that arises from the 'definition'. A group comes to be called a 'political group' when an attempt is made to destroy it with political aims. In other words, if there is a political struggle between two groups and if, in the course of that struggle, one of these groups commits against the other group acts such as murder, injury, massacre or deportation, the injured party comes to be called a political group. Killing civilians in the course of a political struggle continues to be a crime. But that crime is not genocide.

The phrase about a group's cultural contribution to humanity as embodied in Resolution 96 (1) is not included in the Convention. This indicates that the concept of 'cultural genocide' has also been left outside the scope of the Convention.

The fact that the Convention does not consider genocide the acts perpetrated against political groups and the obliteration of the minority cultures through forced assimilation has significantly narrowed down the scope of the Convention when it came to implementation. For this reason, from 1951, when the Convention was adopted, to 1992 it could not be implemented with a few not-so-significant exceptions. This has drawn strong criticism. Some

say that the Convention has not served any useful purpose. On the other hand, many historians, sociologists and thinkers tended to interpret genocide in a broader manner than the definition in the Convention allows. If and when they found out that a significant number of civilians had died in a case they studied, they claimed that this was genocide. Another group of academics, meanwhile, suggested new definitions of genocide in order to expand the scope of Article 2 of the Convention. Both sides ignored the fact that extermination of those groups, which remain outside the four groups protected by the Convention, was already punishable within the framework of "crimes against humanity". Attempts to expand the concept of genocide to cover also crimes against humanity, seemingly, result from the fact that the international community, which was so sensitive to genocide, failed to display as much awareness toward the crimes against humanity. Indeed, for a long time, the international community was not prepared to set up Nuremberg-type international tribunals to protect the victims of the crimes against humanity. Moreover, these groups could not be protected effectively under human rights law in times of peace or under humanitarian law or the law of war in times of war. Consequently, the definition of genocide was broadened by some commentators to embrace all serious crimes committed under the laws of war and human rights.

That situation changed to a great extent, thanks to the activities of the two international criminal tribunals set up following the incidents in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda. Those who commit crimes against humanity and war crimes began to be punished. Further, the Statute of Rome related to the International Criminal Court has eliminated all the loopholes in the law. In addition to inter-state wars, 'crimes against humanity' can now be committed in times of peace, and together with other war crimes they can be committed in internal conflicts as well. The Statute of Rome took Article 2 of the Convention without any change and made it its Article 6. On the other hand, Article 7 of the Statute of Rome, which is the reformulated version of the Nuremberg Principles paragraph 6(c) on crimes against humanity, as well as the relevant articles of the statutes of the international tribunals set up for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, covered the crimes of extermination, persecution, deportation and the like committed against "other groups" not protected by the Convention.

Intent

A crime consists of two parts. One is the mental or subjective element (*mens rea*). This component refers to the intention, aim and will to commit a crime. The other is the act of crime itself, the material or objective element (*actus reus*). In Article 2 of the Convention the phrase "with intent to destroy" represents the mental element. The acts committed with such an intent are listed from (a) to (e).

One of the most important characteristics of the Convention is that for the crime of genocide to exist, acts must have been committed only with the intent to destroy one of the four aforementioned groups. The intent to destroy a group must be in the form of 'special intent'. In other words, it must be fully evident, i.e., beyond any doubt. If the intent to destroy gets declared openly by those who commit the act of genocide or by those who ensure its commission, then there is no controversy. If there is no such oral or written statement, then the presence of genocide becomes debatable. Some jurists stress that at this point one has to look at the consequences of the actions, and they consider it enough, if a significant number of deaths occurred, as a result of these actions.

However, the concept of 'general intent' is valid for ordinary crimes, that is, the short-cut interpretation that the person who committed the act is considered of having an intention commensurate with the consequence of the act. The same concept is simply inadequate in the identification of the acts of genocide. On the other hand, those who commit genocide generally do not declare their intent to destroy. If no clear evidence of an oral or written kind can be found in order to prove genocide, some other elements must be taken into consideration along with the 'significant number of deaths'. As the crime of genocide mostly gets committed by the states or other large-scale organizations of a similar kind, one tries to determine whether the crime was committed by an "organized force" to find out whether there was 'special intent'. Since genocide is destruction of a large number of people, that is, members of a group, it is important to determine whether that organization had prepared a 'plan' well in advance. Also, that organization must have organized a force to implement its plan and carried it out in a coordinated, systematical and massive manner.

From the standpoint of its organization, its implementation and its consequences, the Jewish genocide may be, as an exceptional example, incomparable with the other cases. The decision to introduce a "final solution" for the Jewish genocide, was taken at the Wannsee meeting in 1942, and the crime was confessed during the Nuremberg trials. But even if the intent to destroy had not been revealed clearly like that, one could take into account the discriminatory laws passed against the Jews, the "pogrom" type attacks including the "Crystal Night" of 1938, and the way the Jews had been driven out of the society and forced to live in the ghettos where they could not meet normal human needs as the preliminaries heralding a genocide. Besides, the virulent anti-Semitism had begun as a movement no less than fifteen years prior to the genocide, and the words and writings of Hitler and the other Nazi ideologues in the framework of that movement, make it all too clear the intention to destroy the Jews. Similarly, among the Serbs, having an ethnically homogenous homeland had been a widely-used rhetoric since 1981. In fact, the 'ethnic cleansing' as a concept was allegedly invented by V. Seselj, one of the Serbian paramilitary leaders.

To prove the presence of the intent to destroy, which must be ascertained to show that a given incident was genocide, one has to look at the period preceding the perpetration of the acts of genocide, and investigate whether that kind of intent had begun to take shape. The presence of a state-like organization, a plan and its implementation by an organized force are being considered as factors leading to a presumption of the presence of the intent to destroy.

Motive

Not only the intent with which the crime is committed, but also the reason or the grounds for that intent are vitally important. This urge is set forth as motive, described in the Nuremberg Principles 6 (c) involving the crimes against humanity, as "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts done to any civilian population, or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds". Resolution 96 (1), on the other hand, stated that the crime of genocide may have been committed "on religious, racial, political or any other grounds". According to Resolution 96 (1), the motive for genocide was more comprehensive than even the motive for the crimes against humanity as embodied in the

Nuremberg Principles. Expressed differently, in an armed clash with a group triggered by an existing religious, political or any other kind of dispute, leading to the deaths of a significant number of civilians, could be both genocide and a crime against humanity.

The Convention created quite a different situation. Article 2, not only limits the "intent" to the destruction of only the four groups, but it also narrows down greatly, as we shall see below, the grounds for destruction compared to the bases cited in the two afore-mentioned documents.

During the debates on the Convention, the issue of grounds to destroy triggered lengthy discussions. The representatives of many countries argued that proving the presence of motive would be very hard. If such a requirement were to be stipulated, that would make it impossible for the courts to deliver genocide verdicts. The important thing was to prove that the act was perpetrated with intent to destroy. However, during debates at the *Ad hoc* Committee, the Lebanese representative stressed the importance of the motive, saying that genocide was destroying a group "with racial hatred". Later, during debates at the Sixth Committee, despite the objections of the British and American delegates, the phrase "as such" which meant that only acts aimed at destroying members of one of the four groups due to no other reason than his or her belonging to that specific group, was inserted in Article 2 of the Convention. This was achieved with the insistence of the Soviet Union that was leading the "Anti-Fascist Front" with the support of the majority. This phrase can escape attention at first glance. It does not have its Turkish equivalent and needs to be translated in an explanatory manner. Probably because of that difficulty, it has always been neglected by historians.

One has to take into consideration whether, in the perpetration of the crime of genocide, the motive was collective or individual. When an individual kills a member of the target group, this may not necessarily stem from the fact that the victim was a member of that specific group. The motive may have been something else. For instance, it may be a matter of revenge or a desire to confiscate the victim's money or other possessions or a mere act of political ambitions. Genocide, on the other hand, is a *collective* crime. The organizers and planners of genocide must have acted

with a racial motive not with a political, religious or any other reason. If they acted against the target group with motives other than racial hatred, the acts of genocide cannot possibly be perpetrated, for under those circumstances there would be no way to have an intent to destroy a group "as such". Only could a murderously intensive racial hatred towards a group gives rise to such a deadly intent. As a result, to prosecute the crime of genocide successfully, one has to prove that the defendants felt racial hatred towards the target group to the extent that they became determined to destroy that group 'as a group'. Punishment of genocide applies only to this kind of crime. In that context, the Jewish genocide of the Nazis and the Rwanda genocide of the Hutus can be considered classical cases of genocide.³

Sociologically and psychologically, the intent to destroy a group due to its group character, emerges only in racism, or, to put it more correctly, in the most intensive stage of racism. Racial hatred is quite different from the ordinary animosity laced with anger parties engaged in a substantial dispute may feel towards one another. Racial hatred is a deeply pathological feeling or a complicated fanaticism the causes of which cannot be explained easily. It is an emotional state such as the racist movements in Western Europe, i.e., anti-Semitism, have harboured and peaked on and off for two thousand years and, more actively, in the past millenium. It is a malignant form of prejudice. The Nazis were the product of that culture under exceptionally difficult socio-economic conditions of the inter-war period and the Great Crash of the 1930s. To understand how different that feeling is, it would suffice to read a few of the publications that fill the libraries.⁴ Meanwhile, the Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal documents on the Akayesu case provide information about the history of the racial relations between the farmer Hutus of the Bantu race and the Nilo-Hamitic Tutsis, the shepherds coming from the north-eastern parts of the continent probably in the 16th century.

Racial feelings, which exist everywhere in the world, can disturb the target group to varying degrees. However, racism that

³ Shabas, *op. cit.*, p. 255. Even this author, who classifies the Armenian incidents as genocide throughout his book, drawing extensively on the work of the Armenian author Vahank N. Dadrian, does not mention those events as a classic example of genocides.

⁴ For 24,000 entries on anti-Semitic works in English, see: Robert Singerman, *Anti-Semitic Propaganda: an Annotated Bibliography and Guide*, New York, Garland, 1982.

reaches the stage of actually destroying the target group, has been seen predominantly, even exclusively in the western half of Europe and its white colonies in north America, south Africa and Australia.⁵ In this context, one could list the Cathars being subjected to genocide in France in the 1206-48 period, the Jews in Spain through the 14th century to 1492, the genocide of the indigenous peoples who created the Inca, Aztec and Maya civilizations by the Spaniards in the 16th and 17th centuries, and the so-called Red Indians, by the Americans in the 18th and 19th centuries. Also, there was the Dutch Boers' *apartheid* regime in the Union (later, Republic) of South Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries and, during the same time, the Australian aborigines were subjected to some genocidal acts by the white Australians.

Some societies that created other civilizations too persecuted the civilian populations they consider to be the enemy. However, in those cases, no presence of "racial hatred" leading to the intent to destroy those people as a group can be determined. In the Islamic and Turkish civilizations especially, genocide has never been committed. Otherwise, it would have been impossible for those civilizations to found many multi-ethnic and multi-religious empires that survived for centuries. It must not be forgotten that despite their great technological superiority, the colonial empires set up by the powerful countries of the Western civilization managed to survive only a little more than a century on the average.

The fact that the definition of genocide in the Convention became limited to acts perpetrated with the intent of destroying a group as a group leaves out the persecution of civilian societies with other reasons. This loophole, as I stressed earlier, was eliminated with the definition of the crimes against humanity given in the Nuremberg Principles (Article 6/c), a definition which covers those kinds of crimes. The articles on crimes against humanity in the statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, and, finally, in the International Criminal Court's Statute of Rome, fulfil this function.⁶

⁵ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Macropaedia, 1985, Vol. 15, pp. 360-366.

⁶ The Statute of Rome, Article 7, Crimes against humanity
For the purposes of this Statute, "crimes against humanity" means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:

Briefly, the crime of genocide has been taken out of the persecution category of the crimes against humanity as defined in the Nuremberg Principles, confined to four groups, based on 'intent to destroy' those groups 'as such' and given the highest or the lowest rank in the hierarchy of crimes.

In Whole or in Part

In Article 2 of the Convention, acts perpetrated with the intent to destroy a group, "in whole or in part", are called genocide. In other words, one does not have to destroy a given group in whole for those acts to constitute genocide. There seems to be a contradiction here. Would the kind of racial hatred that creates the will to destroy a group as a group, satisfy itself with destroying only part of that group?

Even the Nazis could not exterminate all the Jews. Until the year in which the war began, they made life for the Jews extremely hard and thus ensured some of them to leave Germany. After the war began, they prevented even those who wanted to flee, from leaving the country, and exterminated all Jews inside Germany. Finally, they subjected to genocide the Jews living in the countries they occupied, rather than expelling them.

Two conclusions can be deduced from all this. Either even for the Nazis, the motive for destroying a group as a group attained the critical intensity only under war conditions or, in reality, the German reach to the Jews was more limited than it looked, and they exterminated those whom they could lay hands on, without permitting them to escape.

Murder;
 Extermination;
 Enslavement;
 Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
 Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
 Torture;
 Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy...;
 Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
 Enforced disappearance of persons;
 The crime of apartheid;
 Other inhumane acts...

With this provision, those who made the Convention probably aimed to ensure that the international community should reach the conclusion that genocide has been committed without waiting for the destruction of a group in whole and to prevent the genocide envisaged in Article 1 and punish it on time.

Application of the Law to the Armenian Incidents

At a hearing of a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee on 21 September 2000, the Armenian apologists said that they no longer needed the opening up of the Turkish archives and that on the basis of the existing information a consensus was achieved to the effect that the Armenians had been subjected to genocide. Half of their arguments were right in a way. However, the concluding statement was exactly the opposite of what they argued. The existing archival material was adequate to prove that no genocide had been committed. Hence, it was not possible for the new archival material to contradict the existing information.

The assessment below is made with the assumption that the readers have adequate historical information about the Armenian incidents. Still, it may be useful to take a brief look at the historical context in which the incidents took place. Since the beginning of the 19th century the Russian advance in the Crimea and the Caucasus uprooted the Muslim populations, mostly the Turkish, and drove them towards Anatolia in successive waves of migration during which large numbers of them perished. The Armenians in the Caucasus helped the Russian armies in return for which they were settled in regions which had been ethnically cleansed from the Turks and the other Muslim peoples of the Caucasus. This process of expulsion and resettlement eventually led to the founding of the Armenian state in the early 20th century. In the course of its expansion the Russian forces entered the north-eastern corner of Anatolia during the wars of 1827-29, 1854-56 and 1877-78. On each occasion, the Armenians sided with the Russians, thus sowing the seeds of future ethnic conflict.

During the Balkan Wars (1912-13), the Ottomans lost all their European territories with the exception of Eastern Thrace. In most of those territories, they had constituted the majority, although sometimes slim, of the population. Turks and other Muslims such as Albanians and Pomaks lost their lives in great numbers. Consequently, large civilian groups were uprooted from their homes and driven towards Anatolia. World War I, which began a

year later, was to seal the fate of the empire. The Ottomans were fighting with the armies of Tsarist Russia in the east, with the British and French navies at Gallipoli, and with the latter's armies on the Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi fronts in the south.

At the start of World War I, the Armenians constituted an estimated 1,3 million and the Greeks about 1,4 million, with the Turks and Muslims making up the rest of the total 17,5 million population of Anatolia.⁷ It is known that unlike the Catholic and Protestant churches, the Greek Orthodox and the Gregorian Armenian Churches did not keep population records. For that reason, the exaggerated statistics put forth by the Armenians do not rely on a sound source. The Ottoman statistics are considered closest to the truth, for those statistics could have never been manipulated with the assumption that the country would one day be dismembered and the distribution of the land would be based on statistical data. On the contrary, the sound population statistics were necessary for tax administration and military conscription. Quite naturally, the statistics originating from European sources are not far from the Ottoman ones. Though the first director of the census administration, which was set up in Istanbul in 1892, was a Turk, the department later operated under a Jew named Fethi Franco between the years 1893-1903, subsequently an Armenian named Migirdich Shinopian, and, as of 1908, an American.

⁷ Estimates of the Armenian population are as follows:
According to

- Marcel Léart, an Armenian (Krikor Zohrab), who took the Armenian Patriarchate statistics as a basis of his estimates	2,560,000
- Armenian historian K. J. Basmachian	2,380,000
- Armenian Delegation that participated in the Paris Peace Conference	2,250,000
- Armenian historian Kevork Aslan	1,800,000
- French Yellow Book	1,555,000
- Encyclopaedia Britannica	1,500,000
- Ludovic de Constenson	1,400,000
- H.F.B. Lynch	1,345,000
- Revue de Paris	1,300,000
- 1893 Ottoman statistics	1,001,465
- 1906 Ottoman statistics	1,120,748
- Ottoman statistics just before World War I	1,295,000
- Annual Register (London)	1,056,000

Armenian Aims and Their Struggle

In order to prove that the 1915-16 incidents were genocide, that is, that the Armenians were subjected to genocide, not as a political group but as an ethnic or religious group, most of the Armenian apologists either refer only briefly or do not refer at all to the politically-aimed Armenian activities including terrorism. Some of them assert that the Ottoman administration was oppressive, and that the Armenians engaged in political activities to defend themselves against it or to gain their rights. They condone, as legitimate defense against a 'big and cruel power', the way the Armenians resorted to terrorist violence, as in the cases of the 'komitaci', *hajduk*, *klepsos* or *chetniks* of the Christian peoples of the Balkans.⁸

Historically speaking, the states do not start ethnic strives except in the case of racist assaults on target groups. But, as I have explained earlier, there was no racism in the Ottoman Empire. It is all the more logical that the ethnic groups initiate struggles for independence in disintegrating empires. That is what happened in the late Ottoman period.

In order to reach their political objectives, the Armenians embraced the Balkan liberation struggle model. Just like the Balkan Christian peoples, they got organized and engaged in political activities. This is, in fact, not so strange. In the aftermath of the French Revolution, the idea of nation-state prevailed, and independence struggles against the multi-religious and multi-national empires were considered legitimate. The Armenians clearly engaged in this kind of activity with the blessing, and often with the material support, of the Great Powers. There was no way, some Armenians thought, that this kind of struggle could be successful without resorting to violence. The use of violence would have to comply with the rules of the law of war. However, the Christian peoples of the empire almost always violated the law in the course of their armed struggle.

⁸ Main Armenian revolts are as follows: 1862 and 1895 Zeytun; 20 June 1890 Erzurum; 17 July 1890 Kumkapı; 1892 Merzifon, Kayseri, Yozgat; August 1894 first Sassoon revolt; September 1895 raids on the Sublime Porte; 1895-96 Van; 1895 Trabzon, Erzincan, Bitlis, Maraş, Erzurum, Diyarbakır, Malatya, Harput revolts; 26 August 1896 raid on the Ottoman Bank; 1904 second Sassoon revolt; 21 July 1905 assassination attempt on Abdülhamid II with a bomb; 1909 Adana revolt; April 1915 Van revolt, and the like.

The Balkan-type use of violence constituted a model in that the terrorist groups would attack the civilian Muslim population to provoke them to retaliate. If the Muslims retaliated or if the administration took military action, there would be loud cries of persecution and calls on Europe to intervene. The great Christian Powers would impose on the Ottomans reforms favoring the Christian population. Those reforms started with local administration rights and extended towards autonomy. After some time, Ottoman sovereignty in certain parts of the empire became nominal. With the first armed conflict, those regions gained independence with foreign intervention and assistance.^{9 10 11 12}

In the 1880s, the Hinchags announced, as the goal of their armed struggle, that they established an (imaginary) Armenia in a

⁹ Louise Nalbandian, *Armenian Revolutionary Movement: the Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963, pp.110-11. The Hinchag program stated that: "Agitation and terror were needed to 'elevate the spirit' of the people...The people were also to be incited against their enemies and were to 'profit' from the retaliatory actions of these same enemies. Terror was to be used as a method of protecting the people and winning their confidence in the Hunchak program. The party aimed at terrorizing the Ottoman Government, thus contributing toward lowering the prestige of that regime and working toward its complete disintegration...The Hunchaks wanted to eliminate the most dangerous of the Armenian and Turkish individuals who were then working for the government as well as to destroy all spies and informers. To assist them in carrying out all of these terrorist acts, the party was to organize an exclusive branch specifically devoted to performing acts of terrorism...The most opportune time to institute the general rebellion for carrying out immediate objectives was when Turkey was engaged in a war".

¹⁰ K. S. Papazian, *Patriotism Perverted*, Boston, Baïkar Press, 1934, pp. 14-15. The author says about the Dashnag society: "The purpose of the A. R. Federation [Dashnag] is to achieve political and economic freedom in Turkish Armenia by means of rebellion...Terrorism has, from the first, been adopted by the Dashnag Committee of the Caucasus, as a policy or a method for achieving its ends. Under the heading 'means' in their program adopted in 1892, we read as follows: 'The Armenian Revolutionary Federation [Dashnag], in order to achieve its purpose through rebellion, organizes revolutionary groups. Method no.8 is as follows: To wage fight, and to subject to terrorism the government officials, the traitors...Method no. 11 is to subject the government institutions to destruction and pillage'".

¹¹ Jean Loris-Melikoff, *La Revolution Russe et les nouvelle républiques Transcaucasiennes*, Paris, F. Alcan, 1920, p. 81. He wrote: "The truth is that the party [Dashnag Committee] was ruled by an oligarchy, for whom the particular interests of the party came before the interests of the people and the nation...They [Dashnags] made collections among the bourgeoisie and the great merchants. At the end, when these means were exhausted, they resorted to terrorism, after the teachings of the Russian revolutionaries that the end justifies the means".

¹² On 28 January 1895, the British Ambassador in İstanbul Currie reported to the Foreign Office: "The aim of the Armenian revolutionaries is to stir disturbances, to get the Ottomans to react to violence, and thus get the foreign Powers to intervene".

region called "*Vilâyet-i Sitte*", that is, the six provinces in eastern Anatolia, namely, Erzurum, Van, Elazığ, Diyarbakır, Bitlis and Sivas. According to today's administrative division that region covered also the provinces now called Erzincan, Ağrı, Muş, Siirt, Hakkâri, Bingöl, Malatya, Mardin, Amasya, Tokat, Giresun, Ordu and Trabzon.

Armenians did not prove successful in that struggle. Therefore, they may compare their lot with that of the luckier Christian peoples of the Balkans and feel unfortunate or injured. However, in order to defend the genocide thesis they cannot simply claim that the Turks subjected them to 'death marches' out of their cruelty, that they were too innocent even to nourish political aspirations, not to mention armed struggle, and that, in view of the above, what they were subjected to was genocide by Turks in the sense of Article 2 of the Convention.

Historical research clearly shows, on the other hand, that the Armenians constituted a political group *par excellence* that engaged in armed political activities for independence. Opting for relocation in the course of a defensive struggle against a local political group that joined hands with the enemy, i.e., Russian occupiers, and resorted to arms as well as systematic terrorist actions amounting to grave breaches of the law of war, does not constitute genocide in accordance with the definition of that crime. Further, the crimes committed, if any, in the course of this type of struggle would not amount to genocide either.

Motive

A political group entertaining political aspirations and pursuing activities to serve such purposes may also be a national, racial, religious or ethnic group. Some political groups too, as in the case of the Armenians, may well be described, on the basis of some other characteristics they have, as an ethnic or religious group or simply "other" group. However, being a political group indicates that the incidents in which group gets involved stem from political reasons, first and foremost.

When evidence points at the fact that a given group has engaged in political and armed activities, there is no way that a particular group cannot be considered as falling under the protective clauses of the Convention which deals only with genocide. As it is explained briefly in the last few paragraphs, the

'parties' or organizations such as Dashnag and Hinchak, as well as the Armenian Patriarchate acting in the name of and supported by the Armenians, aimed as a first step at reforms which envisaged a broad political autonomy, and eventually, secession and independence. To this end, they zealously engaged themselves in the politics of ethnic struggle, openly advocating and resorting to force including terrorism. Due to these distinctive and well-documented characteristics, the Armenians constituted a political group well before the relocation began.

Furthermore, as already explained earlier in this article while elaborating on the law pertaining to genocide, the intent to destroy a given group emerges only when the racial hatred harboured against that group reaches a certain intensity. It is a well-known fact that in the Ottoman Empire no racial hatred was ever nurtured by the Muslim majority towards the Armenians. In fact, the kind of racial hatred similar to anti-Semitism in the West was never observed in the history of the Islamic and Turkish societies.

A brief comparison may be useful with the *Holocaust* at this point. The German Jews neither engaged in a struggle for independence, nor did they ever chase after territorial claims. No one can deny that they did not resort to terrorism massacring innocent German civilians. It is common knowledge that they did not join hands with the armies of Germany's enemies in war. They did not stab the German armies on the back by blocking the strategic roads and logistic lines. The Jews of Germany and Europe constituted a totally innocent group with respect to politics. A peaceful, civilized and successful group, which then won eleven of the forty Nobel prizes, a group which had become fully integrated into the German society, was destroyed with a virulent racist hatred called anti-Semitism in an exceptionally efficient and systematic manner, planned in advance and implemented with a massive organizational drive, for no other reason than being a group.

Starting with Hitler, countless authors expressed for many years a profound enmity towards the Jews. Anti-Semitism, which rose dangerously fifteen years prior to the *Holocaust*, was a movement that had been continuing actively since the beginning of the second millennium. In Western Europe in general and in Germany in particular, there had been innumerable cases of attacks on the Jews in the aftermath of epidemics such as plague,

natural disasters such as floods or earthquakes or defeats suffered in wars. In the course of these attacks, members of the Jewish community were killed, and their assets were plundered. In other words, the Christian communities blamed the Jews for the disasters that struck them. They accused the Jews of deicide or killing Jesus Christ, for which they were considered to be 'Anti-Christ'. There exist thousands of documents and publications cataloging various aspects of anti-Semitism. There were anti-Semites even among the Renaissance writers whom one should expect to be rational thinkers. Anti-Semitism can be discerned frequently also in some of the romantic writers of the age of Enlightenment. It is no secret that to a certain extent Heidegger and even Jung, a leading philosopher and a psychiatrist of the last century, were anti-Semites.

In Ottoman history, on the other hand, there had never been a similar 'anti-Armenianism'. There was no biologically motivated super-race theory for the Muslims to debase the Armenians, portraying them as a subhuman race, or a Social Darwinism that would complement this attitude. Since Islam considered the Christians to be a "people of the book", that is, believers in monotheism, the Muslims never directed against the Christians the kind of accusations the Christians leveled at the Jews. In natural or man-made disasters, the Armenians or the other Christian groups were never turned into a scapegoat. On the contrary, the Armenians came to be called "the loyal people". They were active in the realm of public service. They became civil servants, some of them serving at the highest ranks of the central administration as governors, *paşas* or provincial governors, representing their state as ambassadors—even serving as the country's foreign minister. Since they had the opportunity to be trained at the schools opened by the missionaries in the Ottoman Empire as of the beginning of the 19th century, they quickly flourished and came to dominate the empire's economy. Unlike the Jews in Europe, they were not banned from practicing certain professions. They were not forced to live in ghettos. Though they were the most affluent class, they were not subjected to "pogroms" out of envy or grudge. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Armenians were destroyed out of racial hatred directed at their group.

Under the circumstances, the determination of the nature of the motive behind the relocation gains importance. If that motive

arises from a reason other than the Armenians being Armenians, that is, for example, from a military, political or some other kind of reason, then this cannot accommodate itself with the definition of genocide.

A brief glance at recent history may prove useful to apprehend what has really happened with respect to the Armenians. According to the San Stefano Treaty, signed at the end of the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War, 'greater Bulgaria', which, in the Balkans, had coastlines bordering both the Aegean and the Black Seas and which included parts of Macedonia, was to become an independent country. That country attained a more homogeneous population when 260,000 Turkish civilians died during the war, and 515,000 others were driven out of the country. Similarly, the 70,000 Turks and Muslims of the Caucasus fleeing from the Russian armies which had advanced all the way to Erzurum, took refuge in eastern Anatolia. The exact number of civilians who died in that region is not known.¹³ The treaty also envisaged "reforms" for the Armenians living in the Ottoman lands. A certain article involving reforms was included in the treaty in line with the demand made by the Armenian Patriarch Nerses II during a visit to the Russian Grand Duke Nicholas who had arrived in Yeşilköy, next door to İstanbul. Thus, the Armenians placed themselves under Russia's protection in an internationally binding document. The reforms sought under the *Tanzimat* and *Islahat* edicts until then had been envisaged for all Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. But this time, reforms were being asked for only one particular group, and Russia was going to supervise its implementation.

When the other Great Powers did not endorse these concessions obtained by Russia on its own initiative, the Berlin Congress was held, and it was there that the dimensions of Bulgaria were trimmed down. However, the return of those Turks, who had been forced to leave their homelands, could not even be attempted. The reforms envisaged for the Armenians were confirmed, on the other hand, but this time under the supervision of all the Great Powers.

¹³ Justine McCarthy, *Death and Exile: the Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*, Princeton, New Jersey, The Darwin Press, 1995, p. 339.

During the years 1912-13, the Balkan Wars took place between the Ottoman Empire on one side, and Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia on the other. In those full-scale armed hostilities, 1,450,000 Turkish, Albanian and Pomak civilians died. Another 410,000 were exiled towards Anatolia, fleeing from the attacking armies, under bombardment, leaving behind their destroyed or burnt homes. Thus, in many places that the Turks had known as their homeland for five centuries, including vast areas where they constituted the majority, the Turkish and Muslim existence was brought to an abrupt end. Cultural assets, the legacy of so many years, were torn down. World War I began only a year after hundreds of thousands of those refugees had arrived in the remaining parts of the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottoman Government, whose leaders held a crucial meeting with the Dashnag representatives in August 1914, obtained a pledge from the Armenians to the effect that they would act like loyal Ottoman citizens in the Great War. However, at a secret Dashnag meeting held in Erzurum two months prior to that, a decision had been taken to start a wide-scale Armenian rebellion against the Ottomans to benefit from the opportunity provided by the war. The Armenians failed to honour their promise. And they saw their interests served better in serving the Russian interests.¹⁴

The Russian Armenians too took their places in the Russian armies, which prepared to attack the Ottomans. Etchmiadzin Catholicos (the highest Armenian religious figure in Russia) assured the Russian Governor General for the Caucasus that "the Armenians would unconditionally support the Russian war efforts in return for Russia's ensuring that reforms be made for the Ottoman Armenians".¹⁵ Later, when he was received by the Russian Tsar Nicholas II in Tbilisi, the Catholicos told the autocrat: "Armenian liberation will result in an autonomous Armenia in Anatolia outside the realm of Turkish sovereignty, and this will be achieved with Russia's help".¹⁶

In March 1915, the Russian forces moved towards Van. Armenian insurgency, which started in Van, turned into a full-

¹⁴ *Aspirations et agissements révolutionnaires des comités arméniens avant et après la proclamation de la Constitution Ottomane*, İstanbul, 1917, pp. 144-146.

¹⁵ G. Tchalkouchian, *Le Livre Rouge*, Paris, Imp. Veradzenount, 1919, p. 12.

¹⁶ *Idem*.

scale rebellion on April 11, during which the Armenian armed groups attacked the Muslim population killing and expelling many. Ten days later, the Tsar sent a telegram to the Van Armenian Revolutionary Committee and thanked them "for their services to the Russians". **Gochnak**, an Armenian newspaper published in the United States, gave in its 24 May 1915 issue the 'good news' that "only 1,500 Turks" had been left in Van.

The Armenian forces inside the Russian army that crossed the Ottoman border were under the command of a former Ottoman deputy named Gareguine Pasdermadjian who had adopted the revolutionary name of 'Armen Garo'. Another former deputy, Hambartsum Boyajian, code-named 'Murat', was at the head of the guerrilla force attacking the Turkish villages and massacring the civilian population. Yet another former deputy from Van, Y. Papazian, was the leader of the guerrillas fighting in the Van, Bitlis and Muş region.

After issuing yet another warning, though in vain, to the Armenian Patriarch, the Ottoman administration started on April 24 arresting the leaders of the 'komitacis' in Istanbul whom the Armenians chose to portray as their 'intellectuals'. One can clearly see from these developments the reason for the relocation decision. The Armenian cooperation with the Russian army, their rebellion in Van, and their guerrilla activity in ethnic cleansing in the neighbouring provinces were, for the Ottomans, a re-enactment of an old story with which they were all too familiar. Just as the Balkan Christians had done in the Balkans in cooperation with the Russians, now the Armenians, moving together with the Russian armies, were starting to subject the Turks and Muslims in eastern Anatolia to ethnic cleansing, killing them and burning their houses. A decision was taken to transfer the Armenians to another part of the empire mainly far from the eastern and also the southern fronts to prevent the Armenians from continuing with these military activities and from attaining their political goals.

The Intent to Destroy

According to Article 2 of the Convention, perpetration of one of the five cited acts was a necessary condition for genocide, provided that it be committed with the intent to destroy one of the four groups 'as a group'. However, the Armenian apologists focused their efforts to prove that the Ottoman administration had

the intent to destroy the Armenians. Since no evidence of the existence of 'the intent to destroy' could be found, they did not refrain from what should be called falsification.¹⁷ An Armenian named Aram Andonian published so-called "telegrams" in which Talât Paşa was supposedly "ordering the extermination". Though soon enough these were foiled as fakes, they continued to use them as propaganda material.

Nevertheless, after some time, the failure to find any official documents, which could corroborate the 'intent to destroy', pushed the pro-Armenian circles to adopt a new strategy. Obviously, what mattered was to achieve pre-determined results. They started claiming that 1.5 million Armenians had died during the 'deportation'. Such an unduly high figure was being cited beside its propaganda effect, to prove indirectly the presence of the intent to destroy by way of 'deporting', and thus to prove that genocide had been committed. For that reason, the pre-transfer Armenian population had to be revised upwards. One falsification led to another. History was being distorted to make it coincide with the requirements of the law.

From the Turkish standpoint, Armenian engagement in political and armed struggle for the sake of independence suffices to refute the thesis that members of the group were killed because they were affiliated with that group, and to prove that relocation was not genocide. However, systematic and massive killing of a civilian population, even with political aims, may constitute a crime against humanity.¹⁸ Furthermore, the Armenian genocide claim is now being based on Paragraph (c) of Article 2 of the Convention, namely "Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part".

This claim is presented along the following lines: Since the Ottomans were wary of openly destroying the Armenians, they used the 'deportation' as an opportunity to impose on the Armenians the kind of living conditions that would cause them to perish. Through an 'omission' of their duty to protect the Armenians from attacks during the 'deportation', to ensure safe

¹⁷ Aram Andonian, *Documents officiels concernant les massacres arméniens*, Paris, Turabian, 1920.

¹⁸ The Statute of Rome, Article 7 and the relevant articles of the International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda on crimes against humanity.

transportation, no less than to provide food, medicine, medical treatment and shelter, they accelerated the deaths. The Armenian authors accused the *Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa*, the Ottoman intelligence services, of having actually organized the massacres committed by the criminals released from prisons. These are the claims. It must not be forgotten that along with acts such as murder which has a direct impact, causing deaths deliberately through omission, can also be considered genocide.

Therefore, it is important to focus on whether the deaths resulted in the course of relocation from an intent to destroy a specific group, hence whether the relocation was a covert genocide. I recounted earlier in this article that the relocation decision was aimed at preventing the Armenians from collaborating with the Russian armies and, at the same time, from saving the Turks living in the areas specified by the Hinchag's map from being subjected to ethnic cleansing as in the case of the Turks in the Balkans. The Armenians had formed their own units inside the Russian military forces and were fighting the Ottoman armies along the eastern front. Ethnic Armenian soldiers were deserting the Ottoman armies fighting on other fronts, joining guerrilla bands inside the country, attacking the Ottomans from behind and cutting their logistic supply lines. The Van rebellion constituted the first step of these activities.

Having seen that all hope of reaching an agreement with the Armenians had been lost, and that the warnings it had issued *via* the Patriarch were not being heeded, the Ottoman Government was left with no workable alternative but to decide to transfer the Armenians to a region in Syria and northern Iraq, which were then both Ottoman lands. In a telegram sent to Talât Paşa, the Minister of Interior, on 2 May 1915, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief Enver Paşa reported that the Russians were driving the Muslims in Russia towards the Ottoman border, and that these people were in a pitiful state. He referred to the Armenian rebellion in the vicinity of Van and suggested that the Armenians should either be driven towards the Russian border or dispersed towards some other areas. As a result, Talât Paşa personally assumed responsibility to initiate the removal of the Armenians to other parts of the empire instead of pushing them towards the Russian border, and eventually to Russia. After a while, to share the responsibility, he ensured the passing of an interim law (30 May) relevant to the issue. The commanders were authorized to

instantly deal with those persons who disrupted law and order, staged attacks or put up resistance, and to relocate one by one or *en masse* the population of those villages or towns that engaged in espionage and committed high treason. Thus, the relocation task was handed over to the army.¹⁹

It should be obvious that it was out of the question for a decision to have been made well in advance for the Armenian relocation. No advance planning had been made prior to that decision, and the organizational preparations needed had not been done either. A top military commander concerned about the grave situation on the eastern front demanded urgent action, and the government wanted to respond to that demand immediately. It is so clear that no pre-arrangements had been made in advance that Talât Paşa himself initiated the population transfer without even having a law passed to this effect. He was so anxious to ensure that there would be no more delay. The law came after action. Under the circumstances, everything points to the fact that no plan was made ready, and no organization set up to implement it with intent to destroy the Armenians.

The text of the law in question envisages, moreover, every effort to ensure the security of the Armenians during the transfer, i.e., *inter alia*, the safety of their lives and their assets. It states that the food to be provided for them be financed from the "migration fund", that they be allocated plots of land at their destinations and houses be built for the needy, that the farmers among them be supplied with seeds and equipment, that they receive money for the assets they left behind, and that if anybody were settled in the real estate left behind by them, the value of the real estate should be calculated and the sum in question be forwarded to the former owner.²⁰

Furthermore, with regulations issued on 10 June 1915, the properties of the resettled Armenians were placed under protection. They were extended aid in cash and in kind to facilitate them to resettle at their destinations. The real estate left behind were sold at auctions by the government on their behalf, and a commission founded for this purpose made due payments

¹⁹ *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler: 1915-1920*, Ankara, Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1994, p. 8.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

to the Armenians who demanded them.²¹ With an order issued to the Anatolian provinces on 25 November 1915, relocation was suspended. The activity that took place beyond that date was of a local scope only. Finally, at the beginning of 1916, the whole operation was actually brought to an end. After the war the Armenians were permitted to return to the places of their choice as much as possible. Some steps were taken, not very successfully, to make it easier for them to get back the property held in trust for them by the commissions or sold at auctions.²² All these measures could not be taken to conceal a genocidal attempt.

In the communications that took place between the capital city and its provincial administration on the movement of population, there is no reference at all that could create the suspicion that there was any intention to destroy the Armenians. On the contrary, one sees in these documents that mutual requests were made to ensure that they be transferred in a safe manner. Most interesting communications were exchanged between the Erzurum Governor's Office and Talât Paşa. Since that province was situated on the Russian border, the region assumed priority. The provincial officials were instructed that the Armenians living there be permitted to take along with them all of their movable personal belongings. In these documents, it was also stated that there was no need to transfer the Armenians living in Diyarbakır, Harput and Sivas. But after the Russian threat grew in the direction of central Anatolia as well, that decision was altered. When some Kurdish citizens attacked a 500-strong group set off from Erzurum while the convoy was travelling between Erzincan and Erzurum, the officials in Diyarbakır, Elazığ and Bitlis were told to punish, in a severe manner, any raiders who might attack the Armenians in the villages and towns situated on their path. Similarly, when Dersim highwaymen attacked the Armenians coming from Erzurum, the Elazığ Governor's Office was ordered to take urgent measures. The Erzurum Governor obviously suspended the operation after seeing that the Armenians could not be fully protected during the transfer. He received a message telling him that a postponement was not possible, on account of military reasons. Putting aside that instruction, transfers from Erzurum were halted from time to time for the same reason.²³

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 35, 43, 44, 51.

Despite all these measures, some Armenian civilians undoubtedly died during the relocation. But it is obvious that these deaths did not result from the deliberate neglect of state duties. The 65,000-strong Ottoman army, fighting along the eastern front, was also frozen to death in Sarıkamış. The harsh climate and the rough terrain, the inadequacy of the military units charged with protecting the Armenian convoys, lack of adequate food and medicine and epidemics caused natural deaths. The weaknesses of a state experiencing the final days of its dissolution cannot be considered a deliberate neglect of duty, i.e., omission.

It seems that the British High Commissioner in İstanbul had access to the Ottoman archives. The original text of a secret order dispatched by Talât Paşa was found in the British archives.²⁴ The last article of the order says: "...Because this order concerns the disbanding of the Committees [terrorist bodies], it is necessary that it be implemented in a way that would prevent the Armenian and Muslim elements from massacring each other". In his memorandum about this order, D. G. Osborne of the British Foreign Office says: "...[T]he last article of the order states that one must refrain from measures which might cause massacre".²⁵ The evidences above indicate that the relocation was not arranged with the aim of destroying the Armenians.

Some pro-Armenian writers claim that the Ottoman archives being opened up with a delay (due to the need for classification) was a ploy on the part of the government to eliminate the kind of documents that would prove the Ottoman Government's decision to exterminate. They argue that in the aftermath of the war the *İttihatçıs* (members of the Union and Progress Party) collected and destroyed the documents implicating them. Yet, in the Ottoman recording system all incoming and outgoing documents would be filed into logs. Once a document was filed into the records, there was no way to destroy it. Besides, the large numbers of communications sent out by the Sublime Porte (Prime Ministry) arrived in various provincial centers throughout the empire. A great part of these were the circulars sent from the capital city to more than one governor office. So, even if we were to assume that the copies kept in the capital city were destroyed, it would be

²⁴ Dossier no. 371, document 9518 E. 5523.

²⁵ 371/4241/170751. Cited in: Kamuran Gürün, *The Armenian File*, London, K. Rustem & Bro. and Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd, 1985, p. 237.

practically impossible to collect and destroy the multitude of their originals kept at various centers.

There is another piece of clear evidence indicating that the government of the time had no intention of exterminating the Armenians. Members of the gangs that attacked the Armenian convoys and those officials who exploited the Armenian plight, neglected their duties or abused their powers were court-martialled and punished. Until 1918, that is, until the Mondros Armistice, 1,397 persons received various kinds of sentences in this context, with more than half of them being executed during the tenure of the Union and Progress Government.²⁶ Obviously, the Nazi SS, SA and the Gestapo officers, responsible for the Jewish genocide, were punished only for not carrying out the genocide effectively, and not for the kind of reasons mentioned above.

Acts of Genocide

Most of the acts perpetrated in the Jewish genocide committed by the Nazis were "the killing of persons belonging in the group", that is, the act described in Article 2(a) of the Convention. These massacres took place in the gassing to death of the Jews after they were transported, that is, deported to the camps where they were kept under conditions they would not be able to survive for long. In other words, the deportation itself was not an act of genocide causing deaths. On the other hand, the living conditions at the camps were acts that fit the description made in Article 2(c) of the Convention. The Nazis committed these acts after advanced planning. They got organized and then implemented the plan in a systematic and massive manner.

The fact that the Ottoman forces did not stage armed attacks on the Armenian population or settlements during the relocation shows that the acts described in Article 2 (a) and (b) were not committed. Since the relocation lacked that basic element of ethnic cleansing, pro-Armenian writers who are adamant to portray the relocation as genocide claim that the "deportation" was used deliberately to deteriorate the group's living conditions to

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 259. The distribution of the persons punished according to provinces was as follows: Sivas 648, Mamuretülaziz 223, Diyarbakır 70, Bitlis 25, Eskişehir 29, Şabinkarahisar 6, Niğde 8, İzmit 33, Ankara 32, Kayseri 69, Suriye (Syria) 27, Hüdavendigâr 12, Konya 12, Urfa 189, Canik 14.

ensure physical extermination of the Armenians in an indirect manner, and that Article 2(c) would apply to that situation. In other words, they assert that although the Ottomans did not openly and directly exterminate the Armenians, they adjusted the "deportation" conditions to ensure that the Armenians would die anyway. The Armenian genocide thesis came to be based almost entirely on this argument.

There is no evidence to prove that relocation was planned to commit genocide in an indirect way. It is not possible to come across statements or instructions that would indicate the presence of the intent to destroy through relocation, which must be done to prove genocide. On the contrary, the entire archival material pertains to the implementation of the resettlement decision with as little harm to the Armenians as possible.

To distort these facts, the Armenian apologists take two different tracks to explain the situation. They report in an extremely inflated manner the number of people who died as a result of the relocation. To that end, they first inflate the overall population figures and then the ratio of the casualties. Thus, they try to prove that the aim had been murder rather than relocation. The second path they try is that of "oral history". They want to prove that there had been intent to destroy by gathering the personal accounts of the events related by the people who had survived the transfer or by their children. One could say that in almost all of the books written by Armenian historians, genocide is supposedly "proven" with these methods.

No one doubts that a great number of families and individuals experienced personal tragedies during the relocation. Even population exchanges cause similar tragedies, albeit less dramatic. However, this does not show that the group in question was subjected to genocide. The oral history approach, not only does not carry any legal weight, but also is problematic when it comes to writing down history. It is a twilight zone between history and memoirs.

As stated above, the relocation decision was taken officially after Enver Paşa reported in writing to Talât Paşa on 2 May 1915, that the Russians had sent across our borders on 20 April 1915, a multitude of Muslim civilians who were in a wretched state. At more or less the same time, the Armenians rebelled in Van, and operations began against armed Armenian groups. Therefore, the

arrest of 235 Armenians on 24 April 1915, was neither the beginning of the relocation nor were they prominent intellectuals of the Armenian community, for they were "komitacıs" or terrorists, to use the contemporary jargon. In other words, the claim that the "deportation" that started with the arrest of the Armenian intellectuals constituted genocide is not valid.

The Ottoman Government could have opted for the second alternative suggested by Enver Paşa. As the Russians had done to the Muslims, it could have openly driven the Armenians towards the Russian border which would have caused by far the higher casualty figures than the relocation brought about. The Balkan countries had done that to Turkish and Muslim populations much bigger than the Armenian population. An empire that was locked in a life and death war with the British and the French had no reason to fear the potential reaction of the British or the French public. It had no reason to hide behind a "deportation" process. In other words, offering the Armenians the same treatment the Balkan Turks and Muslims had been given was not so difficult for the Young Turks, as some seem to believe. The Ottoman Government chose the relocation option not to get the Armenians killed indirectly but to have them transported to a safer part of the realm, a place less hazardous with respect to national security during the war.

Let us come to the issue of the Armenian population at that time. In the pre-World War I Western sources, that figure varies from 1,056,000 (London, **Annual Register**) to 1,555,000 (The French **Yellow Book**). In recent publications, however, this figure sometimes rises up to 3 million. François Rochebloine, the rapporteur on whose account dated 15 January 2001, the French National Assembly's genocide bill was based, gives the figure of 1,8 million. The 'Rochebloine report', says in an unprecedented way, that 1,2 million Armenians died (600,000 of them where they were and another 600,000 during the deportation), and that 200,000 others fled to the Caucasus with the Russian armies, 100,000 were supposedly abducted (?), 150,000 survived the deportation and that another 150,000 fled before they could be deported. This must be a feat of imagination! The casualty figures too have climbed continually over the years. The 1918 edition of the **Encyclopaedia Britannica** says that 600,000 Armenians had died. In the 1968 edition of the same publication, this figure rose to 1,5 million.

It would be sounder, on the other hand, to take the Ottoman statistics as a basis, and accept that the Armenian population figure was 1,295,000, simply because the Ottomans had reasons of taxation and conscription to keep correct statistics. This figure is, in fact, also the average of the figures provided by two Western sources of that period as mentioned above.

To calculate the number of the dead, we should first find out the number of the Armenians who reached Syria and Iraq, safe and sound. In its 7 December 1916 report, the Ottoman Interior Ministry states that 702,900 persons were transferred, and specifies the overall sum spent for the relocation.²⁷ The Migrations Commission of the League of Nations gives the number of Armenians passing from Turkey into Russia throughout World War I as somewhere in the 400,000-420,000 range.²⁸ Considering that the number of Armenians living in İstanbul, Kütahya, Edirne, and Aydın (including İzmir), areas where they were not transferred, was around 200,000, one concludes that the number of Armenians who died due to relocations, could not have been high at all, with due respect for the dead of the two sides.

According to the information the İstanbul Armenian Patriarchate provided to the British prior to the Sèvres negotiations, the Armenian population that remained within the Ottoman borders following the 1920 Mondros Armistice amounted to 625,000 people. If one adds to that figure the number of Armenians who went to the Caucasus, the total would reach 1,045,000. Since the pre-war Armenian population amounted to 1,3 million, the number of the dead, whatever the causes may be, turns out to be no more than 265,000.

Boghos Nubar Paşa, who attended the Paris Peace Conference as the head of the Armenian National Committee, declared that 6-700,000 Armenians migrated to other countries and that 280,000 Armenians were living within the Turkish borders. If one would add up these two figures and then deduct the total from the 1,3 million, one would get 220,000-320,000 as the number of Armenian deaths, again caused by a number of reasons. However, he himself claimed that over one million Armenians had been killed. For that to be true, the pre-war Armenian population

²⁷ Chief of General Staff, KLS 361, file 1445, F. 15-22.

²⁸ Gürün, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

should have been over 2 million. The person in question claimed that the pre-war Armenian population had been 4,5 million. Thus, he provided the first example to the subsequent generations of the practice of "bidding higher and higher", as if at an auction.

Arnold J. Toynbee, who was, among others, responsible for war propaganda, said in his "Blue Book" that 600,000 Armenians had died.²⁹ Later this figure was quoted by the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. On the other hand, Toynbee said, in footnote no. 38, that the number of deportees reaching Zor, Damascus and Aleppo, as of 5 April 1916, was 500,000. Along with the 200,000 who were not subjected to deportation and the 400,000 that went to the Caucasus, that brings the Armenian population up to 1.7 million, which is higher than the British figures for the Armenian population. If, on the other hand, the population figure is put at 1,3 million, the number of the dead has to decline from 600,000 to 200,000.

The figures above indicate that, depending on the various estimates about the overall Armenian population, the Armenian losses vary between a couple of hundred thousand to 600,000. Obviously, all the statistics that put the losses over 300,000 happen to inflate grossly the pre-war Armenian population figure. One should never lose sight of the fact that, despite the deaths that occurred during the relocation, those who safely arrived at their destination, even according to Toynbee, were around half a million. This proves that the relocation was not genocide in disguise, for, had it been genocide, there would be no reason for the Ottomans to let them survive.

Considerable number of people may have died. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that not all (not even most) deaths occurred during the transfers. In the wars of the time, those fleeing from the enemy armies too were in a state of migration vulnerable to many dangers. After the Russian army's operation which began around Van in May 1915, the Ottoman army took back the places it had lost. Then, a much bigger Russian attack began and reached all the way close to Elazığ. After the 1917 October Revolution the Russian armies retreated, and the Ottomans advanced once again. While the armies thus advanced and retreated, both the Turks and the Armenians, who found

²⁹ FO, Hc.1/8008, XC/A-018055, p. 651.

themselves on the path of these armies, had to move back and forth. For example, an estimated 900,000 Turks had to be displaced from eastern Anatolia towards the central parts of the country.³⁰ In a region with an extremely rough terrain, people tried to travel in carriages, on horseback and mostly on foot, braving cold weather and the attacks of the gangs of brigands who did not discriminate between Muslims and Christians. In a few days, their food would finish and the children and the elderly especially, would be weakened by fatigue and lack of adequate water, and typhoid fever or typhus epidemics would cause the number of deaths soar all of a sudden.

One can even assert that an orderly relocation, which took place in the same region under similar physical conditions, was safer and caused less health hazards than the haphazard movements of populations mentioned above. For example, some 5,000 Armenians left with the French who evacuated Maraş during the Turkish War of Independence. In the course of their 10-24 February journey, 2-3,000 of these Armenians died on account of the harsh traveling conditions, though they did not come under any attack from outsiders.³¹

Due to all these reasons, Boghos Nubar Paşa, referring to a German report, said at the Paris Peace Conference that the Turks lost more people than the Armenians did, that the entire Turkish losses during the war amounted to 2,5 million, that this occurred from "war, epidemics, scarcity of food and inadequacy of drugs and hospital personnel", that at least half of these deaths occurred among those Turks who were "in the Armenian provinces occupied by the Russian and Armenian armies". This means that a minimum of 1,25 million Muslims must have perished in eastern Anatolia.

Indeed, population research done later confirmed the validity of this figure to a great extent. The Ottoman war zone losses in World War I were in the 500,000-550,000 range, and the civilian losses amounted to some two million. Since the war zone was eastern Anatolia, it is only natural that more than half of the overall civilian deaths occurred in that region. Indeed, McCarthy

³⁰ McCarthy, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

³¹ Georges Boudière, "Notes sur la campagne de Syrie-Cilicie: l'affaire de Maraş (janvier-février 1920)", *Turcica*, Paris/Strasbourg, IX/2-X (1978), p. 160.

estimates that 1,19 million Muslim civilians perished in the region between 1914-1921.

Finally, the Turkish and Armenian civilians, who died in clashes with one another, called '*mukatele*' in old Turkish, that is, mutual killings, are included in those casualty figures, though the definite number is not known. According to the findings reported in the course of the *Şüheda* (Martyrs) Project launched in the early 1980s, mass graves abound in eastern Anatolia. Anthropological research determines scientifically to which group each mass grave belongs. Although it is early to make a general assessment, one sees that the mass graves belonging to Turks are more numerous. These grave sites indicate that the people's tales of Armenians persecuting Muslims are not a myth. The Muslims who took part in the war did not desert the army until the very end of the armed hostilities. Soldiers of Armenian origin, on the other hand, deserted in large numbers. They formed armed groups which attacked the Muslim towns and villages where there would hardly be men at fighting age able to protect them. So, these peoples could not defend themselves effectively. This is why the Muslim deaths were more numerous than the Armenian ones.

There is a difference between the fates of those Armenians who were transferred from western Anatolia and those from eastern Anatolia. The partial relocation carried out in the west caused considerably fewer deaths, because of the availability of railways. A greater number of them returned to their homes in the western parts after the war ended. In the east, Armenian deaths were more numerous because of the rough terrain, lack of railways and the fact that only small gendarmerie units that were spared from the war front were available to protect them.

Still, the number of Armenian deaths were a lot less than claimed. The fact that many of these deaths occurred outside the relocation process indicates that the relocation was not an act of genocide hiding the intent to destroy. Otherwise, we would be faced with a strange, hard-to-explain kind of genocide in which the "genocide-committing" Turks lost much more people than the "genocide victim" Armenians did.

In Whole or in Part

For a case to be considered genocide certain acts must have been committed with the intent to destroy a group in whole or in

part. Since members of a group get destroyed in genocide, because they belong to that group, that is, out of racial hatred, it is logical to say that the intent to destroy must be directed against the whole of the group. In genocide cases survival of some of the group members results, not because there was no intent to destroy the group in whole, but either because those group members had simply been inaccessible or because the organization committing the genocide did not have time to complete its job. That is what happened in the Jewish genocide committed by the Nazis.

Only Gregorian Armenians were subjected to relocation. Catholic and Protestant Armenians were left outside this process. The fact that only one of these groups were transferred shows that the Ottomans did not feel racial hatred against the Armenians as a whole, including the Gregorian Armenians. Considering the fact that Islam perceives all three religions merely as different branches of Christianity, this is all evident enough. It is common knowledge that in the Ottoman Empire there was no religious dispute between the Muslims and Christians, a dispute which could lead to forced displacements. It is obvious that the desire to prevent the Gregorian Armenians, who embraced the similar creed as the Orthodox Russians, from engaging in ethnic cleansing with the help of the Russians or the Muslims in the region, played an important part in the relocation decision. This biggest group of Armenians were situated on the path of the advancing Russian army, and the terrorists and guerrillas that came out of that group were hitting the Ottoman army from behind, cutting the logistic lines and staging massacres at Muslim settlements. All these murderous actions rendered the relocation imperative from the military standpoint. This shows that the reason behind the decision was security concern of the highest order as well as the need to protect the Muslims of the region.

Meanwhile, the Armenians living in certain cities were left outside the resettlement process regardless of their religious creed. That occurred, for example, in İstanbul, Edirne, Kütahya and Aydın (including İzmir). Almost all of the Armenians transferred from İzmit, Bursa, Kastamonu, Ankara and Konya returned to their homes at the end of the war. The majority of the Kayseri, Harput and Diyarbakır Armenians too returned, but most

of them apparently could not go to their villages. Those from Erzurum and Bitlis crossed into Cilicia from northern Syria³² and fought the Turks on the side of the French during the Turkish War of Independence.

In those provinces, including the capital city of İstanbul, left outside the relocation process, some 200,000 Armenians were living. This has a great symbolic significance. In the Jewish genocide caused by racial hatred, it would be inconceivable to have the Jews, for example, in Berlin or Munich, not to be subjected to deportation and genocide. Even that example alone makes it all very clear that the Ottomans did not commit genocide against the Armenians.

Courts

After İstanbul was occupied at the end of the war, courts were set up to investigate the Armenian incidents in line with the provisions of the Sèvres Treaty. The most famous one of these was the *Nemrut Mustafa* Court. In a cable he sent to London on 24 January 1919, Admiral Calthorpe referred to the Ottoman Prime Minister who had told him that 160-200 people had been arrested. The court had one significant characteristics in that it had been created by the members of the 'Liberty and Agreement' Government which was the deadly enemy of the Union and Progress Party. Another characteristics was that the defendants were denied the right to defend themselves. After a while, realizing that the court would not be able to stage a fair trial -and may be that it would not be able to operate effectively- the British occupation forces transferred the 144 defendants to Malta and asked the crown prosecutor to try them in a move that ran against the judicial rules of the time. Due to the United States' delay in entering the war, the American Embassy and the consulates in Anatolia operating under it had remained open until 1916. The British asked the U.S. Department of State to hand over to them the evidence collected by these American missions. After an expert from the British Embassy in Washington examined the American archives, the following was stated in a cable sent to London by the British Ambassador on 13 July 1921: "...There was nothing therein which could be used as evidence against the Turks who are being detained for trial at Malta...The reports in

³² Information given by the Armenian Patriarch, FO, 371/6556/E.2730/800/44.

the possession of the Department do not appear in any case to contain evidence against these Turks which would be useful even for the purpose of corroborating information already in the possession of His Majesty's Government".³³

The British Prosecutor General of the Crown said in his report dated 29 July 1921: "...Up to the present no statements have been taken from witnesses who can depose to the truth of the charges made against the prisoners. It is indeed uncertain whether any witnesses can be found...Until more precise information is available as to the nature of the evidence which will be forthcoming at the trials, the Attorney General does not feel that he is in a position to express any opinion as to the prospects of success in any of the cases submitted for his consideration".³⁴

Under the weight of such evidence, the accusation that the crime of genocide has been committed against the Armenians would be legally unsustainable, not only because it would imply the implementation of a convention retroactively, but also would amount to demanding that the people that could not even be put on trial in the past due to lack of evidence, be judged in the absence of fresh evidence after so many decades.

Was Armenian Relocation a Crime against Humanity?

As explained above in detail, relocation was not genocide, because it did not "deliberately" worsen the Armenian conditions of life calculated to bring about their destruction.³⁵ Nevertheless, can the losses suffered by a relocated group be covered by the concept of crimes against humanity?

When the Armenian relocation began, the British, French and Russian Governments issued in a joint communiqué on 24 May 1915, speaking about "...crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization.." and declaring that they would hold the persons concerned responsible. At that time, crimes against humanity was merely an unbinding phrase. It had not yet been adopted as a legal concept. For this reason, no link can be established between

³³ Cable of the British Embassy in Washington to London, dated 13 July 1921, no.722, FO, 371/6504.

³⁴ Gürün, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

³⁵ International Law Commission, 48th Session, 6 May-26 July 1996, Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind, p. 92.

the Armenian relocation and crimes against humanity just because of that communiqué.

The concept of crimes against humanity was cited for the first time at the international level in 1946 among the Nuremberg Principles (6/c). That crime was envisaged to be committed during war time. It covered acts such as the persecution of any civilian society on political, racial or religious grounds, murdering or exterminating its members or forcing them to migrate, and the like.

The definition of genocide given in Article 2 of the Convention was created from the concept of crimes against humanity as embodied in the Nuremberg Principles. As a result of genocide being taken outside the category of crimes against humanity, what was left was incorporated as the modern concept of crime against humanity into Article 7 of the Statute of Rome of the International Criminal Court.

Accordingly, the precondition that crimes against humanity would have to be committed during war as provided in the Nuremberg Principles was abandoned. The groups against whom such crimes could be committed were not listed. It was assumed that such crimes could be committed against any civilian population. In the introduction to Article 7, no reference was made to the perpetration of crimes against humanity on "political, racial or religious" grounds. The fact that the reasons for the presence of such a crime were not listed indicate that regardless of the reasons, such perpetration would suffice. On the other hand, in Article 7, the only condition put forth for an act to be considered a crime against humanity was that the acts must have been committed "as part of a wide-spread and systematic attack directed against any civilian population with knowledge of the attack". In other words, the eleven acts listed in Article 7(1) from 'a' to 'k' would not constitute a crime against humanity, if committed in isolation. Unlike the Nuremberg Principles, "persecution of any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender...or other grounds" came to be considered not the general motive for the crime. Accordingly, no special motive is necessary for crimes against humanity.

Although both of them are international crimes subjected to international adjudication, the differences between genocide and

crimes against humanity are obvious. Compared with the definition of genocide given in the introduction to Article 2 of the Convention these differences are as follows: Genocide can be committed against only four kinds of groups, namely, national, racial, ethnic or religious. Acts committed against 'political groups' do not come under the scope of genocide. Crimes against humanity, on the other hand, can be committed against any group. In genocide the enumerated acts must have been committed with the intent to destroy a given group. For the crime against humanity the presence of this intent is not necessary. A "wide-spread and systematic attack against the group" suffices for that. In genocide the motive for the acts is the intent to destroy the group 'as a group'. This implies the existence of racial hatred. Paragraph 1 of Article 7 of the Statute of Rome, on the other hand, does not specify any general motive for crimes against humanity.

Under the circumstances, some commentators may attempt to use or abuse the acts cited in Article 7, such as murder (a), extermination (b), deportation (d) and persecution (h) in order to define the Armenian relocation as a crime against humanity. After all, they may assert that some people died as a result of the relocation carried out, albeit without intent to destroy.

As can be deduced from above, the basic condition for crime against humanity is that certain acts must have been committed against a civilian population "as part of a wide-spread and systematic attack". For that reason, the characteristics of such an attack must be properly defined. If there is an open military attack on a civilian population, no other proof would be necessary. But the 'attack' in the sense of Article 7 does not necessarily have to be of a military nature. Simultaneous and intensive (i.e., multiple commission of acts) perpetrations against a civilian population of most of the acts cited in Article 7 have to occur. Also stipulated is that such an attack must have been actively developed, directed and encouraged by a state or some other large (sub-state) organization.³⁶

It may be useful to examine the 1915-16 Armenian relocation in the light of the acts related to 'deportation' listed in Article 7 Paragraph (1). The acts of killing or causing 'deaths' cited in Article

³⁶ PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add. 2, p. 9.

7 (1/a) have to be part of a wide-spread and systematic attack and must be "known" by the persons who commit the crime.

According to Article 7 (2/b), the 'extermination' must, again, have to be part of a wide-spread and systematic attack directed against the group and include intentional infliction of conditions of life, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population. For example, deliberately denying that group food or medicine would come under that heading.

'Deportation and forced transfers' cited in Article 7 (1/d) and 7 (2/d) also would have to occur as part of a wide-spread and systematic attack and, at the same time, these must be staged without grounds permitted by international law.

'Persecution' cited in Article 7 (1/h), means in accordance with Article 7 (2/g) "the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reasons of the identity of the group". Persecution consists of 'multiple of commission' of acts that constitute an intensive violation of almost all of the fundamental rights. Those who commit that crime would be motivated by the kind of political, racial, national, ethnic, religious, gender or other grounds not permitted by international law.³⁷

Applying the concept of crimes against humanity as enshrined in the Statute of Rome to the 1915-16 Armenian incidents some eight decades after these incidents occurred would not be compatible with common sense, let alone the law. Still, an examination of the issue from this standpoint would reveal the following facts.

For the acts listed in Article 7 Paragraph (1) to constitute crimes against humanity, these acts must be part of a wide-spread and systematic attack on a given civil population. Yet, the Ottoman security forces did not stage any such attack on the Armenians in order to carry out their relocation. In other words, Armenians were not subjected to the multiple commission of the specified acts that make up the concept of "attack" as defined by law.

The Armenians were not persecuted on account of their identity as a group on any grounds. Until World War I when a

³⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

dangerous situation arose in the eastern front for the survival of the country, they continued to exercise their fundamental rights like everybody else. There was no policy to deprive them of these rights prior to their armed revolt and the relocation. During the relocation, which necessarily constituted a derogation to a set of rights, their fundamental rights were respected to the extent possible.

The deaths of some group members in circumstances where no wide-spread and systematic attack was underway does not constitute either an element or a part of such an 'attack'. The gang attacks on the Armenians in the course of relocation were basically and exclusively a law and order issue.

While discussing the genocide claims earlier in this article, it was stated that the intent to destroy did not exist. The Armenians claim that the Ottomans used the 'deportation' to impose on them the kind of living conditions that would cause them to perish. The relocation was not carried out as part of a 'wide-spread and systematic attack' on the Armenians. Relocation, which does not constitute any such attack, was not the kind of deportation as defined in Article 7 (1/d) and 7 (2/d), hence not a crime against humanity.

In the genocide section above, it was explained that it was out of the question that the relocation was imposed deliberately in ways that would cause the Armenians to perish. Relocation was initiated in response to the request Enver Paşa made as a result of the developments taking place on the eastern front. It was aimed at eliminating the threats the armed elements inside the Armenian population posed in collaboration with the Russian troops against the security of the Ottoman army. This military requirement constitutes, from the standpoint of international law, permissible grounds for a forced population transfer.

On the other hand, the government of the time did not impose any limitations in food and medicine supply to the Armenians during the relocation. In fact, the Turkish-Muslim population which was also frantically migrating in the same region fleeing the Russian and Armenian invasion forces, suffered the loss of more people due, *inter alia*, to a lack of food and medicine, as was clearly stated by Boghos Nubar Paşa, the leading Armenian at the Paris Peace Conference.

In the light of the outcome of the Balkan Wars, the relocation also aimed at preventing the Armenian attempts to unite with the invading Russian armies, to conduct an ethnic cleansing of genocidal proportions in the eastern region which had predominantly Turkish and other Muslim populations, and thus to set up their own state. In those days especially, such a common action would constitute a major security concern from the standpoint of international law. The concept of self-preservation accounts for this situation.

Under the circumstances, the Armenian relocation was legitimate. The crimes that occurred, much more limited than generally assumed, in the course of relocation constituted common crimes according to criminal law. Indeed, it is known that 1,397 people who committed such crimes were punished in an extremely severe fashion.

For a better understanding of the subject at hand, it may be useful to take a brief look at issues such as ethnic cleansing, relocation and population exchange in a comparative manner. Both ethnic cleansing and relocation seem, at first glance, to be aimed at creating a more homogeneous demographic structure on a certain piece of land by driving a given ethnic group from that region. However, a closer look reveals that there are serious differences between the two with regard to motive, method and geography. The ethnic cleansing, which is not a legal concept, began to be used in the 1980s in former Yugoslavia. In fact, it was reportedly coined by a Serbian guerrilla. For this reason, one has to take as a basis the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina and compare that, first, to the appalling conduct freely exhibited towards the Turks and other Muslims during the Balkan Wars and, then, to the Armenian relocation.

Ethnic cleansing starts with the armed forces of one side attacking the civilian population of the other warring party. Naturally, the civilians, who do not have the capacity to defend themselves, get killed or wounded. Their houses and settlements are destroyed and burned down. Humanitarian convoys bringing food and drugs are not permitted to enter the region. Men of fighting age get arrested, imprisoned at camps with poor living conditions or killed right away. Women get raped in a systematic and massive manner. The cultural assets of the target group, including temples and libraries, get burned. If they do not leave

their homes, they face continual fire or bombardment. The massacre continues. After a while, these attacks bear fruit, and masses of people start fleeing in the direction their attackers want them to proceed. They get driven outside the region where the attackers intend to cleanse ethnically, that is, outside the potential borders of the state to be founded. The members of the target group get prevented at all costs from returning to the region. At a certain stage of ethnic cleansing, the attacking group comes to be dominated by a certain feeling similar to racial hatred when dealing with the target group. For example, the Muslim Bosnians came to be called "Turkish seed", and in this way they were dehumanized. These persons get presented with the entire bill for Ottoman sovereignty in the past. Rape gains a new biological meaning, becoming an effort aimed at breeding a new generation dominated by the aggressive race. Even after a region is rendered homogeneous from the ethnic standpoint, civilian men get massacred in large groups and buried into mass graves as in the case of Srebrenica. According to the law in force, the acts constituting ethnic cleansing amount to crime against humanity, and these acts may also be accompanied by acts of genocide that aim to destroy a group 'as such', as in Srebrenica. For these reasons, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal of former Yugoslavia said in the indictment he prepared for Karadžić and General Mladić that acts of genocide were committed on nine counts.

The crimes inflicted in connection with the Turkish and Muslim populations during the 1877-78 Russian-Turkish War and the 1912-13 Balkan Wars are similar in essence to the ethnic cleansing the Serbs committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The only difference is that what had happened to the Turks and Muslims in the Balkan Wars was of a much greater magnitude. The number of Turks and Muslims who died in those two wars amounted to some two million, and nearly one million had been forced to emigrate to Anatolia.

The Armenian relocation too involved a forced migration. But since forcing to migrate did not happen in the form of staging armed attacks against them, there were almost no cases of killing, wounding, starving or keeping under fire during the process of evacuation. Secondly, the relocation did not aim to send Armenians outside the borders of the country and create a homogeneous population within. They were taken to other parts of the Ottoman

territory. Therefore, they benefited from certain facilities in cash and in kind to adjust to the new conditions when they were resettled. One could say that after the relocation began, due to the conditions prevailing at that time deaths occurred anyway. This is correct. On the other hand, the relocation led to much fewer deaths than an ethnic cleansing would have caused. Unlike the victims of an ethnic cleansing, they could take along with them a greater amount of personal belongings and assets. They could use horses and carriages. Those assets they left behind were spared to a great extent from being plundered. Their cultural assets remained largely intact. As is obvious from the above, relocation is quite different from ethnic cleansing in that it is much less violent.

If one tried to identify the first case of genocide in the 20th century, one would undoubtedly arrive at the conclusion that the ethnic cleansing committed during the 1912-13 Balkan Wars was the first such instance, not the 1915-16 Armenian relocation. Indeed, the relocation was carried out in order to prevent the Armenian guerrillas or terrorists, in cooperation with the Russian army, from launching in eastern Anatolia an ethnic cleansing similar to the one done to the Turks of the Balkans. According to the Ottoman statistics, the overall population in the Anatolian regions where the transfer took place, was 5,061,857 of which only 811,085 were Armenians. In other words, Armenians accounted for 16% of the population. If they had not been relocated and if Russia had not withdrawn its forces at the end of 1917 under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, one can imagine the dimensions the potential ethnic cleansing of the Turks and Muslims would gain in the region. In fact, this ethnic cleansing had already begun.³⁸

One could compare relocation to other kinds of forced migration too. During World War II, the Americans transferred to the east the Japanese living in the western parts of the country. That relocation was prompted by "three minor bombing incidents

³⁸ Province	Total population	Armenian population
Erzurum	645,702	134,967
Bitlis	398,625	131,390
Van	430,000	80,798
Elazığ	578,814	69,718
Diyarbakır	471,462	79,129
Sivas	1,086,015	170,433
Adana	403,539	97,450
Trabzon	1,047,700	47,200

and certain mysterious radio signals". Four months had passed since the raid on Pearl Harbor. It had been seen that Japan was not going to cross the Pacific and try to invade the United States. Japan had neither such intention nor capacity. It was not as if the American Japanese were going to join hands with the Japanese army and stage armed operations against the United States. However, the U.S. Supreme Court stated briefly in its decision it took on the Korematsu Case on 18 December 1942, that 112,000 men and women of Japanese origin, including children and the elderly, had been transferred to another place on the grounds that "it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal [citizens]", with military considerations such as "preventing espionage and sabotages". Therefore, the relocation had not been unlawful. It cited as an excuse that during the war all Americans had met with hardships. Major General J. L. DeWitt's reports had contained phrases about the Japanese which could be considered racist. The local groups who had "lobbied" for the transfer of the Japanese to the east had also used racist arguments.

After World War II, some 15 million Germans were forced to immigrate to Germany mostly from western Poland under Article 13 of the Potsdam Protocol.³⁹ With the population exchange made in the wake of the Turkish War of Independence, 900,000 Greeks went from Turkey to Greece, and 430,000 Turks arrived in Turkey from Greece, in addition to those who had taken refuge during the Balkan Wars. Between the years 1914-45, a series of twenty such population exchange agreements were concluded.

Population exchanges were also forced upon the people since their approval has never been sought. Undoubtedly, some deaths occurred, albeit fewer, since these migrations took place in peace time in a much better organized manner and physical conditions, with appropriate transportation. But this does not change the fact that they were forced migrations.

In short, the Armenian relocation was not carried out with the aim of destroying a group as a group or for any other unlawful reason. Its aim was to transfer them to a region in the south far from the war zone of eastern Anatolia where they cooperated with the invading Russian armies, served as spies and guides for them,

³⁹ Shabas, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

instigated rebellions, attacked the Ottoman army and cut the Ottoman army's supply lines, launched terrorist guerrilla attacks on Turkish-Muslim settlements, committing massacres and ethnic cleansing, all in order to gain their independence and establish their own state where there was a huge Turkish and Muslim majority. This ground for the relocation based on 'imperative military reasons' is in line with international law even today.⁴⁰

Besides, all signs were pointing to the fact that without relocation the Armenian forces joining with the Russian army were going to eradicate the Turkish and Muslim majority in the region with an ethnic cleansing campaign of genocidal proportions, as in the Balkans. In this context also, the grounds for the relocation were clearly and definitely military within the concept of self-preservation. It aimed at protecting the non-Armenian majority population against destruction.

Conclusion

1. The Armenians constituted a political group since they engaged in armed political activities, first to gain autonomy and then to found an independent state on the Ottoman lands. For this reason, they were not one of the four groups protected by Article 2 of the Convention.

2. Since the Ottomans did not harbour towards the Armenians an 'anti-Armenianism', that is, a racial hatred akin to the anti-Semitism the Nazis displayed towards the Jews, the relocation was not carried out with a motive which could have led to the intent to destroy them as a group. The relocation decision was taken to prevent the military operations the Armenians had initiated together with the invading Russian armies to exterminate the Turks and Muslims that made up 84% of the population in the eastern Anatolian region through an ethnic cleansing of genocidal proportions, as had been done to the Turks during the Balkan Wars.

3. The Ottoman Government did not have the intent to destroy the Armenians, a condition stated in Article 2 of the Convention. Not only are there no written documents, there are no oral accounts either attesting to the intention to destroy on the part of the administration. All the documents available envisage the

⁴⁰ Protocol II: Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, Article 17.

protection of Armenian convoys in the course of relocation and their safe resettlement. The number of Armenian deaths, which is grossly exaggerated, is far from proving the presence of genocide. A significant part of the Armenian deaths resulted from reasons not related to the relocation. The Turkish civilian deaths occurring in the same region due to the similar reasons were more numerous than the Armenian loss of life. Therefore, in the context of Article 2 (c) of the Genocide Convention, the relocation was neither a covert genocide nor an indirect one.

4. The Catholic and Protestant Armenians all over the country as well as the Gregorian Armenians living in İstanbul, Aydın (including İzmir), Edirne and Kütahya, that is, the western part of Anatolia, were not subjected to relocation. This partial relocation did not stem from the Ottoman administration's weakness. The Gregorian Armenians in other areas were transferred, because they were situated on the path of the advancing Russian armies and, having the same religious faith as the Russians, they were collaborating with them against the Ottoman army and the Muslim population. This clearly shows the military rationale for the relocation.

5. Under the circumstances, the relocation, not only did not constitute genocide according to the Convention, but also did not affect a crime against humanity, considering the military imperative that prompted it as a permissible ground in international law. On the other hand, the relocation does not meet the conditions cited in Article 7 of the Statute of Rome. This is not a case of "multiple commission of acts" as part of a "wide-spread and systematic attack" that constitute crimes against humanity in accordance with Article 7 (b) of the said Statute. Moreover, the Armenians have never been subjected to persecution on religious or other grounds.

6. Along with the "imperative military reasons", the relocation was aimed at foiling the efforts of the Armenians in collaboration with the invading Russian armies to ethnically cleanse the Turks and Muslims who made up the large majority of the population in the region, as in the case of the Balkan Wars. The Ottomans, who were fighting on three fronts all at the same time, could not always protect all of the Armenians effectively with the limited number of troops available. The gangs in the region attacked the Armenian convoys, killing some of them and plundering their

possessions for their private purposes. The civilian Turks who were forced to migrate under similar conditions of rough terrain, harsh climate, lack of adequate food and medicine in the face of epidemics, lost more people than the Armenians did. This clearly shows that the relocation was not the cause for all Armenian casualties.

7. And, finally, those who ordered the relocation came to have feelings of regret due to undesirable incidents, feelings of sympathy for the Armenian victims and a resentment towards the persons who had attacked them. The culprits of the robbery and murder cases, which came under the ordinary crimes category, were put on trial before the war ended, and most of them were executed.

THE JEWISH HOLOCAUST AND THE ARMENIANS

Türkkaya Ataöv

One can discern, off and on, some effort on the part of some Armenian authors and their close supporters to associate the notorious Jewish *Holocaust* of the Nazi period (1933-45) with Armenian-Turkish relations during the First World War (1914-18). There are sweeping generalizations stating that unfortunately there had been "no Nuremberg"¹ (Nürnberg) for the defeated Ottomans in 1918. There are even attempts to lump together Fascist Germany, the United States, Israel, South Africa, Britain, El Salvador, Guatemala and Kampuchea under the collective heading of "genocide".² While the latter source makes an unqualified, one-sided and highly objectionable generalization on the Ottoman Empire in just two sentences in the whole book,³ another source draws parallels between the Armenians, Jews, Bangladeshis and the Hutu.⁴ There also exist, largely Armenian-inspired, outright comparisons of the Armenian and the Jewish cases.⁵

William Wordsworth, immortal English poet said in a poem: "Like-but oh, how different!" One may agree with Alexandre Dumas (fils): "All generalizations are dangerous-even this one." The danger of historic comparisons is obvious. All-inclusive assumptions quoted in the first paragraph are over-simplifications. They strike one as 'too liberal' refutations of veritable differences in terms of origins, accumulation, circumstances, and results. Concisely, in various phases of European history, dominant Christian groups living on that continent, who needed to

¹ Peter Lanne, *Armenia: The First Genocide of the XX Century*, tr. Krikor Balekdjian, München, Institute for Armenian Studies, 1977, pp. 175-208.

² Alexander Galkin et al., *Genocide (Genotsid)*, Moskva, Izdatel'stvo Progress, 1985.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴ Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1981. His two chapters on the Armenians and Jews in pp. 101-137.

⁵ For instance: R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Determinants of Genocide: Armenians and Jews as Case Studies", *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective*, ed., Richard G. Hovannisian, New Brunswick and Oxford, Transaction Books, 1986, pp. 85-96.

externalise and project their unwanted "bad" parts unto others and thereby feel themselves as "good", killed and expelled the inoffensive Jews. The citation of Europe only in the previous sentence does not necessarily connote the non-existence of antisemitism even in the United States - moreover, even currently.⁶ It was Wilhelm Marr (1819-1904), a professed antisemite German writer,⁷ who coined (1879) the term "antisemitism". Although there was no clear distinction between early and modern Jew-hatred,⁸ it included old and new ideas and concepts embracing racist as well as religious notions.

This chapter does not intend to chronicle the development of antisemitism in different periods of history or in various countries.⁹ It may never be easy to fully explain this phenomenon. Scholars will probably continue to discuss the relative importance of many factors facilitating its spread.¹⁰ World libraries are full of printed works describing the Jews as a unique religious, historical and a cultural phenomenon. They were perhaps the oldest minority having spread virtually all over the world. Being nowhere more

⁶ The National Jewish Population Survey found in 1990 that some 85% of American Jews believed that antisemitism was a serious problem in their own country. It has declined since then. Jerome A. Chanes, "Antisemitism in the United States: 1999, a Contextual Analysis", *Approaches to Antisemitism: Context and Curriculum*, ed., Michael Brown, New York/Jerusalem, The American Jewish Committee and The International Center for University Teaching of Jewish Civilization, 1994, pp. 32-45.

⁷ Moshe Zimmerman, *Wilhelm Marr: the Patriarch of Antisemitism*, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986. Marr's pamphlet: *Der Sieg des Judentums über das Germanentum vom konfessionalen Standpunkte* (The Victory of Jewry over Germanism from the Confessional Point of View). The old term "Jew-hatred" could describe only the traditional Christian antipathy toward Jews based on religious foundations. The modern Judeophobia was grounded on genetics and racism. The hyphen, sometimes seen in English, is not used in German or Hebrew. There is no such thing as "semitism".

⁸ Although Christian attitudes, those of the Catholics and the Lutherans, initially consisted of the views of the clergy, Spanish authorities later insisted on "pure blood" introducing the racist element. Likewise, the Nazi laws reflected, not only racist, but also religious notions.

⁹ There are full bibliographies on the subject, especially in the European context. Robert Singermann's annotated bibliography (*Anti-Semitic Propaganda: an Annotated Bibliography and Guide*, New York, Garland, 1982) is perhaps the most comprehensive one. It contains 24,000 entries. A valuable one among the single volumes: Shmuel Almog, ed., *Anti-semitism Through the Ages*, New York and Jerusalem, Pergamon Press and The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism of The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1988.

¹⁰ Israel W. Charny et al., eds., *A Critical Bibliographic Review*, London, Mansell, 1988; David M. Szonyi, ed., *The Holocaust: an Annotated Bibliography and Resource Guide*, New York, KTAV for the National Jewish Research Center, 1985.

than a small minority, the Jews were often chosen as scapegoats.¹¹ They were the first organised monotheists who preached a religion based upon righteousness. They certainly posed an important theological issue no less than antagonizing some others, in later times, with their socio-economic status as financiers or as left-wing theoreticians/activists. In the inevitable process of industrialization and modernism Jew-hatred was cultivated to evolve into a new ideology ready to pass from one generation to another. There was -and still is- antisemitism even in some societies without Jews.¹² Some countries imported it, along with alien technology. Although the announcement of the Catholic Church that Jews cannot be held collectively responsible for the death of Jesus came as late as 1965, it nevertheless signifies the alternative of compromise and toleration in the Christian tradition feeding the hope that the cancerous growth of antisemitism may one day be destroyed. That disease of some non-Jewish societies may be healed with the development of a new multicultural, multiethnic and pluralistic world in which groups mature to accept and respect each other. The last time antisemitism was elevated to the status of official policy of a leading state, the outcome was the Second World War causing the loss of many millions of people, in addition to some six million Jews.

Because the perception of the Armenians in Ottoman society on the one hand, and the World Jewry on the other has been so contrastingly different from the description above that it will be worthwhile to remind one, in some limited detail, the overall maturing of antisemitism. The Israelites, who developed a belief in one God, undermined the polytheistic world of ancient times. Although the Persian king allowed the Jews to return to Jerusalem and rebuild their temple, the one, only and the universal deity that they believed in clashed with the culture of Ancient Egypt, Babylonia, Greece and Rome. The Jewish ethical conceptions, largely based on monotheism and the Ten Commandments of Moses, were quite apart from those of the other groups.¹³ A massacre of Jews was carried out in Alexandria in 38 A.D. on

¹¹ Josef Banas, *The Scapegoats: the Exodus of the Remnants of Polish Jewry*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979.

¹² Paul Lendvai, *Antisemitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe*, New York, Doubleday, 1971.

¹³ Rosemary Ruether, *Faith and Fratricide: the Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism*, New York, Seabury Press, 1971.

account of the Jewish refusal to put a statue of Caligula into a synagogue.¹⁴ For instance, Hellenism, with its family of gods and goddesses and other sets of values, was an opponent of Judaism. In Roman times as well, Judaism was still a vigorous religion, horrifying many Romans threatened by potential changes in their imperial civilization.¹⁵ When Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire (321), some of the old prejudices were carried on into the "Christian" attitudes toward the Jews.¹⁶ Of course, new misconceptions were added. Apart from the old notion that the "gods" hated the Jews because the latter did not recognise them gave way to "collective responsibility" for the death of the "Son of God". The Christian church, which held Jews responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus, moreover believed that its new creed superseded Judaism. Not only was the entire Jewish community considered to be the "culprit", but also Judaism was supposed to be an "enemy" of Christianity.

Discrimination and repression intensified with the First Crusade (1096) leading to the massacre of Jews among others. While the campaigns were waged behind a screen of religious slogans such as setting free the Holy Land from the "infidels", the feudal lords of Western Europe made no secret of their intentions to plunder the economically much better developed lands of the East and seize new territories with serfs, and peasants also took part in the hope of escaping from the feudal yoke and obtaining land for themselves. They all hoped to conquer Syria and Palestine from the Seljuk Turks and drive out their rival, the Byzantine Empire, from the sphere of Eastern trade. Renewed and intensified anti-Jewish prejudice was part of this overall discrimination, exploitation and plunder. On their way to Palestine, the Crusader mobs indulged themselves in the mass slaughter of Jews in the Rhineland cities of Mainz, Worms and Cologne where entire Jewish communities were destroyed.¹⁷

¹⁴ Jacob Lestchinsky, "Anti-Semitism", ed., Feliks Gross, *European Ideologies: a Survey of 20th Century Political Ideas*, New York, Philosophical Library, 1948, p. 656.

¹⁵ Menahem Stern, *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism*, 3 vols., Jerusalem, Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1974-1984; John G. Gager, *The Origins of Antisemitism: Attitudes towards Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity*, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1983.

¹⁶ Bernhard Blumenkranz, *Juifs et Chrétiens dans le monde occidental: 430-1096*, Paris, Mouton, 1960.

¹⁷ Robert S. Wistrich, *Anti-Semitism: the Longest Hatred*, London, Thames Mandarin, 1992, p. 311.

For a very long time and contrary to the experience in the Ottoman Empire, the Jews of Western Europe felt little inclination to become an organic part of the economic life of the countries where they led insecure residence.¹⁸ In most cases, they were forbidden to own land and excluded from the handicrafts. When the Jews, government service being closed to them, indulged more and more in trade and became distinguished as usurers, they became the target of further resentment. Prohibited by Christianity and Islam at least in theory, usury became a Jewish preserve. Such "theological hatred" of the Jews led to the Fourth Lateran Council edict demanding that the Jews wear a yellow mark on their clothes. What became tragically popular much later in Nazi Germany had its roots in the Middle Ages.

Accusations of blood murders, called "blood libels", constituted the baseless (and perhaps the ugliest) charge that the Jews hammered nails into barrels, put murdered Christian children into them at Easter time and rolled them down a hill to use their blood to make *matzot* (Passover bread).¹⁹ They were even held responsible for the "Black Death" epidemic. Seven centuries before they were hunted in Germany, the Jews were expelled from England and France and finally from the Iberian Peninsula (1492). As it will be expounded in some detail further in this chapter, they were welcomed by no other than the Muslim Turkish sultans of the Ottoman Empire.

The general picture in Western Europe continued until the 19th century when the able and hard-working Jews became part and parcel of the economic, cultural and scientific life of Europe. It was inevitable that the Jews would create their own capitalist class in the process. The new allegation that there was an essential link between Judaism and capitalism and that the Jews as such could essentially be exploiting capitalists missed the point once more. Capitalism is a socio-economic formation, replacing feudalism, with no direct connection with any race or religion.

But this basic truth did not prevent some romantic German nationalists from considering even assimilated Jews as "aliens" in

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 649-650.

¹⁹ This aggressive attitude brings to mind much later speculations in the Soviet Union that some Jewish doctors were poisoning their patients to get more money or just for pleasure. Levas Kovarskis, "On Being a Soviet Jew", *Mind and Human Interaction*, Charlottesville, VA., III/3 (May 1992), p. 72.

their homeland as well as supporters of leftist causes²⁰ from considering them "the enemies of the working classes", (both extremists providing part of the background for the murder of German and European Jewry in the coming 1930s and the 1940s). Germany's Jewish citizens were much larger than that of the Western European countries—about 1% of the total population. While the feudal class carried the old antisemitic tradition regarding the Jews as inferior people, these believers in Moses came to play a dominant role in all the vital branches of the country's economic life.

While Jews, Armenians and Greeks were employed in the highest posts of the Ottoman Empire, the German authorities strictly forbid, even towards the end of the 19th century, the hiring of Jews as state officials. This was the case even when German Jews attained high achievements in science, medicine and literature. The prestige of the Jewish-owned liberal press²¹ and the large number of Nobel prizes won by Jews irritated, not only the German antisemites, but also some liberal intellectuals. The defeat of Germany at the end of the First World War shocked the people who looked for a victim upon whom they could vent their wrath.²² When a severe economic crisis gripped Germany, the stage was basically set for the Nazi alternative.

Germany was not the only country where antisemitism was rampant. In France, the allegation that the Jews benefited from the fruits of the French Revolution gave way to accusations that they were plotting to destroy Christian culture. Such discriminatory sentiments were fanned by influential publications, especially after the "Dreyfus affair",²³ which helped to "institutionalise" antisemitism in France. The antisemites there tried to profit by the Dreyfus case to overthrow the young French Republic. This was the first important attempt to set the "Jewish question" in motion

²⁰ Robert Wistrich, *Revolutionary Jews from Marx to Trotsky*, London and New York, Harrap, 1976.

²¹ For instance: *Berliner Tageblatt, Frankfurter Zeitung, Vossische Zeitung*.

²² No one seriously challenged Count von Schlieffen's plan that the war with France would not last longer than a month. Holger H. Helwig, *The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918*, London, Hodder Headline Group: Arnold, 1997, pp. 46-49, 66-67, 97-106.

²³ Michael R. Marrus, *The Politics of Assimilation: a Study of the French Jewish Community at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971.

to serve a political struggle.²⁴ Tsarist Russia gave the world especially after 1881, *pogroms* (Russian: devastation) which made life unbearable for the Jews. It was in 1871 that the first *pogrom* occurred in Odessa. In the crucial year of 1905, there took place about 700 *pogroms* (attacks on Jewish shops and houses)²⁵ in Russia. The Tsarist policy was formulated as such: "One-third of the Jews will have to emigrate; another third will die out; and the rest will become Gentiles".²⁶ Some came to Turkey. The authorities encouraged quite few of the Jewish massacres in Russia, in part, to divert attention from pressing domestic problems and revolutionary reactions to them. The plight of the Jews in parts of Eastern Europe was similar. These events were paralleled all over Europe by the emergence of pseudo-racial theories, justifying inequality, exploitation and even wars.

This historical accumulation provided Germany's National Socialists with the opportunity to use every accusation and tool of oppression culminating in the Nuremberg Laws (1935). At the heart of Europe, within a nation that considered itself the most culturally advanced, a significant minority conceived of a plan to annihilate the Jews. Some industrialists and even scholars played no less a part in Germany's antisemitic drive than politicians. Adolf Hitler's Third Reich made the 'Jewish question' an affair of the state. It created an antisemitism unparalleled in history. It was thoroughly ideological, racial, coherent, official, juridical, total, and expansionistic. The national state was based on the idea of race as the final criterion. In the eyes of the state, a person of Jewish "blood", whether a citizen or not, could not avoid the consequences of being a Jew. The state did not want to absorb even the best Jewish elements. The "cream", including Albert Einstein and the Nobel Prize winner Fritz Haber had to become exiles. German antisemitism was a publicly proclaimed official doctrine of the government. It was not a policy carried out by the government in disregard of codes ruling the country; antisemitic ordinances became laws themselves. Wholesale murders were planned, organised and carried out officially by the government or the party in power. It embraced all realms of civil, social, political, economic,

²⁴ The Nazi occupation gave the French antisemites much of the freedom of action that they desired.

²⁵ Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, New York, Praeger, 1952, pp. 158-159.

²⁶ Gross, *op. cit.*, p. 663.

intellectual and military life. It did not limit its authority to the subjects of the Third Reich. Anti-Jewish laws were equally applied to aliens of Jewish "blood", who resided even in German-occupied territories. Nazi antisemitism became the total extermination of about six million people belonging to a particular religious group. It is properly described as genocide or the Jewish *Holocaust*.

Mussolini's state in Italy, where *fascismo* became monolithic, was a model for Hitler. *Il Duce* had written: "Humanity needs a *credo*. It is faith that moves mountains because it gives the illusion that mountains move. Illusion is perhaps the only reality of life".²⁷ He honoured Vilfredo Pareto, the theorist of aristocratic *élites*, by making him a senator of the fascist Italian state. Having praised political assassins as heroes, Mussolini combated the whole complex of democratic ideology. For him, the goddess of liberty was dead, and her body was already putrescent. Believing neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace, the final plan of fascism was imperialist. Mussolini, who was not within the constitutional system but above it, *ha sempre ragione* (was always right).

Although the era under discussion in this chapter is the Nazi period, it is fair to state that the German society oscillates between alternatives.²⁸ To some observers, the Germans will always be a prey to some sort of authoritarianism: Prussian conservatism, fascist totalitarianism, Communist control or neo-Nazism. Others believe that Germany can achieve an unbroken democracy with a pluralism that will give everyone a chance to speak his (or her) mind. As Madame de Staël noted, Germany often was "*le coeur de l'Europe*" (the heart of Europe), events there affecting the whole continent. This point assumes more importance when one remembers that no other major country has undergone such frequent and extreme changes. In a relatively short period of time (during which the United States steadily developed), Germany has swung from utter disunity (up to 1871) to unification and utmost centralization (under Hitler) to fragmentation and later to unity again. It has gone from one extreme of impotence to the other of commanding power positions, from authoritarianism to pluralism and back to tyranny. It can boast of the greatness of Beethoven,

²⁷ George Catlin, *The Story of the Political Philosophers*, New York, Tudor Publishing Co., 1939, p. 716.

²⁸ Luigi Barzini, *The Europeans*, Middlesex, U.K., Penguin Books, 1985, pp. 66-113.

Goethe or Kant but not of the moral abyss of the concentration and extermination camps.

Perhaps because of this duality, the Germans have alternately appeared as good and bad in the extreme to the world. There were times when they earned the hatred of even their allies. They shocked the world when they rolled over neutral Belgium twice. They were the first to resort to poison gas. They attacked the Soviet Union without warning (1941) although they had signed a treaty of non-aggression only two years before. They sent the Jews to gas chambers, and shot hostages in wars. They even seized the vehicles of the Italians, their allies, and made them walk on foot in the African desert. But there were also times when an entire generation shared the ideals of enlightenment and liberalism. Wilhelm von Humboldt was a German equivalent of John Stuart Mill. It is this diversity of theories that sometimes left the German people without accepted standards of attitude and action. Emanuel Geibel, a German poet, had written almost prophetically: "*Am deutschen Wesen soll die Welt genesen*" (The German spirit will heal the world). But which "spirit" was this going to be? It was this feeling of uncertainty that contributed to the rise of a new dogmatic creed around which large masses congregated - Nazism.

The Weimar Republic (1918-33) is generally described as "the first German experiment in democracy".²⁹ While the Constituent Assembly met, after the general elections of 1919, in the quiet atmosphere of the National Theater in Weimar, the charming city of Goethe, Schiller, Herder and Liszt, in the fourteen years of the republic (up to the accession of Hitler) Germany saw twenty different cabinets, and nowhere else in the world could one perhaps find stronger party discipline.³⁰ Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg, the candidate of the right-wing parties who was elected president after Friedrich Ebert's death (1925) but who permitted himself to wander away from democratic and parliamentary principles, became one of the destroyers of the Weimar system, accomplished through the immense prestige of the man himself and the constitutional powers of his office, including Article 48 which permitted the Reich President to suspend the

²⁹ Gwendolen M. Carter and John H. Herz, *Major Foreign Powers*, 4th ed., New York and Burlingame, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962, p. 369.

³⁰ James K. Pollock, "The German Party System", *American Political Science Review*, 23 (November 1929), pp. 859-891.

fundamental rights of the citizens and invalidate the effectiveness of the Constitution.

Thomas Mann, Max Reinhardt, Emil Ludwig, Gerhart Hauptmann and others had worldwide importance connected with achievements in drama, literature and music. The Nobel Prize for Literature (1929) was awarded for the first time in seventeen years to a German, Thomas Mann. Germany was particularly responsible for new ideas in architecture, expressed in the works of Walter Gropius. While the teachers at the *Bauhaus* included painters like Wassily Kandinsky, Paul Klee, Lyonel Feininger and Oskar Schlemmer, the first few of Bertolt Brecht's plays³¹ were premiered in Reinhardt's Berlin theaters.³² The "Dada" movement, led then by George Grosz, Walter Mehring, Max Ernst and the like, had spread rapidly with outposts in capitals other than Berlin and Vienna. Musical life in Weimar Germany, in which Arnold Schönberg, Paul Hindemith, Anton Webern and others caught most attention, was conspicuous for a hitherto unexcelled wealth of talent in opera and music. But the Germans had not been educated for democracy, and the new republic, which stood under an unpropitious star, was unloved.³³ When many of these great names left Germany, there were indeed few places where they could go. One was the Republic of Turkey—a fact to be elaborated further below.

German society was ripe for dictatorship, racism and antisemitism from the point of view of hitherto many philosophical writings. Not only some Germans but also quite a few French and even British writers, although the latter very few, taught history of philosophy according to racial lines. For them, the white race was superior to the coloured races; the Aryans enjoyed supremacy among white men; the Nordic race was the best among the Aryans; and the Teuton Germans were destined to lead the Nordics. Judging by the writings of Count Arthur de Gobineau³⁴ and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, why should not some Germans embrace racism if influential Europeans felt themselves Teutons

³¹ *Trommeln in der Nacht, Im Dickicht der Städte* and *Mann ist Mann*.

³² *Deutsches Theater, Kammerspiele, Grosses Schauspielhaus*.

³³ *German Cultural History from 1860 to the Present Day* (an up-dated new edition of: Ernst Johann/Jörg Junker, *Deutsche Kulturgeschichte der Letzen Hundert Jahre: 1860-1960*, München, 1970), München, Nymphenburger Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1983, p. 127.

³⁴ *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* (*The Inequality of Human Races*, tr. Adrian Collins, New York, Putnam, 1915).

and assigned to the Germans the highest rank among the Teutons? In France, Maurice Barrès³⁵ developed Gobineau's theory of pure racist antisemitism. The Nazis (and Mussolini) inherited from George Sorel, who abhorred mass democracy, the idea of the "myth". Chamberlain, the son of a British admiral, was the son-in-law of Richard Wagner,³⁶ the celebrated German composer, and chose to become a naturalized German citizen. Hardly a great loss for the English people! Chamberlain's *Die Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts*,³⁷ which emphasised that everything good came from the Teuton and everything bad emanated from the Jew, turned into a Bible of the German racists. Alfred Rosenberg brought from Moscow *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, supposedly an authentic report of the minutes of a secret Jewish congress to overthrow Christian civilization.³⁸ The Tsarist police had used it to turn the wrath of the people from the government to the Jews. It was now widely circulated in Germany. As Chamberlain's disciple, Rosenberg's elaborated myth was the superiority of the Teuton race.³⁹ Alexander Tille's amateurish attempt to apply Darwinism to the human society constructed, nevertheless, the ideological link between the Nazis and the big German industrialists. Oswald Spengler, who preached the downfall of Western civilization,⁴⁰ was not an advocate of Nazism, but he helped disarm many of its opponents. It was Arthur Möller van den Bruck who invented the myth of *Das Dritte Reich*, which was also the title of his book. While Carl von Clausewitz's idea of war in his celebrated *Über den Krieg*⁴¹ was not a total one, but merely a continuation of political intercourse, General Erich Ludendorff's theory of "total war"⁴² was the logical consequence of the Nazi *Weltanschauung*.

³⁵ Zeev Sternhell, *Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français*, Brussels, Éditions Complexe, 1985.

³⁶ Jacob Katz, *The Darker Side of Genius: Richard Wagner's Antisemitism*, Hanover, New Hampshire, published for Brandeis University Press by University Press of New England, 1986.

³⁷ H. S. Chamberlain, *Foundations of the 19th Century*, New York, J. Lane Co., 1912.

³⁸ Norman Cohn, *Warrant for Genocide: the Myth of the Jewish World-Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, London and New York, Harper, 1967.

³⁹ Alfred Rosenberg, *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, München, Hoheneichen Verlag, 1942; Alfred Baeumler, *Alfred Rosenberg und der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, München, Hoheneichen Verlag, 1943.

⁴⁰ Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, Gütersloh, C. Bertelsmann, 1921.

⁴¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Washington, D.C., Combat Forces Press, 1953, pp. 16f.

⁴² Erich Ludendorff, *Der totale Krieg*, Berlin, Ludendorffs Verlag, 1935.

Although there were divergences of opinion between the governing and the governed in Weimar Germany, one may assert that these variations were subordinated to a dominant factor—a fierce chauvinism. All Germans thought that the conditions of the Versailles *Diktat* were extremely harsh but they had to be signed. The new republic had been born out of defeat and was still dependent on the forces that had shared the responsibility for the defeat. Constant use of the "stab in the back" legend, that is, the cowardly civilians stabbing the brave German soldiers in the back, helped the militarist circles to gain the upper hand. The emergence of this dominant factor may be explained by a multiplicity of factors, such as a rapid increase of population, a powerful industry, the loss of needed raw materials, the influence of heavy industry or writings in favour of a policy of force. But the fact remains that nearly all of the political elite was intoxicated by morbid chauvinism. German frontiers, flag and titles changed, but not the national anthem: *Deutschland über alles*. A small minority, which had escaped that disease, could have no hold on the mass of the governed. Thomas Mann's passionate appeal for reason in late 1930 in the Beethoven Hall in Berlin could not convince the anti-democrats that their struggle against Weimar was preparing the way for the worst. Some members of the small resisting minority, such as Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and Kurt Eisner were assassinated. Heinrich Brüning of the Center inaugurated the dictatorial régime in Germany, and another Centrist leader, Franz von Papen, opened the way to power for Hitler. This was a very different thing from plain patriotism. With Hitler the disease reached its climax and crisis.

Hitler had taken a keen interest in the Austrian pan-German and antisemitic movement, whose leader (G. R. von Schönerer⁴³) had greatly impressed him. In late 1919 he joined the *Deutsche Arbeits Partei*, a violently antisemitic and reactionary group whose funds was exactly 7,50 marks. He was its seventh member, but addressing an audience of 2000 only five months later. Article 4 of the famous "25 Points" of the program that he had written stated: "None but those of German blood, whatever their creed, may be members of the nation. No Jew, therefore, may be a member of the

⁴³ P.L. Carsten, *Fascist Movements in Austria: from Schönerer to Hitler*, London, Sage Publications, 1977.

nation".⁴⁴ All editors and contributors of newspapers published in the German language were to be from the members of the nation. The name of the party was changed (NSDAP), and the semi-military units were formed under it.⁴⁵ When Hitler was incarcerated in the fortress of Landsberg-on-the-Lech on account of the failure of his *coup de force* (1923), he wrote *Mein Kampf*, which describes the Jew "as a parasite in the body of other nations and States", that he possesses "no culture-creating energy" and that any progress of mankind takes place "not through him but in spite of him".⁴⁶

Fritz Thyssen, together with his Ruhr colleagues, financed Hitler's National Socialist organisation. The Rhineland industrialist admitted this fact in the title of his book, *I Paid Hitler*.⁴⁷ John Heartfield's poster, entitled *Millionen stehen hinter mir* (Millions stand behind me), depicted Hitler with Nazi salute about to grab the banknotes handed to him by a sponsor half-hidden in the back.⁴⁸ The Prussian landowning class, likewise, made the Neudeck estate a gift to the President, the incorruptible Hindenburg on the occasion of his eightieth birthday. Dipping deep into the pockets of the big industrialists and aided by the 1929 economic crisis, Hitler and his lieutenants marched slowly but surely to power. Even before attaining it, a group from his party including Frick, Goebbels, Göring and Strasser introduced a motion in the Reichstag that the entire property of the "Eastern Jews and other foreigners" who had immigrated since 1 August 1914, be confiscated without compensation.⁴⁹ The Prussian Diet, where the Nazi Party elected its new Speaker, passed a law confiscating the entire property of all Jews who had entered Prussia from Eastern Europe after this date.⁵⁰ Gregor Strasser, then in charge of the party's organisation, stated in his first broadcast that the Nazis wanted "German leadership without the Jewish spirit, without Jews pulling the strings and without Jewish

⁴⁴ W. M. Knight-Patterson [W.W. Kulski], *Germany from Defeat to Conquest*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1945, p. 330.

⁴⁵ The notorious S.A. (*Sturm-Abteilungen*) and the S.S. (*Schutzstaffel*). Together they constituted an immense army of half a million men.

⁴⁶ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1940, pp. 418, 420.

⁴⁷ Fritz Thyssen, *I Paid Hitler*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1941.

⁴⁸ *Fragen an die deutsche Geschichte*, Bonn, Bundestag, 1984, p. 309.

⁴⁹ Knight-Patterson, *op. cit.*, p. 483.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 535.

capital".⁵¹ Following the resignation of Franz von Papen's "Cabinet of Barons" and the subsequent fall of General Kurt von Schleicher from the Chancellorship, the new Hitler regime (1933) issued without delay a number of Decrees, two of which (7 April) immediately excluded the Jews from all posts in the administration and introduced anti-Jewish regulations for lawyers.⁵² The key idea in the first antisemitic law for the restoration of the professional civil service was that the officials of non-Aryan origin were to be eventually retired.⁵³

The Jewish Holocaust that followed is unique in the annals of history for a number of reasons. The Nazis sought to murder every Jew everywhere, regardless of gender, age, beliefs or actions, using the government bureaucracy of an efficient modern state for this purpose. The Jews of Germany and of the German-occupied lands of Europe were a peaceful religious/ethnic group that laid no claims either to land or power, but had, moreover, contributed to science, arts and literature of their country (or countries) earning about one-third of the Nobel prizes. Most German Jews considered themselves no less German than any of their Christian compatriots. Thousands of them had laid their lives in the interest of their beloved country fighting during the First World War. It was difficult for them (and for the third parties as well) to grasp that a German government could strip them of their rights and identity, and moreover, annihilate them wholesale. The Nazis openly stated, on the other hand, that their total liquidation was to the advantage of Germany and the world. Grounded on a spurious ideology that considered the Jews a destructive race, it was such an extreme case of antisemitism that led to the genocide policy and implementation of *die Endlösung* ("Final Solution"), the cover name (*Deckname*) for the destruction of European Jewry.

Once Hitler, whose Teuton background showed it only in his blue eyes, seized power, reality for him was his ideas about "national enemies". Acts of violence against Jews immediately gained a new momentum. The dismissal of Jewish civil servants heralded their systematic elimination from all aspects of life. The

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 541.

⁵² Franz von Papen, *Memoirs*, New York, E.P. Dutton, 1953, pp. 207 ff.

⁵³ Konrad Heiden, *Der Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power*, Cambridge, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1944, p. 588.

"Aryan paragraph" of the law⁵⁴ was increasingly used against artists, doctors, dentists, chemists, lawyers, journalists and others. The school gates were more and more closed to Jewish children. They were barred from associations and clubs. They were frequently forbidden to use public baths and park benches or enter bars. Jewish works were removed from libraries, galleries, theatres and concert halls. Their names were erased from the polls of honour on war memorials. Marriages between Jews and Aryans were forbidden. Such matrimonial unions, in spite of the law, even if the ceremony had taken place abroad, were invalid and punishable with imprisonment.

Making use of an assassination attempt by a Jewish minor on a German diplomat in Paris, a massive persecution campaign started throughout the Reich with the beginning of the Second World War. On the notorious *Reichskristallnacht* (9 November 1938), the police and the S.A. forces destroyed Jewish shops, synagogues burnt down, property looted, and some Jews sent to concentration camps. The complete identification and the social outlawing of the Jews became clearer than ever with the decree (1941) that required all above seven years of age to wear, on the left arm or the left hand side of the chest, a hexagonal star, the size of the palm of the hand, drawn in black on a yellow background with the inscription of "Jude" on it in black. The physical extermination of the "Jewish Bolshevik ruling elite in the Reich" and the Jews of Eastern Europe, along with the need to acquire *Lebensraum* for the German master race, became a war aim. Starting with 1942, the "Final Solution" was the terminology used for the systematic extermination of the Jewish population of the whole continent.

The relative defencelessness of the Jewish minorities in many countries had made them a convenient target almost throughout history. But Hitler had elevated them to a new degree of sin and evil. They were made into a symbol of impurity, never attained before, and, by implication, all forms of indecency were more or less caused by their influence. Even such words as democracy, capitalism, socialism, intellectuals, art and the like could be transformed into something "evil" simply by adding the epithet

⁵⁴ Uwe D. Adam, "An Overall Plan for Anti-Jewish Legislation in the Third Reich", *Yad Vashem Studies on the European Jewish Catastrophe and Resistance*, 11 (1976), pp. 35-55.

"Jewish" before it. At times appealing to legends and even superstitions, the Nazi regime created its antithesis referring to German science or teaching. What was left for the Jews were the concentration (*Konzentrationslager*)⁵⁵ and extermination⁵⁶ camps. The Jews were murdered in the latter, frequently upon arrival, either by means of poisonous gas in special chambers or by mass shootings (*Einsatzgruppen*). The total number of the Jewish genocide probably reached a little less than six million.

Perhaps the biggest center of Nazi genocide was the death camp in Auschwitz,⁵⁷ where some four million people including Jews, Gypsies, leftists, some resistance members, and a host of others lost their lives. An enormous death complex rose there, which consisted of a mother camp and a network of small sub-camps. They were surrounded by rows of electrified barbed wire and by sentry towers. The inmates, condemned to death, were used as cheap labour by the S.S. as well as such concerns as Krupp or Hermann Göring Werke. The camp numbers, having replaced the names, were tattooed on the prisoners' left arms. Doctors, who carried criminal experiments, used some of them as guinea pigs.⁵⁸ The prisoners lived under constant threat, knowing that tomorrow might be their last day. After the airtight doors of the gas chamber were locked, the cyclone-B poison poured through special holes, killed the inmates in about quarter of an hour. Only a few, emaciated as skeletons, lived to see the liberation.

The Jews of countries ruled directly or almost directly by Germany had a very slim chance of survival. Puppet states either brutally murdered their own Jews or turned them over to the Germans. In some of the European countries, antisemitism plagued their societies irrespective of the Nazi presence or rise. Although no French scholar has attempted to present a comprehensive history of native antisemitism, there has been an

⁵⁵ Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, Flussenburg, Gross-Rosen, Mauthausen, Natzweiler, Neuengamme, Travensbruck, Sachsenhausen, Theresienstadt.

⁵⁶ Auschwitz-Birkenau, Belzec, Chelmno, Lublin-Maidanek, Sobibor, Stutthof, Treblinka.

⁵⁷ *KL Auschwitz*, Warszawa, Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1960; Mark Clinton, "The Mysticism of Mass Murder: Ethical and Political Issue in the Autobiography of Rudolf Hoess", *Centerpoint*, 4/1 (1980), pp. 60-69.

⁵⁸ Jack S. Boozer, "Children of Hippocrates: Doctors in Nazi Germany", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 450 (1980), pp. 83-97.

anti-Jewish sentiment in France.⁵⁹ Robert Byrnes's book covers only the period from the French Revolution to the "Dreyfus affair" (1894).⁶⁰ Some non-French books analyse the deep-seated nature of antisemitism in that country. Edgar Morin concludes, for instance, that French hostility towards Jews is embedded within the collective psyche of that nation.⁶¹ The "shame"⁶² of the French officials has been admitted by a former Vichy Jewish affairs commissioner. The reappearance of antisemitism in contemporary France makes one think that the evaluation above deserves serious attention.

This is not to say that there was no resistance against the Nazi regime in Germany. Sections of the middle class conservatives, the political left, churchmen and some officers opposed Hitler, his lieutenants and allies, but they could not create a united front, not only of their diverging views but also on account of the perfect surveillance system. There was no substantial attempt to overthrow Hitler until mid-1944; however, it was unsuccessful.⁶³ The *Holocaust* was the ultimate degeneration of German civilisation, but one cannot indict a whole people with a crime committed by a transient leadership.

Antisemitism is an ancient phenomenon, initially assimilated into Christian culture and then transformed in some secular societies, manifesting it even today particularly in Europe. It targeted Jews who were seldom equipped to protect themselves. The understanding of the issue not as a "Jewish problem" but as a "gentile problem" is indispensable for a balanced evaluation of Western civilization.

In sharp contrast to the undisguised and obvious antisemitism described above, the coexistence of the Jews and the Muslims within the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey has a history of more than five hundred years. One can assert that this coexistence was not hampered by treason or oppression. An international Quincentennial Foundation celebrated the 500th

⁵⁹ David Weinberg, "French Antisemitism: Recent Historiographical Trends", *Approaches to Antisemitism*, op. cit., pp. 309-317; Michael R. Marrus and Robert Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews*, New York, Basic Books, 1981.

⁶⁰ Robert Byrnes, *Antisemitism in Modern France*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1950.

⁶¹ Edgar Morin, *Rumour in Orléans*, New York, Pantheon, 1971.

⁶² Luce Giard, "La Honte", *Esprit*, I (1979), pp. 71-78.

⁶³ *Germans Against Hitler*, Bonn, Berto-Verlag, 1960.

anniversary (1492-1992) of the mass immigration of Jews to the Ottoman lands escaping from the European Inquisition. Activities all over the world, encompassing the entire year of 1992, reflected the beauty and grandeur, in the words of the President of the Foundation, "of this humanitarian approach".⁶⁴ Many German intellectuals, including prominent Jewish professors, fled Nazi oppression before and during the Second World War and found shelter in Turkey. Historical evidence demonstrates that the Turks, during the Ottoman and the Republican times, welcomed and embraced the persecuted Jews. The prompt Turkish response to the Jewish drama in both cases, separated from each other by centuries, is also a reminder to those who seemed undisturbed and stood aloof from these bestial acts.

Under the Ottoman *millet* system of autonomous self-government, the Greeks, the Armenians, the Jews and the other major non-Muslim minorities were each administered under their own religious leaders, who had more power over their followers that had been the case in the Christian states which had previously controlled the same lands.⁶⁵ The Ottoman society was divided into various communities along religious lines, each group or individual belonging to one or the other *millet* according to religious affiliation. Such division was also customary among the Romans, as well as the medieval empires of Europe and the Middle East. The Ottomans elaborated and institutionalised it. Each *millet*, including the non-Muslim Ottoman citizens, established and maintained its own laws and institutions to regulate conduct and conflict under its own leaders.

In addition to the Muslims, the Ottomans initially recognized three basic religious groups. Jews and Christians were "People of the Book", whose religions were related to but superseded by Islam. The Orthodox included some Slavs apart from the Greeks and about half of the Rumanians. It was the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II, who recognized (1461) the Armenian *millet* and its national church, which was monophysite in doctrine and condemned as heretical by the Orthodox Church. The Jews, under their own Grand Rabbi (*Hahambaşı*) enjoyed so much autonomy

⁶⁴ Jak V. Kamhi, "Foreword", *Exhibit of the Quincentennial Foundation*, [Istanbul, 1992], p. 2.

⁶⁵ Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 58-59, 151-153.

that tens of thousands of them had a narrow escape to the Ottoman lands from Spain and other parts of Europe such as Austria, Bohemia and Poland. Those from the Iberian Peninsula, called the Sephardim, kept their old dialect *Ladino* alive, and dominated the whole Jewish community that also included the Ashkenazim coming from central Europe. There is some opinion, though not conclusive evidence, that the Jews of Constantinople aided the Turks in 1453 by opening to them some gates of the city.

The years before 1492 witnessed a mounting persecution of the Jews, making expulsion more or less a logical climax.⁶⁶ The Safarid Jews, who were previously expelled from Andalusia, segregated into separate quarters and were forced to wear a yellow armband (*rouelle*), had to leave Spain after having lived there for over fourteen centuries. Even the converted Jews (*conversos*) had to go in order to preserve *limpieza de sangre* (purity of blood). The forcibly converted Muslims were also expelled.⁶⁷

The Safarid Jews found a "safe haven" in the vast Ottoman lands. Much earlier than that (1326), the Ottoman Sultan Orhan I authorized the construction (in Bursa, the newly-acquired capital) of the *Ez ha-Hayyim* (Tree of Life) synagogue that was functioning until the 1950s when an accidental fire destroyed it. Numerous Jewish communities found themselves within the tolerant Ottoman state as the latter expanded in the Balkans. Not only the Turkish rulers actively encouraged Jewish immigration, but also the Ottoman Jews invited their coreligionists to seek safety and prosperity among the Turks. A letter by Rabbi Isaac Sarfati (written probably in the mid-15th century) criticises "the tyrannical laws, the compulsory baptisms and the banishments" in the German states and proclaims that "Turkey is a land wherein nothing is lacking, and where, if you will, all shall yet be well with you". Adding that everyone there "may dwell at peace", he advises at the end to leave their "accursed land forever".⁶⁸ The Jews enjoyed considerable self-rule in the Ottoman Empire

⁶⁶ Eleazar Gutwirth, "Towards Expulsion: 1391-1492", ed., Elie Kedouri, *Spain and the Jews: the Sephardi Experience, 1492 and After*, London, Thames and Hudson, 1992, pp. 51-73.

⁶⁷ Mehmet Suphi, "The Expulsion of Safarad Jews: Regression in the Development of Modern Society", *Mind and Human Interaction*, Charlottesville, VA, IV/1 (December 1994), pp. 40-51.

⁶⁸ Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 135-136.

administering their economic, social and judicial affairs, as well as religious ones.⁶⁹ They had to pay a special (military exemption) tax, along with the other non-Muslim religious minorities, but the state guaranteed the safety of their lives and property. Even when this tax was abolished, a very high percentage of the non-Muslims chose to continue to pay the tax instead of doing military service. The Jews, who brought their financial and intellectual skills, at one time provided about forty physicians to the Sublime Porte. While well-to-do Jews offered their financial resources to the advantage of the state, some Turkish sultans intervened abroad to prevent their persecution or to protect Jewish rights to trade freely. When Sultan Abdülmecid's imperial edict (*ferman*) stated (1840) about the "blood libel" that he could "not permit the Jewish nation, whose innocence of the crime alleged against them is evident, to be worried and tormented as a consequence of accusations which have not the least foundation in truth",⁷⁰ the belief in the authenticity of the same charge was rampant as epidemic in many corners of Europe. The Ottoman Jews had no separatist ambitions and were never seen by Turks as agents of the European powers.

The Republic of Turkey was a major place of refuge for European Jews, as the Ottoman Empire had been centuries ago. The Republican régime once more opened the gates of the country to hundreds of intellectuals fleeing from Nazi persecution and to thousands more who were less well known.⁷¹ There were prominent jurists, economists, historians, sociologists, philologists, mathematicians, physiologists, pharmacists, botanists, zoologists, chemists, engineers, astronomers, composers, architects, sculptors and leading members of other professions who helped improve university teaching and academic research in Turkey.

Ernst Reuter, who later became the Mayor of West Berlin, taught urban planning in Ankara. Léopold Lévy educated many gifted Turkish painters in İstanbul. Carl Ebert founded the Theatrical Department at the State Conservatory and was the

⁶⁹ Walter F. Weiker, "Turkish-Jewish and Turkish-Christian Relations", eds., David A. Altabé, Erhan Atay and Israel J. Katz, *Studies on Turkish-Jewish History: Political and Social Relations, Literature and Linguistics*, New York, Sepher-Hermon Press for The American Society of Sephardic Studies, 1996, pp. 21-34.

⁷⁰ Naim Gülerüz, *The History of the Turkish Jews*, İstanbul, Batur Matbaası, n. d., p. 12.

⁷¹ Stanford J. Shaw, *Turkey and the Holocaust: Turkey's Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933-1945*, New York, New York University Press, 1993.

Director of the State Theater in Ankara. Rudolf Belling served as professor of sculpture at the İstanbul Fine Arts Academy. Andreas Schwartz taught Roman law, Ernst Hirsch international trade law and Fritz Neumark economics at İstanbul University. Albert Einstein could not respond to a Turkish offer because he had already accepted a position at Princeton University. Even when none other than Hitler wrote a personal letter to Turkey's President İsmet İnönü requesting him to send back the German professors who had taken refuge in Turkey and suggesting instead another group of German academics, İnönü replied in writing that he would cling to the good ones that he had. Almost all stayed until the very end of the Second World War, and many extended their stay beyond that date. Some were buried in Turkey or left a will requesting their remains to be sent there.

Several Turkish diplomats serving in Paris, Marseille, Belgrade, Constanza, Rhodes, Prague, Budapest, Athens, Varna, and elsewhere did their best and succeeded in saving the lives of thousands of Jews who would have otherwise ended up in the Nazi concentration and extermination camps. To have a Turkish passport or to have been a former citizen of the Turkish Republic meant for a Jew in Europe the difference between life and death. Having diplomatic relations with Germany and with most of the German-occupied countries, Turkish diplomats frequently and insistently used their status on behalf of the Turkish Jews living or working in those countries. Some had married locally, acquired a new citizenship or failed to register with the Turkish consulates abroad. The Turkish diplomats encouraged them to register, issued false papers when necessary and even saved the lives of non-Turkish Jews as well. A Turkish diplomat was imprisoned, and his wife was killed in connection with that kind of activity. Turkey permitted the Jewish Agency to open up a rescue office in İstanbul. The Turkish frontier officials generally allowed Jews coming from neighbouring Greece, where life was one of the worst in the whole of Europe, to enter Turkish territory.

Jewish experience with the world, and especially the events encountered during the Nazi period, are far different from the Turks' relations with the Armenians throughout the ages. Although the Christian Armenians were believers in the monophysite Gregorian sect and as such were condemned as heretical by some other Christians, it was the Ottoman Turks who legally recognized them, as early as 1461, as a separate community with self-

government under its own leadership. In consequence of the Ottoman *millet* system, this statutory right, renewed by the *fermans* of the succeeding Ottoman rulers, conceded to the Armenians their religious and ethnic freedoms at a time when Cromwell's soldiers were persecuting the Catholics, the French massacring the Huguenots and suppressing the other Protestants, established churches subduing the Calvinists, and above all, when the Inquisition was quashing and wiping out the Jews.

Even when one takes the date of 1071, as indicative of mass and permanent Turkish penetration into Anatolia, one should say with certainty that the Turks had not taken over those lands from the Armenian community, which had no independent state then. The well-known armed engagement took place between the Muslim Seljuk Turks and the Greek Orthodox Byzantine Empire. The Turks, whether Seljuks or Ottomans, did not bring any Armenian state entity to an end. The Byzantines terminated the official Armenian existence and moreover, resettled them. Frequently, the Armenians cooperated with the Muslim rulers to be able to withstand the repressions of their fellow Christians. The early Turks, on the other hand, had earned praise even from the Armenian historians, such as Mateos of Urfa, who spoke highly of Turkish sovereigns (Kılıçarslan and Melihşah) as well as their appointed governors as being "good, virtuous, merciful, protector of Armenian monuments and bent towards construction".⁷²

For hundreds of years, coexistence and peace dominated the association of the Turks with the Armenians. Quite dissimilar to the Jewish experience in other parts of the world, the Armenians, like the other minorities, enjoyed considerable self-rule, the Ottoman Government retaining final authority only in some spheres. The non-Muslims often appealed to Muslim courts when dissatisfied with the decisions of their own courts. One cannot do justice to the relations between these two peoples unless one approaches the subject in a larger and proper perspective. This point is all the more significant when one remembers the contrasting treatment of the Jews throughout the ages. These lines are not written, however, to idealize the past Seljuk or Ottoman states. It is only fair to remember, on the other hand, that many foreign historians and travelers pay high tribute especially to the

⁷² Ali Sevim, *Genel Çizgileriyle Selçuklu-Ermeni İlişkileri*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983, pp. 20-21, 27.

early centuries of Turkish administration. This chapter is not the suitable place to offer their views in support of this statement. Some adversities may also be found even in those better centuries that preceded the most troublesome epoch in the long history of the Ottoman Empire. For instance, there were times when the safety of the caravan trade could not be guaranteed, on account of gangs (*Celâlis*), who did not differentiate between the Muslims and the non-Muslims. It is important to note that the latter, within the norms of the era, were not subjected to persecution.

The Armenian Patriarch had authority over his followers, similar to those enjoyed by the Greek Patriarch and the Grand Rabbi, all of whom had permanent high places in the state bureaucracy. The Ottoman Government protected the Armenians, not only from the encroachments of others, but also occasionally intervened in order to bring about harmony within the Armenian community itself. Such mediation occurred in 1841 when a new Armenian national committee was established to balance the interests of the old conservative Armenians and those of the emerging common folk. Especially in the late 19th century, there grew internal turmoil within each of the minorities under the continued dominance of their own religious authorities who were conservative in their attitudes in non-religious matters as well. It was also the Ottoman Government that acted as a factor of equilibrium in the bitter controversy between the Armenian Gregorian Church and the newly converted Armenian Catholic and Protestant groups. The Turks had to issue two more edicts establishing separate Catholic and Protestant *millets* within the Ottoman state, defining the rights and the privileges of each.

Whether Gregorian, Catholic or Protestant, the Armenians, like the members of the other minorities, entered all walks of life (as tradesmen, bankers, writers, journalists, architects, doctors, lawyers, actors, musicians, and the like). Economically, the Armenians were better off than the rest, including the Muslims. Gabriel Noradounghian, an Armenian, had been in charge of three different ministries, one being the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – a post he held until 1913, a year before the First World War. The fact that an Armenian citizen was entrusted with the reins of Ottoman foreign policy during the turbulent years of the Balkan Wars should not be permitted to pass as an ordinary event. Would a

Jewish German citizen have been allowed to fill the post of Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, Freiherr von Neurath or Joachim von Ribbentrop? Hagop Kazazian, another Armenian, was, at the time, the Ottoman Minister of Finance while Garabet Artin Davut headed the Ministry of the Postal Services. Three other Armenians held, in turn, the post of the last mentioned ministry and three more the Ministry of Public Works. There were four Armenian Senators and nine Armenian Representatives in the short-lived 1878 Ottoman Parliament. There were eleven Armenian Deputies in the 1908 Ottoman Parliament and still eleven more in the 1914 Ottoman Parliament.

Apart from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, four of the Permanent Under-secretaries were Armenians, and a total of 48 Armenians worked in the Foreign Ministry. Garabet Artin Davut had been Ottoman Ambassador to Berlin and Vienna, Dikran Aleksanian to Brussels, Yetvart Zohrab to London, and O. Kuyumjian to Rome. The counsellors of the Ottoman embassies in Berlin and Brussels were also Armenians. Fifteen of them served as Ottoman consuls and 12 more as diplomatic secretaries with varying ranks. Four were members of the Council of State, 51 were Lieutenant Governors or high officials in the Interior Ministry.⁷³ The Ottoman archives have complete lists of the many Armenian citizens employed in foreign relations, finance, justice, education, public works, postal services, forestry, agriculture and the like. In the Ottoman society, there was no racial, ideological, official or any kind of expressed or implied discrimination against the Armenians. Apart from the belief in the Islamic doctrine that the monotheistic religion propagated by Muhammad being the last and thereby the most perfect universal faith of its kind, Ottoman behaviour toward the minorities, including the Armenians, "can be characterized as impressively tolerant".⁷⁴

It was in the second half of the 19th century that the Ottoman Empire met several reverses. It was no other than the government itself that saw the need to introduce reforms. It was also toward the end of the same century that the "Armenian question" became an international issue. Although that aspect of the problem is beyond the scope of this chapter, one should only remind the reader that such an internationalisation cannot be isolated from

⁷³ An Armenian source on this point: Masrob K. Krikorian, *Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire: 1860-1908*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.

⁷⁴ Weiker, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

the attributes of the "Era of Imperialism", which affected almost every event of the age. Not only by judging from what happened elsewhere in all continents, but also a glance at the great power interest in the retreating Ottoman state gives any researcher the serious thought that the Armenian issue had also become a plaything in the hands of foreign governments of the day.

Again, this chapter is not the appropriate place for an analysis of imperialism, or international competition based on industrialization and the search for raw materials and markets. But it is worth offering a comparison between the goals of the principal economic powers of the worldwide marketplace and the aspirations of the less developed areas, on which the former were becoming increasingly dependent. Although the subjugation of vast tracts of land and indigenous populations was by no means a new phenomenon, as rivalries increased, European powers moved with greater determination and frequency to control territories, economies, governments, and peoples. The last-mentioned included the minorities as well. The French supported imperialism as a means, first of undoing the results of the humiliating defeat before the Germans in 1871, and then stopping the loss of existing and potential markets. The British were alarmed at the accelerating pace of German industrialisation. The Germans were after a place in the club of great powers. Hitler carried this craving to the point of world domination.

The developing political consciousness of the Ottoman Turks, on the other hand, was diametrically opposed to the ambitions of the established great powers. The Ottoman Empire had lost its grandeur and was searching for ways and means to reform itself, principally on the basis of the liberal political thinking of Western experience. The government gradually appreciated the value of important technological changes elsewhere, such as the mass production of steel, the use of electric power in industry and commerce, the introduction of the steam turbine, and much later conversion from coal to oil. But the Ottoman liberals, whose loose association was frequently referred to as the Young Turks, argued in favour of accompanying fundamental political and social reforms.⁷⁵ Contemporaneous education was part of this drive, in

⁷⁵ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Vol. II, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 255-259, 263-267, 270-287, 298-304, 332-334.

which the government took a willing lead. Some of their graduates formed groups, one being the Committee of Union and Progress, which advocated constitutionalism and freedom. The compulsion of the Ottoman elite was in the direction of individual liberties.

It was this same committee, which ruled the Ottoman society during the First World War, including the stormy year of 1915, which forced (1908) Sultan Abdülhamid II to restore the Parliament (closed down in 1876) and subsequently to abdicate. The dedicated liberals, including Ahmet Rıza (1859-1930), Mehmet Murat (1853-1912), Damat Mahmut Paşa (1853-1903) and his sons Princes Sabahaddin and Lütfullah, in contrast to Gobineau, Barrès and Sorrel in France or Chamberlain, Rosenberg and Möller in Germany, demanded a constitutional regime for the benefit of the people. The Second Young Turk Congress, which met (1907) in Paris, was chaired jointly by two veteran Muslim liberals (Ahmet Rıza and Prince Sabahaddin) and also by K. Maloumian, of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (*Dashnags*). One of the leading cities in Macedonia, Salonica, where there was a substantial Jewish population, happened to be a leading center for constitutional activity. In contrast to the *Reichstag* fire in Germany, the Young Turk Revolution forced the sultan to reopen the Parliament and give up most of his powers. This bloodless change signified the defeat of autocracy in favour of constitutional government. The Abdülhamid era was over although he remained on the throne one more year. Muslims and non-Muslims embraced each other in the streets. Political prisoners were pardoned. New political parties and newspapers were established, and new elections, though still indirect, were held. The Turks gained a majority in the Parliament, and the Armenians sent 11 representatives.

This decisive step, however, was not a panacea for all the ills of the past autocracy. While the conservatives campaigned against the Constitution and even led an abortive uprising (1909), the Union and Progress government, in four years, lost even more territory than the deposed sultan had to give up during his long reign. When the new regime failed to create miracles, the Armenian and the Greek terrorists were again active in their own localities.

If Turkish nationalism came to prominence during these years more than it ever was in the past, it can in no way be compared to German nationalism of the 1930s. It is important to remember

that ideas related to "Turkism" did not originate in the home country, i. e., in the Ottoman Empire or in the Republic of Turkey, but in the diasporas. In this way, it differs from Pan-Germanism, Pan-Hellenism, Pan-Slavism and similar irredentism of other neighbours. It originated abroad, mainly in response to the "pan-ideologies" of other nations. For instance, the official Tsarist policy of Russification, often accompanied with Christianisation, provoked some Turkic groups, such as the Crimean Tatars, to be increasingly aware of common ties with each other. The inception of Turkism by them unfolded on the cultural plane with emphasis on unity or similarity in language, literature, folklore and history. Its propagators felt themselves justified because they had more than their share of competitors or opponents in the form of Pan-Slavism of Tsarist Russia and the *Megali Idea* of the Greeks. Unlike German Nazism, the ideas of Turkism were defensive and not irredentist.

The Nazi leaders put into action after 1933 and during the war years what they had openly advocated even before coming to power. The future could be read undisguised in the party program, theoretical works, step-by-step decisions and in almost all public pronouncements. Only the victimizers had the political power and the guns needed for the genocide of the peaceful and loyal Jewish minority. The Armenians lived and acted in a much different Ottoman milieu. When they took up arms towards the end of the 19th century and shed much blood since then, especially at the beginning of the crucial year 1915, the Ottoman Government, left between Scylla and Charybdis, had to take a relocation decision which carried most of the Armenians to the south, some losing their lives in the process. Relocation turned into murders in certain segments of the migration. It was only the Ottoman courts, however, that tried and convicted the guilty. There are no decisions or documents ordering annihilation. The instructions cover the compulsory but bloodless transfer of people to safer areas. The directives are detailed enough, at least on paper, to secure an eventless journey. The relocation did not encompass all Armenians either. Otherwise, there would not have been any Armenians left in Turkey today. Catholic and Protestant Armenians, those serving in the army, professionals such as doctors, personnel of the Ottoman Bank and the health departments, the officials of the state tobacco company, some bureaucrats, groups of traders and workers, the employees in foreign diplomatic missions, and those known to be

loyal citizens, with no links to violence, no matter where they might be residents, together with the members of their families, were all excluded from the process of resettlement.

Some Armenian groups, prepared to start a southward journey, were stopped because the government abandoned the resettlement policy before they hit the road. The government initially authorized but later cut short, in reaction to rumours of abuse and corruption, the auction sales of the immovable property of the relocated people. The amounts received from sales were sent to the actual owners by way of a state commission created for this purpose. The fact that a great majority of the Armenians reached their destinations can be authenticated, not only in numerous Ottoman documents, but also in reliable Armenian and Western accounts. Some officials, whose negligence, lack of solid will to ward off attacks, or outright crimes of their own were observed, suffered discharge and punishment including court martial in serious cases.

It is no exaggeration to say that many Armenian and Muslim lives were lost on account of the general war conditions, sickness and rampant epidemics of all sorts. Even the British, German and Turkish commanders fell victim to these diseases.⁷⁶ The consequences of a similar deportation organised by the French go to prove the truth of this point. A scholarly French-language journal informs us that when the French gathered the Armenians of the south-eastern Turkish cities like Adana to carry them away to the port of Marseille in their own battleships, a few thousand of them, made to walk to the shore, lost their lives on the way due to fatigue and failing health.⁷⁷ Those Armenians were certainly not victims of genocide or massacre perpetrated by the French. The same applies to some other instances.

It is also true, however, that some Armenian groups in the process of relocation were attacked mainly by Muslim marauders of various ethnic backgrounds. The Turkish courts were the only tribunals set up to try the culprits and pass judgements, including prison sentences and capital punishments duly carried out. One

⁷⁶ Türkkiye Ataöv, *Deaths Caused by Disease, in Relation to the Armenian Question*, Ankara, Sevinç Matbaası, 1985.

⁷⁷ Georges Boudière, "Notes sur la campagne de Syrie-Cilicie: l'affaire de Maraş (janvier-février 1920)", *Turcica*, Paris/Strasbourg, IX/2-X (1978), p. 160. Also in Kâmuran Gürün, *Ermeni Dosyası*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983, p. 225.

must also remember that almost all high-ranking Ottoman statesmen, inclusive of the Grand Vizier, the Speaker of the Parliament, Chief of the General Staff, the *Sheikh-ul Islam* (chief religious authority), cabinet members, MPs, governors, army commanders, university professors, editors, journalists, and some minor officials were all deported to the British crown-colony of Malta where they awaited legal evidence against them, but finally freed.⁷⁸ Some of them were gunned down by Armenian assassins while on their way back to Turkey.

Relocation was temporarily stopped on account of severe winter and totally discontinued in early 1916. Less than 450,000 Armenians were moved southwards from their original places of residence, and a great majority of them seem to have reached their destinations, so designated even by some officially responsible Armenians of the time. Some of the remainders died from diseases, and some were unfortunately murdered.

One other point that needs proper attention is the fact that, within a short period of eight years (1914-22), various Armenian groups, in contrast to the much later behaviour of the Jews in Nazi Germany or in Europe, participated, under their own (or foreign) commanders, in about a dozen wars, during which they killed their adversaries and even each other for political or ideological reasons. The Armenians themselves published several books and a series of articles with photographs documenting their active engagement in a number of battlefronts.⁷⁹

Those who returned were given back their properties along with some allowance to start a new life. Their debts were either cancelled or postponed. The money sent from the United States or donated by church missionaries and consulates were distributed to the Armenians with Ottoman Government approval and supervision. Orphans were entrusted to relief committees composed of Armenians themselves.

The experiences of German Jews and Ottoman Armenians and the circumstances of their place in history seem to be so different

⁷⁸ Bilâl N. Şimşir, *The Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question*, Ankara, Foreign Policy Institute, 1984; _____, *Malta Sürgünleri*, 2. B., Ankara, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985.

⁷⁹ For instance: A. P. Hacopian, *Armenia and the War*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1917.

that they cannot be grouped together under such a general heading as "genocide". The Jewish ordeal is unprecedented.

CONCLUSIONS

All sections of this book relate to one or the other aspect of relations between the Turks and the Armenians especially in the late Ottoman period. The contributors are among those well known for their learning and previous published researches on this issue. Many more studies are needed to explore the interactions of these two communities in the various phases of their long histories. To allow interpretations diverging from deficient traditional views is not necessarily "revisionism" but a requirement of academic accuracy. In fact, revising one-sided history can only help bring the Turkish and the Armenian communities closer and open new prospects for mutual understanding. Further research is required for a fuller comprehension of all events stripped from day-to-day politics and propaganda.

This volume includes sections not specifically devoted to a discussion of "genocide". Many of the present contributors, who focus on the events of 1915, share, however, the view that the circumstances then cannot be set forth, even with a flight of fancy, as genocide. This term is applicable to very few occurrences throughout history, such as the Nazi policy towards the Jews of Europe, with which none of the Ottoman minorities can be compared in any way. Especially for the Jews, the Ottomans offered a haven against Christian persecution over the centuries. Further, no part of the long and peaceful relations between Turks and Armenians may be described as a deliberate and systematic policy of one group to eliminate another one. A wealth of historical and legal evidence referred to in some chapters of this book substantiates the revolt of large sections of Armenians during World War I, and the Muslim blood shed by them, armed and financed, during the troublesome decades of a declining empire, principally by Tsarist Russia and other foreign powers.

While one of the chapters stresses the centuries-old but not widely remembered, friendship and interaction of the two peoples, no less than five others remind the readers of the still little-known fact, albeit confirmed by foreign as well as first-hand Turkish material, of Armenian massacres of Turks, Kurds, and other Muslims before and after 1915. One article is totally devoted to the Armenian armed uprising in Van province on the eastern borders of Turkey, precisely to a series of bloody acts perpetrated by

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Armenians. It was this Russian-provoked conduct that preceded the Ottoman decision to resettle the insurgents, together with their supporters, and even actual and potential sympathizers, in the southern portions of the country.

The official archives of many states, not only those of the Ottomans, and the confessions of Armenian writers who have boasted in many published works, be they memoirs of leading commanders, their own chronicles of war, and Armenian analyses of events, prove far beyond doubt that Armenians formed battalions with heavy guns and used them against Muslim civilians and the soldiers of their own state in time of war. No objective historian can fail to admit, in the face of irrefutable documentation, that undisguised cooperation with the adversary on the battle-field and the sanguinary insurgency that accompanied it actually caused the relocation, and not *vice versa*.

One of the chapters presents a quantitative analysis, which reduces both the often much-exaggerated Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the loss of lives down to more realistic proportions. Many contributors argue that the role of the general conditions of war in the Armenian and Turkish deaths ought not be minimized. Several contributors remind the reader that the only tribunals which tried and convicted the criminals who attacked, robbed and killed some of the Armenians moved for resettlement to areas remote from the war zones were no other than Ottoman courts set up after the war. It is also clear that the number of Armenians who died, though very regrettable, was much less than claimed by some writers unfamiliar with events and reliable statistics. Some chapters demonstrate how many Armenians, supported by foreign governments, not only near the Caucasus, but also in the south close to Syria, inflicted brutal behaviour against the Turks. Their savagery and slaughter, at times, infuriated some Russian and French officers, who initially seemed to uphold Armenian claims but who later felt that their military honour had been undermined.

This book, which offers a second set of views based on reliable evidence, demonstrates that the special circumstances of events before and after 1915 are far from warranting a description of genocide, and especially bear no resemblance to the Nazi treatment of the peaceful and loyal Jewish minority in Germany and elsewhere in occupied Europe.

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CONTRIBUTORS AND ADVISORS^(*)

Gündüz Aktan, a former Turkish ambassador in Athens, the United Nations (Geneva) and Tokyo, and presently a foreign affairs columnist with a daily paper, is also a researcher now focussing predominantly on the relationship between history, culture, and politics.

Türkkaya Ataöv, Professor of International Relations, is the author of many works, including 77 booklets (in foreign languages) specifically on Armenian-Turkish relations, in addition to articles in foreign press on the same topic. Translated into about twenty languages, he is the recipient of several academic or governmental awards, and serves on the central executive committees of five international organisations (or groups) affiliated with the United Nations.

Hüseyin Çelik, a former Associate Professor of Turkish Literature at the Yüzüncü Yıl (Centennial) University in Van, is a deputy from the same eastern Anatolian province, and is also the author of works on relations with the Armenians, foremost among them being his doctoral dissertation, and later a published monograph on the massacre inflicted on Turks before the Ottoman decision in 1915 to resettle Armenians in the southern parts of the land.

Nejat Göyünç, Professor of History at Selçuk University also served at the Universities of İstanbul, Hacettepe, Boğaziçi, İnönü and Uludağ. He published three books, one being on the Armenian public functionaries of the Ottoman Empire. He also served as the editor of a periodical on Ottoman research (*The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, İstanbul, since 1980).

Yusuf Halaçoğlu, Professor of History at Marmara University, and presently the Director of the Turkish Historical Society, published various works utilizing first-hand archive material on the demographic realities of Anatolia. In his latter capacity, he is the publisher of the quarterly *Belleten*, a Turkish academic

(*) In alphabetical order.

journal of long standing. His latest (2001) book (**Ermeni Tehciri ve Gerçekler: 1914-1918**) is a detailed scholarly work especially on the relocation of the Armenians in 1915.

Ömer İzgi, a deputy from the Konya province, is the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. Formerly, he was one of the Vice-Chairmen of his political party. Trained as a lawyer, he served as the legal expert at the Prime Minister's Office and was a practicing barrister. After earning a graduate degree in law, he co-authored the printed version of a collection of selected legal texts.

Enver Konukçu, Professor of History at Atatürk University, is the leading scholar who, on the bases of documentary evidence as well as eyewitness accounts and in the presence of witnesses, unearthed in Erzurum, Iğdır, Kars and Van the mass-graves, in which murdered Muslims, predominantly Turks, were buried before and after the year 1915. He is also the author of a book on Erzincan 'in the grip of the great powers and the Armenians'.

Justin McCarthy, Distinguished Professor of Arts and Sciences at the University of Louisville, is a historian and demographer who has written extensively on the people of the Balkans and the Middle East. Fluent in Turkish as well, his recent works include **Muslims and Minorities, Death and Exile**, and **The Ottoman Peoples and the End of Empire**.

İlber Ortaylı, Professor of Political Science at the Universities of Ankara and Galatasaray, and known for his analyses of historical issues, is generally acknowledged as a specialist on Ottoman and Turkish history, for which he received several awards. His specific interest is the last two centuries. His published books include scholarly works on Turkey's administrative history, Ottoman local government, German influence during the Abdülhamid era, and the last millennium of the Ottoman Empire.

Süleyman Seyfi Ögün, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Uludağ in Bursa, emphasises the relationship of comparative social theory and history. Analyzing the impact of political scientists on the history of Turkish thinking, he generally concentrates on questions of political culture. Recently, he studied the perception of nationalism in Turkish thinking as distinct from those of the Western societies.

Yılmaz Öztuna, a former parliamentarian, is acknowledged for his numerous compendiums on Turkish and Ottoman history. He

also served as editor of several general reference works, including an encyclopaedia on Turkey and was decorated for such scholarly endeavours. Among his many published works, **Osmanlı Tarihi** (Ottoman History, vols. 1-14) and **Devletler ve Hanedanlar** (States and Dynasties, vols. 1-5) should be especially emphasised.

Stanford J. Shaw, now Professor Emeritus of Turkish history at the University of California, Los Angeles, also previously taught at Harvard University and was the editor of **International Journal of Middle East Studies**. As a pioneer among Western scholars in the use of the Ottoman archives, he published several academic works, including **The History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey** (vol. 2 with E. K. Shaw). His latest (2001): **From Empire to Republic: the Turkish War of Liberation, 1918-1923**, vols. 1-5.

Ömer Turan, now an Associate Professor of History at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, had pursued graduate studies in Belgium. The traces of his recent research on the Armenians at the Lausanne Conference, done in the governmental archives in London, may be seen in his contribution to this volume.

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ABOUT the BOOK

The preparation of this book has been undertaken with the aim of providing a fresh look at Ottoman-Armenian relations in the period of the First World War and its immediate aftermath. It was necessitated by virtue of the fact that to date Western public opinion has been heavily saturated with what can be most generously described as a one-sided Armenian perpetrated view of what the present study shows to have been a complex relationship which can only be fully comprehended in the light of the surviving records compiled by the war-time Ottoman Government. As such, it is intended to introduce the reader to a more balanced and realistic view of Turco-Armenian relations, both in the period of 1915-1923, and in the centuries that preceded it.

It is necessitated by virtue of the fact that today, close to a century after the events in question, Armenian organisations in a variety of nations are actively pressuring the legislatures of their adopted homelands to enact legislation proclaiming the Armenians to have been the victims of a war-time 'genocide' in the Ottoman Empire. This is a view, which the present study shows is unsustainable in the light of objective scholarship.

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey undertook the sponsorship of the publication of this work in an effort to introduce parliamentary colleagues around the world, and others interested in the issue, to a more balanced view of the relations between Turks and Armenians throughout history.

There has been no attempt whatsoever to influence the individual Turkish and foreign scholars who have contributed essays to the book. The views expressed are theirs and theirs alone. Nor do their views always concur with each other as to the details of the events they describe. This establishes the degree of independence, which marks each contribution and illustrates the extent to which a consensus has yet to be reached by the scholarly community at large.